• Adam Dean–Toll Roads and Gated Communities: How Private Commerce Took Over the Public Internet

    Adam Dean–Toll Roads and Gated Communities: How Private Commerce Took Over the Public Internet

    This text is published as part of a special b2o issue titled “Critique as Care”, edited by Norberto Gomez, Frankie Mastrangelo, Jonathan Nichols, and Paul Robertson, and published in honor of our b2o and b2 colleague and friend, the late David Golumbia.

    Toll Roads and Gated Communities:
    How Private Commerce Took Over the Public Internet

    Adam Dean

    “The kind of environment that we developed Google in, the reason that we were able to develop a search engine, is the web was so open. Once you get too many rules, that will stifle innovation” (Katz 2012).

    When the Internet went private with the High Performance Computing Act of 1991, it was the metaphorical Wild West—the land-grab decade, where unknown companies popped up to claim untapped real estate in the form of domain names, and prospecting users invented pathways to share unlimited unlegislated copyrighted material. It was in this period that long-established telecommunications companies grew their existing infrastructure to deliver faster Internet to our homes, and a new generation of hosting companies were born. Those companies that got in early parceled out the Internet into what it is today—high-speed toll roads leading to gated communities. Decades later, when the problems with this model became noticeable to the everyday user, the FCC began to assert itself as regulator by establishing Net Neutrality, which limited the Internet Service Provider’s (ISP) legal right to control the direction and speed of Internet traffic for the everyday user. President Barack Obama called it, “…a victory for the millions of Americans who made their voices heard in support of a free and fair Internet” (2016).

    That victory was short-lived. When those regulations were rolled back by the FCC in 2017, it was done under the banner of freedom as well. The title of the press release that introduced the rollbacks read: “CHAIRMAN PAI CIRCULATES DRAFT ORDER TO RESTORE INTERNET FREEDOM AND ELIMINATE HEAVY-HANDED INTERNET REGULATIONS” (Pelkey 2017). Then, in 2022, the FCC announced plans to support legislation to make Net Neutrality regulations law. Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel said, “…everyone should be able to go where they want and do what they want online without their broadband provider making choices for them. I support Net Neutrality because it fosters this openness and accountability” (Perez 2022). That legislation, introduced that year in the House (H.R. 8573) and Senate (S.4676), which “expressly classifies broadband internet as a telecommunications service rather than an information service for purposes of regulation by the Federal Communications Commission,” never advanced in either chamber (Markey and Matsui 2021). As a result of this stall, the FCC under Rosenworcel’s Chairship voted to regulate the ISPs in three specific ways: 1) By prohibiting ISPs from blocking, throttling, or engaging in paid prioritization of lawful content, 2) By empowering the FCC with the discretion and ability to revoke the authorizations of foreign-owned broadband operators, and 3) By empowering the FCC to monitor and intervene in service outages (FCC 2024). Of course, the battle for a free internet didn’t end there. In January, 2025, the FCC’s jurisdiction of oversight was struck down in federal court (Bowman 2025).

    Through all of this, the battle over Net Neutrality has been defended and opposed under the banner of freedom—on one side the freedom banner protects the everyday consumer/end user so that they can visit any law-abiding website without restrictions or throttling, and on the other the freedom banner protects the ISP’s interests to compete in an open marketplace, where, as traffic controller, the ISP can direct end users and restrict or promote sites and content in their business interest. But the Net Neutrality battle isn’t actually limited to these two sides—the FCC v. the ISPs—and at risk of defending those should-be telecommunications companies that deliver the Internet to our homes, this simplified two-sided battle distracts from another group of traffic controllers who have been given a pass. In caring for our public Internet, the deeper critique in this essay is of the true winners of the Internet land grab. Content curators like Google (Alphabet) and Facebook (Meta) are not, by the strict definition, ISPs, nor are they telecommunications companies, and so they would not have answered to the FCC even if the 2024 order had been upheld by the federal court. Instead, these commerce companies abide by the regulations set by the FTC despite their role as the replacement for traditional radio and television broadcast stations, charged with the responsibility to curate the daily news and entertainment options for 5.5 billion users each day while restricting access to those that do not pay with their personal data (Statista 2022).

    In caring for the public Internet, this essay critiques precisely how the Internet was built with tax dollars and then given away to private content curators from whom the public now must rent. References made to the Internet throughout this essay are not meant to indicate published content in/on/across the Internet, but there should be some understanding that freedom of access to the Internet and freedom to access the information therein are coupled. While it is intuitive to assume access applies to both the same, there are different public and private partnerships with stakes in one or the other, and sometimes both, so their access challenges often differ. For example, Google does not have the ability to restrict access to a URL on the World Wide Web. A user can navigate directly to a website; however, most users search, even using the address bar to do so, and are subject to omissions made by the search engine in the result. On the other hand, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is the international governing body of the domain names and has the technical power to revoke a website name from public access through its Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy. However, its regulatory power is restricted to enforcing the basic rules of the registry, such as cybersquatting and trademark violations (ICANN 2016). As an international governing body, ICANN is one example of the existing structure already in place to enforce Internet regulation, but apart from the FCC’s push for Net Neutrality, there is no U.S. regulation for how companies, such as Alphabet or the ISP, direct, divert, dissuade and restrict users as they navigate.

    The Public’s Internet

    “The ARPANET was not started to create a Command and Control System that would survive a nuclear attack, as many now claim. … Rather, the ARPANET came out of our frustration that there were only a limited number of large, powerful research computers in the country, and that many research investigators, who should have access to them, were geographically separated from them” (Hertzfield 2019).

    Much has been published on the Internet’s roots, through amusing intra-government memos on over-the-network etiquette, its truncated first transmission message “LO”[i], and its ties to the U.S. Military’s first air defense system S.A.G.E. Despite its establishment by the U.S. Department of Defense, the original Internet known as ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network) was a means to tie together the nation’s most powerful computers at various research institutions. In short, in its origin, the Internet had no commercial appeal:

    It is considered illegal to use the ARPANet for anything which is not in direct support of Government business … Sending electronic mail over the ARPANet for commercial profit or political purposes is both anti-social and illegal. By sending such messages, you can offend many people, and it is possible to get MIT in serious trouble with the Government agencies which manage the ARPANet (Stacy 1982).

    While ARPA held oversight over its own network, it did not deter private companies from copying the technology, and copy they did:

    A number of U.S. companies have also procured or are procuring private corporate networks utilizing many of the techniques developed for ARPANET. For instance, it was recently announced that Citibank of New York City has constructed (by contract to BBN) a private network very similar to the ARPANET. …A number of companies have taken advantage of the fact that the ARPANET technology is in the public domain to obtain the listings of the ARPANET software. (Bolt, Beranek and Newman Inc. 1981).

    By 1980 taxpayers had invested billions of dollars in the Internet’s infrastructure, through research grants to public universities and the RAND Corporation from ARPA, the National Science Foundation and other government entities, but the handoff to private corporations was not formalized for another decade. In 1991 the High Performance Computing Act appropriated more than $1.5 billion from the National Science Foundation to “serve as the primary source of information on access to and use of the Network” (Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and Gore 1991). With the research directive still prevalent, computer science programs at UCLA, MIT, Stanford, Wisconsin and others received substantial funding toward the collective goal to provide high speed internet to the public. ISPs emerged and remained attached to the regulatory structure that came with the funding. But there were pockets of research that fell beyond the scope of ARPA—namely the organization and curation of the content published on the Internet and the potential profits in collecting and selling user data that were still untapped. While private ISPs worked closely with government partners to make the internet accessible to the everyday user, another group developed websites to host the traffic that was coming.

    Google: Popularity is not Accuracy

    Google began its success nearly two decades ago with this now infamous public promise to itself: “Don’t be Evil”—a mantra that helped the company become the most trusted search engine in the world. But what on earth did it mean? The phrase floated around Google in its early days, where buzzwords like accuracy, transparency and democracy were thrown around in every meeting. The phrase gained enough traction to be included in the young company’s code of conduct until 2015 when it restructured under Alphabet, Inc. Eric Schmidt attributes the phrase as “invented by Larry and Sergey” and talks about it often, including in his book, How Google Works, co-authored with Jonathan Rosenberg. Schmidt makes a strong case that it was perhaps a legitimate foundation for a code of conduct still in place at Google, or maybe not. As a guest on NPR’s quiz show “Wait Wait Don’t Tell Me!” in 2013, Schmidt remembers a conversation with an engineer, as an example of this sincerity:

    Well, it was invented by Larry and Sergey. And the idea was that we don’t quite know what evil is, but if we have a rule that says don’t be evil, then employees can say, I think that’s evil. Now, when I showed up, I thought this was the stupidest rule ever, because there’s no book about evil except maybe, you know, the Bible or something. So what happens is, I’m sitting in this meeting, and we’re having this debate about an advertising product. And one of the engineers pounds his fists on the table and says, that’s evil. And then the whole conversation stops, everyone goes into conniptions, and eventually we stopped the project. So it did work (NPR.org 2013).

    So it did work, says Schmidt. And perhaps it did in some way create a subtle check at the brainstorming sessions, or perhaps it could have even been internalized by programmers and designers, who may have resisted subtle changes pressed by their sales wing. Perhaps. We can only know anecdotally what Google chose not to do, yet we can take a careful look at what it has done. In an interview for Logic magazine, Fred Turner, a prolific critic of cyberlibertarianism and tech utopianism, said:

    About ten years back, I spent a lot of time inside Google. What I saw there was an interesting loop. It started with, “Don’t be evil.” So then the question became, “Okay, what’s good?” Well, information is good. Information empowers people. So providing information is good. Okay, great. Who provides information? Oh, right: Google provides information. So you end up in this loop where what’s good for people is what’s good for Google, and vice versa (Turner and Weigel 2017).

    At the heart of the mantra is not whether Google is good or evil in abstraction, but that they curate what is good and evil for their users. Looking back at the company’s foundation, Brin and Page wrote in their famous paper, “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine”, that PageRank would improve search quality, which is described really as keyword accuracy:

    “Junk results” often wash out any results that a user is interested in. In fact, as of November 1997, only one of the top four commercial search engines finds itself (returns its own search page in response to its name in the top ten results). … Indeed, we want our notion of “relevant” to only include the very best documents since there may be tens of thousands of slightly relevant documents. This very high precision is important even at the expense of recall (the total number of relevant documents the system is able to return) (Brin and Page 2012).

    The notion of “quality” is the first hint in the original writings that PageRank could quickly get caught between two competing goals: most accurate and most popular. The word “accurate” appears only twice in the document (and accuracy does not appear). First in reference to anchor text as providing more accurate descriptions than the pages themselves, and second to criticize a web user’s lack of specificity in keyword searches (“some argue that on the web, users should specify more accurately what they want and add more words to their query”) (Brin and Page 2012). Neither of these address the question, is quality accuracy, and is accuracy quality? But Brin and Page did not seek to answer this question in the original document, perhaps relying on a public trust—whatever their answer, it won’t be evil.

    At the heart of Brin and Page’s famous paper is the argument that PageRank will bring order to the Web, and certainly it has done that if the public consensus is the indicator. Google’s search engine is the most popular in the world, with 80% of the desktop market share (Statistica Research Department 2022). Credit is due to the Internet pioneers like Tim Berners-Lee and John Postel, who organized the underlying system upon which Brin and Page could organize, and credit is due to Brin and Page for discovering that hyperlinks are the lexicon of the web and can be used not just as a map of the entire globe, but to create a hierarchy for all pages. What PageRank did that had not been accomplished previously, was determining the value of pages on the web by how they relate to one another. In essence, this is the voting system that determines which webpages are “the best”. As Brin and Page explain it in their paper,

    These maps allow rapid calculation of a web page’s “PageRank”, an objective measure of its citation importance that corresponds well with people’s subjective idea of importance. Because of this correspondence, PageRank is an excellent way to prioritize the results of web keyword searches. For most popular subjects, a simple text matching search that is restricted to web page titles performs admirably when PageRank prioritizes the results (demo available at google.stanford.edu). For the type of full text searches in the main Google system, PageRank also helps a great deal (Brin and Page 2012).

    They go on to explain the algorithm, which weighs and thus ranks pages according to not only the amount of links to the page but again the quality. This is the root of the democracy, as each page is a voter and is also in the pool to be voted for, and this is objective somehow. An earlier paper Brin and Page wrote with their advisor at Stanford, Terry Winograd, places this idea of PageRank’s inherent objectivity in the abstract, placing all subjective interpretation on users alone. It reads:

    The importance of a Web page is an inherently subjective matter, which depends on the reader’s interests, knowledge and attitudes. But there is still much that can be said objectively about the relative importance of Web pages. This paper describes PageRank, a method for rating Web pages objectively and mechanically, effectively measuring the human interest and attention devoted to them (Brin et al. 1998).

    Their very idea of a popularity ranking metric, which is measured in a way that “corresponds well with people’s subjective idea of importance” really means that each page has been cited by another page in the form of a hyperlink. And if we take a step back and consider that a person created the hyperlink, we are now in the loop that Fred Turner described. Who made the link? Someone that knows how to make links. Who decided how important that link was? Google. But the question this essay seeks to answer is not whether Google’s own judgment of evil is a proper measure, or even whether there is a notion of good and bad on which we’d settle. Making an argument for Google as good or evil would have to include their lesser-known contributions, like DeepMind, or the mobile Wi-Fi surveillance probe built into the Google Maps car, or lawsuits that charge the company with giving “unfair preference” to their own services and subsidiaries over those of their rivals. And we would have to talk about censorship and surveillance, both at the company’s own discretion and in cooperation with its regulators and partnership. All that, including the ethics of simultaneously controlling the information hierarchy and the ad revenue—AdWords and AdSense, which work hand-in-hand with PageRank—would be a long discussion of what is good, and what is evil, indeed. There is already a great deal of opinion on “Don’t be Evil” in popular media as well, so it’s safe to say that testing the morality of the mantra has been covered. What has hardly been touched, though, is the public trust in which Google is deeply embedded. Despite the widespread exposure of “Don’t be Evil”, there is some agreement, as indicated in number of users, that Google is trustworthy. It may be trust in accuracy, speed, convenience, or something else, but trust is the right word. The democracy that it is founded on, according to the original workings of PageRank, might even be a symbol of U.S. citizen trust in democracy itself. Many users may not know or consider the implications of the PageRank’s dependence, but there is significant implicit trust in its democracy, if the market share is the indicator.

    But it’s important to note here that at best it’s a misunderstanding that Google is democratic, and it is not entirely clear that this was ever its purpose. It was certainly its key to the success of PageRank, but it was only the foundation. In addition to targeted search results weighing heavily on top of PageRank, the myth of the “objective” voting system has been trusted for two decades. Only in the wake of the 2016 election did the public really begin to take seriously the question: is the democracy rigged? Carole Cadwalladr reports on an ad hoc test in The Guardian, allowing Google’s autocomplete function to guide her in toward the most popular/accurate/quality results. She started with a simple keyword and allowed autocomplete to choose for her, and the results are shocking. She writes:

    Google is knowledge. It’s where you go to find things out. And evil Jews are just the start of it. There are also evil women. I didn’t go looking for them either. This is what I type: “a-r-e w-o-m-e-n”. And Google offers me just two choices, the first of which is: “Are women evil?” I press return. Yes, they are. Every one of the 10 results “confirms” that they are, including the top one, from a site called sheddingoftheego.com, which is boxed out and highlighted: “Every woman has some degree of prostitute in her. Every woman has a little evil in her… Women don’t love men, they love what they can do for them. It is within reason to say women feel attraction but they cannot love men” (Cadwalladr 2016).

    Cadwalladr hoped these were not the most popular/accurate/quality results, so she contacted Google and received the following response.

    Our search results are a reflection of the content across the web. This means that sometimes unpleasant portrayals of sensitive subject matter online can affect what search results appear for a given query. These results don’t reflect Google’s own opinions or beliefs – as a company, we strongly value a diversity of perspectives, ideas and cultures (Cadwalladr 2016).

    Jonathan Albright, Director of the Digital Forensics Initiative at the Tow Center for Digital Journalism, studied this too. He created a list of 306 widely circulated fake news sites and followed the lexica, just as PageRank was designed to do (Albright et al. 2017). Essentially Albright revealed through the hyperlinks that there had been a vast movement to manipulate PageRank’s popularity-based results to favor this subset of pages. Understanding how this is done is the key to breaking any illusion that the PageRank democracy is representative of popular opinion. Pages vote for one another by the amount and quality of hyperlinks, which means, in oversimplified terms, the creator of the link submits the vote. Albright’s experiment shows clearly that democracy can be rigged, or even automated. This subset contained 23,000 pages and 1.3 million hyperlinks. It is very unlikely these represent the popular vote of people making the pages, and even more unlikely that it resembles the popular opinion of the searching public. Add to this the more recent and increasing deployment of Artificial Intelligence to aid in content curation and the immediate creation of webpages that are included in search results, and it is clear that Brin’s and Page’s original ideas about organizing the Internet by either popularity or democracy are dead.

    Facebook: Move Fast and Break Things

    Hierarchies of information are big business, as Google has proven. Like traveling, the business of digital information is not in the destination. It’s the journey. Page visits are the blue ribbon for the web. The almighty click has stripped away any attention to content itself. Facebook has a famous sign that hangs in its office. It is big red lettering that says, “Move Fast and Break Things.” Indeed, the symbol of the company’s take on “Don’t be Evil.” Facebook was, for at least the four years following its launch, a community closed to advertisers. This meant that content circulated within the community by account holders, posting on their own behalf more or less. Sharing information this way, whether it was news articles, cat pictures, or political opinions, could be traced back to a user. When Facebook launched its Initial Public Stock Offering on May 18, 2012, the community-curated content dynamic broke. Facebook transformed its entire platform and mission from giving “people the power to build community and bring the world closer together” into an advertising company “making the world more open and connected.” Under Meta, Facebook logs more than 2 billion daily active users (Dixon 2022). Facebook is popular for reasons that should be obvious by now; a cult of personality that so effectively brings like minds together with individualized pseudo-authority to “friend”, “like”, “unfollow”, “block.” This may be the source of the widespread success of content curation that has seated Meta among the top 10 most valuable companies in the world, but the content is no longer managed by the community of active users any more than the search results over at Google. The newsfeed now contains ads from outside the friend circle, and the ever-changing “Trending” section consists of popular news, selected by a concoction of user likes and shares, and Meta’s magic dust. What was once an exclusive friends network, with the “.edu” email address as its user criterion origin story, is now an advertiser-consumer matchmaking app. It is spelled out plainly in Meta’s Transparency Center:

    Facebook’s goal is to make sure you see posts from the people, interests, and ideas that you find valuable, whether that content comes from people you’re already connected to or from those you may not yet know. When you open Facebook and see Feed in your Home tab, you experience a mix of “connected content” (e.g., content from the people you’re friends with or are following, Groups you’ve joined, and Pages you’ve liked) as well as “recommended content” (e.g., content we think you’ll be interested in from those you may want to know). We also show you ads that are tailored to you (Meta Platforms 2024).

    As an aside, when auto-generating a citation for this webpage, the result is on point: “‘Log in or Sign up to View.’ n.d. Transparency.meta.com.”‌ In short, the introduction of advertisers into the closed community of Facebook has sparked the downward spiral that we are struggling to reverse. Advertisers inside the social circle means an exchange of data, but it is not a free exchange. The data flows overwhelmingly in one direction. As we converse, like and share, the advertiser listens. 

    The Gated Community

    As the leading two aggregators of unprecedented amounts of market research, these two companies effectively direct and manage what is accessible on the World Wide Web without having to take part in the ongoing battle for a neutral net. And, while the two companies gained credibility and user loyalty through long held outspoken advocacy of free and accessible information, their business models are now based almost exclusively on restriction. Users are contractually restricted to access only curated monetized content through their services, in exchange for opting in to a vast digital infrastructure of behavioral analytics. Most of the world accesses the Internet through Alphabet and Meta, having opted-in to participate as subjects of for-profit behavioral analytics, and we have been lured through their gateways on foundational promises of democracy and free information.

    Despite these false promises, younger generations on social media may have never experienced a free Internet, where their clicks were not tracked, and we see the window for such a freedom actually shrinking further. ISPs have always been privy to our data, but have not been allowed to monetize it as the curators have. With the rollbacks on Net Neutrality protections, the ISPs could join the data free-for-all, but their entry is late in the game. Alphabet and Meta continue to expand the transactional design of their Internet, tightening the terms under which we all surf, and locking off the information they curate behind a login screen—the gated community.

    Putting this together, everyday users must pay an ISP to access the Internet, then exchange personal data to search it, then log in to view and interact with one another on the most popular social media websites. There are still niche social and search companies that allow users to interact without the paywall, but the majority of users choose to pay the toll road to enter the gated community. Users still can choose to rent or purchase a domain in order to share their own intellectual property without having to grant permissions for the hosting party to monetize it, but so many users instead choose to post original content through their social media accounts, where the owners of those servers are within their users agreements to harvest and sell it.

    The question of free space is just part of it. There is also the question of free information, which has been the main subject of this essay. When posting on social media, for example, we are led to believe that what we write is sent out to our friends, but we know that the property owner will decide that for us. Having a personal account on a social site is comparable to renting a house because it lets you be with your friends, but the landlord prohibits curtains, enters without asking, and sometimes takes your stuff. The restriction of information is at the discretion of the landlord, and there is no obligation, implied or written, that we have a role in this decision process. All information has restriction inherently, too. We know that if we click on a news essay, for instance, that publisher is under similar constraints. They must pay to let you enter their gate, come in their home and eat their food. A paywall is often how they do that, or agreeing to the cookies statement that pops up, or whitelisting to allow ads on your screen. The question emerges, if the information wasn’t free in newspapers, why do we expect it to become free on the Internet? In some ways, that’s a fair question, but what is unfair is the introduction of new gates to the community, each with their own tolls and taxes. It is not only the access point at which we arrive at the information. It is the service-oriented process of finding it. At one of the gates to the Internet community, you are asked, “what are you looking for?” The answer we give is the search query. You are not only given directions to the content (that would be the URL). We are given the door itself…the link directly to the information. The search engines do not promise to help us find the information. They promise that they have already found it for us. This has the makings of a utopia indeed, the world at our fingertips! But the search transaction is the exact opposite really. The queries deliver us to the information, not the information to us. The choice is narrowed down, organically we are told, so that we can choose from the very best sources related to our search. This is the trust we have in search. It is not that we used their service to find what we’re looking for within a myriad of information, it is that we were delivered to their preferred information based on the words we typed. That’s what targeting is.

    It is safe to say that these companies have made the rules that suit their needs, and our choice is between their way or the highway. Opt-in culture is comparable to an entry fee at a movie theater, but you have to keep paying while you’re watching the movie. Given the backward progress of Net Neutrality, which may be an idea of the past, it is difficult to see a path that puts the freedoms of the everyday user over those of the ISPs and content curators. Though a solution that protects the everyday user’s freedom to use their public Internet feels quite out of reach at this time, it is at least worth declaring that there is one, and it is attainable, if only on the technical side. The solution to the problem is two-fold: First, the FCC can restore and extend privacy protections that were approved by the FCC in October 2016 but repealed under then chairman, Ajit Pai, in March 2017, however the cycle could continue if future chairpersons choose to roll them back again. Instead of limiting oversight power to the FCC, Congress can revisit The Net Neutrality and Broadband Justice Act of 2022, and this has the potential to solidify Net Neutrality into law. Second, Net Neutrality should go beyond the ISP, into the domains, where the content curators monetize the clicks. ICANN already acts as a licenser in assigning domains, and so it can enforce as licenser in accordance with Net Neutrality law, which should include a standard for “basic service” for companies in the business of mass information dissemination.

    For the first solution, it’s important to make a distinction between the end-user license agreements (EULA) and privacy policies. EULA are not mandatory by law, and terms of service are fairly broad and unregulated. The most common types are explicit (clickwrap) and implicit (browser wrap). EULAs are common on the web and ubiquitous in OS software and mobile apps. While equally hostile and unreadable to the end-user, it is more pressing that a solution be found within the privacy policy documents, as they must by law directly address data collection and use. Privacy laws are already subject to federal regulations, however there is almost no regulation in effect at this time. Further, a user has no option to opt-out. That option would mean that you choose not to use the service in any capacity. Considering the requirements from employers for e-mail, as the most obvious example, the forceful nature of opting-in to keep your job or do your homework reveals the high costs of the information access hierarchy. As mentioned, a gradual step toward protecting individual privacy was made by the FCC in 2016, and should be expanded. The Broadband Consumer Privacy Rules, (approved October 2016 then repealed 2017) separated the standard all-or-nothing Opt-in agreement into the following:

    • Opt-in: ISPs are required to obtain affirmative “opt-in” consent from consumers to use and share sensitive information. The rules specify categories of information that are considered sensitive, which include precise geo-location, financial information, health information, children’s information, social security numbers, web browsing history, app usage history and the content of communications.
    • Opt-out: ISPs would be allowed to use and share non-sensitive information unless a customer “opts-out.” All other individually identifiable customer information – for example, email address or service tier information – would be considered non-sensitive and the use and sharing of that information would be subject to opt-out consent, consistent with consumer expectations.
    • Exceptions to consent requirements: Customer consent is inferred for certain purposes specified in the statute, including the provision of broadband service or billing and collection. For the use of this information, no additional customer consent is required beyond the creation of the customer-ISP relationship.

    Obviously, these rules aren’t broad enough to shake us free from Alphabet’s and Meta’s information headlock, but it is the place to start. The ability to select from tiers of service might sound problematic, since it is actually adding another hierarchy on top of the hyperlink hierarchy Google has put in place for us. However, the tiers of service has an immediate and measurable improvement to all-or-nothing opt-in privacy agreements because, like initialing each page of a legal document to indicate it has been read, incremental agreement options mean more opportunities to stop and think. Alphabet and Meta have made improvements to their privacy policies, at least in transparency, but both companies retain full power to restrict content from those that will not allow their personal data to be sold. It is still, in essence, a strong-arm agreement. Regulation could ensure that access to any site is independent of that site’s own policy document. In other words, a universal agreement that grants access to all sites on the World Wide Web.

    For the second solution we must create and enforce a standard for “basic service” for companies in the business of mass information dissemination. Given that the underlying infrastructure of the World Wide Web has always depended on public funding, it would be consistent with the investment to regulate mass information disseminators that utilize the infrastructure for private profits. There is precedent for this. Newton Minow proposed that networks have an obligation to serve the public interest in his famous “Vast Wasteland” speech to the National Association of Broadcasters in 1961. Specifically, a universal set of “basic services” must be publicly accessible with a default “opt-out” privacy agreement. For example, a person not logged in to any account could utilize Google’s search engine with the inherent agreement that their search habits may not be shared or sold. Some may argue further, that under a default opt-out agreement the data should not even be logged.

    The enforcement model, too, is in place. Indirectly, the FCC must establish “basic services” for mass information disseminators and work directly with ICANN to enforce it. In simplest terms, the information contained behind the gates of these companies must be accessible without entering. Facebook’s login page is the most striking example. It is a moat around a castle, and the only drawbridge is your login. ICANN, which has the authority to restrict domains for registration violations, can be expanded beyond trademark and general uniformity of the domain names. The organization’s internal governance structure needs modification if it is to become an enforcing body. It currently consists of “governments and international treaty organizations, root server operators, groups concerned with the Internet’s security and the ‘at large’ community, meaning average Internet users” (ICANN 2014). When it was established in partnership with the U.S. government, it included a mandate that it must operate in a bottom-up and democratic manner. However, ICANN has stated repeatedly in public meetings that input from a global community is not amenable to the Board. In addition, ICANN has not conducted its “Conflicts of Interest and Ethics Practices Review” since 2012, and gives no indication that it intends to schedule another review (ICANN 2023).

    Due to its impartial governance structure, under the proposed solution ICANN should remain limited to the management of the domain register, but could be directed by the FCC to restrict domains when for-profit mass information disseminators would violate a “basic services” mandate. It should be said, at this time, that this proposal does not take lightly the role of FCC oversight historically and looking to the future. It is crucial that the FCC return to its charge of regulating the venues of public information, far from which it has strayed.

    Dr. Adam Dean is the Program Director for Communication and Media at LMU. He holds a BA in Media Studies from Penn State University, an MA in Radio, Television and Film from the University of North Texas, and a PhD in Media, Art and Text from Virginia Commonwealth University. Before joining the faculty at LMU Dr. Dean taught Digital Media Arts at Barry University in Miami while working professionally as an Adobe Certified Expert for CBS and Univision. His research and professional work focus on digital democracy and include creative projects that bring students and community partners together to produce documentaries, podcasts and other educational media.

    Bibliography

    “Accountability Mechanisms – ICANN.” n.d. www.icann.org. https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en.

    Albright, Jonathan, Janna Anderson and Rainie Lee. 2017. “The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online.” Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. March 29, 2017. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/03/29/the-future-of-free-speech-trolls-anonymity-and-fake-news-online/.

    “Board of Directors’ Code of Conduct.” 2023. www.icann.org. January 21, 2023. https://www.icann.org/en/governance/code-of-conduct.

    Bolt, Beranek & Newman Inc., A History of the ARPANET: The First Decade (Report prepared for DARPA). Apr. 1, 1981. https://ia600108.us.archive.org/15/items/DTIC_ADA115440/DTIC_ADA115440.pdf.

    Bowman, Emma. 2025. “Net Neutrality Is Struck, Ending a Long Battle to Regulate ISPs like Public Utilities.” NPR. January 3, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/01/03/nx-s1-5247840/net-neutrality-fcc-struck.

    Brin, Sergey, and Lawrence Page. 2012. “Reprint Of: The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine.” Computer Networks 56 (18): 3825–33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2012.10.007.

    Brin, Sergey, Lawrence Page,  Rajeev Motwani and Terry Winograd. 1998. “The PageRank Citation Ranking: Bringing Order to the Web.” Technical Report. Stanford InfoLab. January 29, 1998.

    Cadwalladr, Carole. 2016. “Google, Democracy and the Truth about Internet Search.” The Guardian. December 4, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/04/google-democracy-truth-internet-search-facebook.

    Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and Albert Gore. Bill, High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 §. S.272 (1991).

    Dixon, S. 2022. “Number of daily active Facebook users worldwide as of 2nd quarter 2022.” Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/346167/facebook-global-dau/.

    “FCC Restores Net Neutrality.” 2024. Fcc.gov. April 25, 2024. https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-restores-net-neutrality.

    Gallagher, S. 2022. “50 Years Ago Today, the Internet Was Born. Sort Of.” Ars Technica, October 29, 2019. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/10/50-years-ago-today-the-internet-was-born-sort-of/.

    Internet Live Stats. 2022. “Google Search Statistics.” Internetlivestats.com. https://www.internetlivestats.com/google-search-statistics/.

    Katz, Ian. 2012. “Web Freedom Faces Greatest Threat Ever, Warns Google’s Sergey Brin.” The Guardian. April 15, 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/15/web-freedom-threat-google-brin.

    Markey, E. 2021. “S.4676 – 117th Congress (2021-2022): Net Neutrality and Broadband Justice Act of 2022.” Congress.gov. 2021. https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4676.

    Matsui, D. 2021. “H.R.8573 – 117th Congress (2021-2022): Net Neutrality and Broadband Justice Act of 2022.” Congress.gov. 2021. https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/8573.

    Meta Platforms. “Our Approach to Facebook Feed Ranking.” Transparency.meta.com, 19 Dec. 2024, transparency.meta.com/features/ranking-and-content/.

     NPR.org. n.d. 2013. “Google Chairman Eric Schmidt Plays Not My Job.” May 11, 2013. https://www.npr.org/2013/05/11/182873683/google-chairman-eric-schmidt-plays-not-my-job.

    Obama, Barack. 2016. “Net Neutrality: A Free and Open Internet.” The White House. June 14, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/net-neutrality.

    Pelkey, Tina. 2017. “CHAIRMAN PAI CIRCULATES DRAFT ORDER to RESTORE INTERNET FREEDOM and ELIMINATE HEAVY-HANDED INTERNET REGULATIONS.” Federal Communications Commission. November 21, 2017. https://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman-pai-proposes-restore-internet-freedom.

    Perez, Paloma. 2022. “CHAIRWOMAN ROSENWORCEL STATEMENT ON NET NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION.” Federal Communications Commission. July 28, 2022. https://www.fcc.gov/document/chairwoman-rosenworcel-statement-net-neutrality-legislation.

     Statistica Research Department. 2022. “Worldwide desktop market share of leading search engines from January 2010 to July 2022.” https://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwide-market-share-of-search-engines/

    Stacy, Christopher C. “Getting Started Computing at the AI Lab.” MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, September 7, 1982. https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/41180/AI_WP_235.

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    [i]                 On October 29, 1969, Leonard Kleinrock successfully transmitted the first message over the ARPANET from UCLA to the Stanford Research Institute. The message was “LO” while the intended message was “LOGIN”, interrupted by a computer crash.

  • Rian C. Johnson–There Are No Good Games: Dismantling Canonicity in Videogame Studies

    Rian C. Johnson–There Are No Good Games: Dismantling Canonicity in Videogame Studies

    This text is published as part of a special b2o issue titled “Critique as Care”, edited by Norberto Gomez, Frankie Mastrangelo, Jonathan Nichols, and Paul Robertson, and published in honor of our b2o and b2 colleague and friend, the late David Golumbia.

    There Are No Good Games: Dismantling Canonicity in Videogame Studies

    Rian C. Johnson

    Broken Machines: An Ugly Ontology of the Videogame 

    Videogames are bad objects.[1] They proliferate hidden structures of control, concentrated power, and inequity (Golumbia 2009b, 154). They are vehicles for the ideology of neoliberal capitalism (Jagoda 2020, 44). They are the “paradigmatic media of empire,” and they operate as the “ideological avatar of play,” insisting on a correct way to play that isn’t even really play at all (Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter 2009; Boluk and LeMieux 2017, 281). They promulgate rhetorics of destruction, conquest, exploitation, colonization, and violence (Mukherjee 2018; Harrer 2018; Dooghan 2019). They are a medium steeped in misogyny and the objectification and aestheticization of women (Gray, Voorhees, and Vossen 2018; D. J. Leonard and Kishonna L. Gray 2018; DeWinter and Kocurek 2017). They minstrelize people of color when not erasing them entirely (Everett and Watkins 2008; D. J. Leonard and Kishonna L. Gray 2018; D. Leonard 2003). And they are inextricably embedded in the American military-industrial complex (Ivory 2015).

    Videogame culture is bad; it is “dark” and always has been (Paul 2018, 2). Popular videogame culture proselytizes the most toxic logic of the videogame in all its noxious glory. From booth babes to in-game harassment to eSports to GamerGate to the racist frenzy that forced a Japanese politician to declare official neutrality towards a Canadian-produced Samurai game in the Summer of 2024, videogame culture is toxic to everyone who sets foot outside of its punitive magic circle (Cryer 2024). The culture is the circle, and the circle is toxic. The magic circle of popular videogame culture is the proverbial embodiment of Hidetaka Miyazaki’s poisonous swamp, and like “hardcore” logic of Miyazaki’s Souls-like games, it reproduces the hidden hierarchy created through pseudo-meritocracy that ensures those who begin on top remain on top (Paul 2018, 13).

    The videogame industry is very, very bad. Born in the laboratories of Brookhaven and MIT, it reached maturity amid the capitalist parable of Atari that began with dorm room piracy, snowballed into the Magnavox vs. Atari lawsuit, and ended under concrete in the New Mexico desert. From Atari to Nintendo to Blizzard, the development of videogames has been inseparable from the exploitation, harassment, and abuse of workers: fan laborers, outsourced grunt coders, and white-collar American women in Irvine, California, alike (Bulut 2020). The videogame industry is both an arm of the American military entertainment complex and an agent of warfare in its own right (Milburn 2018, 173; Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter 2009, 98–105).

    Even videogame scholarship has its problems. The gendered undertones of the Narratology vs. Ludology debates, a tendency to smooth over unseemly edges, a longstanding aversion to politics, ludo-orientalist and techno-orientalist tendencies, the murky conflation of game development and critical game studies, even a cursory survey of the field indicates that it is far from tidy. Despite this mire, the field is also always attempting perpetual normalizations in the form of theories, methods, actions, and, indeed, canons. And yet, lest negativity be misconstrued as hatred, as I write this critique, like so many others, I am simultaneously producing works arguing for the liberatory, radical, anamorphic, ameliorative, or at the very least, harmless potential in videogames. I argue, however, that if videogames offer us any chance or experience of liberation from the oppressive weight of late capitalism, it is as a glitch, a bug, a tactical action informed either by hybridity, a reparative reading, or an oppositional gaze. Left to their own devices, videogames will not bring about a revolution; they will dehumanize global workforces through a simulation fever of ludic optimization.

    By nature, videogames are part and parcel of computation. Videogames are, after all, just software. If, as Tara Fickle poses in the Race Card, Eurocentrist and white supremacist cultural frameworks position Eastern cultures as ludic mirrors of Western culture, then videogames are the ludic mirror of functionalist software (Fickle 2019, 113–37). They are one and the same, operating under different mythologies. Stephanie Boluk and Patrick LeMieux suggest that if one gets close enough to the game, it ceases to be one (Boluk and LeMieux 2017, 287). Up close, all is reduced to computation.

    David Golumbia wrote that “computation is not a neutral technology; it is a means for expanding top-down, hierarchical power, for concentrating rather than distributing” (Golumbia 2009b, 151). It is perhaps easy to imagine macro-level computational infrastructures striating and concentrating power through systemic mechanisms of economic, political, and social control. However, it’s harder to imagine the logic of computationalism at play in our everyday micro-encounters with computer technology, especially the kind disguised as play. If I was once told that Golumbia was not really a videogames scholar, it is because he was a scholar of computation and software, the latter of which videogames are but one variety, like word processors, web browsers, and media players.

    As software, videogames operate as mechanisms for organizing power (and often towards the end of producing labor).[2] On games, Golumbia wrote that “within a wide variety of computer games, one can see a process exactly isomorphic to such software applications, in which quantified resources are maximized so that the player can win the game.” These games, he contended, “reveal exactly the oligarchical-monopolist, Statist, even fascist politics at issue throughout the computerized world” (Golumbia 2009b, 135). Videogames both materially concentrate their operational powers at the hidden level of the code and offer a simulation of power concentration to players through an interface essentialism that obscures everything that the player does not control. Like computers, videogames are inherently ideological objects. They are immersive, interactive, fictional worlds that invite simulational, speculative, and parasocial thinking on the part of players and, at the same time, mask the mechanics of their own functionality and material composition, projecting outward to the surface only that which is desirable, accessible, pleasurable, fun, interesting, exciting, or entertaining when what lies beneath is always, and only, binary code.

    If videogames are indeed bad, can they be fixed and made better? Can the videogame be redeemed? Can it be reborn anew, as it should have been, as factions of the independent and avant-garde games movements strive towards? No, nor should they be. Every attempt to reform the videogame reproduces in some other iteration what was problematic to begin with, simply shuffling its contents around and forcing the form’s most toxic ooze out of a different orifice. All we can do as game scholars and game players is confront them as they are and accept them for it. This is, of course, a monumental undertaking. Within the scope of this work, however, is one argument that I hope will serve as a small but necessary cog in the greater mechanism of critical videogame studies.

    If we are to acknowledge videogames as bad objects, we must stop trying to salvage our favorites among them, imbuing them with the nullifying powers of aestheticization in the market economy of cultural capital. We must cease construction on and dismantle the foundations that have already been laid for the “canon” of videogames that implicitly shapes videogame studies. Multiple scholars warn of the increasing stagnation, narrowness, and coalescence of game studies (Gekker 2021; Deterding 2017; Murray 2018; Phillips 2020; Paul 2018). They are correct. To begin to remedy this pressing threat, we must surrender our attempts at mimicking the cohesion of other fields of textual study in desperate attempts at legitimization or separatism. Despite the best efforts of videogame studies’ most prominent scholars to prevent the field’s “colonization” by literature, film, or visual studies, it has ultimately colonized itself anyway (E. Aarseth 2001).

    Almost twenty-five years after the discipline’s formal opening ceremony, videogame studies has colonized itself by promoting the hierarchical, bourgeois, and ultimately counterproductive economic logic of cultural capital. By arguing fervently for the legitimization of the videogame as an artistic, aesthetic object imbued with cultural capital, the videogame has been not only divorced from its origin as software but from the problematics of computationalism writ large. The result is the implementation of a logic of canonicity within videogame studies, culminating in the uneven allocation of cultural capital and the imposition of yet another layer of hierarchy upon objects that are always already incarnations of concentrated, hierarchical power.

    I contend that this hyperconcentration of hierarchy has created an intellectual choke point. Only the deconstruction, dismantling, and destruction of the extant canon of videogames can correct already-established trajectories of concern within videogame studies and cultivate a freer, more diverse, and more productive future for the study of videogames. A game studies discourse grounded in the deeply flawed nature of all videogames, can more easily describe their reparative potential than one couched in terms of “good” games, “bad” games, “real” games, and “junk” games.

    Culture, industry, and scholarly toxicity aside, videogames are still tricky, “grotesque” objects. They are profoundly unstable commodities and objects.  Like all new media, particularly those associated with analog gaming (and thus also with gambling), the videogame was born into a marginalized and subordinate status within the popular media landscape (Kocurek 2016). Outside of their hegemonic origins in the political and technological realms, videogames have an infamously low standing in the social and cultural hierarchy. Even if, as so many critics have argued, the videogame has or will soon achieve cultural and artistic legitimacy, this legitimacy is still largely meaningless outside of academic, industry, and entertainment gaming cultures. It should, moreover, already be clear that we cannot expect videogame culture to improve the medium’s standing in general culture.

    Dismissal, denigration, and disinterest in videogames as a medium still pervades Western cultural sentiment. In 2023, 13-year-old Willis Gibson became the first human recorded to “beat” Tetris, a typically unending and thus unbeatable game (Mohtasham 2024). This accomplishment is remarkable in terms of gaming as a hobby, sport, practice, and field of study and made more so by the roughly forty years between the game’s creation and the event. One would be hard-pressed to think of many other games, particularly as ubiquitous as Tetris, that required forty years of global effort to beat. And yet, Gibson’s accomplishment was overshadowed in the news cycle by a single snide remark from a Sky News anchor three weeks later (Rogers 2024).[3] John Walker’s Kotaku article from October of 2024 also iterates this point: Walker asks one simple and critical question about the failure of a 400-million-dollar game, “Sony’s Concord might be the biggest entertainment failure of all time, so why wasn’t it news?” (Walker 2024). Indeed, outside of Kotaku and other popular gaming presses, it wasn’t. However, the news cycle at that same moment in time did focus on a 200-million-dollar box office flop. [4]

    A lack of cultural capital is not the only way videogames have a unique relationship to the dominant culture. Like film, the history of videogames is filled with legends of lost, damaged, or unfinished games. Lost media is a feature rather than a bug in the production and circulation of the videogame, which is native to digitized late capitalism. From development to production, games have a “limited lifespan” enforced by interindustry apathy towards data preservation, techno-industrial practices of planned obsolescence, and the generational cycle of console development (Newman 2012). This ephemerality is reinforced by economic systems of release, trade-in and used sales, intellectual property laws, region-locking, digitally native releases and updates, the politics of backward compatibility, and finally (outside even of the control of publishers, manufacturers, or capitalism itself) bit rot. While bit rot and data discarding may be the only empirically objective factors currently contributing to the lifespan of the videogame, their effect is exacerbated by the industry. Videogames are a mortal medium.

    I am not arguing that this dismissal, disinterest, or resignation to decay is correct, good, or culturally beneficial. I am in firm agreement with Shira Chess and Mia Consalvo’s sentiment that “the future of media studies is game studies,” not because of some unique, essential power of the videogame to eclipse and supplant all other media, but because “as convergence culture becomes less of a special case and more of an everyday reality, the medium itself matters less” (Chess and Consalvo 2022, 160). Rather, I argue that the marginalization of video games as a form has not ended in mainstream culture, at least not yet. No matter how many canons have been constructed by games scholars, journalists, developers, or archivists, and how many treatises on games-as-art those same demographics publish, the game has not been elevated to an equal cultural evaluation as other, older mediums, including those that historically faced the same hurdles such as the novel, the film, or the television series. As such, these processes have accomplished little and have only limited knowledge production within game studies.

    I can’t deny that, in my day-to-day life, a videogame canon is appealing. Subjectively, perhaps the driving impetus of this article stems from my own disagreement with those games that have been deemed canonical within videogame studies. However, it is by being earnest about such sentiments that the more significant issue becomes visible. As John Vanderhoef argues, following Bourdieu’s work on cultural capital, videogame canons are the product of “taste cultures,” in which the taste of dominant groups shapes the perceived importance, legitimacy, and material value of individual cultural artifacts characterized as videogames (Vanderhoef 2012). Moreover, as Glas and Von Vught demonstrate through practical experience, these dominant groups are almost always white, male, cis-gendered, and heterosexual (Glas and van Vught 2019, 9). While I do not meet all of these criteria, I meet most of them. Thus, I must also recognize that the imposition of my own fantasy canon on the field at large would be nothing more than the slightest alteration of who exactly the dominant party is. Instead of canon reformation, I argue for self-awareness. I argue for the acknowledgment that it is not the current canon that is bad or even current games that are bad, but that these problematics or “badness” are inherent attributes of the videogame. We must instead work with them rather than fruitlessly attempt to breed out these sine qua non traits.

    In short, this negativity is not an argument for the obliteration of the videogame in some formalist eugenics any more than it is a call for the obliteration of any and all media that bear some problematic origin (as so many do). Rather, it is a reminder that the videogame was born in a network of power, politics, economics, and Empire, and acts of reclamation, redemption, subversion, or even radical liberation attempted with or through the videogame must neither set aside nor willfully ignore that origin. If we are to continue to study videogames, and if they are to be recovered, redeemed, or even simply neutralized, we must acknowledge their faults.

    The Invisible (Master) Hand: Of Canons and Videogames

    The current videogame studies canon is a fluid collection of works imbued with exceptional levels of cultural capital, and, like all canons, it does not really exist. There is no stone tablet engraved with the words World of Warcraft, Grand Theft Auto, EverQuest, Tetris, or the Sims preserved in the basement of the Strong Museum of Play, nor even the Library of Congress. The videogame canon is, as John Guillory wrote of the literary canon, “an imaginary totality of works” (Guillory 1993, 30). And yet, “what does have a concrete location as a list…is not the canon, but the syllabus,” and “every construction of a syllabus institutes once again the process of canon formation” (Guillory 1993, 30–31). Like literary syllabi, game studies syllabi certainly exist, and the games on them are, more often than not, canonical games by virtue of their citational, instructional, and analytic repetition. Game studies, like film and literature, shapes its canon through material acts of scholarship, research, theorization, and dissemination. Jonathan Frome and Paul Martin consider the five games listed above canonical through a disproportionately high citation frequency in the two most prominent game studies journals (Frome and Martin 2019, 6). Published in 2019, Frome and Martin’s study is profoundly limited in that it only surveys two journals, disregarding published monographs, edited volumes, and not exclusively game-focused journals. However, even in this microcosmic analysis, evidence of disproportionate citation and, thus, canonization is immediately evident. In 2017, two years before Frome and Martin put the word “canon” to print, Coavoux, Boutet, and Zabban gestured towards the presence of a canon in videogame studies. Yet, they argued against it without ever actually using the word, instead decrying the harmful limitations of “selective focus on a few particular games” (Coavoux, Boutet, and Zabban 2017, 573). While I agree with Coavoux et al. in positionality, I insist on calling a canon a canon, because only by doing so can we access the depths of its potential harm.

    If videogames are inherently problematic, so are cultural canons. Canons are hegemonies that confer cultural dominance upon a particular collection of artifacts. Hegemonies, however, are not static. Canons are lived hegemonies, and “a lived hegemony is always a process…it is a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and activities with specific changing pressures and limits” (Williams 2009, 112). They necessitate relationships of domination and subordination, and the dominant, in this case, is manifest in what is culturally accorded the status of art or literature, creating the familiar dichotomy of high and low culture or the distinction between art and culture (Williams 2009, 110). As Williams suggests and Liam Dee expands on in Against Art and Culture, “art and culture are thus clearly the concepts of human expression, transcending rational or natural dictates, but they have an important distinction. One makes this expression extraordinary [art]. The other makes it ordinary [culture]” (Williams 2009, 145; Dee 2018, 15). That is, art and culture are the same thing inside different rhetorical frames, and thus why Dee refuses the separation between them and instead writes against “art/culture” as a dyad “to make explicit the shared qualities of ‘high art’ and ‘popular culture’…and make clear that I am not referring to ‘skill’…nor an amorphous ‘way of life’” (Dee 2018, 17).

    One of the cultural frames that enforces this false dichotomy and hegemonic relationship is that of the canon. For John Guillory, “the problem of what is called canon formation is best understood as a problem in the constitution and distribution of cultural capital, or more specifically, a problem of access to the means of literary production and consumption” (Guillory 1993, ix). This is simply another means of describing Williams’ hegemony in which certain objects are attributed higher values of cultural capital than others and accordingly venerated, elevated, and distributed in controlled or institutional contexts. Ultimately, canonicity is intrinsically a problem of inclusivity and diversity, for “canonization of a work is nothing but the affirmation of the social values expressed in the work” even when that affirmation is hidden beneath a veneer of artistic aestheticization. As such, the social values expressed in canonical videogames (and indeed all videogames as pieces of software) are hierarchy, exclusion, and dominance (Guillory 1993, 270).

    While Guillory is not explicit in attributing the intentionality of canon formation to any individual or system, I would like to posit here that the process of canonization that has been churning in game studies for the last twenty years has been enacted through what Simone Winko theorizes as an “invisible hand.” Hans-Joachim Backe translates and synthesizes Winko’s theory as “a process in which countless individual (micro-level) actions—which may have altogether different goals—will result, in conjunction, in the (macro-level) phenomenon of canon formation” (Backe 2015, 11). In this light, canon formation is not enacted singularly or with necessary intentionality. Certainly, scholars’ selection and valuation of texts are intentional, but their usage in the canonization process is not. Canons are constructed through evaluation, and for literature, “evaluations can influence the act of writing either beforehand…or during the writing process” and are made by “literary mediators…television and radio producers…literary critics, scholars, and teachers” with the latter operating in the mode described above by the decision “to give the text more or less space” or “other works whose values have already been defined are used as points of comparison” (von Heydebrand and Winko 2010, 225). In what follows, I would like to briefly survey three significant moments of interaction between this invisible hand and the game studies canon that served to establish, legitimize, and reformat it over the nearly four decades since the field’s foundation. These moments are, chronologically, the beginning of videogame studies, the height of the videogame legitimation debate, and the recent (ironic) dominance of “independently developed” games. 

    In the primordial moment, 1985 and 1986, respectively, Mary Ann Buckles and Brenda Laurel separately and coincidentally completed the first videogame studies dissertations long before videogame studies existed. When Buckles and Laurel were researching and writing about interactive narratives within videogames, they were doing so within the German Literature and Theatre departments, respectively. Working without precedent, they established the first approaches to videogame analysis, and, with them, which videogames provided the most productive analytical fodder. Thus, they also established which games would become early canonical texts.

    Buckles’ dissertation is a close reading of the storied text-based role-playing game Adventure. In her introduction, Buckles delineates her area of study, distinguishing Adventure from contemporary arcade games: “Let me first emphasize what Adventure and other works of interactive fiction are not: they are not video arcade games. They do not resemble games like Donkey Kong, Space Invaders, or Pac-Man, which require good hand-eye co-ordination and quick physical reactions” (Buckles 1985, 6). Notably, Buckles does not disvalue “video arcade games” or place them in a value hierarchy with “interactive fiction” but rather creates a taxonomy based on the skills and actions required to play.

    Laurel creates a different taxonomy that, while divided along similar lines as Buckles’, introduces an element of hierarchy in its teleological orientation. Laurel’s primary area of study is what she calls “interactive fantasy systems,” which produce “interactive dramas,” a “first-person experience within a fantasy world, in which the user may create, enact, and observe a character whose choices and actions affect the course of events just as they might in a play” (Laurel 1986, 10–11). Her two primary examples are Zork! and Star Raiders, which both allow “the user to participate in the fantasy world as an active character” (Laurel 1986, 86). Arcade games are characterized as “antecedents to interactive fantasy” or “poetic interactive works” that generate affective experiences for the player but do not integrate the player into the world (Laurel 1986, 19–20). While Laurel does not position this class of “poetic interactive works” as oppositional to or less than “interactive dramas,” the connotation of antecedent implicitly argues for an evolutionary view of games in which the latter represent the more evolved, more complex and more capable (and thus more valuable) form of the former, creating a hierarchy between them.

    The establishment of both systems of taxonomy fragmented the vast body of media called video or computer games. From the starting point of Buckles’ analysis, Adventure has become a canonical text, representative of the literary qualities of the videogame.[5] As videogame studies, videogame history, videogame culture, and videogame development influence one another in a digital feedback loop, Adventure has remained relevant and briefly achieved prominence once again with the release and subsequent studies of the serially released 2012-2020 and acclaimed game Kentucky Route Zero which directly references and indirectly alludes to Adventure.[6] Conversely, while Buckles and Laurel may have purposefully omitted (and articulated their reasons for doing so) Space Invaders from their studies, it has hardly been omitted from the subsequent forty years of game studies. Returning to Frome and Martin’s survey, Space Invaders was cited 34 times, ranking 20th out of 38 in 2019 (Frome and Martin 2019, 6). In this, the game has come to stand as synonymous with both the arcade genre and a particular moment in video game history.[7] Moreover, the ludic turn in videogame studies in the early 2000s emphasized exactly the kind of highly structured, ludus games that Space Invaders represent as if in direct response to Buckles and Laurel’s emphasis on gamic fiction.[8] A direct correlation between Adventure and contemporary videogame studies is as clearly recognizable as its inverse: the omission of arcade games from these original studies, and the ludic fixation in early organized game studies.

    What I hope to bring attention to here in this first moment is the process through which games assume and maintain prolonged and disproportionate relevance within game studies over the course of decades, rather than Mary Ann Buckles and Brenda Laurel’s personal responsibility for the field’s subsequent trajectory. It matters that these games still receive citations in game studies survey texts when innumerable other early, influential, or impactful games do not.[9] However, no two games are alike, and this delicate negotiation of relevance shapes the ways we play, think about, study, analyze, and promulgate videogames and their study. There is a parallel universe in which the team at Cardboard Computer who developed Kentucky Route Zero made a game that takes place not around the Mammoth Cave National Park on which the world of Adventure was based, but in and around the highly fantastic Great Underground Empire of Zork! This is the power of the invisible hand that shapes canonization through individual evaluations.

    A second crucial moment in the formulation of a videogame studies canon comes in the late 2000s and early 2010s in the form of popular and scholarly legitimation discourse. In Felan Parker’s 2017 article for Games and Culture, “Canonizing Bioshock,” Parker untangles the structural and rhetorical actions that made 2K’s 2007 first-person shooter Bioshock the quintessential entry in the game studies canon. Parker argues that Bioshock’s rapid incorporation into the canon of videogame studies coincided with a different moment in videogame culture: the apex of the legitimization discourse, a discourse that has plagued videogame studies to various degrees since Laurel and Buckles’ time as doctoral students (Parker 2018, 83).[10] This discourse has always been predicated on the artificial dichotomy between “art” and “culture.” Were videogames doomed to be forever considered popular or “low” culture? Could they be art? Should they be art? Which games are art? And which games definitely are not art? These questions were voiced loudly by oft-cited works like Aaron Smuts’ “Are Videogames Art?” and Grant Tavinor’s The Art of Videogames. In both scholarly and popular culture, this phenomenon was most evident in what Parker called “Ebert versus Games,” in which, between 2005 and 2010, film critic Roger Ebert became the representative of “the prejudice against digital games as art,” disparaging the artistic legitimacy of videogames in his film reviews and on his personal blog (Parker 2018, 80).

    The question of whether videogames were or could be art inspired a moment of mutual panic for scholarly and popular videogame critics. This duality is a process accounted for by Winko and von Heydebrand’s schema and is evident in the canonization of Bioshock as described by Parker. Bioshock was used to produce a “special class of AAA game that is expected to excel commercially but has a distinction from other popular favorites and best sellers by the grace of its supposed artistic quality and canonical status,” known familiarly as the prestige game (Parker 2017, 740).[11] This definition purposefully conflates popular and scholarly consumers because, for these games to achieve the status of prestige and warrant canonization, they must be commercially, culturally, and critically successful. This formula produces games that feature dense textual experiences and raise philosophical, ethical, political, social, or cultural questions without limiting market shares by remaining “neutral enough in…politics to be widely marketable” (Parker 2017, 747). “Attractive, marketable gameplay is seen as a kind of delivery mechanism for the game’s highfalutin subject matter, and in this sense, the prestige game purports to be both more entertaining and more effective than other ‘message’ games” (Parker 2017, 748). That is, Bioshock and other prestige games juggle accessibility, entertainment, “literary” value, and novelty, culminating in an experience that Parker argues “is designed from the ground up to invite sustained reflection, debate, and criticism” and thus operates as a justification for “the whole enterprise of games criticism and scholarship” (Parker 2017, 751–52).

    The traits that render Bioshock legitimate art and warrant its canonization skew strongly to the technological and economic. The game includes “attractive, marketable gameplay” and requires the newly evolved technological capabilities of the seventh generation of videogame consoles, the PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360, as well as the ability of developers to anticipate and respond to the needs of broad audiences. As Grant Tavinor writes in The Art of Videogames, “the stunning representational advances may also provide one of the most compelling reasons to see videogames as a form of art” (Tavinor 2009, 70). Similarly, Smuts considers art to be those games that meet the following conditions: “integrated narratives, graphics, nearing photo-realism and elaborate three-dimensional worlds with rich and detailed textures” (Smuts 2005). We can see a clear correlation between technological capability and perceived artistic legitimacy. Notably, the games chosen as art by both Tavinor and Smuts, Grand Theft Auto IV, Max Payne, Halo, Tom Clancy’s Splinter Cell, and, of course, Bioshock, are all games that, while demonstrating cutting-edge technological capabilities, were also exceedingly successful on the commercial market. It should come as no surprise that these are hardly attributes that legitimize other cultural artifacts as “art.” After all, art films are collectively imagined to be the most inaccessible (and often unappealing) of films, and literary fiction is much less often profitable in the book and adaptation market than genre fiction. It matters that the attributes of “prestige videogames” are counterintuitive to other mediums’ conceptions of prestige. That these attributes are promoted and valued by popular videogame culture should be a point of, if not worry, then inquiry to videogame studies.

    These prestige games, as marked by their success in the marketplace and culture, are ideologically aligned with the dominant logic of computation and the oozing toxicity it produces within popular “hardcore” videogame culture. It is also these games that were used within academic and popular contexts to nullify any lingering arguments for the potential illegitimacy of videogames as art. Scholars arguing for the artistic legitimacy of videogames positioned themselves in opposition to social sciences research on potential correlations between videogames and violent or antisocial behavior, put succinctly by Liam Dee in Against Art and Culture, in that “the pathology of the obsessive gamer is such that computer game addiction is recognized as a mental addiction, while poetry addiction is not” (Dee 2018, 206). To finally move beyond this discourse, videogames must be legitimized as art, for as Dee argues, “once an image is deemed aesthetic, it is abstracted from the representational hurley-burley, no longer treated as a document of reality,” which permits the aesthetic image as art to bypass sociological concerns and discourses of obscenity (Dee 2018, 68). This is not to say that I believe in a narrow or reductive relationship between videogames, violence, or addiction as the social scientists of the day were investiating or that games scholars should not play or study Bioshock because it happens to be a favorite title of “hardcore” gaming culture and the reactionary Internet bigots and trolls “hardcore” gaming culture contains. Rather, I argue that the conversion of culture to art is an established remedy to such concerns. As art, neither a text’s content nor popular fandom can be used against it. This remedy is made all the more appealing by the fact that so many videogame scholars can be described, as Simon Deterding does, “as aca/fans who turn their passion into a research profession, defending their lifestyle through research that defuses moral panics and elevates gaming as a valuable cultural practice”(Deterding 2017, 525). Yet, this solution to the crisis of legitimation is ultimately harmful, concretizing and reduplicating some of video games’ worst aspects.

    But, is it possible these problems are exclusive to AAA games? Is there a form of game that has separated itself from the poisonous swamp of the mainstream games industry?  Perhaps the solution is simply to canonize different games as the “ludologists” once did to avoid the domination of the field by narrative and text heavy games like Adventure and Myst. Perhaps upon the release of Bioshock: Infinite, with its ludic stagnancy, implicit racism, and questionable political commentary, the problems in these new canonical texts, like those before them, would float to the discursive surface. This scenario could then allow for corrective actions without sacrificing the newfound artistic legitimacy of the videogame (Parker 2017, 753–55). This has happened over the last decade or so in game studies, in which a new dichotomy rivaling that of ludology and narratology has emerged: that of mainstream and independent (indie) gaming. It is this confrontation that emerges as the third and most recent moment of canonization.

    The advent of indie games has come with benefits, including greater insight into abstract procedural rhetorics, the trickle-down ideological effects of binary logic in computing, increased probes into and criticism of dominant gaming cultures, and a more welcoming venue for marginalized scholars to enter and thrive within game studies. That indie games offer salvation from the hellish mire of mainstream gaming is an explicit sentiment, unlike the presence of a canon. In the 2022 special edition of Critical Studies in Media and Communications dedicated to the future of game studies, Amanda L. L. Cullen et al. argues that “it is also the role of game studies to fight for the legitimization of creators who do not engage with the games industry in normative fashions,” ultimately working towards “making queer games a sustainable alternative” to mainstream gaming (Cullen et al. 2022, 203). In this scenario, we see queer used almost synonymously for independent, for it is posed as oppositional to the mainstream. The reader must assume Cullen’s “queer” games are not merely the inclusion of diverse identities in the newest $250 million Dragon Age game but the independent. In videogame studies, the subaltern speaks through itch.io.

    The veneration of the indie game as an alternative to mainstream AAA games imbues the indie game itself with a level of ontological benevolence that should immediately set off alarms. In fixating on indie games as a social good, one sees metaphysical reorientation that extrapolates more from legitimate art’s cultural function than gamers’ potential to accumulate cultural capital. As Cullen et al. conclude their argument for non-normative creators, their definition becomes apparent in their desire to look towards “creators who are making games and content for non-monetary practices” (Cullen et al. 2022, 203). Despite this, Stephanie Boluk and Patrick LeMieux      rightly characterize indie games as a concretized “genre” of videogames that are “games about games” (Boluk and LeMieux 2017, 28–29). And the games these indie games are about are, more often than not, the “mainstream” games to which they are positioned as alternatives (Boluk and LeMieux 2017, 31–32). On the level of creative production, indie games are created through the cannibalization and regurgitation of the mainstream, not its opposite regardless of the intentionality of their production.

    This is, in effect, the sort of “mystical bullshit” that Liam Dee argues still “dominates” the concept of art itself, in which “creative expression is seen as special and wonderful precisely because there is a non-creative quotidian for it to be contrasted with” (Dee 2018, 3; 24). The quotidian in question is, of course, day-to-day existence under capitalism. In art, however, “even when commercial relationships are explicit, there are many strategies that are undertaken to make it seem that commerce is not what our culture is really about and that, in fact, it is anti-commercial” (Dee 2018, 114).  When Cullen et al. and others praise the indie game for its ability to shirk the economics of the marketplace and instead free the artistic vision of the creator, they transpose onto videogames the bourgeois logic of literary hierarchy that begets canons in the first place. As Raymond Williams explained,

    Art is a kind of production which has to be seen as separate from the dominant bourgeois productive norm: the making of commodities. It has, then, in fantasy, to be separated from ‘production’ altogether, described by the new term ‘creation’; distinguished from its own material processes; distinguished, finally, from other products of its own kind or closely related kinds—‘art’ from ‘non-art’; ‘literature’ from ‘para-literature’ or ‘popular literature; ‘culture’ from mass ‘culture’ (Williams 2009, 154).

    Or, perhaps, Indie Game from AAA Game.

    Little exemplifies this problem better than Melissa Kagen’s resounding critique of the production and representational logic of the former indie darling Eastshade. Kagen argues that the game’s creator, Danny Weinbaum, “threads the needle between presenting himself as the visionary artist he is…and humble laborer” and that Weinbaum is not alone in this rhetoric of self-sacrifice for artistry amongst indie developers (Kagen 2022, 60). What is really happening “in this paradigm [in which] successful independent game development consists of a complicated cocktail of work, luck, and affect” is the possession of “enough privilege to survive precarity and the promise of overcoming it through hard work, patience, and (crucially) the subjugation of both personal needs and artistic vision in deference to player/consumers” (Kagen 2022, 62-63). In totality, Eastshade is “a fairy tale of late capitalist precarity,” in which “twenty-first-century ideologies and prejudices…make sense to have and do no harm. They aren’t underhanded, racist, or backstabbing, and they result in a gorgeous experience where everything is beautiful, and nothing hurts” (Kagen 2022, 63; 56).

    “Everything is beautiful, and nothing hurts” just as easily describes the now-canonical indie game Stardew Valley, which possesses a similar production narrative of the bootstrapping auteur in developer Eric Barone.[12] In Stardew Valley, the player experiences the quotidian of small-scale agriculture in a contemporary village in a simulacral Euramerica, farming, managing livestock, retailing crops, and marrying townsfolk. The game has been nearly universally acclaimed and ushered in a new wave of non-mimetic farming simulators, which are indeed the games that, as an indie game, Stardew Valley is about on a metatextual level.

    Stardew Valley is a quintessential indie game. It is emblematic of the manner in which “indie games circulate as a form of cultural imperialism that both colonizes profitable forms of independent production and sanitizes them for mass consumption” and which “reduces all independent development to this particular aesthetic and mechanic genre of videogames and also reduces all independent developers to those white, Noth American men able to make a living developing games” (Boluk and LeMieux 2017, 33). Like Eastshade, “Stardew Valley may appear anti-capitalist and environmentalist in its invocation of a slow, community-oriented life that leaves the office cubicle behind. The gameplay…suggests a different attitude” (Jagoda 2020, 68). Patrick Jagoda argues that this different attitude is the neoliberal ideology underpinning all videogames, indie or mainstream, problematic or ameliorative. For Jagoda, “Stardew Valley is something more than a representation of neoliberal life: it is a participatory training ground for the types of processes, modes of thinking, and habits necessary to survive and thrive within—and in many active senses to build—a neoliberal lifeworld” (Jagoda 2020, 69). And, as Golumbia once wrote, “a more apt name,” for the state of the contemporary world under computationalism itself “might be ‘neoliberalism” (Golumbia 2009b, 144; Jagoda 2020, 13).

    Indie games may appear to provide a break from the dominant concerns of mainstream gaming, such as technological development, homogeneity, conquest, and heroics, and that delicate balance of difficulty and accessibility that makes for a respectable prestige title. However, on a sublimated level, they replicate the same underlying ideologies of pseudo-meritocratic neoliberalism, bourgeois cultural hierarchy, and artistry while obscuring the harmful realities of the videogame as a medium. Even when the invisible hand attempts to correct itself, it cannot escape the systems that animate it in the first place. The only way out of the double bind is to get outside of it. To do so, we must acknowledge that the issues we take with some games are present at some level in all. This is to say, Stardew Valley is not special. It is not special either as a beacon of cozy comfort amidst the dominance of the epic and brutal conquests of mainstream gaming or as a reaffirmation of the neoliberal capitalist world order. Under a system of canonicity in scholarship, when only touchstone texts are ever given complete critical treatment, both our praise and critique of Stardew Valley have the same effect: reinforcing its canonical status and unrivaled cultural importance.

    The prominence of indie games brings forth one peripheral problem that haunts the videogame canon and the maneuvers of the hand itself. This is the specter of a stubborn, implicit Orientalism. That is to say, for all of the influx of interest in Stardew Valley within popular and scholarly gaming cultures, there has been little interest in uncovering, addressing, and analyzing the game’s immediate East Asian ancestor, the storied and still in production, Harvest Moon series.[13] Christopher B. Patterson argues that “videogames are Asiatic even when they contain no explicit racial representations, as they are manufactured and innovated upon in Asian contexts and remain colored by Asian associations as new media products” (Patterson 2020, 27). Meanwhile, the list of 38 canonical games compiled by Frome and Martin features only seven games developed in East Asia, and if we discount arcade cabinets which carry loose regional associations despite their origins, only five remain: Super Mario Bros., Final Fantasy, Resident Evil, the Legend of Zelda, and Metal Gear Solid. Much like the conversation around issues of inclusion and diversification in the Western canon, the canonical texts of game studies are remarkably homogenous despite the fact that East Asian products overwhelmingly dominate the global videogame marketplace. We must ask if the videogame is indeed Asiatic in the collective cultural imagination, how can a canon of videogames be no more than 13-18% East Asian in origin? The pivot to indie games over AAA titles has made no more room for a discussion of these regional biases. As Stardew Valley’s cannibalization of Harvest Moon demonstrates, the games that indie games are so often about are East Asian. An uneven distribution of cultural capital is visible, and it is predicated upon a reductive conception of regional origin. Geographically and racially coded exclusion is a profound consequence of sheer inattention to the systemic mechanisms at play in the discursive formation of a games canon.

     As the three moments detailed above demonstrate, the academy’s structural conditions empower the invisible hand of canonicity to propagate the generation, maintenance, and dissemination of cultural capital embodied through canon formation and organization. In this way, canonicity operates in a manner equivocal to computation by obscuring the operations of already-established systems that constantly accumulate, condense, and employ power. The presence of a canon in game studies doubles the relationship between the game and hierarchical power, manifest in both games themselves as software and in canons as creations of institutionalized cultural capital. When we write about games only because other scholars have discussed them, ignored them, undervalued them, or overvalued them, we replicate the binary logic of value judgments predicated on the individual tastes of others. When we endlessly discuss the merits and demerits of the same AAA games, we reproduce them and all that comes with them. When we value games made by individual creators or studios because of their relationship to an authorial or artistic presence, we reinforce the bourgeois ideology of art as a metaphysical product of genius, discrete from the material production of commodities. When we write about only those games we think other people want to read about, we allow imagined demographics to shape material knowledge production. Each of these moments arose because of the implicit presence, fluid though it may be, of a canon of games deemed worthy of research, which shapes the how, why, and for whom we research games at the cost of all possible alternatives. When we replicate and reinforce the shadow canon of videogame studies, we allow ourselves to be manipulated by an invisible, immaterial, and unnecessary presence created by and for institutions and cultural ecosystems very incongruent with the videogame.

    Player 3, Select Name, Double A: On Becoming the Hand

    Like many scholars working in and around the field right now, I am concerned for the future of videogame studies. Following Alex Gekker, I am concerned that “the emphasis on certain types of (commercial) gaming phenomena” within the field, e.g. canonicity, “leads to a path of dependence that pushes game scholars to focus on a limited number of highly visible games, genres, and related practices, limiting publishing opportunities to those lacking in certain gaming capital” (Gekker 2021, 74). These limitations are what Kelly Bergstrom worries are a defining reason for the lack of diversity within videogame development and videogame studies, encapsulated by young scholars’ (including my own) worry that “their work [is] too niche, too concerned with edge cases, and too far afield to be considered within the boundaries of game studies” (Bergstrom 2022, 178). Gekker suggests a solution grounded in reframing game studies as a post-humanities field in which scholars intermix “various forms of humanities and social sciences analyses to better account for the material shift in media technologies,” or essentially, an opening up of the boundaries of game studies to include all scholars who work on, around, with, or even in videogames (Gekker 2021, 78). Bergstrom’s suggestion is similar. She asks that “we reframe our field’s genesis point,” positioning issues of identity and culture at the forefront (Bergstrom 2022, 178).

    While I do not disagree with either of these suggestions, and attempt to uphold them in my own work, I question whether the amount of coalescent organization required from the field of game studies to make an organized and concerted effort of reform is not simply a reproduction of the problem itself. An organized game studies that can make a majority decision to correct its own course is a narrow game studies. This narrow game studies then once again excludes those who, Gekker writes “might be participating in game studies but not defining themselves according to their affinity with the field” (Gekker 2021, 75). Simon Deterding has already pointed out that game studies is an “increasingly narrow inter-discipline” intellectually dominated by humanities scholars and game developers within the field, and as such, an orchestrated reorientation of the field predicated on identification with the extant field only replicates the same omissions (Deterding 2017, 532).

    I am also concerned that taking on any actions at the strategic level reinforce Soraya Murray’s worries about the effects of neoliberalism in the university. Like Gekker and Bergstrom, Murray is troubled about the state of game studies, emphasizing “the residue” of game studies’ origins in “entertainment writing” and “the overwhelming priority given within the academy” to “technical, training, development, and interaction” (Murray 2018, 9; 12). However, as a post-colonialist scholar, Murray is also concerned that “the neoliberalism of the university has resulted in an environment in which the critical cultural theorist of technological forms is often made to feel that, as they are not ‘making’ something, what they are doing is not productive” (Murray 2018, 17). That is to say, we do not need to make videogames, make things from video games, or (re-)make the field of videogame studies to produce insight into the cultural functions of the videogame. And yet, because videogames as objects and videogame studies are closely tethered to production, both in the material production of games themselves or the theorized production of new skills, affinities, attitudes, and information through interaction with them, it is often especially difficult to escape the logic of productivity when dealing with them in any capacity. This potential to lapse into the whims of neoliberal capitalism is especially worrisome, considering that, as we have already seen, the videogame can often double as a rhetorical instrument of neoliberalism itself. As such, instituting a post-humanities turn, reframing our field’s genesis, the promotion of specific creators, or even Christopher A. Paul’s “obligation” to address problems within videogame studies, while noble and beneficial projects, verge on simply other ways to “make” things, to prove productivity under neoliberalism (Paul 2018, 2).

    What I suggest here, then, is tactical action, attention, and inattention to the field in tandem so as to produce scholarship that responds to inquiry and need. The implicit production of a canon that results in numerous chapters on Bioshock, treatises on Stardew Valley, and conference panels on The Last of Us is simply one of many components that maintain and limit the purview of game studies. It is one boundary spurring on an “increasing coalescence” of game studies “into a relatively closed community” (Deterding 2017, 536–37). Despite the depth to which canonicity is ingrained in Western scholastic culture and textual studies, de-canonization seems to be one of the easiest reparative projects to initiate within game studies. When players over 100,000 players gather in the subreddit for Palia or when Splendid Land, the working name for developer and artist Samanthuel Louise Gillson, publishes simple, short, metatextual games like Franken which comment on and promote the consumption of other niche or dying genres, they are doing de-canonization through the selection and rendering visible of these works. For, if the canon is crafted in the shadows by an invisible hand who picks and chooses, values and devalues, remembers and forgets, includes and excludes, and if we can agree that the presence of a canon in game studies is as, if not more, problematic than the existence of a canon in literary or film studies, then we must render the hand visible in game studies, as well.

    The title of this subsection refers to the glitch through which the final boss of Super Smash Brothers Melee, Master Hand, a hostile, disembodied, gloved hand, can become a playable character. By plugging in two controllers, one in the 3rd slot of a Nintendo Gamecube, loading the character select screen, lingering over the select name option on Player 3’s character slot, and pressing A on both controllers simultaneously, the player can enter battle as Master Hand. As neat as access to an otherwise forbidden character may be, playing as Master Hand is less than fun. It freezes frequently in battle and is unusable in certain game scenarios. The Super Smash Brothers fan wiki describes the pros and cons of utilizing Master Hand succinctly: “if Master Hand is allowed in a game, he may at first appear to have a considerable advantage, as he does not take knockback and thus cannot be KOed at all,” but “since the Master Hand glitch most often causes a major disadvantage to the player using it, few players even consider the option, preventing the situation from being a competitive issue” (“Master Hand Glitch” 2024). As a boss, Master Hand is a hostile NPC and a part of the encoded structures of the game itself, an unchangeable, essential quality of it. With the glitch, however, Master Hand becomes interactive, controllable, and strategically deployable as a broken character capable of breaking itself, others, and the game it inhabits. I suggest here that the system of canonization that has taken place over the last forty years of game studies has occurred through an invisible hand that we, as games scholars, might do well to think of as Master Hand. To ameliorate some of the harm it has enacted on the field, we might consider using the glitch and becoming Master Hand.

     To become Master Hand, we must become aware of our own actions in the field and how they shape it. If we want to see it changed, we must be willing to make those changes on an individual, tactical level in our own scholarship. This could mean anything from a fundamental refusal to acknowledge the existence of Bioshock to a persistent, granular inquiry into those games that are neither prestigious nor subversive like Madden ’13, Cat Quest, or The Sims: Medieval. If we desire not only the survival of game studies but the realization of its transformative power, we must accept games as they are: as a diverse array of commodified software. Eventually, if the structural logic of canonicity is left in place, the field will be reduced to a true echo chamber, appraising and sponsoring the same games, the same types of games, the same players, and the same game cultures. We cannot kill our personal Master Hand any more than we can kill the one that lives inside a tiny disc for the Nintendo Gamecube; attempting to do so will only cause it to respawn, perhaps a bit wilder this time, as Crazy Hand. Rather, we must control the Hand. Before this sounds too much like the neoliberal reforms suggested above, I want to clarify that the control I imagine is that of small, imprecise, and often ineffective gestures, just as controlling Master Hand for a round of Smash feels.

    To control the Hand, we must become it and simultaneously ignore it. And as the Master Hand, we could study and theorize those games that we are interested in, that our students (all of them) are interested in, that the world at large is interested in, and those games that carry meaning for us, for others, or no one. We could study games broadly, diffusely, and carefully. We could contradict ourselves and others within our field and allow those contradictions to hold without the easy answers of reform or replacement. We could both continue to write, as we have, about the ways in which Stardew Valley offers the image of liberation from the oppression of late-stage techno-capitalism and simultaneously reinforces it under a more quaint, rural veneer. We could also write about the way the game plays, the way it was created, the way it was received culturally, its lineage as a Western descendent of East Asian non-mimetic farming simulators, and its relationship to ultra-realistic Western-produced farming simulators, and who plays it, why they play it, where they play it, and why they enjoy playing. We are also able to ask and answer all the same questions for those quaint, cozy, lightly fantastic farming games that came before it and the genre of “cozy” indie games that have come after it, and finally, we must compare our answers. We could ask if Stardew Valley is exceptional amongst its peers, and if so, try to articulate why, even if that answer turns out to be, disappointingly, nothing more than a matter of historical timing. We could acknowledge that videogames as objects are computational commodities, born in the military-industrial complex and nurtured to maturity on the sustenance of exploited labor, resource extraction, abuse, hate, and profound misogyny just as often as we rightfully acknowledge the radical, liberatory, speculative, ameliorative, healing, and educational possibilities equally embedded within the medium. Acknowledging these things means choosing not only what we say about games but also what games we say things about and why. Even when Master Hand freezes up and cancels out the game, we could always continue to try to control it to prevent it from controlling us.

    Rian C. Johnson is a doctoral candidate in the Media, Art, and Text program at Virginia Commonwealth University, where he is also an adjunct instructor in the English department. His primary areas of interest are critical video game studies, speculative fiction studies, and cultural studies. Rian is currently in the process of completing a dissertation exploring representations of the mundane, the quotidian, and the everyday in high-fantasy single-player Japanese role-playing games.

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    [1] No matter how hyperbolic, provocative, or subjective it may sound to call videogames bad objects, I am not the first. Ian Bogost once characterized games as “gross, revolting heaps of arbitrary anguish” in which players engage in a desperate, unnecessary “attempt to get a broken machine to work again” (Bogost 2015, 1). Videogames are, Bogost claimed, “grotesque” (Bogost 2015, 1). As the theorist behind procedural rhetoric, Bogost’s orientation towards games has always been markedly more computational than most of the field and equally hyperbolic. While Bogost was referring to Flappy Bird in the above quotation, his descriptors apply to videogames in general and should do so explicitly.

    [2] See Golumbia’s “Games without Play” for more on the inextricable relationship between games and labor (Golumbia 2009a). 

    [3] The anchor, Jayne Secker, received substantial online blowback, including demands for an apology from anonymous netizens. Yet, an apology was never issued, nor was the comment acknowledged by the anchor or the network which in and of itself demonstrates a pervasive cultural, if not dismissal of, or at least disinterest in videogames as valuable artifacts.

    [4] Unlike Concord’s simultaneous flop, publications ranging from film news to entertainment news more broadly and to mainstream general news platforms like CNBC, NPR, BBC News, and the Guardian were all invested in the post-mortem of Todd Phillips’ Joker: Folie a Deux (Kim 2024; Barber 2024; Whitten 2024; Hoad 2024).

    [5] On Adventure’s equivocation with storytelling and literary textuality in early game studies see Espen Aarseth’s 1997 monograph, Cybertext, which takes the game as a primary case study, Chris Crawford’s 2003 chapter “Interactive Storytelling” which names Adventure as a sort of videogamic proto-narrative, Aarseth’s 2004 chapter “Genre Trouble” in which he does much the same, taking Adventure’s narrative identity as a priori, Jesper Juul’s Half-Real, in which Adventure is used again as an early prototype of Juul’s category of “progression” games in which linear, teleological ludic and narrative progression is valued above freeplay or exploration, and finally, Nick Montfort’s 2003 Twisty Little Passages, named after a quotation from the game itself. (E. J. Aarseth 1997; E. Aarseth 2004, 51; Crawford 2003, 259–60; Juul 2005, 76; Montfort 2003)

    [6] For more recent research on or around Adventure, see Reed, Murray, and Salter’s 2020 Adventure Games, which encapsulates both Adventure and Kentucky Route Zero, Stuart Moulthrop’s 2021 chapter on the legacy of hypertext fiction, “Hypertext Fiction Ever After,” Andrew Reinhard’s 2021 archaeological investigation of the game, Jérémie LeClerc’s work on race, Adventure, and Kentucky Route Zero, Dennis G. Jerz, Tiffany Funk, and Jesse Snider’s work on the relationship between the in-game world and the real Mammoth Cave complex, and finally, Aubrey Anable’s phenomenal affective reading of the metatextuality between both games in Playing with Feelings (Reed, Salter, and Murray 2020; Moulthrop 2021; Reinhard 2021; LeClerc 2024; Jerz 2007; Funk 2022; Snider 2023; Anable 2018, 1–37). 

    [7] A few exceptional examples are Mark J.P. Wolf’s early article on video game spatiality utilizing Space Invaders as a primary example, King and Krzywinska’s formal analyses of Space Invaders, Raiford Guins’ discussion of the Space Invaders cabinet, Jaroslav Svlech’s semiotic reading of the depiction of enemies within Space Invaders, and works from within popular video game culture like Steve Bloom’s Video Invaders or Martin Amis’ Invasion of the Space Invaders. (Wolf 1997; King and Krzywinska 2006; Guins 2014; Švelch 2023; Bloom 1982; Amis 1982)

    [8] The most glaring relation between this turn and Space Invaders as an early “non-canonical” text that was then incorporated into the canon is Jesper Juul’s “Games Telling Stories?” which uses the game as a primary example in investigating the existence and presentation of narratives within videogames, but the phenomenon is what Sky LaRell Anderson considers “ludic anxiety” and provides a discursive summary in “Start, Select, Continue,” (Juul 2001; Anderson 2013)

    [9] Consider the fundamental relation between texts like Ultima IV, Dragon Quest, Missile Command, Mystery House, or even Puyo Puyo and contemporary, canonical video games as well as their relative absence from anglophone video game scholarship.

    [10] For insight into Mary Ann Buckles’ time as a graduate student, see Michael Erard’s 2004 profile (Erard 2004).

    [11] AAA games are those games produced by major video game studies which receive the largest investment of resources, including economic, creative and skilled labor, manufacturing and distribution, and the most popular attention within and without gaming culture.

    [12] For a particularly succinct and ostentatious example of this, see GQ’s 2018 photoshoot-accompanied feature on Barone as the “alchemist” of gaming (White 2018).

    [13] The series’ first iteration was released in 1996, and new installments have been released regularly since then. However, in 2015, the series changed its title in the Anglosphere from Harvest Moon to Story of Seasons due to changes in licensing, localization, and publication deals. Despite this, the Japanese title, Bokujō Monogatari, and the series continuity have remained unchanged. 

  • Critique as Care: A b2o Special Issue in Honor of David Golumbia

    Critique as Care: A b2o Special Issue in Honor of David Golumbia

    b2o is pleased to announce the publication of a special issue in honor of our friend and b2o as well as b2 colleague, David Golumbia, who passed away in September 2023. Edited by Norberto Gomez, Frankie Mastrangelo, Jonathan Nichols, and Paul Robertson, the issue brings together two terms that we associate with David’s work in digital studies: “critique” and “care”. The special issue launched with a first essay by Adin Lears on April 24th, 2025 and further contributions will be published as they become available.

    Read Alexander Galloway’s review of David’s book Cyberlibertarianism here.

  • Ali Rıza Taşkale–Mapping Affective Landscapes within Financialized Capitalism through Speculative Fiction

    Ali Rıza Taşkale–Mapping Affective Landscapes within Financialized Capitalism through Speculative Fiction

    This response to Torsten Andreasen’s article “The Day the Music Died” was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier.

    Mapping Affective Landscapes within Financialized Capitalism through Speculative Fiction

    Ali Rıza Taşkale

     Introduction

    In ‘The Day the Music Died’, Torsten Andreasen explores the link between Robert Brenner’s theory of a ‘long downturn’ in advanced economies and Fredric Jameson’s concept of the ‘waning of affect’. Brenner argues that capitalist economies have faced low profit rates since the 1970s, while Jameson describes postmodernism as the cultural logic of financialization, leading to a shift in affective responses from deep historical engagement to surface-level intensities. Andreasen expands on Jameson’s notion of affect as a historically specific capacity to perceive and act in a given social context, exploring how the genre of finance fiction both depicts affective reactions to finance and itself constitutes such a reaction.

    Andreasen identifies three stages of affective response to financialized capitalism: the euphoric hubris of the 1980s, the schizophrenic horror of the 1990s and early 2000s, and the resignation following the 2007-2008 financial crisis. To Andreasen, these stages mirror broader cultural shifts in responses to financial capitalism, from optimism to crisis-induced alienation and eventual acceptance, as illustrated by films like Wall Street, American Psycho, and Cosmopolis.

    I find Andreasen’s periodization helpful, as it reflects shifts in how speculative finance and capitalism are culturally represented. Moreover, his exploration of the evolution of finance fiction is particularly insightful, as it frames a transition from the optimism of the post-war era to a growing recognition of the breakdown of industrial capitalism, ultimately leading to the post-crisis affect of resignation. Thus, the strength of his argument lies in his critique of finance fiction’s focus on individual crises, highlighting how this emphasis often overlooks the systemic violence embedded in financial capitalism. Ultimately, Andreasen calls for a more critical engagement with the structural forces sustaining financial capitalism, rather than perpetuating the individualization of crises within finance fiction.

    However, Andreasen’s piece is not without its limitations. These become particularly visible in his references to Raymond Williams’ ‘structures of feeling’. Williams’ concept is closely tied to a political economy of affect, which Andreasen hints at but does not explicitly explore. This is important because some of his analyses illuminate affective logics shaped by the values embedded in specific historical and material processes. This raises an important question: what, exactly, are the prevailing affective states within speculative financial capitalism, and how are we to understand them?

    Affective Landscapes through Pattern Recognition

    In his piece, Andreasen alludes to affective states, but he does not capture what I refer to as ‘speculative fatigue’, which I argue is the dominant affective state of contemporary financial capitalism. Speculative fatigue, I argue, is the exhaustion caused by continuous market volatility and high-risk investments, leading to disillusionment with financial systems that appear disconnected from real-world stability. To address this, I suggest turning to speculative fiction to gain a deeper understanding of the affective modes within financial capitalism. Speculative fiction brings distinctive powers, pleasures, and textual and visual richness to the issues discussed by Andreasen (Canavan 2017; Chambers and Garforth 2020; Vint 2021). It not only exposes the inherent contradictions of financial speculation but also unveils the predominant affective dynamics associated with it.

    Several works of speculative fiction effectively make legible the prevailing affective states of financial capitalism. Examples could include Kim Stanley Robinson’s New York 2140 (2017) and Jonas Eika’s After the Sun (2021). I want to focus, however, on one particular novel: William Gibson’s Pattern Recognition (2003, hereafter PR), a work of speculative fiction that explores the intersections of branding, marketing, and finance in a digital age. Although written in 2003, just after the 9/11 attacks and before the 2007–2008 global market crash, the novel’s portrayal of homo-economicus as the affective subjectivity and speculative fatigue as the dominant affect remains strikingly relevant today.

    The novel’s protagonist, Cayce Pollard, is a marketing consultant with an exceptional ability to recognize patterns in cultural trends and advertisements. When tasked with tracing the origins of enigmatic film clips known as ‘footage’ circulating online, Cayce becomes entangled in a global conspiracy. As her investigation deepens, she not only confronts her own inner demons but also navigates a reality increasingly shaped by virtual connections and speculative agendas. This journey mirrors the broader thematic concerns in PR, especially the commercialization and commodification of life within late financial capitalism. Cayce’s search for the origins of the footage can be seen as a metaphor for the way financial capitalism shapes our affective valuation of life, reducing personal and emotional experiences to marketable and commodified elements.

    In the novel, one of the most potent tools of such market commodification is a strategy called ‘cool-hunting’. Cool-hunting, or trendspotting, as defined by Cayce, involves identifying ‘a group behavior pattern around a particular class of objects’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 86). She further explains that this tactic relies heavily on pattern recognition, with cool-hunters aiming to identify ‘a pattern before anyone else does’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 86). Following this, she describes the next process: ‘I point a commodifier at it […], it gets productized. Turned into units. Marketed’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 86).

    Trapped in the Perpetual Present: Homo Economicus in Financial Capitalism

    The commodification of everyday life, where even the most intimate moments can be analyzed and monetized by pattern-recognizing experts and cool hunters employed by profit-driven multinational corporations, poses a significant threat as life is reduced to ‘homo economicus’, driven solely by market and corporate interests. Homo economicus is the ideal figure within the financial market. Just as financial capitalism creates markets, it also shapes homo economicus as a form of subjectification and affect. Within financial capitalism, therefore, ‘we are everywhere homo economicus and only homo economicus’ (Brown, 2015, p. 33). In this framework, the subject is left to fend for itself and is addressed affectively. Its wants, desires, passions, and instincts are duly noted and turned into a financial narrative. It is in this space that financial capitalism aligns with its affective subjectivity – the subject of homo economicus, motivated only by self-interest.

    Thus, what is distinctive about the figure of homo-economicus, and necessary for the functioning of financial capitalism, is that it legitimizes and ultimately (re)produces individuals based on market-defined self-interest(s). This system has become so pervasive that it has transformed everyday human existence into a vast game, or an endless stream of derivatives and speculative instruments. Individuals are increasingly defined by their ‘speculative value’ (Davis, 2018), a phenomenon that extends beyond consumers to include those working within the system, such as the cool-hunters themselves.

    This is further illustrated in PR, which shows how the dominance of techno-financial culture, the surplus of consumer goods, and the illusion of instant gratification collectively transform society’s perception of time. This transformation gives rise to what Fredric Jameson (1991) terms a ‘perpetual present’. This is not just a structural shift but is also deeply affective, reshaping how individuals experience and internalize their place in the world by establishing a regime of ‘indifference’ (Martin, 2007). This affective state of perpetual present manifests in a world where the boundaries between the past, present, and future are increasingly blurred, as technological advancements and financial imperatives accelerate the pace of life. The constant flood of new products, information, and experiences generates a sense of ‘immediacy’ (Kornbluh, 2023), where the future is always deferred, and the past is continually reinterpreted to serve present speculation. In a world dominated by the logic of speculative finance and branding, time becomes a commodity – something to be sold, consumed, and constantly redefined. The notion of inhabiting a perpetual futuristic present also resonates with the statements of the sinister entrepreneur in the novel, Hubertus Bigend:

    We have no idea, now, of who or what the inhabitants of our future might be. In that sense, we have no future. Not in the sense that our grandparents had a future, or thought they did. Fully imagined cultural futures were the luxury of another day, one in which “now” was of some greater duration. For us, of course, things can change so abruptly, so violently, so profoundly, that futures like our grandparents’ have insufficient “now” to stand on. We have no future because our present is too volatile. [. . . ] We have only risk management. The spinning of the given moment’s scenarios. Pattern recognition. (Gibson 2003, p. 57)

    Therefore, for Bigend, history has effectively ended, and resistance is deemed futile. To project meaningfully into the future from a ‘perpetual present’ characterized by constant change, has become an impossible task. The novel also suggests that we, as readers, may be vulnerable under such circumstances to ‘apophenia’, a concept defined within the text as ‘the spontaneous perception of connections and meaningfulness in unrelated things… an illusion of meaningfulness, faulty pattern recognition’ (2003, p. 115). While cool-hunters recognize real patterns to be economized, we merely imagine them in a desperate attempt to give meaning to our lives. They are hunting for cool; we are seeing patterns where there are none.

    In the novel, people become more and more fixated on the footage, attempting to decipher patterns and significance within it. They engage in speculation about the meaning, function, or nature of the footage within Internet forums and across various digital networks, fostering the creation of new channels through which objects can be circulated and marketed (Nilges, 2019, p. 47). This reflects the relationship between interpretation and object, speculation and value, which forms the system through which the footage circulates.

    This obsession with patterns must be understood differently depending on the historical period, allowing us to expand Andreasen’s periodization. In the 1980s, it aligns with Baudrillard’s critique of the simulacrum, where the proliferation of signs detached from reality creates existential uncertainty and a loss of meaning. By 2003, it reflects early Internet culture’s optimism about digital connectivity and the democratization of meaning, generating excitement and a belief in new possibilities, even within an emerging neoliberal landscape. By 2025, the affective response shifts again, shaped by a highly financialized, algorithm-driven digital economy, where engagement with content is driven by monetization and speculation. This fosters anxiety, compulsive interaction, and a sense of precarity, as meaning itself becomes a commodity. This shift does not follow a simple linear progression, nor does one phase completely replace another. Instead, it highlights how the pursuit of meaning moves from existential uncertainty to optimism, and finally to a precarious, commodified engagement with digital networks and financialized attention economies.

    PR captures this historical trajectory while dramatizing humanity’s endless quest for meaning in a world dominated by signs and symbols – a pursuit for authenticity (amidst simulacra), continuity (in a culture celebrating fragmentation), and depth (in a society increasingly shaped by surface-level engagement and algorithmic immediacy). In the novel, this is an obsession that Hubert Bigend seeks to capitalize on financially. The objective is not to uncover patterns that might imbue the footage with meaning but, rather, as he sees it, to exploit and commercialize the footage. At this point, Bigend makes an important statement that aptly describes today’s financial market, which has increasingly become a simulacrum or a speculative construct rather than a tangible entity: ‘Far more creativity, today, goes into the marketing of products than into the products themselves’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 67). Thus, Bigend serves as a living embodiment of financial capitalism, wherein speculative value and profit supersede all other considerations. To him, life is viewed primarily through the prism of marketing and speculation.

    However, the rise of speculative financial instruments does not signal the end of production and labor in today’s economies, nor a decrease in the focus on commodities. Instead, it reflects a shift from traditional consumer- and production-based capitalism to speculative financial practices, which are altering our understanding of value. Under financial capitalism, value increasingly derives from activities like ‘debt trading, financial market activity’ and ‘rentier practices’ (Davis, 2018, p. 5). This reflects a transformation in how economic value is generated: it is no longer grounded in production, but in abstract financial mechanisms that reshape wealth distribution and economic power.

    This transformation is portrayed in PR, where Bigend’s pursuit of the footage is driven purely by financial motives. Cayce’s search, by contrast, is motivated by a desire to uncover something of genuine value, revealing a tension between speculative financial practices and the human need for meaning beyond profit and homo-economization. This contrast demonstrates how speculative capitalism not only redefines value but also influences individual desires and perceptions of worth.

    Jameson (2003, p. 114) offers a reading of Gibson’s PR in which he observes that the clips’ absence of pattern and style provides ‘an ontological relief’ to Cayce, granting her ‘an epoch of rest, an escape from the noisy commodities themselves, which turn out […] to be living entities preying on the humans who have to coexist with them’. Although Cayce’s abilities develop within an overpowering technological market, she manages to avoid being reduced to homo economicus or having her life fully economized. She possesses what is known as a ‘trademark allergy’, which evolves into a phobia or nausea towards certain trademarks like Tommy Hilfiger and Bibendum, the Michelin Man. This reaction can be described as a side-effect of too much exposure to the world of branding and marketing. To cope, she removes trademark logos from her clothing and avoids contact with fashion brand names. As Gibson describes it, this rejection reflects Cayce’s conscious effort to resist being consumed by the hegemonic power of the techno-financial system and avoid becoming merely a commodified entity.

    In her journey to find the creator of the footage, Cayce travels to various cities, including Tokyo. Upon her arrival in that city, she is confronted with what Gibson (2003, p. 125) describes as ‘the manically animated forest of signs’, leading her to seek nature and authenticity in the city. Cayce perceives Tokyo as a place where reality has been exiled, to the extent that even the paved streets seem to conceal no soil beneath them; everything appears artificial. She reflects, ‘she’s never actually seen soil emerge from any incision they might make in the street, here; it’s as though there is nothing beneath the pavement but a clean, uniformly dense substrate of pipes and wiring’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 125).

    Tokyo thrives on signs and simulacra; yet, through her individual re-appropriation, Cayce resists the overwhelming dominance of financial instruments and cultural discourses, managing to prevent her life from being economized and commercialized. In other words, she refuses to be consumed by the simulacrum. In this sense, Cayce’s radicality and authenticity do not lie in overthrowing the oppressive systems of capitalism in which she is immersed, but rather in surviving within that system with some degree of agency.

    Speculative Fatigue

    PR anticipates a technologized future where financialization becomes ingrained in daily life. In this world, the distinction between the actual and the virtual blurs, and speculative finance takes center stage. The result is a subject reduced to a mere number, shaped by the totalizing forces of financial capitalism, where individuality is obscured, and the capacity to engage with or make sense of events is suspended. In this condition, the subject embodies homo economicus – driven by market logic rather than personal agency. Paralyzed by brands, speculative financial instruments, and AI technologies, this subject inhabits the world without truly interacting with it.

    But how is the dominant affective state presented in the novel? While there are many affective responses throughout, PR illustrates an affective state in which speculative financial capitalism creates a life of suspended agency, where individuals are trapped in an endless loop of commodification and abstraction, shaped by the banality of corporate logos, technologies, and financial instruments. I call this affective state speculative fatigue, as it frames the affective and psychological toll of living under the constant pressure of financial speculation. If homo economicus is the product of financial speculation, then speculative fatigue could be seen as the affective residue left from being constantly subjected to its logic. In this sense, speculative fatigue isn’t just about an individual’s weariness with financial markets; it’s about how these markets and the perpetual self-calculation they demand leave people exhausted, emotionally drained, and disconnected from anything other than their economic value. It acknowledges the toll that the pervasive logic of financialization takes on people, whether or not they’re actively participating in it.

    Speculative fatigue diverges from the affective states of euphoria and resignation, as described by Andreassen, through its distinct tone and lived experience. Euphoria, seen in the early stages of financialization, is driven by optimism and belief in the limitless potential of financial markets. In contrast, speculative fatigue arises from the constant pressure of engaging with financial speculation, leaving individuals mentally and affectively drained rather than energized. Resignation, often following a crisis, involves passive acceptance of the financial system’s dominance. While speculative fatigue shares some emotional distance with resignation, it is more about the ongoing toll of living in a financialized world that limits agency and connection, rather than simply giving up. In short, euphoria is driven by hope, resignation by acceptance, and speculative fatigue by the affective weariness of navigating a financially-driven reality.

    Speculative fiction, in this context, provides a lens through which to explore the speculative fatigue produced by financial capitalism, though such explorations are not exclusive to the genre. PR exposes how financial speculation actively shapes cognitive and emotional experiences, leading to an endless state of homo economicus – a condition of perpetual economic calculation and self-optimization. This state is not abstract or universal; it is a direct result of how speculative finance permeates daily life, inducing affective overload and fatigue. Thus, speculative fatigue emerges as the emotional and psychological toll of this constant engagement with the logic of financial speculation, leaving individuals disconnected and mentally drained. The novel not only depicts the speculative fatigue of living in a financialized world, but also critiques the very systems that generate this fatigue. By revealing how homo economicus is both constructed and perpetuated by the very forces it critiques, and how speculative fatigue emerges from this process, PR illustrates how speculative financial capitalism reshapes not only our material world but also our affective landscapes, reducing individuals to economic units within a system that demands constant self-commodification.

    In this sense, PR reveals the inherent contradictions of contemporary speculative financial capitalism, showing how speculation functions not only as an ‘immanent critique’ (Nilges, 2019) but also as a mechanism that cultivates homo economicus – a state where the pursuit of financial success, self-optimization, and market-driven choices supplant deeper values and genuine social connections. This homo economicus is not a passive backdrop but a central feature of the narrative, embodying the instability and uncertainty that come with speculative finance, where future outcomes are unpredictable. The affective experience of homo economicus, which manifests as speculative fatigue, is not incidental to financial speculation; rather, it is an intrinsic consequence of the constant cycle of self-assessment and recalculation of worth. This perpetual recalculation, driven by the fluctuating demands of financial markets and speculative mechanisms, exhausts individuals emotionally and psychologically, leaving them trapped in a state of ongoing fatigue.

    Conclusion: Speculative Fiction as Critique

    Andreasen identifies three stages of affective response to financialized capitalism: the euphoric hubris of the 1980s, the schizophrenic horror of the 1990s and early 2000s, and the resignation following the 2007–2008 financial crisis. In PR, however, speculative fatigue transcends this periodization, presenting a perpetual state of homo economicus, shaped by the pervasive logic of speculative finance.

    Yet this is not the entire story. PR is also illuminating in its depiction of Cayce’s resistance to speculative fatigue generated by commodification and financialization, extending beyond Andreasen’s understanding of the affective stages of financial capitalism. The novel concludes with Cayce peacefully falling asleep after achieving her initial goal: finding the maker and revealing the mystery of the footage. However, just before drifting off, Cayce’s trademark allergy is suddenly cured. She no longer fears the Michelin Man or Tommy Hilfiger products. This cure symbolizes her ability to save herself from the ‘logo-maze’ that threatened to erode her, as she has gained a deeper understanding of the system. Her consciousness reaches a new level. From now on, she continually works to expose, challenge, and resist the coercive system attempting to dominate her. Furthermore, of equal significance in the novel’s final scene is Cayce’s weeping ‘for her century, though whether the one past or the one present she doesn’t know’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 356).

    Resistance, though not an affect in itself, is fueled by a complex blend of emotions – frustration, anger, hope, and determination – that arise in response to the fatigue caused by speculative finance. This dual perspective, combining the affective state of speculative fatigue with the resistance that follows, highlights the transformative potential of speculative fiction. It does not simply capture the affective landscape of life within financialized systems but also weaves in acts of defiance, fueled by these very emotions. In this way, PR illustrates how resistance is both a reaction to the speculative fatigue of financial capitalism and a catalyst for imagining alternative futures.

    Thus, it is crucial to engage with speculative fiction, not merely as a realm of flying cars and futuristic gadgets, but as a toolkit for examining how speculative financial practices shape social and cultural dynamics. Speculative fiction exposes how desires, fears, and imagined futures are engineered by economic systems, while also offering a glimpse of new possibilities and forms of resistance that can disrupt and transform those systems.

    Ali Rıza Taşkale is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Social Sciences and Business at Roskilde University. Prior to joining Roskilde University, he held positions at Near East University, Northern Cyprus, and Hacettepe University, Turkey. His research has been published in journals such as Critical Studies on Security, Urban Studies, Utopian Studies, Distinktion, Thesis Eleven, Rethinking Marxism, Northern Lights, New Political Science, Contemporary Political Theory, Third Text, Theory, Culture & Society, and the Journal for Cultural Research. His book, Post-Politics in Context, was published by Routledge in 2016. He serves on the editorial board of Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, overseeing special issues and the forum exchange section and is actively engaged in a project exploring the logical and structural relationship between speculative fiction and speculative finance.

    References

    Andreasen, T. (2024). The day the music died – the waning of affect in finance fiction of the long downturn. Boundary (forthcoming)

    Brown, W. (2015). Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New York: Zone Books.

    Canavan, G. (2017). Green Planets: Ecology and Science Fiction. Wesleyan University Press.

    Chambers, A. C., & Garforth, L. (2020). Reading Science: SF and the Uses of Literature. In N. Ahuja, et al. (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Twentieth and Twenty-First Century Literature and Science (pp. xx-xx). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48244-2_14.

    Davis, A. (2018). Defining speculative value in the age of financialized capitalism. The Sociological Review, 66(1), 3-19.

    Frantzen, M. K. (2024). Making a Killing: The Birth of the Financial Thriller in the 1970s. Edinburgh: UEP. (forthcoming)

    Gibson, W. (2003). Pattern Recognition. Putnam Adult.

    Jameson, F. (1991). Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke University Press.

    Jameson, F. (2003). Fear and loathing in globalization. New Left Review, 23, 105–114.

    Nilges, M. (2019). The Realism of Speculation. CR: The New Centennial Review, 19(1), 37-59.

    Vint, S. (2021). Science Fiction. MIT Press.

     

  • Torsten Andreasen–The Day the Music Died: Finance Fiction and the Affects of the Long Downturn

    Torsten Andreasen–The Day the Music Died: Finance Fiction and the Affects of the Long Downturn

    This article was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier.

    The Day the Music Died: Finance Fiction and the Affects of the Long Downturn

    Torsten Andreasen

    All About that Base…

    Since the late 20th century, finance fiction has evolved through distinct affective phases – euphoria, schizophrenia, and resignation – both reflecting economic transformations and shaping the cultural logic of financialized capitalism. By bringing Robert Brenner’s theory of the long downturn into dialogue with Fredric Jameson’s waning affect, this article proposes a periodization of finance fiction that traces how affect mediates the contradictions of financial accumulation, not only registering crises in capitalism but also framing the ideological terms in which they are understood.

    Robert Brenner’s theory of a “long downturn” in advanced capitalist economies since 1973 and Fredric Jameson’s description of the same period as a “waning of affect” have each inspired innumerable analyses and diagnoses of late capitalist society and its cultural artefacts[1]. The theory of the long downturn grapples with enduring low industrial profit rates due to persistent overcapacity despite decreased investment in labor and equipment (Brenner 2006). The waning of affect is characteristic of postmodernism as the superstructure correlate to the base of financialized economy’s compensation for waning industrial growth  (Jameson 1991: xx-xxii): the transition from Munch’s Scream to Warhol’s Marilyn Monroe, from depth hermeneutics to simulacral surface, from a psychic experience and cultural language dominated by historical temporality to a fragmented hyper-spatiality transcending the modernist alienation of subjective anxiety and thus surpassing the capacities of the human sensorium and mutating the now ungraspable totality of the world system into impersonal schizophrenic experience.[2]

    Brenner’s long downturn and the financial bubbles and busts obfuscating it, have been analyzed and debated in minute historical detail, while Jameson’s waning of affect has been an important reference for discussion of both other affects and other kinds of waning—for example, the waning of genre. However, it is much less frequent for the two to be considered together.

    In an attempt to think through certain shifts in the historical development of cinematic and literary finance fiction, this article scrutinizes and further periodizes the waning of affect as a historical claim. It does so by considering affect in light of the long downturn, as specific affective reactions to concrete historical operations of financial capital after the post-war boom.

    The concept of affect is often employed in a somewhat vague manner. Jameson considers affect to be the interior feelings or emotional states of a historically specific subject: the bourgeois ego. Since postmodernity entails the fragmentation of the subject, there is no longer any ego to contain the emotions of old, and instead of feelings and emotions, the postmodern subject is left with free-floating and impersonal intensities.

    Holding on to Jameson’s notion of affect, I also consider a further, although more general, tradition of questioning affect: From Plato and Aristotle to Brian Massumi’s reading of Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, the question of affect has been framed as the ability to “affect and be affected”. In Plato and Aristotle, the ability (δύναμις) to affect (ποιεῖν) and be affected (παθεῖν) is a fundamental “property of being” (ἴδιον τοῦ ὄντος) (Aristotle 1960: V, IX) or of that which has “real existence” (πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι) (Plato 1921: 247 d7-23). Focusing on human existence, Spinoza was in search of “that which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many ways (ut pluribus modis possit affici), or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways (ad corpora externa pluribus modis afficiendum)” (Spinoza 2005: IV, prop. 38). Human affect, then, can be considered not so much a question of subjective or even impersonal emotion but as the ability to perceive, comprehend and react to the surrounding world: it is emotion as linked to perception, cognition, and, most importantly, agency.

    Jameson’s periodizing analysis of the waning of affect as characteristic of postmodernity reminds us that although there exists a long and varied philosophical tradition of analyzing as “affect” the ability to affect and be affected, it should not simply be read as a transhistorical subjective category, where each encounter is one of either joy or tristesse. Affect relies on historically specific material conditions, and Jameson’s argument implies that in this stage of late capitalism, the joy or tristesse of Spinoza’s encounter are displaced by euphoria and schizophrenia.

    Jameson himself defined the “ideological task” of the concept of postmodernism by referencing Raymond Williams’s concept of “structures of feeling” which, according to Williams, defines “forms and conventions in art and literature as inalienable elements of a social material process” (1977: 133) and describes how these structures constitute emergent, dominant, or residual social forms. I thus take affect to be a historically specific subjective ability to experience, feel, understand, and act within a given social material process – an ability enabled and mapped by cultural representation.

    My question is, then, whether it would be possible to consider the waning of affect as discontinuous constellations of shifting cultural dominants and their accompanying residual and emergent forms in late capitalism. I tentatively answer this question by looking at the representation of financialized affect in a selection of films and novels ostensibly about finance to distinguish various affective modes in the cultural depiction of the financier subject.[3]

    Jameson claimed that anxiety and alienation had been replaced by schizophrenia and euphoria as the two intensities available to the postmodern subject. I argue that within the cultural representation of the financier, euphoria and schizophrenia are historically separate modes, the second following the first, and both followed by a third. I thus propose to further periodize the conjecture of “waning affect” by sketching out three successive modes of perceiving, understanding, and reacting to one’s surroundings as they appear in finance fiction:

    1. “The Future’s So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades”: euphoric hubris of the 1980s.
    2. “And as Things Fell Apart…”: schizophrenic horror of the 1990s and early aughts.
    3. “The Day the Music Died”: predominant resignation after the financial crisis of 2007-2008.

    Through this periodization, I hope to analyze the cultural logic of financialized late capitalism as manifested in fictional renditions of finance in novels and movies.

    The Future’s So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades

    The financialized economy that superseded the production-based economic expansion of the postwar boom is, in Marxian terms, based on the belief that it is possible to cut out commodity production from the general formula for capital, M – C – M’, so that money is exchanged for more money with no value-adding labor required. The formula for this is M – M’, what Marx called the “most superficial and fetishized form” (Marx 1981: 515) of the capital relation, it is “fictitious capital” (1981: Chapter 25).

    The financiers in 1980s fiction all seem to subscribe to such a fantasy. Historically, this specific version of that recurring fantasy came out of the general slowdown in manufacturing profitability in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The slowdown was combatted by government facilitated debt creation – public, corporate, and private. Because of low profit rates, firms were unable to meet debt-fueled increases in demand by investing in production, and without an increase in supply prices went up (Brenner 2006: 157-159). The subsequent inflation peaked at 14.8% in March 1980, which was combatted by Fed Chair Paul Volcker by increasing the Fed funds rate to its peak of 20% in June 1981. The shift from Keynesian stimulus in the 1970s to Volcker’s monetarism at the end of the decade brought an abrupt end to subsidized demand and recession inevitably ensued.

    Wall Street had suffered during this slowdown in production, and “Between 1968 and 1975 over 150 firms were absorbed or closed” (Bruck 1988: 29). But while Volcker’s decision to fix money supply and let interest rates float inaugurated a recession in the American economy from 1979-1982, it also marked what Michael Lewis called “the beginning of the golden age of the bond man” (Lewis 1989: 43). This period saw the invention of the securitized mortgage loan and its repackaging in the so-called Collateralized Debt Obligations and “between 1977 and 1986, the holdings of mortgage bonds held by American Savings and Loans grew from 12.6 billion dollars to 150 billion dollars” (142), i.e., more than a ten-fold increase over the course of a decade.

    The early eighties also saw an explosion in Junk bonds (bonds rated below investment grade, i.e., BB+ or below) and the related debt-fueled hostile mergers and acquisitions which enabled the emergence of that crucial figure of the age: the corporate raider. This explosion in debt also drove stocks toward new highs before the crash in October 1987. The specific version of the fantasy of M – M’ which constitutes the clear cultural dominant of 1980s finance fiction should no doubt be seen in the light of this bull market run-up to the crash.

    This first stage of my proposed periodization, the stage of euphoric hubris where the future is so bright that shades are strictly necessary, is the age of what has been called the “Masters of the Universe.” The financial masters were famously described in Tom Wolfe’s Bonfire of the Vanities (1987) as the proud moniker which the protagonist, Sherman McCoy, awards himself:

    […] one fine day, in a fit of euphoria, after he had picked up the telephone and taken an order for zero-coupon bonds that had brought him a 50,000$ commission, just like that, this very phrase had bubbled up into his brain. On Wall Street he and a few others – how many? – three hundred, four hundred, five hundred? – had become precisely that… Masters of the Universe. There was… no limit whatsoever! (Wolfe 1987: 11)

    These masters were also known as Big Swinging Dicks, as famously documented in Michael Lewis’s Liar’s Poker: “If he could make millions of dollars come out of those phones, he became that most revered of all species: a Big Swinging Dick” (Lewis 1989: 56). Limitless accumulation of capital through the technologically mediated and thus seemingly immediate exchange of paper: this is the fantasy of the masters of the universe. In terms of affect, Jameson’s euphoria is clear, even explicit. The ability of the financier to immediately affect the world renders the M – M’ relation sensible as the absence of material limits. Money is transformed into more money, just like that!

    However, confronted with the stratified realms of production – the white working class (e.g., the airplane builders in Wall Street (1987) and ship builders in Pretty Woman (1990)) and racialized precarious labor (e.g., Eddie Murphy’s character Billy Ray Valentine in Trading Places (1983) and the depictions of Harlem and the Bronx in Bonfire) – these masters are generally depicted as incorporations of hubris. They are figures of Icarus who, in their euphoria, fly too close to the sun and fall as a result of their moral transgressions.

    The immediate expansion of finance capital via M – M’ as cultural dominant is accompanied by the residual forms of the manufacturing sector, presented as the sound but betrayed foundation of the American economy. The machine maintenance workers of Bluestar Airlines in Oliver Stone’s Wall Street are the salt of the earth betrayed by the soaring immoral greed of Gordon Gekko and his protégé Bud Fox. When Bud’s analyses of publicly available stock data find little demand in his one-shot ideas pitch to Gekko, he proposes the airline in which his father is a machinist and union representative. His insider’s knowledge of the company’s troubled financial situation enables him to argue that there is money to be made if the unions agree to a 20% salary cut to be reversed if the company turns a profit. Gekko pretends to go along but in fact intends to break up the company, sell the parts, and siphon off the surplus in the pension fund.

    As has been pointed out by Leigh Claire La Berge (La Berge 2015: 99), Bud is caught between his two fathers, the two ideals: on the one hand, the corporate raider for whom “Greed is good” and who clearly states “I create nothing; I own” and, on the other, the honest hard-working man who advises his son to “stop trading for the quick buck and go produce something with your life, create, don’t live off the buying and selling of others…”

    The two confronting ideals are narratively deployed to organize a moral showdown between labor and predatory ownership, between “the real economy” and “fictitious capital”, between a post-war production economy and the financial “zero sum game” where “Money itself isn’t lost or made, it’s simply transferred from one perception to another. Like magic. […] The illusion has become real”, as Gekko puts it.

    Wall Street and other finance fiction of the 1980s condemn finance in moral terms: the immorality of finance is to claim the reality of financial illusion, a claim rendered dubious in the film’s staging of the ideological confrontation between Gekko and Fox. During their heated exchange, the camera swivels restlessly around the two interlocutors, almost desperately avoiding a steady shot. But exactly at the transition from Gekko’s “I create nothing” to “I own”, the camera finally rests on Gekko in a satisfied pose, drink in hand, and New York skyscrapers as a backdrop. That brief image of capital’s self-satisfaction is only disturbed by the worker on a lift outside the building, cleaning the windows with long strokes from top to bottom.

    Gekko’s demonstrative pose as master of the universe is only minimally tainted by the slow movement of manual labor. I disagree, here, with La Berge’s description of the window cleaner as an evocation of “cleansing” (110). I would argue, rather, that he is an almost comical stain on the fantasy of frictionless transition of money from illusion to reality. Even in the most glorious image of the dominance of finance capital, the residual head of manual labor pops into the frame and by the strokes of its servicing hands discretely insists on labor as the inescapable material reality behind financial euphoria.

    A similar confrontation between the dominant fantasy of financial profit without cumbersome labor and the residual postwar ethos of a production-driven economic expansion appears in Pretty Woman where the corporate raider Edward Lewis is brought onto a more virtuous path by a sex worker with a heart of gold. The movie presents several forms of labor: the sex work of Vivian and her friend Kit, the corporate raiding of Edward and his icky lawyer Stucky, the service work of the hotel manager Barnard, the Rodeo Drive saleswomen, other service workers, and, finally, the family founders of the shipbuilding Morse Industries.

    Although the movie hints at the troubles of sex work by briefly mentioning the death of Skinny Marie (who Kit repeatedly dismisses as a flake and a crack head who is thus not worthy of Vivian’s “Cinder-fucking-ella”-like social ascent), the material conditions that constitute such work are quickly occluded by the question of inner subjective nobility predetermining social destiny. Because Vivian flosses her teeth and weeps with emotion at the opera, she proves a true princess who should, surely, be rewarded with a true prince protruding from a limousine sunroof, that preferred steed of budding financial royalty.

    Pretty Woman’s particular rendition of several age-old narrative schemata (e.g., Cinderella and Pygmalion) gets historically specific, however, when depicting the two mutually constitutive transformations in Vivian and Edward. In the opening scene, midway upon the journey of his life, Edward finds himself without a straightforward pathway. Lost in a Lotus, descending into the inferno of Hollywood Boulevard, Edward encounters real-world wisdom and grace united in the form of Vivian. The financier in the penthouse suite whose vertigo announces his inability to confront the material conditions of his social status is brought out of the euphoric hubris of his station by the straightforward humanity and nobility of the sex worker. The nobility of physical labor enables him to realize the ignominy of the M – M’ fantasy. As he says to Stucky: “We don’t build anything, Phil. We don’t make anything.”

    Instead of buying Morse Enterprises to break the company apart and sell the pieces in a replica of Gekko’s plan for Bluestar, Edward decides to invest in the company’s production: “Mr. Lewis and I are going to build ships together. Great big ships” as Mr. Morse says, thus providing Edward with a new and more benevolent father of industrial production than the one of inherited wealth who divorced his music teacher mother and thereby drove Edward towards the immoral quest of corporate raiding – a quest initiated by taking over and splitting up his father’s company in a fit of oedipal frenzy.[4]

    While Edward is obviously the knight in suit and shining armor, Stucky is the villain, insisting on maximizing profits through corporate raiding and even venting his frustrations with Edward’s newfound nobility by violating its source, Vivian, who, as a sex worker, is supposedly obliged to obey the proposition of an impromptu stint of wage labor. But the villainy of Stucky is the very condition of possibility of Edward’s nobility, just as Vivian’s nobility rests on the backdrop of a dead Skinny Marie. Only because the raw greed and dirty business tricks have been outsourced to Stucky – “That’s why I hired you, Phil, to do my worrying for me” – can Edward maintain the shine of his armor, and only because of the crackhead flakyness of certain colleagues can Vivian’s nobility stand out enough for her to ascend beyond her station and, from there, engage in the benevolent financing of Kit’s education. Carved of less noble wood than Vivian, Kit needs a philanthropic push from those of natural worth to work her way towards middle class respectability while Vivian takes the express elevator straight to the penthouse.

    The problem with this plot where innate moral nobility redirects the dominant 1980s fantasy of M – M’ back towards the residual M – C – M’ of a supposedly healthy and noble postwar industrial economy, is that such a turn enacts an ideological intervention in the historical causality of capital. Contrary to the movie’s claims, a return to an earlier era of production is not a question of morals. The laws of capital demand profit and you can neither morally nor magically restore the profitability of the manufacturing sector.

    The residual aspect of Pretty Woman does not solely spring from its fairy tale plot, then, but from the persistence of a postwar ethos of production as a valid response to the beginning cracks in the 1980s fantasy of finance, cracks that became exceedingly manifest on October 19, 1987, the day of the so-called Black Monday stock crash. The depiction of finance as moral corruption is a very real “imaginary resolution of […] objective contradictions” (Jameson 1981: 118). Pretty Woman and its contemporaries thus provide a residual affective response to the failing affective dominant of the 1980s. It is not simply a nostalgia for the good old days, but the claim that only the immorality of a few Gekko’s and Stucky’s inhibit the restoration of the supposedly more sustainable and more noble character of production and honest labor. The failure of this residual affect of the post-war boom to actually and not just imaginarily resolve the failing affect of euphoria becomes the main problem in my two subsequent periods.

    And as Things Fell Apart…

    Something emerged in the cultural representations of finance in the beginning of the 1990s. A new threat of a schizophrenic disintegration of signifying surfaces seems to accompany a shift in the cultural perception of the financial sector after the Black Monday stock crash on October 19, 1987. The bull market of 1981-1987 came abruptly to a halt, and what could, in relation to the crash, be considered the euphoric hubris of Wall Street traders bound to fail and fall soon turned out to be a systemic negation of reality.

    Along with the authorities in other countries, e.g., Japan, the US Fed decided to alleviate the collapse in equity prices by cutting interest rates. Volcker’s successor as chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, slashed short term interest rates to zero between 1990 and 1993 to help the market and it was widely believed that, as Robert Brenner’s critical account of this time would have it, “the stock market would never be allowed to drop too severely, and the bull run continued” (Brenner 2000: 16). Nobel Prize-winning economist Rudiger Dornbusch expressed the belief clearly in 1998: “This expansion will run forever” (Dornbusch 1998). Brenner more pertinently described the asset-price run-up in the late 1990s as a stock market “climbing skyward without a ladder” (Brenner 2009: 21).

    Further, the recession of 2000-2002, i.e. the bursting of the dot.com-bubble, was quickly followed by yet another ladder-less climb, this time in bonds. Driven by an initially low interest rate and the explosion of subprime loans, another bubble violently separating the financial sector from its material underpinnings was underway and about to finally burst both the euphoric fantasy of the 1980s and its haunted schizophrenic counterpart in the 1990s and early aughts.

    The year after Pretty Woman attempted to save financial capital from euphoric hubris by insisting on the possibility of profitable investment in manufacturing, Brett Easton Ellis’ American Psycho (1991) introduced a new cultural response to the market’s systemic negation of reality by exhibiting the collapse of fantasy into horror. As a chapter title announces, the novel stages the “End of the 1980s”. With the rambling confessions of the investment banker Patrick Bateman – the next generation financier, who is neither a new Master of the Universe “with a taste for human flesh”, as one commentator would have it[5], nor much of a master at all – we have gone from the dominant hubris of 1980s financial euphoria accompanied by industrial production as its residual moral counterpart to the dominant schizophrenic dissolution of the financier subject: “my depersonalization was so intense … I was simply imitating reality, a rough resemblance of a human being …” (Ellis 1992: 282).

    In American Psycho, euphoric hubris joins the remnants of the industrial expansion as the residual affective forms accompanying dominant schizophrenic horror. The fantasy of a world of financial signs with immense exchange value but very little material reality behind them to limit their instantaneous circulation has begun to crack and fragment its correlated subjective form: “There wasn’t a clear, identifiable emotion within me, except for greed and, possibly, total disgust” (282).

    These schizophrenic intensities of the pleasure principle with no reality in sight are manifested in the main formal characteristic of American Psycho which is repetition standing in for plot: The enumeration of brands, the more or less heated arguments about table reservations, the inability of anyone to recognize anyone else, the renting and returning of video tapes, the frantic and senseless cash withdrawals from ATMs, and, of course, the forced iterations of physical violence desperately exploring new extremes to escape the dullness of the very repetitions to which they contribute.

    The bourgeois ego that reached its limit in the greed of Gekko and Stucky but retained a certain affective capacity for shame or remorse in Bud Fox, Sherman McCoy, and Edward Lewis, has now fallen apart and been reduced to a narrative structure with “… no catharsis. I gain no deeper knowledge about myself, no new understanding can be extracted from my telling. There has been no reason for me to tell you any of this. This confession has meant nothing” (388).

    Nothing is to be learned, nothing to be gained, and the bizarre, automated telling machine convincingly described by La Berge (2014: 133-138) has no point but its own continuation: “I just want to… […] keep the game going” (Ellis 1992: 394). The Automated Telling Machine seems to be a ploy to render the reader just as empty and numb as its narrator: “expecting a heart, but there is nothing there, not even a beat” (116). The listing of brand names and consumables almost challenges the reader to not skim or skip ahead, just as the violence constantly probes whether the reader maintains the ability to be affected. The purpose of this, of course, is the interpellation of any unaffected reader as the hypocritical semblable of the narrator.

    La Berge argues that “American Psycho destroys the very genre that it creates” (La Berge 2014: 113). If genre, as Lauren Berlant would have it, provides “an affective expectation of the experience of watching something unfold” (Berlant 2011: 6), the novel’s destruction of genre consists in the extensive use of repetition in lieu of plot to numb the reader’s sensorium so that, indeed, no hope of unfolding is possible for those who enter. Joshua Clover observes: “Narrative requires motion and change, not simple replenishment; motion and change are exactly what constitute the general formula [of capital]. Implied in M-C-M’ … is not simply change and motion but expansion beyond any limit …” (Clover 2011: 36). For Bateman, there is no possible catharsis, no possible development or systemic expansion, just the eternal continuation of the same game.

    That plot development and economic expansion are both residual expectations haunting the dominant psychosis of a 1990s and early aughts bull markets with extremely distant material underpinnings is not just characteristic of American Psycho but can be read as part of a wider tendency. While the big swinging dicks of the eighties tried and failed to master the universe – they flew too close to the sun and got burnt – Bateman’s generation is frantically trying to navigate the financial imaginary in a world of signs increasingly haunted by their negated material referent.[6] Bateman’s killing spree is an attempt to break out of this postmodern Platonic cave, not to touch the sun but to reach the sunlight of actual reality.

    If American Psycho is the first clear manifestation of this period of schizophrenic affect, Don DeLillo’s Cosmopolis (2003) can be read as its culmination. While American Psycho was an explicit step beyond Bonfire, Cosmopolis is, in many ways, a clear continuation of American Psycho. After having his Rolex stolen at gunpoint as revenge for one of his murders, and he sobbingly expresses his humble desire to “keep the game going”, Bateman is presented with an injunction: “As I stand, frozen in position, an old woman emerges behind a Threepenny Opera poster at a deserted bus stop and she’s homeless and begging, hobbling over, her face covered with sores that look like bugs, holding out a shaking red hand. “Oh will you please go away?” I sigh. She tells me to get a haircut” (Ellis 1991: 394).

    Along with an inexplicably mounting yen, this task provides the central plot device in Cosmopolis.

    The financier Eric Packer rides around in his limousine manifestation of the Big Swinging Dick fantasy of an immaterial connection to the market and the future as such: pure M – M’. The limousine is, however, also the vehicle bringing him to the goal of the day: a haircut – a financial term meaning the reduction in a given asset’s value, as compared to market value, when it is used as collateral for a loan. But in this case, Packer literally wants a haircut from his old family barber, Anthony, who knew his father and gave him his very first haircut. Of course, Packer is unable to go through with this emotional confrontation with his past and leaves in the middle of the haircut.

    Here, the limousine is far from Edward’s princely steed in Pretty Woman. It is now the postmodern Platonic cave on wheels, an immaterial fantasy connected to material reality via screens and data.

    Material and emotional reality is the weak residual expectation or goal haunting the fantasy of high finance. Through the limousine sunroof, Packer contemplates an urban scene, focusing on the bank towers a bit further away: “They were the end of the outside world. They weren’t here, exactly. They were in the future, a time beyond geography and touchable money and the people who stack and count it” (DeLillo 2003: 36). They are so abstract that he must concentrate to see them. The material world becomes the disturbing veil through which to glimpse the abstraction of something purer. But the abstraction of the “pure spectacle, or information made sacred, ritually unreadable” (80) holds its own haunting. Not just the difficulty of focusing on the abstraction of information through the materiality of the bank towers, but also the inability of the abstraction of the market to encompass concrete life and death: “People will not die … People will be absorbed in streams of information” (104). But when confronted with the televised images of a man in flames, reality beyond financial signifiers crack the surface of the spectacle of the market: “The market was not total. It could not claim this man or assimilate his act. Not such starkness and horror. This was a thing outside its reach” (99-100).

    Packer’s asymmetrical prostate is the subjective, physiological counterpart of what cannot be assimilated by data and should therefore, according to his doctor, be allowed to “express itself”. This becomes the ethos of a financier staring at the impossible soaring of the yen on which his fortune depends. This subjective expression of objective contradictions – in this case the soaring yen as well as generalized misery and numerous deaths (real, fake, and threatened) – plays out in a realm of surfaces with no material backing. Like American Psycho, this is formally manifested through repetition: Finance requires a new theory of time to understand the repeated temporal glitches of the limousine security camera and television screens, where the mediated events often precede their actual occurrence; Packer has multiple chance encounters with and misrecognitions of his wife, recalling the misrecognitions in America Psycho; the semiotic construction of reality is explicitly questioned by the repeated claims of the referential obsolescence of words, objects, and subjects.

    This problem of referentiality comes down to what Packer’s Chief of Theory terms “an aesthetics of interaction” (86) charting what Packer describes as a “… common surface, an affinity between market movements and the natural world” (86). This is the affinity that no longer applies. The yen soars skyward without a ladder and things no longer chart. The “new and fluid reality” (83) of cyber-capital is money “talking to itself” (77) and “lines of code that interact in simulated space” (124). And the subject desiring a realm of pure information excluding subjective agency, this self-contradiction, finally expresses itself in a longing for action[7]: “He was alert, eager for action, for resolution. Something had to happen soon, a dispelling of doubt and the emergence of some design, the subject’s plan of action, visible and distinct” (171-172). A subject’s plan of action which in this period leads only to death, but which, soon, will lead nowhere.

    The Day the Music Died

    In the 1980s, dominant euphoric hubris was accompanied by a residual belief in the continued viability of an industrial economic expansion. The resulting moral indictment of financial fantasy – the belief in production as the true driver of economic expansion itself becoming a driver of narrative development – however, soon disintegrated into the formal repetitions of schizophrenic horror during the 1990s and early aughts. Those formal repetitions were haunted by the failure of the residual expectations of plot development and economic expansion, no longer present to restore the balance and bring Icarus to justice. The falls of Icarus – first, from the penthouse to jail and, next, the quest for reality disintegrating into death – were both historically separate versions of “the feeling of M – M’, haunted by the C to come” (Clover 2011: 46). In the 1980s, the fantasy of M – M’ was haunted by the crisis of profitability in manufacturing, i.e. in the sphere of production, while, in the subsequent period, it was haunted by the circulation and consumption of commodities as empty signifiers and immaterial data. In my final period, post-crisis resignation can be described as the affective correlate of the reassertion of the economic law of value: “The law of value asserted itself with savage clarity, fictitious capital was destroyed, jobs were annihilated, exported immiseration refluxing toward the economic cores” (Clover 2012b: 113). As the profits of a hoped-for future production proved absent, the temporal fix collapsed in an instant and the spatial fix returned only misery.

    There is a vast archive of narrative fiction representing the resignation of the post-crisis financier and questioning the narrative structuring of the financial economy through plot: Sebastian Faulks’ A Week in December (2009), Jonathan Dee’s The Privileges (2010), Adam Haslett’s Union Atlantic (2010), Justin Cartwright’s Other People’s Money (2011), John Lanchester’s Capital (2012), Zia Haider Rahman’s In the Light of What We Know (2014), Adam McKay’s movie The Big Short (2015), Paul Murray’s The Mark and the Void (2015), and Gary Shteyngart’s Lake Success (2018) all stage financiers, nostalgically longing for lived reality, and a financial profession no longer understanding what it is doing or why it is doing it.

    Murderous horror in the quest for reality has been replaced by the longing for simple things like childhood memories, romance without consideration for social status, a sense of control of one’s destiny, a sense of nation, a sense of family… It is the hope to be delivered from abstraction while resigning to the acknowledgement that reality is not readily available. The hubris of finance remains as a residual affect but without the euphoria, i.e., only in the form of explicit renunciation of sensible reality and emotional ties in favor of a focus on the numbers and the ensuing profit – without desire, horror, or haunting. The dominant affect is therefore, quite clearly, resignation. 

    In J. C. Chandor’s movie Margin Call (2011), Jeremy Irons’ diabolic CEO, John Tuld – a less than subtle reference to Lehman CEO Dick Fuld – clearly states the dominant affect: “I am here for one reason and one reason alone. I am here to guess what the music might do a week, a month, a year from now. That’s it, nothing more. Standing here tonight, I am afraid that I don’t hear a thing. Just silence.”

    It is the day the music finally died. The movie opens with layoffs at a large investment bank. Leading risk analyst Eric Dale is fired but, just before leaving, he hands a yet to be resolved riddle to junior risk analyst Peter Sullivan. Peter cracks it and communicates the extreme danger of the company’s current overleveraged position to higher management. This opening establishes the “epistemological distance between the players and the rest of the world” (Clover 2012a: 8) where a couple of risk analysists and higher management alone know what the markets would inevitably soon learn in the form of the 2008 crash. This epistemological distance structures both the staged separation of those who know from those who do not and the plot’s development toward dumping toxic assets onto an unknowing market at the price of annihilating all trust between trading partners and thereby ending the trader’s professional futures.

    The epistemological distance clearly operates as an aesthetic instrument. While scrutinizing the numbers, Peter is acoustically cut off from the surrounding office space by his earbuds and, visually, by the illuminated screen against the darkened offices. The city is present merely as indistinct lights beyond soundproof windows. Even when Peter and his fellow analyst Seth go out to retrieve Eric, the fired source of knowledge who is nowhere to be found, the passing urban scenery is perceived as vague and hazy shapes beyond the windows of a chauffeured car. Only after dawn, when they finally find Eric and the epistemological distance is about to vanish, the world becomes distinguishable when perceived from an open convertible.

    In this narrative, as in this final phase of my periodization more generally, the fundamental opposition is not between financial cynicism and the production economy but, as pointed out by Clover, between the greedy cynicism of management and the morally pure calculations of the analysts. The “ideological payload” is “precisely the proposition that quantification is not itself a problem: quantification is on no one’s side; the risk is in its misuse” (8). The hunt for the lost risk analyst is explicitly a matter of information control, but it also obviously implies that the party could have continued were it not for a new kind of hubris: this time, not the renunciation of the “sound” production economy, but of the “sound” and risk-controlled mathematical foundation of the financial system.

    Although pure mathematics is the new position from which to launch the moral indictment of financial greed – a greed incorporated by Tuld who shrugs at the repeated financial crises: “It’s all just the same thing over and over; we can’t help ourselves” – the residual affect of the production economy persists. When they finally locate Eric, he continues the tradition from Edward’s “We don’t build anything, Phil. We don’t make anything” in Pretty Woman and Gekko’s “I create nothing; I own” in Wall Street: “Do you know I built a bridge once? … I was an engineer by trade.” After a lengthy calculation, he concludes: “[t]hat one little bridge has saved the people of those communities a combined 1,531 years of their lives not wasted in a fucking car.” The affect of the production economy persists, though no longer as a salute to honest and noble industrialized labor but as a means to optimize the productivity of human capital. The difference between these two perspectives on “building” – the difference between Pretty Woman’s Edward and Margin Call’s Eric Dale – is the one expressed by the transformation of Dolly Parton’s canonical song “9 to 5” (1980) from a 1980s lament of poorly waged and little-credited office work to a post-crisis advertisement jingle, “5 to 9” (2021), about the realization of human capital as the goal and meaning of life. 

    The dominant cultural affect in Margin Call and, indeed the whole period, however, remains resignation. At the end of the movie, the traders are paid to destroy their future ability to trade ever again by dumping worthless assets, i.e., they cut their relations to the market, their ability to affect and be affected by it. The traders lose their relation to the market, while others keep that relation but lose their personal, emotional ties. Head of Sales and Trading, Sam Rogers, is finally kept on at the company, paid to ignore his moral disgust with his own complicity. In the beginning, while preparing a pep talk for his traders about to be laid off, he is in tears, not in solidarity with his employees, but at the news of his dog’s terminal illness. At the end, after the liquidation of toxic assets, the firing of the remaining employees, and the collapse of the epistemological distance under the general market crash, after accepting management’s money offer to ignore his own inclinations and keep the game going, we find him digging the dog’s grave in his garden – the sounds of the digging continuing into the end credits.

    This is the end…

    By pairing it with Brenner’s long downturn, Jameson’s waning of affect can thus, I argue, be further periodized as a number of emergent and residual forms interacting in finance fiction from the 1980s until today. The emergence of the master of the universe during the run-up to the 1987 crash carried with it a residual faith in the continued viability of the post-war industrial boom and the related moral indictment of fictitious capital’s promise of economic expansion without manufacturing and thus without a certain exploitative societal distribution of wealth through wage labor.

    In the 1990s and early aughts, the residual affective structure of noble industrial labor and its moral condemnation of the dominant euphoric hubris gave way to on a dominant affect of schizophrenic horror, fragmenting the subject and the ability of language to index reality. The residual structure, here, seemed less the nobility of labor and commodity production to sustain M – C – M’ but the circulation and consumption of commodities as empty signs and dubious data, exchange value without use value. The music had seemingly lost its base. Where, in the 1980s, the financier tended to end up in jail, he now surrendered himself to death and destruction, the absence of exit from haunted existence forcing an eternal repetition of violence, both exuberant in its transgressions and desperate for its own end.

    As the haunted system crashed spectacularly during the financial crisis of 2007-2008, resignation emerged as the new dominant affective mode. Whether giving up on the illusion of financial mastery to recover a sense of control by retreating to personal emotional bonds or by giving up on emotional contact altogether to sustain the residual fantasy of self-sufficient financial products, resignation has become unavoidable. ‘Your money or your life’ is, indeed, the fundamental ultimatum of post-crisis finance fiction.

    In a certain way, the masters of the universe subscribed to Marx’s ironic description of money from 1844: “The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. … Do not I, who thanks to money am capable of all that the human heart longs for, possess all human capacities?” (Marx 1970: 324). But the master financier only considered one side of the coin, as it were. Marx continued: “If money is the bond binding me to human life, binding society to me, … [i]s it not, therefore, also the universal agent of separation?” (324).

    The schizophrenic experience springs from the beginning realization in the finance fiction of the 1990s and early aughts that the problem of finance is not reducible to the pursuit of money by immoral means but, rather, that “[m]oney is the alienated ability of mankind”, that money turns ability “into its contrary” and operates as the “distorting power against the individual and against the bonds of society …” which “confounds and confuses all things” (325). The meaningless repetitions and repeated meaningless violence constitute the attempt to either end or transcend a world that has revealed itself as “the fraternization of impossibilities” (325).

    Post-crisis resignation, then, poses the question of the possibility for a financialized “relationship to the world to be a human one” (326). The financier either attempts to abandon the exchange of paper to “exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc.” (326), or he abandons love and material reality in favor of the magical self-sufficient power of money. These two forms of resignation are not the first glimpse of a future after capital, however. What was in the 1990s the schizophrenic ambivalence – the search for the exit and hope for the game to continue – has now been separated as two distinct forms of resignation, two roads – your life or your money – both leading nowhere.

    However, Marx’s analysis of money progressed from a question of the human relationship between subject and world – where the alienating mediation of money is vanquished by love, trust etc. evenly given and received – toward an analysis where money is an expression of value within capitalist social relations. Similarly, the analysis presented here of the varying degrees of universal mastery wielded by the financier subject should progress toward not simply other subjective forms than the financier – those excluded from the narrative or forced into the background on the basis of race, class, or gender as conditions of possibility for the affect of the financial agent – but toward a questioning of the insistence of finance fiction to engage with finance in terms of subjectivity, thus occluding the analysis of the impersonal structural violence operated by financial capitalism. The purpose of the analysis is therefore not just to propose a periodization of financial affect but to lay the groundwork for a further study of the ideological operations of finance fiction, which, by various imaginary resolutions of objective contradictions, tend to limit our critical scope. Immoral hubris, schizophrenic horror, or the resignation of lost illusions all partake in the same ideological claim: that the problem is caused by our errant subjective agencies within the world of capital and not by the capitalist mode of production as such. The different phases of waning affect within finance fiction are active responses to a failing fantasy, a fantasy that survives in residual forms to this day. I have tried to present the phases as historically specific affective relations to developments within capital accumulation, but the goal must be to go beyond the crises of subjective fantasy and seek an active response to the failing self-reproduction of capitalist social relations which, along with its fantasies, deserve to be laid to rest.

    Torsten Andreasen’s work currently focuses on the periodization of the correlation between culture and financial capital since 1980.

    Works cited

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    [1]  Jameson bases his economic periodization of the waning of affect on Ernest Mandel’s Late Capitalism (1978). However, in later engagements with finance capital (Jameson 1997; 2015), he turns to Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century (1994).

    [2]  See Jameson (1984) and (1991: chapter 1).

    [3] This financier protagonist of finance fiction is predominantly white and male, a dominance only partially challenged in the last of the three phases that I intend to lay out. I hope to present a study of those occluded from the both economic and narrative universe of the financial masters in a later publication.  

    [4] It should be noted here, that both Wall Street and Pretty Woman associate what they consider the morally sound capitalism of industrial production with international transportation: airplanes and ships, the essential foundation for the “spatial fix” of globalization. David Harvey famously argued that the fading postwar boom sought a “spatial fix”, i.e., the inclusion of new and geographically dispersed markets and labor forces in the capitalist system. The spatial fix of globalization, however, required a further temporal fix in the form of financialization, defined as “capital that has a nominal money value and paper existence, but which at a given moment in time has no backing in terms of real productive activity or physical assets as collateral” (Harvey 1990: 182). As formulated by Annie McClanahan: “it allows capital to treat an anticipated realization of value as if it has already happened. … financialization allowed capitalism to supplement the declining profitability of investment in present production with money borrowed from the profits of a hoped-for future production” (McClanahan 2017: 13). By morally contrasting the means of international transportation and trade with the immorality of finance, the two films almost seem to propose that the spatial fix will be sufficient for sustainable economic expansion and that the “temporal fix” of finance is but immoral exuberance. That the spatial fix is necessarily linked to the colonial enterprise and war effort of empire is only hinted at by Morse Industries’ potential contract to build destroyers for the Navy.

    [5]  Quoted in (La Berge 2014: 130).

    [6]  A similar development can be seen in the use of Talking Heads songs in Wall Street and American Psycho, respectively. In Wall Street, the decoration of Bud Fox’s new apartment is accompanied by the Talking Heads song “This must be the place”, whereas American Psycho opens, as mentioned with “and as things fell apart / Nobody paid much attention” from the songs “Flowers” about the inability to live in a new paradise, where consumer society is covered in flowers. The last words of the song: “Don’t leave me stranded here / I can’t get used to this lifestyle.”

    [7]  Arne De Boever argues that “Packer, throughout the novel, seems to be in search of such threats and their potentially fatal consequences in a desperate attempt to encounter something – anything – real” (De Boever 2018: 2). The same applies to Bateman, though both characters also share a desire to perpetuate the game—one within the realm of simulacral surfaces, the other within pure information.