The b2o Review is a non-peer reviewed publication, published and edited by the boundary 2 editorial collective and specific topic editors, featuring book reviews, interventions, videos, and collaborative projects.  

  • Christian Thorne–World Literature as Counter-Revolution

    Christian Thorne–World Literature as Counter-Revolution

    For more on the subject of world literature, see Christian Thorne’s interview with Joe Cleary that was published in our series “Re-read, Re-examine, Re-think”

    Poetry for when the tariffs come down

    The current interest in world literature tends to boil down to a single open-ended recommendation: that we be curious about what happens to literature when it travels outside of its home country and, often enough, outside of its native language. What happens to American literature when non-Americans get their hands on it? Do readers in China tend to understand Dostoevsky differently from readers in Russia? Why did German readers take so quickly to the Latin American Boom novel? How did Män som hatar kvinnorMen Who Hate Woman—morph into the leering demi-blason of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo? Do different countries have different cultures of translation?—different standards for what counts as a good rendering?—different foreign literatures that they tend to favor? Or is everybody really just reading Swedish crime novels?

    This particular conception of world literature is most often traced back to Goethe, which is both plausible and a bit of a problem. For any biography of Goethe will tell you that he was an oligarch from the banking city of Frankfurt and a counter-revolutionary official in one of Germany’s petty autocracies, the kind of guy whose finance ministry responded to peasant grievances by ordering that the Bauer be punished for having dared to complain; the kind of guy, I mean, whose government shut down any student societies they suspected of democratic sentiments and who paid informants to keep tabs on the political attitudes of their classmates and professors (Rothe; Wilson). The question, of course, is what we should make of these biographical prompts. Is it possible that a theory as manifestly liberal and world-loving as Weltliteratur could carry the marks of Goethe’s social and political positions? Is world literature poetry for patricians? Is it anti-Jacobin?

    Anyone who has pored over Goethe’s scattered comments on the topic would, I think, have to say yes and yes. Of course, the cosmopolitanism of world literature as usually presented is entirely generic and low-stakes—an internationalism born of buying the right books, the worldly-wisdom of the Duolingo app and the laboriously mastered subjunctive. But to all this ¿Donde está la biblioteca?, Goethe’s original account adds some more specific features that have proven easy to overlook. I’ll just name three.

    1) World literature is, above all, a contemporary project undertaken by living writers. It’s not that Goethe meant to dissuade anyone from reading books that were both foreign and old. As a young playwright, he made his name by writing pseudo-Shakespearean rant; and he closed out his career a half century later by publishing a twelve-book homage to the Persian ghazals of the fourteenth century. His own engagement with the literary past would thus be hard to dispute. But Goethe maintains even so that world literature comes into being only when living writers keep tabs on each other’s work and, better still, when they enter into conversation across national boundaries. “Living, striving literati should get to know each other, and through their own inclinations and similarity of tastes, find the motive for corporate action” (qtd Strich 350). Kenzaburō Ōe conducts an open correspondence with Günter Grass about the legacy of World War 2 in their respective countries. In 2016, the Goethe-Institut matches German poets with South Asian ones, so that they can translate each other’s work, even if they don’t understand each other’s languages. Langston Hughes befriends the Hungarian Arthur Koestler—in Turkmenistan. Thus construed, world literature has the surprising tendency to push us away from the classics, since the idea, rather, is to track new, transnational literary constellations as they emerge, or, indeed, to help foster their emergence, even if that’s not how W. W. Norton seems to understand the matter.

    2) World literature is a project of mutual correction and expansion. If you are a writer and you spend most of your days in London, one good reason to read Indian and Somali and Chilean literature is to learn about ways of writing that the British haven’t gotten round to yet—to encounter new techniques, new styles, perhaps entire new forms or genres. Irish and Egyptian writing gets imported to fill a niche, to remedy a deficit in domestic literary production, to furnish the book stalls with the things that we don’t make. It is important to notice that world literature, on this understanding, cannot be pitted against this or that national literature. We don’t advance the cause of world literature by repudiating (as provincial or exclusionary) the framework of Pakistani or Polish literature, or by insisting that there is finally no such thing as “Mexican literature.” Quite the contrary: World literature battens on the national literatures that it at once subsumes-and-retains. It needs the national literatures, since there will be much less reason for me to read Jamaican novelists if it turns out they are all writing like Faulkner anyway. Goethe, in fact, sometimes seems to suggest that the character of a national literature will only become apparent once it is assessed by foreign readers (Strich 349). American literature is manifestly diverse, and the critic in New York is accordingly likely to brag about its breadth and variety and fine gradation—to insist that American literature is no particular way. But critics in Paris are in a good position to spot what American writers do more often than French writers, or what they do to a perfection. They will be quicker to announce—and perhaps to admire—the distinctive features of American fiction and poetry, because they will not accede to that Whitmanesque literary narcissism that holds that we are all things and all ways. World literature is an active process of learning what foreign writers do better than you do.

    3) World literature is writing under the sign of the market. You don’t need someone with a Warwick PhD to tell you that world literature is the poetry of global capitalism. It should be apparent to anyone who re-reads the paragraph I just wrote that Goethe has patterned his argument on the classical, more or less Smithian defenses of international trade: National literatures should not try to be self-sufficient. At any given point in time—though, of course, changingly—your national literature will do some things better than others. As of 1600, German poets hadn’t figured out yet how to write sonnets or classical epics. American writers in the 1840s wrote almost nothing that we would recognize as a realist novel. Home-grown, ethnically English modernism was pretty tepid as modernisms go—an avant garde from the middle of the pack. What your literature does best, meanwhile, will be more apparent to remote readers than to local ones. Italian writers are well advised to let Danish and Russian and Turkish critics tell them what they are doing right, and this in much the same way that Italian farmers need to know that Dutch greenhouses can grow bell peppers but not olives. The national character of any country’s literature gets bestowed upon it comparatively and from without—which is to say, internationally. Most important: All readers gain simultaneously when nations practice a free trade in letters—and when local writers agree to lean in to their already established advantages. (“The immediate consequences of a general world literature; the nations will be quicker in benefiting by each other’s advantages” (qtd Strich 351).)  Brazilian and Indonesian and Norwegian literatures should therefore figure out ways of exchanging what each does best. Columbia should export magic realism for roughly the same reasons that it exports coffee.

    Goethe, it is worth noting, is entirely upfront about all this. Sometimes his language is figurative: The German language, he says, is “a market where all nations are offering their wares” (qtd Strich 28). Goethe’s great twentieth-century expositor says that you should “enrich your own personality with the geistiger Gut aller Völker, the spiritual goods of all nations” (Strich 30). A translator, meanwhile—back to Goethe—is a “middleman” in the “generalized commerce of the mind,” the one who “makes it his business to promote trade.” Translation, indeed, is “one of the most important and worthy businesses in all of world trade” (qtd Strich 17). The interesting thing about those last two sentences is the way in which the commercial metaphor in the first edges back towards a factual claim in the second. Maybe translators are like import-export houses; but then again, maybe they are best understood as actual businessmen, at which point it becomes salient to remark that Goethe sometimes draws strong and entirely literal connections between Dichtung and the economy: World literature, he says in one draft, has become “inevitable,” given the “ever-increasing speed of Verkehr”—of traffic, commerce, and intercourse (Strich 45). Weltliteratur is literature for free-marketeers—poetry for when the tariffs come down.

    Goethe occasionally refers to “European or world literature,” which is doubtless exasperating, insinuating as it does that Weltliteratur could come into being and still omit most of the world, though non-European versions of this German program are easy enough to devise (qtd Strich 251). Oxford’s “very short introduction” to Native American Literature begins, in its very first paragraph, by assuring readers that American Indians have always been traders: merchants of the high desert, brokers of the wet prairie, a paleo-bourgeoisie who collected goods from far-flung regions, seashells and chunkey stones and grizzly-bear teeth. That opening paragraph also suggests that Native literature works on these same commercial principles, “displaying a dynamic world inextricably connected to and even fascinated with other worlds” (Teuton xix – xx). Trade is the key to understanding indigenous art. A people receives: “By the late twentieth century a number of Native poets received extensive formal training” (104). A young Blackfeet poet has an Irish-American for a mentor at the University of Montana and sets out “to adapt western poetic forms” (ibid). And a people also gives: “If Native Americans were hopelessly conquered, how could they be sharing traditional knowledge at Princeton? (74)” Native poems and novels are thus documents of “interaction” (xix)—ledgers, I think such books are called—and we’ll want to look back now to see that Goethe and his expositor have their own words for “interaction”, several of them, in fact, in emphatic synonymy. “Keine Weltliteratur ohne Wechselseitigkeit und Gegenseitigkeit und Austausch.” “No world literature without mutuality and reciprocity and exchange” (Strich 69).

    It is worth underscoring here just what it is that Goethe expects from the international trade in poems and plays. Again: World literature arrives in any one country to augment its national literature—to extend its catalogue of titles and perhaps in some sense to plug that literature’s gaps. The word in German for this kind of add-on is Ergänzung, which your dictionary will instruct you to translate as “supplement,” though in English this could quickly prove misleading. The curious thing about the word “supplement” is that it strictly means “to supply a deficiency” or “to make up a lack.” You take a vitamin supplement because you’re a vegan and won’t otherwise get enough B12. If you need a supplemental policy, that’s because your employer has left you underinsured. And yet the word “supplement” has tended to drift over time to designate things that are genuinely optional or indeed supernumerary. For twentieth-century newspapers, the “Sunday supplement” was the insert that contained the week’s only comic strips in color, alongside puzzles and celebrity profiles; supplement here names that-in-the-newspaper-which-is-not-news. You might read it, but then again you might just hand it to the kids. Admissions offices at American colleges often discourage their applicants from sending “supplementary letters of recommendation”—more letters, that is, than the admissions officers have asked for; more than they want to read. German Ergänzung, meanwhile, can sometimes refer to a mere “addition,” but what keeps it from naming an unwanted or trivial addition is the root that it permanently flaunts, that second syllable -ganz-, which is the ordinary German word for “whole.” An Ergänzung contributes towards making something whole. Why this matters should become apparent if I now remark that the counter-revolutionaries of Goethe’s generation typically spoke of the French republic as a malign solvent, as an engine of disintegration and fragmentation, as violently sundering the still living bonds that had bound Alteuropa together. Burke describes the process by which “men dissolve their ancient incorporation”; the “dissolution of an ancient society … hath taken place in France” (E. Burke 1992, 164). The state, Burke says, is “not morally at liberty … wholly to separate and tear asunder the bands of [its] subordinate community, and to dissolve it into an asocial, uncivil, unconnected chaos of elementary principles”—though this, of course, is precisely what he took the Jacobins to have done (E. Burke 2014, 101). Thus, too, Goethe: “Everything on earth seems at once to come apart. In the states most adamant, the basic laws fall apart. And property breaks loose from its old owner. Friend breaks loose from friend. In this way, too, love breaks loose from love.” (qtd Rothe 79) Or there’s this, from the West-East Divan, first published in 1819: “North and West and South splinter apart, thrones explode, kingdoms tremble: take flight to the pure East to taste the air of the patriarchs! Amidst loving, drinking, singing, Khidr’s spring will make you young again” (113). I trust this makes the matter sufficiently clear: Revolution is the crisis; world literature will be its overcoming. In an age of social fragmentation, you read Hafez—or mock-Hafez—because he will transport you back before the Day the Thrones Exploded, rejuvenating a Europe-of-three-compass-points by re-acquainting you first with the habits of patriarchy. Goethe often says that world literature is one of the best ways for the learned members of any country to acquaint themselves with the cultures of other nations, and finally to accept or “tolerate” these (qtd Strich 359). It is easy enough to applaud this biblio-pacificism, provided we also say clearly that world literature, in this configuration, is meant to revive the ancien regime, to reknit the social bonds that the Revolution has severed. Weltliteratur is a making-whole is restoration. Literature is ligature.

    The question at this point is whether you think Goethe is right about any of this? Do you, for one, think that the most conspicuous thing about markets is that they overcome differences and divisions, rather than create them? Do you think that international trade is first and foremost the creator of benign human connection? It is easy enough to see that Goethe is offering a literary riff on eighteenth-century doctrines of doux commerce, which riff one is tempted to paraphrase in the accents of a Montesquieu: Where the ways of man are gentle, there is world literature; and wherever there is world literature, there the ways of men are gentle. The natural effect of world literature is to lead to peace. The hard part comes once we acknowledge that the notion of sweet trade is one of the capitalist era’s stupider myths, one that redescribes as irenic and collaborative a system whose very defenders more typically call it “competitive” and “disruptive”; or once we remark that the theory of world literature resembles nothing so much as Thomas Friedman’s claim that no two countries that both have a McDonald’s have ever fought each other—No two countries that have both read Turgenyev…. For once we do that, we will find ourselves obliged to ask about world literature all the difficult questions that dissident economists have taught us to ask about international trade. Do all countries have equal access to world literature and do they all benefit from it equally? Do French and American authors gain readier entry to the international presses than do Nigerian or Filipino ones? Do a nation’s writers have to change the way they write—do they have to manufacture a different literary product—in order for their writing to circulate internationally? Does world literature sort Korean and Guatemalan writers into winners and losers, and does it do so in patterned ways? Can world literature induce a nation’s writers to prioritize the needs and desires of foreign readers over the needs and desires of local ones? Are small languages more likely to suffer from literary trade dependency, which we might define as the ability of foreign readers to dictate the shape of one’s national literature, including their ability to withdraw their interest from it altogether? Can world literature introduce distortions into a nation’s writerly economy, perhaps by herding all of a country’s poets and novelists into the same few export niches, in a manner that generates literary monocultures—endless fields of Rushdie, vast plantations of Garcia Marquez? Can countries with more developed literary institutions inhibit poorer countries from developing literary institutions of their own? Do talented writers tend to exit the smaller, regional, and often dominated vernaculars in order to add to the literary riches of the larger, mostly imperial languages? Is there conflict in world literature, and not just concord? Do rival literary groups seek to remold world literature each to its own advantage?

    The danger of drumming out these questions in such brisk tattoo is that they will drown out Goethe’s own misgivings about the market. For anyone who continues to read in Goethe’s essays will eventually realize that he was not the altogether enthusiastic adherent of trade that his isolated statements sometimes make him out to be. He does, after all, begin to suspect the obvious, which is that an expanded, energized and international market for books will tend to produce a highly commercial and consumerist literature—boarding-school apologetics masquerading as feats of the imagination (Tom Brown’s Schooldays, but this time with wizards); some improbably famous pornography that you can download on your Kindle so that no-one on the subway will know what you’re reading (you know, the one about the aspiring young professional woman who learns to love getting dominated by a billionaire); serial killer novels from the UK, serial killer novels from Japan, serial killer novels from Argentina; not, at any rate, the transnational salon of fine song and keen judgment that the elderly German poet once promised you. Goethe’s way of putting this is to say that he dreads the coming literature of the multitude: “What appeals to the multitude will spread endlessly and, as we can already see now, will be well received in all parts of the world, while what is serious and truly substantial will be less successful” (227). And yet he continues to hope that the market in foreign literatures will remain open to true poets and their discerning critics. World literature might well produce, as its most public face, a sink of ephemerally cosmopolitan hackwork, a kind of world-pulp, and yet it will at the same time make it easier for “the serious-minded” to find each other in their own market niche, where they can “form a silent, almost secret congregation” (ibid). This is presumably what Goethe had in mind when he said that the writers of the world must find a “motive for corporate action.” That last phrase is especially suggestive, because it suggests that Goethe is trying to figure out how to revive, at least in spirit, one of the corporate bodies of the vanished Ständestaat. World literature should allow writers to gather as though they were organized into a guild or medieval university, and is thus how the old Gelehrtenrepublik—not just “the republic of letters,” but “the republic of learned men”—will survive in a liberal economic order otherwise primed to distrust such closed institutions. What we can say now, then, is that Goethe’s conception of world literature takes it cues, not only from Adam Smith, but also from Metternich. In the ten or fifteen years before Goethe started commenting on Weltliteratur, the major political project across the continent was the making of a new European federation—a Europe of peace and order to be created via vigorous diplomatic exchange and the ruthless repression of populists, nationalists, and the Left. An American admirer of Metternich’s singles out the prince-chancellor’s ethos of “conservative internationalism” (Egedy). One Dutch historian credits him with attempting a properly “European ‘security culture’ marked by a preference for multilateral problem-solving through international congresses, ministerial conferences and international commissions” (Clark summarizing Beatice de Graaf). “Europe,” Metternich once said, “has become my native country” (qtd Egedy 139). The counter-revolutionaries, said the important Burkean intellectual who served as Metternich’s secretary, were building “a great political league, which with some justification has been dubbed the European Republic” (ibid). And world literature came into being as the writing of this royalist anti-republic: “European, or world literature,” to quote Goethe again; a parallel order of congresses, conferences, and commissions for writers without portfolio; the Concert of Europe in prose and rhyme.

    Learning still from Casanova

    At this point, the student of world literature has two options. You can convict Goethe of having freighted Weltliteratur with some outmoded Biedermeier ideology and resolve to redo the concept without all that unpleasant business about markets and patriarchs. In practice, this is likely to mean turning every West African novel you ever read into a delivery system for some generic, vacant “alterity”—“I believe that one of the fundamental desiderata of a World Literature course should be the inculcation of an appreciation for the nuances of alterity” (Pizer 15)—without ever pushing yourself to say how le livre de l’Autre is produced and distributed. The alternative would be to hew all the more closely to what is most unpalatable in Goethe’s presentation. For the latter’s theory of freie Marktliteratur is not simply an error, and the mystified position is not the one that tactlessly blurts out world literature’s dependence on the market. It is the one that touts literature’s cosmopolitan encounter with the other while maintaining a discreet silence about transnational fiction’s conditions of existence. A great many of us have explained what we find least convincing in Pascale Casanova’s World Republic of Letters—I certainly have (Thorne)—but all too few of us have taken the trouble to build on her achievement and where necessary amend it. Her insight continues to outstrip ours. One easy way forward would be to scour the classics of dependency theory and world-systems analysis in order to see which of its many claims we could poach and repurpose. Among the gawkish charms of Casanova’s work is her evident resolve to model The World Republic of Letters on Wallerstein’s Modern World System without ever bothering to cite it, her method apparently having been to write the word “literary” wherever Wallerstein had written “economic” and then to see whether she could make the resulting sentence stick. This procedure has much to recommend it—but then why stop with Wallerstein? World-systems theory didn’t stop with Wallerstein. Doesn’t the study of world literature deserve its Samir Amins and Andre Gunder Franks and Janet Abu-Lughods? I’ve already begun to catalogue the questions we might yet ask about world literature, but that list could easily be extended, like so:

    -In one recent year, publishers in the UK brought out some 186,000 new titles and editions. Uganda, by contrast (and in another recent year), published 288. What, then, are the differences between a literary scene whose bookshops are full of imported books and one whose bookshops mostly stock domestic manufactures?

    -A different question that might at first sound like the same question: What are the differences between literary scenes where translated titles make up a large percentage of new books and ones where they don’t? Translated titles make up some 3% of the new books published in the UK every year, but roughly half of the new books appearing in Denmark or Finland. Can we say in some general way what kind of effects it is likely to have when translations make up such a large percentage of a country’s publishing list?

    -Do we know why some countries and not others emerge as regional literary hubs—as satellites, that is, to the properly global literary centers? Can we say, for instance, why Latin American publishing, once it took its transnational turn, was coordinated from Argentina and Spain and not, say, from Columbia and Mexico (Santana-Acuña)?

    -If we pause to remark that some countries have achieved mass literacy and established commercial publishing houses only late in the day, much later than the modern book trade’s Gutenbergian heartlands, it might occur to us to wonder whether literature is produced differently in such countries—countries, that is, where the entire apparatus and ideology of literature have been borrowed en bloc from abroad? Does publishing, in other words, display latecomer effects? And if so, can these effects be discerned in the literature itself?

    -Similarly, is there a difference between a literary form in the country of its origin, where it first appeared as an attractive innovation, and that same (but maybe no, not same) form when adopted by writers in other countries? The literary historians have identified scores and scores of such cases, but would it be possible to establish some defensible generalizations on this topic? Ask first about something moderately concrete: What’s the difference between the French realist novel and the various latecomer realisms? And then see if you can extrapolate: What’s the difference between any literary form and latecomer versions thereof?

    -Is it possible for writers in a particular national language to import a literary form without first having written in the mode to which that form was initially a response? It is often observed that literary modernism never took root in China, first because it was largely sidelined by the politically committed literature of the 1920s and ‘30s, and later because the Communist government would not publish it (eg Denton). We also know that when censorship eased in the 1980s and ‘90s, Chinese writers began eagerly experimenting with foreign models, many of them by that point postmodern (Zha). So what do we make of this postmodernism that did not follow a modernism? If we identified five or six instances of such leapfrogging, would it be possible to come to any general conclusions about it?

    -Goethe himself observed that national literatures can suffer from trade imbalances (Strich 159). For many decades, nobody outside of Germany much wanted to read what German poets were writing. The Germans were reading the French, Italians, English, and Spanish, but they weren’t being read in return. His point, finally, was that this situation had changed in his lifetime; that the imbalance had been addressed; that Germany literary goods were at last available in sundry European marketplaces. We might then ask about the effects of such a switchover. Could we perhaps study various national literatures in two cross sections each?—the generation before their most prominent authors became fixtures of literature in translation and also the generation after. Could we say anything in general about such turning points? Do national literary scenes change when they get incorporated into world literature?

    -What if, say, Native American writers wanted to delink from world literature? What would they have to do to take charge of their own writing and so to undermine the adventitious authority of non-Native editors, scholars, and lay readers? What are the obstacles to this project and how could they be cleared?

    Of course, if questions aren’t your bag—if, say, you expect something less tentative from an essay—I can offer you theses, which I will count off.

    Thesis #1) There is a social whole that may be called world literature, which came into existence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when translations between the vernacular languages began to compete with the scholarly networks of international Latin, and which has since expanded from its European origins to cover the globe.

    Thesis #2) No analysis of individual national literatures can be made without placing them in the context of a commercially and academically organized world literature.

    Thesis #3) The study of world literature is incomplete if it fails to consider what lies outside of it: the literature that stays in place, poems without a passport, novels without exit visas, the literature that remains national or provincial, the writing that, in some cases, sees world literature as its enemy.

    Thesis #4) Since the Second World War, at the latest, English has been the globe’s dominant language, and its presses have been able to impose relative order on world literature. What is world literature in the age of the Big Four?

    Thesis #5) Anyone reading under the rubric of world literature will have trouble so much as spotting the existence of other transnational literary systems, though once glimpsed, these other systems will provoke questions of their own: Do other systems merely produce alternative conceptualizations of world literature—different reading lists, with a different mix of national literatures? Or are they rivals to world literature in the form that has come down to us, which is above all a market literature? Is it possible to generate a transnational literary system by other than commercial means?

    Five theses. But then theses are just questions masquerading as findings, and these five should not be understood as the considered products of study and reflection. They, no less than the questions, are on loan from the Braudel Center. They are what our conclusions might look like if we were capable at this moment of drawing conclusions—a measure, then, of the work to be done.

    Reading Joe Cleary

    To resume: Literary historians still have a long way to go to catch up with Pascale Casanova; we are, if anything, in danger of letting the trail that she blazed in 1999 grow over with the banality of ethics. This all by itself is reason enough to hail the publication of Joe Cleary’s 2021 book on Irish and American modernisms. For Cleary is one of the few literary historians of note to have adopted Casanova’s model in some at least semi-systematic fashion. I should say upfront that anyone opening Cleary’s volume for the first time may not be able to tell as much just by scanning its table of contents: a chapter on Yeats and Pound, a chapter on James and Eliot, one on Fitzgerald and O’Neil, a standalone chapter on Joyce. Disappointed readers might at this point wonder why nobody had told them we were experiencing a Hugh Kenner revival. But the book is called Modernism, Empire, World Literature, and most of its considerable interest is generated by the way that Cleary lets that third category monkey-wrench our settled perceptions of hyper-canonical authors. In practice, after all, don’t we most often use the rubric of world literature to convince students to read writing from Asia and Africa and South America? What would it mean, then, for the concept of world literature, having first sherpa’d us into the undervisited fastness of un-American books, to whip round and swallow up our literary proximity? Strange, you say—this account of world literature, Cleary’s, that includes no literature not written in English. But then that strangeness is very much to his point. To announce that The Great Gatsby is best understood as “world literature” is a little like telling a fan of Conogolese soukous that Aerosmith was the real world music all along. It’s irritating, but you might learn something by losing your grip on some too convenient categories.

    I can put this another way. Readers are likely to warm to Modernism, Empire, World Literature when they begin to notice that a book that seems to be about an overfamiliar canon-of-two-nations is in fact about a transnational system of literary production and the competition for attention and prestige that, crackling across all such systems, precludes the smooth functioning of their circuits, the uptown hum of well-reviewed books in wide circulation. That said, the essentials of Cleary’s argument are easy enough to telegraph:

    1) that modernist literature, in the English-speaking world, was largely the creation of Irish and American writers, who typically wrote with easily politicized chips on their shoulders—a grudge against English writers and critics for presuming to tell the world what counted as belles lettres, and for occupying all the seats at literature’s high table. One of many reasons we might consider modernism important, then, is that it marked the moment when Irish and American writers joined forces to overturn a thoroughly entrenched literary hierarchy. The old story you were once told about modernism—that it was an insurgency against a routinized academic art undertaken by avant gardes and experimentalists—gets overwritten here by a second, less familiar story, which is that it was a mutiny launched by the periphery of the literary world system against that system’s overendowed center;

    2) that this literary revolt tracks other major geopolitical shifts, and especially the rise of the United States as a global superpower and the epochal decline of British imperial might. Britain gets recast as junior partner to the US: modernism was, among other things, the playing out of this process in literature—and may not have succeeded had it not been accompanied by extra-literary changes on a large scale;

    3) that many important modernist works reflect on these geo-literary rivalries in their own pages. The literary historian might still want to set aside his copies of The Golden Bowl and Pound’s Cantos for as long as it takes to understand how trans-Atlantic publishing was organized in the year 1900 or 1925. But when he resumes his reading, he will find that the period’s poems and novels record their own fraught sense of transnational literary relations, which can serve as provisional and vernacular maps of the literary system, to be tested, no doubt, against the independent findings of the literary sociologists.

    Specialists of various kinds will have their own reasons for consulting Cleary’s splendid book. Students of literary modernism could see the book as putting a cap on three decades worth of research into the peripheral modernisms—“Modernism and African Literature” (Woods); “Modernism and Caribbean Literature” (Gikandi); “The Theory and Practice of South Asian Literary Modernisms” (Banerjee)—by making it clear that even such hyper-canonical American figures as Henry James and T.S. Eliot are best understood as peripheral modernists in their own right, sharing more with George Lamming or Amos Tutuola than with Marinetti or Baudelaire. Students of Irish literature, meanwhile, might want to mull Cleary’s big geopolitical revision to older accounts of the innovations that originated west of Liverpool: Irish modernists entered the scene as the informal allies of their American cousins. Together they opened a war on two fronts against the English literary establishment, centered in London but transnational in reach. Two of Cleary’s key figures, O’Neill and Fitzgerald, discussed in a single chapter, are Irish-Americans and can thus seem to embody that alliance in their very persons. One of Cleary’s more intriguing stories is his account of how that alliance broke down, as the US (and not Ireland!) asserted its position as the new headquarters of the world literary system, framing itself henceforth as the modernist (and then postmodernist) literary nation par excellence, and so relegating late twentieth-century Irish writers to world literature’s B team: Banville, where once there was Beckett.

    For anyone, finally, still hoping to devise a more materialist account of world literature, Cleary’s (repeatable?) accomplishments are fourfold:

    1) He retains the basic categories of the old nationalist literary histories—American, Irish, British or English—while demonstrating that these very categories only function relationally, within a transnational system. It is forever tempting to explain literary modernism as the effect of big changes that happened first outside the domain of literature: industrialization, urbanization, the accelerated pace of steamer and rail. Maybe modernist literature is but the reflected image of the skyscraper and electric light. But what Cleary is able to show is that this explanation won’t do—that each nation’s modernism came into being only in conjunction with the multiple modernisms of many nations, each experiencing these other modernizations at different times and different speeds. One immediately wishes for scholarly volumes that would attempt the same argument for other schools and periods—and rushes, perhaps, to outline them. Can we reconceive of American postmodernism as a specific position within an ensemble of international postmodernisms? Could we convince les romanistes that Flaubert was only possible because he was in conversation with realisms that were not French?

    2) He relaxes Casanova’s relentless emphasis on Paris as global literary center in order to emphasize experiments that originated on the literary periphery. Casanova, despite finally knowing better, sometimes gives the impression that poets from Denmark and Ireland and Senegal had to travel to Paris to learn how not to write like provincials. In this regard, Cleary sounds like no-one so much as Samir Amin announcing that Marx had been wrong, that world-historical transformations are more likely to take place not in the core of the world-system but at its subordinated geographical margins. And, indeed, Cleary’s reasoning is based on some not unconvincing economic analogies. Historians of the seventeenth-century have observed that the merchants who built Atlantic capitalism—the in this case English enterprisers who fundamentally (and violently) transformed the Atlantic rim in order to furnish Western Europe with various hot-weather commodities—were not London’s most successful merchants, at least not at first. If they had been successful to begin with—or if they had enjoyed better connections to the royal establishment—they wouldn’t have needed to attempt something as preposterous as the Caribbean sugar plantation, the farming and export on an industrial scale of a non-native plant on islands with no existing infrastructure and no available workforce. Innovation—and, indeed, innovation at the periphery, falls to those with no easier options (Brenner). So, too, with literary modernism: It is Cleary’s hunch that English writers, propped up by a transnational literary establishment whose aesthetic criteria already favored them, could afford to embroider gradual, twice-generational refinements on the realist novel or lyrically to coast on Tennysonian fumes, whereas American and Irish figures writing in those same modes could only render themselves redundant. From the modernism that overturned this literary culture, then, we would want to draw two conclusions at once, which are really the same conclusion run in opposite directions: that literary innovations are, if anything, more likely on the periphery than at the putatively cutting-edge core, as writers attempt to pull free from hierarchies of distinction that never seem to work to their advantage; and that the world’s economically underdeveloped regions are therefore not fated to supply world literature with the traditional, the folkloric, and the re-enchanted.

    3) He brings to the fore Casanova’s rather muted perception of rivalry within the literary system, helping us perceive world literature as an arena of conflict, and not as a list of “books to read before you die.” For many readers, Casanova’s great achievement was to help them see that powerful institutions, concentrated in just a few of the planet’s cities, get to create world literature—get to determine which books will pass from the small (and often dominated) languages into the large (and often imperial) languages, get to decide which books will get translated and reviewed and taught. This has been enough to make her book a generational touchstone. If we wish now to add to The World Republic of Letters an expanded account of national literary rivalries, either within the system or at its borders, then this is only because she has so convincingly described that system’s success—i.e., its relative closure—such that we now need to ask how subordinated writers, and foreign ones, no less, have ever managed to compel the system to change its standards of literary judgment. What lies beyond the system’s closure? Many of us grew up reading Haruki Murakami, because he offered a Japanese variant of postmodernism; and J. M. Coetzee, because he offered a South African variant of postmodernism; and Roberto Bolaño because he offered…. But it is enough to read that sentence to wonder what else those countries had to offer, outside of this Penguin-curated po-mo; to wonder that is, about the novels that we didn’t get a chance to read, about how and why they got shut out, and about whether some of them, at least, wouldn’t have forced us to revise or expand our rather settled criteria for judging contemporary fiction.

    4) He pushes readers to identify major changes in the literary world system—transformations, that is, in the organization of world literature. In this, he is very much unlike Casanova, who encourages an almost sepulchral perception of continuity across several centuries; a literary world system ­that is and always was run out of Paris; a French-but-international neoclassicism giving way to a French-but-international-Enlightenment; giving way to a French-but-international realism (in the manner of Balzac); giving way to a French-but-international modernism (in the manner of Mallarmé); a four-century Frenchness which may finally have petered out around 1960, with the rise of New York, so let’s stop the book before we get there. Cleary breaks with Casanova first by assigning Paris a partner, identifying London as a second Western literary center, co-responsible for organizing world literature, at least by the nineteenth century; and next by spending the bulk of Modernism, Empire, World Literature documenting London’s eclipse, its drastically reduced ability to set the global canon. ­His arguments thus serve as a prompt to think about how else we might periodize the literary world system, and about how and why the institutional organization of world literature sometimes changes. Have there been other major geographical shifts in the world literary system, in addition to the one that Cleary identifies? Was there a world literature before the one centered on France? Does the literary world system simply track the capitalist world system? Does literary authority follow on from economic power and military might? Surely that would have to be one’s first hunch, but then how do we account for the central role played by France, which no economic historian has ever thought was the world economy’s preeminent power at any stage? Conversely, many economic historians hold that Antwerp and then Amsterdam were the dominant entrepots in the seventeenth-century version of the world economy. But then there doesn’t seem to have been a Dutch variant of world literature, one that held, I mean, even for readers outside of the Low Countries. But then if world literature does not, after all, trot obliging behind the world economy, can we say why not? Can we identify its independent sources of authority and the mechanisms by which these sources sometimes move? The mutation in the world literary system that we will presumably most want to talk about is the one that scholars will have the hardest time studying, which is the transformation that might or might not be underway right now; the one that may transfer the headquarters of world literature to precincts far away from New York and so out of the hands of Simon & Schuster; the one that may yet lead to a version of world literature in which nobody reading this essay now is likely to have any say.

    References

    Amin, Samir. Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. Monthly Review, 1976.

    Banerjee, Rita. The New Voyager: Theory and Practice of South Asian Literary Modernisms. 2013. Harvard University, PhD

    Brenner, Robert. Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550 – 1653. Verso, 2003.

    Burke, Edmund. Further Reflections on the Revolution in France. Liberty Fund, 1992.

    —. Revolutionary Writings. Cambridge University Press, 2014.

    Casanova, Pascale. The World Republic of Letters. Harvard University Press, 2004.

    Clark, Christopher. “A Rock of Order” in the London Review of Books (42:19), 2020.

    Cleary, Joe. Modernism, Empire, World Literature. Cambridge University Press, 2021.

    Denton, Kirk. “Historical Overview.” Columbia Companion to Modern Chinese Literature, 2016

    Egedy, Gergely. “Peter Viereck’s View of Metternich’s Conservative Internationalism”. The West Bohemian Historical Review (2012): 133 – 147.

    Gikandi, Simon. Writing in Limbo: Modernism and Caribbean Literature. Cornell University Press, 1992.

    Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Essays on Art and Literature. Goethe’s Collected Works, Vol. 3. Suhrkamp, 1986.

    —. West-Eastern Divan. Ginko, 2019.

    Pizer, John. The Idea of World Literature. Louisiana State University Press, 2006.

    Rothe, Wolfgang. Der Politische Goethe: Dichter Und Staatsdiener Im Deutschen Spätabsolutismus. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998.

    Santana-Acuña, Alvaro. Ascent to Glory: How One Hundred Years of Solitude  Was Written and Became a Global Classic. Columbia University Press, 2020.  

    Strich, Fritz. Goethe and World Literature. Kegan Paul, 1945.

    Teuton, Sean. Native American Literature: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2018.

    Thorne, Christian. “The Sea Is Not a Place: Or, Putting the World Back into World Literature.” boundary 2 (2013) 40 (2): 53-79.

    Wilson, William Daniel. Das Goethe-Tabu: Protest Und Menschenrechte Im Klassischen Weimar. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999.

    Woods, Tim. “Modernism and African Literature.” The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms. Oxford University Press, 2012: 926 – 941.

    Zha, Jianying. China Pop. New Press, 1995.

    Christian Thorne is co-editor of boundary 2 and the author, most recently, of Deconstruction is America. He teaches in the English department at Williams College.

  • Christian Thorne Interviews Joe Cleary–World Literature Under American Supervision

    Christian Thorne Interviews Joe Cleary–World Literature Under American Supervision

    This interview is part of a series titled “Re-Read, Re-examine, Re-Think”. For more on Casanova, Cleary, and world literature, see Christian Thorne’s companion essay.

    Christian Thorne:  We’ve all read some cutting reviews of Pascale Casanova’s work. But you refuse to be cutting. Your book sets out, rather, to extend and amend The World Republic of Letters in a sympathetic spirit. Can we imagine you’re talking to someone who read maybe two chapters of Casanova fifteen years ago? What might such a person have missed? What in Casanova’s approach is most worth carrying forward? What might we learn from her that we will have a harder time learning from other scholars? And what in her framework have you nonetheless felt compelled to revise?

    Joe Cleary: When Harvard University Press translated The World Republic of Letters (1999) into English in 2004, its reception in the English-speaking world did appear to be quite frosty and skeptical. Much of the early criticism was predictable and concentrated on matters such as eurocentrism, francocentrism, canonicity, and so on. For some critics, one of the problems with Casanova’s study was that it was too systemic and imposed an excessively tidy order on the putative complexity of modern literary production and consecration. For others, hers was a rickety system produced by loosely combining Bourdieu, Braudel, Wallerstein, and others, and as such not nearly systemic enough. In addition, there was considerable resistance to Casanova’s stress on competition and conflict, on rivalries and struggles, on power and domination as matters constitutive of ‘world literature.’ For the more Goetheian and Kantian versions of ‘world literature,’ for criticism that assumed a contemporary transnational dispensation for which nation-states no longer greatly matter, or indeed for liberal modes of criticism generally, Casanova’s stress on the literary world system as an always contested force field that had been historically created and then transformed by national rivalries, as well as by individual authors’ bids for recognition and consecration, struck an unwelcome note. In other words, Casanova’s emphasis on conflict and competition, repression and recognition, domination and revolution did not sit well with those forms of world-literature studies that highlighted cross-civilizational communication and exchange, or those forms of postcolonial criticism that stressed hybridity, or modes of liberal criticism premised on literature’s capacity to cultivate empathy. The World Republic of Letters cites a great many writers (more writers than critics I imagine); I’m not sure if many contemporary writers have returned the compliment and seriously engaged Casanova.

    However, the skeptical or dismissive responses to Casanova are only part of the story. The World Republic of Letters was quickly translated into numerous languages, generated extensive international debate, and attracted a good deal of serious and respectful criticism. It is worth mentioning, too, that The World Republic of Letters received an early and enthusiastic welcome from senior figures associated with the ‘new left,’ including Perry Anderson, Edward Said, Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton, and her later essays appeared, as did Franco Moretti’s, in the New Left Review.

    What are some of the things worth carrying forward in Casanova’s work? To begin with, it is worth stressing that her work did not begin and end with The World Republic of Letters; the later articles and books deserve consideration though her career was, due to illness, all too short. Some things that I value in the World Republic book are the following:

    Casanova stresses the historical nature of the world literary system, which she traces back to the rise in the early modern period of European national vernacular literatures, absolutism and the Westphalian state system and, later, the era of national self-assertion and self-determination.

    She is interested in how that system consolidates and regulates its operations and dominates its peripheries but also, vitally, in how, from time to time, that system undergoes transformations and mutations. And periodically, maybe not more than once or twice a century, as Jerome David puts it, the world literary field is subject to revolutionary disruptions or re-centerings when new literary forces or movements, the bearers of new representations of reality, burst on the scene and impose themselves on the existing field. More than others, Casanova is interested in the social conditions, literary and linguistic strategies, and motivations that enable significant transformations. These concerns seem of particular interest in our contemporary moment when the postcolonial decolonizations of the 1960s and 1970s and even more “the rise of China” and the BRICs are challenging Western European and US geopolitical and geocultural world domination. Though Casanova was working loosely with Wallerstein’s work, Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century appeared in 1994 and his Adam Smith in Beijing in 2009.  Arrighi and Casanova were apparently unaware of each other’s work, but their interests converge despite their different disciplines. Each is interested in articulating and analyzing political and cultural phenomenon in terms of a modern world system, in explaining the history and dynamics of the emergence and operations of that system, and in considering the possibility of its imminent transformation.

    Casanova’s interest in the peripheries and semi-peripheries of the world literary system as sites for change is also worth stressing. Her knowledge of these postcolonial peripheries may have been limited and sometimes superficial (though she was hardly alone in this respect). Nevertheless, she contended that the drive for radical change issues periodically at least from the semi-peripheries and peripheries. Writers in the metropolitan centers (Paris, London, New York) can easily bask in their contemporary fame and apparent ‘universality’ and take the advantages they derive from the world system largely for granted. Those from the peripheries have greater reason to be more conscious of the powers and privileges that accrue to the centers and they have to be canny about how to maneuver to find recognition in that system or to take it on in various ways. Directly or indirectly, their strategies can disclose a great deal about the operations of the world literary system. Likewise, at the level of the nation, the most prestigious literary nations can rest on their past historical accomplishments and powerful consecrating institutions. Those countries or cultures with historically lesser prestige typically have fewer resources but if they find the will to improve their situation or to challenge and buck the system, they can sometimes find the means to do so.

    What in Casanova’s framework did I feel compelled to revise in Modernism, Empire, World Literature?  First, it is important to say that the study of world literature has clearly developed quite a bit from 1999 when Casanova’s volume appeared. Naturally, some things are clearer now than they were some quarter of a century ago. Likewise, geopolitical developments, such as the rise of East and South Asia, for instance, have probably done more to change settled perceptions of things than have the critical debates and academic controversies on world literature over that period because that “rise” has done so much to highlight the contingent nature of American cultural and political power. Therefore, many things appear in different light now than they might have done when Casanova was writing her book in the 1990s. That said, even in my early review of the World Republic of Letters in the Field Day Review I pointed to several limitations of her framework that still matter. I noted then that she made no allowances for world literary systems not centered on Paris; the Soviet world literary system centered on Moscow was an obvious example. Katerina Clark’s Moscow, The Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism and The Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931-1941 (2011) is a pioneering study in English of that literary world and its ambitions. Important studies by Monica Popescu and Rossen Djagalov on that Soviet system and the ‘Third World’ have followed. Likewise, Casanova pays no heed to non-European literary systems organized in terms of “world languages” such as Chinese, Arabic, Urdu, Hindi, Turkish, and so on. Even if one takes the view that these other systems were eventually subordinated to the European-centered system that was globally expanded in the age of empire, and that they were therefore considered ‘non-modern’ as opposed to modern systems, their persistence and accumulated accomplishments were something Casanova did not engage. Casanova is not wrong, in my view, to stress the exceptional importance of Paris and French culture for other cultures almost everywhere in the modern era.  But the world literary system seems to be more layered and laterally stratified than she describes. Thus, while Casanova is, I feel, sincerely interested in how things change, her system can seem, despite itself, somewhat static and caught in Parisian freeze-frame. For Modernism, Empire, World Literature, I wanted to study one moment of rupture in which, I contend, the literatures of one soon-to-be-dominant but still-quite marginal literary power, namely the United States, and one British colony and semi-periphery, Ireland, were able to effect a transformation of the Anglophone literary world previously centered on London. Moreover, in so doing, I suggest, these literatures energized what we now called Anglophone modernism and its strange new forms, styles, idioms and extravagant ambitions. As with most, maybe all, “revolutions,” this modernism was a compound of radical and reactionary intellectual and aesthetic forces and ambitions, but when it imposed itself on the early twentieth-century world system one could never see “English literature” in the same way as before. A sea change had occurred: New York emerged as a rival to London as literary capital and Dublin became, for a period at least, a significant site of peripheral literary insurgency, one to which several African American, Caribbean, Indian, Chinese, and African writers looked with considerable interest. In Modernism, Empire, World Literature, I am interested in the literary, intellectual and institutional dynamics of this change in a more granular way than Casanova could be in The World Republic of Letters. I have no real competence to deal with contemporary changes brought about by Asian and African decolonizations and by “the rise of China,” but for the period when I was writing the book my sense of the transatlantic modernist period was shadowed by considerations that comparable or greater changes may be underway now as US hegemony is contested by a variety of new forces.

    CT:   The most obvious difference between your book and Casanova’s is that you give detailed readings of individual literary works, and she mostly doesn’t. Having brought into view the existence of a world literary system, she spends nearly all of her book trying to figure out how that system works—and this in roughly sociological terms. What has to happen for a novel or a poem to count as world literature? Who gets to say that a particular book should be read all around the world, and what gives them the authority to do that? Which are the institutions that allow books to circulate outside their countries of origin? What sorts of books do those institutions tend to promote? And why books of that type and not others? How does the situation of a writer in any of the small languages differ from a writer in any of the global or imperial languages? What forms of inequality does the system tend to produce?

    But those aren’t exactly your questions, since you’ve found a way to travel from Casanova’s reconstruction of the system in extensio back to particular works, which you need to lift from out the system long enough to peer at them closely. You seem, in other words, to have translated Casanova’s literary sociology into something rather like a practical criticism, and I’m wondering what a fellow literary historian would have to do in order to emulate your accomplishment. If we’ve read Casanova carefully, which questions should we asking of individual novels and poems and plays? 

    JC: Though I reach back into the mid-nineteenth century to consider how Paris and London shaped conceptions of American and Irish national cultures in that century, and to review the ways in which American and Irish literary nationalist conceptions of their particular situations internalized much of this metropolitan sense of things, even as they also partially resisted it, Modernism, Empire, World Literature covers a more compressed timeframe than Casanova’s much wider study. Moreover, while Casanova deals with literatures in several languages, my study deals only with a few English language modernisms. This narrower frame allows more scope for detailed textual studies. Because of questions of scale and its association with Moretti’s “distant reading,” world literature studies are sometimes assumed more interested in questions of markets, circulation, translation, consecration, or consumption than in incisive close readings, and I did want to press against this. Even so, I should stress that I consider the sociological dimensions of Casanova’s work crucially important. Any serious literary materialist analysis ought to pay proper attention to how literary works are produced and circulated, and to the many institutions or awards systems through which they reach publics—booksellers, libraries, schools, universities, broadcasters, academies—and leftist cultural study ought to be responsive to such analysis. The challenge is really how to do this kind of sociological study dialectically so that one does not crudely reduce the literary work to a mere effect of the external conditions of its production and transmission.

    In the individual case studies in Modernism, Empire, World Literature, I attempt to show how the dynamics of the world literary system often show up, directly or indirectly, in the torsions of the literary texts themselves. They do so in different ways, not in the same repetitive manner in every great literary work. In the case of The Golden Bowl the subject of imperial cultural plunder and transfer—Roman, British, and American—is thematized in the figure of the enormously wealthy art collector Adam Verver and the expert management of crises is dramatized in the figure of Maggie Verver. In Eliot’s The Waste Land, English and European collapse, political and literary, is not so much directly thematized as inscribed in the distressed form and dissonant linguistic music of the poem, though the poem, as I read it, is as much reconstructive in impetus as it is a lamentation of collapse. That is, what The Waste Land offers is a poetic reconstruction on new principles that accompanies Eliot’s attempted reconstruction, conducted via The Criterion and elsewhere, of a “European republic of letters” after World Wars I and II. And Eliot’s reconstructed poetics and his will to recuperate this international “republic of letters” seems to anticipate the wider American reconstruction and management of Europe after World War II. In Walcott’s Omeros, a much later work obviously, the triangulation of Europe, the United States, and Africa, with the exilic poet-persona anxiously shuttling between these sites and his abandoned island home of St. Lucia, gives the epic its topos and compositional form. In its American-European and Caribbean-African shuttlings, Omeros expresses at the level of form an ambitious will to master the contemporary US-dominated world literary system that a clearly distressed “Walcott” self-figure unhappily inhabits. That is to say, for Walcott the Caribbean poet must either master his circumstances or be mastered by them and become, like the Saint Lucian service worker strata in his poem, low-wage worker-writer in the literary field. In these cases, and others, I attempt to underline that while writers have little option but to navigate the given literary field or system as best they can, the task of the critic is not simply to diagnose, after Casanova, how that field or system works outside of or as surround to the literary work once it is published. Critics can also work to show how the pressures of that force field or dynamic structure imprint themselves, whether in open or obscure manner, on the literary work’s style, content and form. Just as Marxist critics are interested in investigating how the traces of the commodity form imprint the literary work, or how the literary work resists its conscription as commodity, so we can expect that if a great literary work inhabits a complex and contested world literary system, that system will also inhabit the literary work, however obscurely.

    However, questions of literary form are only one piece of this. Some writers seem to be, as Casanova suggests, lucidly aware of the operative logics of the world literary system and quite deliberate in their determination to improve their individual situations or those of their national literatures in that system. I consider this matter particularly in the case of Yeats and Pound, two writers who had big ambitions for their national literatures and were restively antagonistic to London’s imperial cultural authority, which they both, in their respective ways, considered ‘decadent.’ In addition, in the case of Joyce, I discuss the treatment of national rivalries and the consecration of literary greatness by way of Stephen Dedalus’s contentions with Shakespeare (and behind him Goethe and Yeats) in the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ episode of Ulysses. The epic has always been a particularly important form to assertions of individual and national literary distinction and greatness; each chapter of Modernism, Empire, World Literature attends to questions of epic, though the approach varies in each case.

    You asked, which questions prompted by Casanova’s work should we direct at individual novels, play or poems? Firstly, I think we should include writers’ and critics’ critical writings in this catalogue also. Casanova’s work, in my view, prompts several different types of questions—these include issues of mimicry and emulation, the inscription of literatures in a system and the inscription of that system in literary works, the uneven character of transnational literary exchanges and rivalries, and so on. I consider Casanova’s World Republic to be an ambitious but inevitably preliminary or rough sketch of a world literary system, not something she intended to be the completed model. Moreover, Casanova’s work describes what is essentially a Western European literary world system, one that has been contested and reconfigured a great deal since World War II, and one that is changing again in our time as new technologies of transmission, new geopolitical struggles, new migrations, and new literary or cultural capitals exert their influence. Since we should think of the system as dynamic and contested, rather than static or merely self-reproducing, the questions that we ask about literature will change, to some extent at least, as the system changes.

    CT: I’m wondering about the place of Paris in your thinking. Let me say straight off that I take this issue to be more important than it might at first glance seem. I finished The World Republic of Letters suspecting that Casanova had made Paris too important. That book sometimes gives the impression that world literature is largely the creation of Éditions Gallimard.  But then when I finished your book, I couldn’t altogether quash my misgivings about your having (mostly) omitted Paris. To hear you tell it, ambitious Irish and American writers had to work out their relationship to the English literary establishment, but they didn’t have to take any kind of position with regard to the French (or the German or the Spanish). At first glance, this seems only obvious: Writers in the former English colonies have always had to play king-of-the-mountain with the English canon. But I’ve always thought of Casanova as usefully prodding us beyond that commonsensical position. If there really is a literary world-system, then that system is one; that’s the force of the concept, as adapted from Immanuel Wallerstein. Post-colonial theory taught us all how to talk about the literatures of the individual European empires, but Wallerstein’s point was always that the empires should not be considered in isolation, that they finally add up to a single network—conflict-ridden and dynamic, to be sure, but functionally unified even so. World-system theory has always been a theory of super-imperialism. The literary world-system is to that extent most visible when a novel or poem moves from one linguistic zone to another. The concept of the Anglosphere, by contrast, doesn’t capture the multi-imperial dimensions of the thing.

    There’s more: One of the ways in which you improve upon Casanova is by bringing in the work of Giovanni Arrighi, to refine her use of world-systems theory. But Arrighi is if anything even more insistent than Wallerstein that the world-system has, in any period, only one capital—one country that plays an outsized role in coordinating global capitalism as a whole. You’re doing something notable, then, when you write that “by the nineteenth century Britain and France were the world’s two leading imperial as well as literary powers” (5) or when you say that “the old literary system [was] organized by Paris and London” (39). That strikes me as your major (and silent) amendment of Casanova’s case, all the more notable in that it contravenes one of the central tenets of world-system theory. I can ask my question concretely: What is the status of Paris in your thinking? My impression is that the book first shifts our attention to London by partnering the city with Paris, and then lets itself ditch Paris altogether, but that might not be fair. I can also ask the question theoretically: Can a world system, literary or otherwise, have more than one capital?  

    This is an important issue. One might reverse the question and ask, “Where is London in Casanova’s model?” Your question rightly identifies that the problem of the interplay between various literary capitals, however organized and stratified, requires a good deal more attention than world literature studies has afforded it to date. How do major and satellite literary capitals relate to each other? In what ways are those relationships both competitive and cooperative (or symbiotic) at the same time? If there is only one capital of capitals, then how do the lesser but still major capitals relate it to it and it to them? How do major historical events (world wars, revolutions, new media technologies, the changing statuses of “world languages,” reader demographics) affect such relationships? I think my book has things to say on this but let me try to address your question as clearly as I can.

    First, I think it is essential not to readily conflate the world system model as it comes to us from Wallerstein or Arrighi with the world literary system as developed by Casanova and others after her. It is true that Casanova takes her model from Braudel, Wallerstein, and world systems theory, but that system is economic and political in conception whereas she is conceptualizing a cultural or literary system. It is true, too, as you say above, that a world system is functionally unitary, and I think this holds for both literary and economic-political systems. This would not imply, however, that the operative dynamics of each system are simply the same. The relationship of great literary capitals to each other need not follow the same logic as that of financial capitals. And whereas Arrighi thinks in terms of world systems in which the central coordinating powers are combinations of states and business corporations of increasing size and complexity (in turn city states, nation-states, continental states), it may be that capital cities (Paris, London, New York, Barcelona, Constantinople, Moscow, Beijing) matter more to Casanova’s model even though those cities are mostly national centers also. There may well be a compensatory element to cultural capitals for example. Nineteenth-century London had surpassed Paris in size, and England and its allied European powers defeated the grand ambitions of Napoleonic France. The British Empire also exceeded France’s in size and geostrategic significance. Yet Paris’s cachet as a great center of fashion, consumption, taste, and culture seems still to have surpassed London’s.

    Though some critics disagree, I think Casanova is basically correct to assert that for the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century Paris was the capital of literary capitals, the functional center or hub of the world literary system (one that was effectively and assumptively European even if its sway by the mid-nineteenth century reached into all continents). She takes her sense of Paris’s super-eminence not only from Baudelaire, Benjamin and Bourdieu, but also from the testimonies of writers around the world hymning Paris. What she might have formulated more clearly is the Paris-London relationship and how she thinks it works. I found Evan Horowitz’s article “London: Capital of the Nineteenth Century” (New Literary History, 2010) one of the most useful and suggestive reflections on this topic. Summarizing crudely, Horowitz argues that in all sorts of ways nineteenth-century London and England were more modern and advanced, and more politically stable, than Paris and France. However, he concludes that if uneven development—the clash of center and province, of capitalist industry or finance and agriculture, of modern and non-modern, of academies and avant-gardes—is catalytic to cultural creativity, then London may simply have been too evenly modern to be the volatile and creative cultural crucible that Paris was. Further factors such as Paris’s continental location between southern and northern Europe (something to which Moretti has also drawn attention), its long-accumulated prestige as a center of taste, fashion, and intellectual radicalism, and the prestige of French as the language of transnational culture and diplomacy were also crucial. Nevertheless, even if one accepts Paris’s supereminence this still does not tell us much about the precise nature of its relationship with literary London. The issue is not merely which capital is primary and which secondary, but how primary and secondary centers relate.

    In Modernism, Empire, World Literature I assume Paris’s precedence as world literary capital. Nevertheless, London is a close competitor and serves for writers in the Anglophone world as a hinge-city to Paris and French and European notice and fame. Irish and American writers move between both cities: Henry James, Oscar Wilde, and George Moore are notable late nineteenth century instances. However, many made their larger careers in London or had to establish reputations there to become really notable in Paris. The two cities, however similar in some respects, serve quite different functions: Paris, for example, is decidedly Europe’s art capital in a way London is not. And this matters to literature and to literary modernism, which is in so many ways influenced by the artistic avant-gardes from the Impressionists to the Surrealists. Because Paris is the capital of European art, the trendsetter, the great art collectors and patrons gather there too, those from the Anglophone world included. So, it is not just a case of writers living in Paris; as Henry James observed, ‘American  art’ in his day was made in Paris but even when it was made outside of Paris we find a great deal of Paris in it. We all know about the Irish and American expatriates who moved to Paris in the early twentieth century or in the twenties. But even these writers continued to depend on English or American literary magazines, reviewers, publishers, patrons, and readerships, so for the Anglophone writer it was rarely if ever a case of working exclusively in a Parisian or French world.   However, I also suggest, contra Casanova, that things were slowly but surely changing, and that the changes were speeding up across the twentieth century especially. As the British Empire expanded, and as the United States was transformed from a largely agrarian colony and slave plantation into a growing industrial power and empire (expanding into Mexico, the Caribbean, and the Pacific), the English language’s reach as “world language” was expanding too. Contemporary English-speaking linguists and writers were mostly triumphantly aware of this shift and this awareness is a crucial factor in literary production of the period, though not only among English-language writers. In the Belle Époque and the US’s Gilded Age, there was a much-commented-upon attempt by wealthy Americans, especially on the Atlantic coast, to augment the US’s cultural capital by building great museums, galleries, libraries, concert halls, universities, and so on, to compete with London and Paris and Europe generally. This kind of cultural catch-up led to “the plunder of Europe” and “the Orient” for artifacts of all kinds and their transfer to US repositories. James in The Golden Bowl (1904), Ezra Pound in Patria Mia (1913), and Lewis Mumford in The Golden Day (1926) all write wonderfully on this topic as do many other early twentieth-century writers and present-day American cultural historians and scholars. My argument in Modernism, Empire, World Literature is that while Paris is indeed the leading capital of the world literary system and enjoys an enormous, maybe unrivalled, prestige in the modernist era, the rapid expansion of English across the globe (thanks in part to empire and better communications systems), the remarkable rise in US wealth and power, and European turbulence after 1914 and in the entre deux guerres moment, means that the literary world system is already being reconfigured in ways Casanova either overlooks or recognizes—if she recognizes it at all—only in her own lifetime.

    However, things are happening on the peripheries that matter too. Concurrently, though in very different circumstances, the Irish and Celtic Revivals gained momentum alongside the Irish struggle for Home Rule, and attracted much attention in the US both from mainstream white intellectuals (like Pound or Van Wyck Brooks, for example) and from writers in the Harlem Renaissance (Claude McKay is a notable Caribbean-American instance). My argument is that Irish and American modernisms were nurtured by these earlier domestic national literary and cultural assertions, and by their sense of ambition. Even if many individual modernists wrote scathingly of their domestic societies and cultures and went into long-term exile in London and Paris, they still took with them something of this increasing national assertiveness and diffidence to things metropolitan. For writers from the English-language colonies in Ireland, the US, and the Caribbean, and indeed for Irish nationalist, African American, and Caribbean political and intellectual activists, London and England were critical: it was there that crafts could be refined, contacts made, patrons found, voices amplified, reputations elevated. So, we have great migrations from Ireland (George Moore, Wilde, Shaw, Yeats), the US (James, Pound, Eliot, Stein), and from the Caribbean (CLR James, McKay and others)—these are just the obvious examples. Still, if London is a necessary first citadel to be taken, so to speak, for Anglophone writers, Paris remains preeminent.

    At the same time, there are different ways of taking on Paris in a literary sense. For James, Eliot, and George Moore there are sojourns and immersions in French literary circles or in poetic and other artistic and philosophical developments. Others like Stein and Joyce, Hemingway and Fitzgerald, and many major African-American expatriate artists, bypass London for a more or less direct route to Paris (the routes of Joyce and McKay are more circuitous than most).  Even in the case of someone like CLR James who moves to Lancashire and London, Paris and France are patently important intellectually—one need only consider the enormous reading and research on French domestic and imperial politics and culture necessary for James’s scholarly epic, The Black Jacobins. Or, think of Ulysses, one of the obvious landmark modernist masterpieces. Joyce initially gets published with the help of Pound, but his Parisian consecration comes essentially with Ulysses, a work to which Sylvia Beach’s Shakespeare and Company is indispensable. What an amazing cooperative venture—this creation of Irish Catholic and American Presbyterian expatriate renegades in Paris. The sense of intellectual and artistic ambition not just to get to the European capitals or be recognized there, but to radically remake “literature” as understood in Paris or London is still remarkable and underappreciated.

    In any case, to bring things to a point, my sense is that London and later New York mattered to English-speaking writers from the peripheries because it was there that primary reputations were made. English-language publishers and reviewers were indispensable to finding what every writer needs, namely readers and markets and reviews. Nevertheless, Paris still mattered more to avant-garde painting and literature more than London did, and still conferred the highest form of cultural prestige or consecration: French translation (a power supplemented or confirmed by the Nobel Prize in time). There is another twist though, another ruse of literary history. The English-language modernisms of Ireland, the Caribbean, and the United States may have been written with a certain sense of resentful diffidence to received pronunciation or the King’s English—a diffidence especially obvious in Joyce, Stein and McKay, to mention a few. Nevertheless, one of the paradoxes of the success of English-language modernisms taken collectively is that they also hugely augmented the prestige of English as a world language and world literary language. Other things were also tipping the scales away from French and towards English. The rapid rise of the US as world power after WWI, the assertion of New York as an ultramodern center of finance, fashion and publication, the development of air travel (the language of international aviation is English), the promotion of American popular cinema and culture, and the fall of Paris and France to Nazi Germany in 1940 all contributed. In many respects, the English-language modernisms from the peripheries can be read as a brash challenge to and in some sense, a remarkable takeover and renewal of “English literature” as earlier formulated by means of a converging series of attachments to and rivalries with literary London. Nevertheless, when modernism comes to be celebrated as one of the great literary revolutions or sea changes in twentieth-century literature, then modernism, willy nilly, becomes part of the story of the augmentation of the Anglophone sphere’s cultural prestige and reach and, conversely, part of a relative reining-in of French literary preeminence.

    Paris does not suffer any kind of sudden or absolute decline, but its sense of itself as uncontested “universal” capital of culture comes under strain from the rise of the Soviet Union and the rise of the United States and American English. Had Oscar Wilde, Henry James, James Joyce, William Butler Yeats, Gertrude Stein, Ernest Hemingway, Claude McKay and CLR James not just been fascinated by Paris, but also written their oeuvres in French, how different modern literature would appear!  There’s a Leonard Cohen song that goes, “First we take Manhattan, then we take Berlin.” In the case of Anglophone modernism, this might be revised, “First we take London, then we take Paris.” However, as New York came increasingly into prominence the London-Paris nexus became a more complex London-New York-Paris one. Still, I recognize that my response remains sketchy. It is easier to point to broad contours of change than to explain them in some more finely detailed accounts of reconfigured literary fields or world systems. This, I expect, will require collective scholarship and combinations of cultural sociology, quantitative analysis, translation studies, and close reading. The changing roles of publishing companies, university populations, and critical scholarship, literary migrations, prizes and awards, and many other things, would have to be considered in terms of this wider transatlantic and intercontinental system.

    CT: Casanova makes a few suggestive remarks about American fiction and has quite a lot to say about Irish literature, but you largely omit the very authors she foregrounds—those would be Faulkner and Beckett. I’m wondering if that’s significant. Casanova, after all, regards Beckett as the greatest of all twentieth-century writers—and greatest because he was the culmination of the literary world system, enabled by dislocation to achieve “the total autonomy of literature” (128), a literature beholden to no place, no community, no particular language.

    About Faulkner, meanwhile, she says the following:

    “William Faulkner, no less than Joyce, was responsible for one of the greatest revolutions in the world of letters, comparable in its extent, and in the depth of the changes it introduced in the novel, to the naturalist revolution of the late nineteenth century. … in the outlying countries of the literary world [Faulkner’s innovations] were welcomed as tools of liberation. Faulkner’s work, more than that of any other writer, henceforth belonged to the explicit repertoire of international writers in dominated literary spaces who sought to escape the imposition of national rules, for he had found a solution to a commonly experienced political, aesthetic, and literary impasse.” (336)

    Faulkner, she says, could play this role because he was writing about a backward and perhaps even colonized portion of the U.S., archaic and left behind. His American South was of a piece with the global South, and this made him compelling to readers in the colonies and post-colonies. Faulkner wrote a regionalist and rural fiction, to be sure, but his novels were unlike anything the nineteenth-century had served up under that rubric. It thus fell to a white American to teach the writers of the old Third World how to forge a rural modernism, in which an underdeveloped region manages to sustain stylistic bravura. Faulkner modeled for (post)colonial writers how to stay on the periphery and still be experimental and formally challenging.

    I’m wondering, then, about whether you think Casanova is right about Beckett and Faulkner. And I’m wondering, too, whether you think these judgments are compatible with your account of American and Irish modernisms. Does your passing over Faulkner and Beckett in (near) silence suggest a disagreement or at least a different emphasis? Two years before The World Republic of Letters, Casanova published a single-author study called Beckett the Abstractionist, but then in the later book she wrote about him all over again. In 2021, you published not only Modernism, Empire, World Literature but also The Irish Expatriate Novel in Late Capitalist Globalization, and in neither book do you make more than passing reference to Beckett. Casanova made him central more than once in quick succession. You seem to have responded by skipping him twice over. 

    JC: That’s something I hadn’t ever considered and one to which one might give a few answers.

    Some of the differences may be just down to the vagaries of reading and what makes an impression, some to the architecture of my argument, but some stem from a disagreement with Casanova’s conception of literary world systems.

    In terms of the quirks of reading, I came to modernism as an Irish undergraduate in the early 1980s. We read what would now be considered a conventional and conservative high modernist canon: Henry James, Conrad, Joyce, Woolf, Lawrence, Yeats, early Pound, William Carlos Williams, and Faulkner. If I remember correctly, we encountered Beckett selectively as a dramatist. I came to Beckett’s novels later, after college, and Beckett’s plays still make a deeper impression. (Beckett died in 1989; perhaps he was lodged somewhere anomalous between “contemporary” and “modernist” in undergraduate Irish syllabi and “late modernism” wasn’t really a category.)  It was only at graduate school in Columbia University that I really came to what we now call “postcolonial literature” in a serious way. In some ways, then, the modernist literature that made the greatest impression on me was “early” and “high” modernism, and “late modernism” always seemed a little compromised or hobbled by its adjective, its tardiness. In many ways, I’m anti-Lukácsian when it comes to high modernism, but must fight with my tendency to view “late modernism” in rather Lukácsian terms! Casanova, on the other hand, seems magnetically drawn to Beckett as late modernist and, like Adorno, to have a far keener feeling for Beckett than for Brecht.

    In terms of the structure of my book, it would be a stronger work were there a chapter on Stein or Faulkner, coming after the chapter on Joyce and before that on Walcott. But since the study is fundamentally about how it took the energies of two former peripheries, one a colony in the process of breaking with Britain and the empire, the other a former colony in the process of becoming an imperial metropole and new-world hegemon, to bring about a significant structural change in the literary world system, I wanted to keep the focus largely on the period before World War II. In addition, because my stress was on Irish and American modernist connections and mutual awareness, I decided to focus on F. Scott Fitzgerald and Eugene O’Neill rather than Stein or Faulkner. I saw that chapter as a kind of bridge chapter: two American Irish figures working largely in the US and building on the achievements of the earlier expatriate Americans but belonging to a different phase of American assertion and imminent ascendancy. I was also trying to expand a little the conventional sense of “Irish modernism.” Irish studies, with a few notable exceptions, has largely tended to bypass Irish American modernism and to fixate on the trinity of Yeats, Joyce and Beckett, with Bowen now added to make the trio a quartet. For its part, “American modernist studies” has always been far more interested in American and British modernist connections than in connections with Irish modernism. There are many interesting books on the expatriate Americans in London and Paris, because these were the cities where the major expat writers resided. However, there are few if any ambitious scholarly works on American or African American takes on the Irish Revival and modernism. In many respects, the American scholarly fascination with London and Paris confirms Casanova’s thesis.

    Third, and most important, I fundamentally disagree with Casanova’s assertion that “autonomy” is the highest and finest stage of accomplishment in terms of world literary systems. For her, Beckett’s attempt to be free of all constraints—of nation, public, or language—represents “autonomy” pushed to its auto-referential highest reach, literature aspiring to the quality of visual abstraction.  You’ve written admirably on the contradictions in The World Republic of Letters on this issue in “The Sea is Not a World” in boundary 2. On the one hand, Casanova is committed to the idea of a world literary system that is one but uneven and expanding in scale but disrupted and sometimes even transformed or revolutionized from its peripheries or semi-peripheries. On the other hand, she takes a conception of “autonomy” which is ultimately a kind of meta-art transcending national communities, linguistic adherences, and political commitments as the highest kind of literary attainment because this establishes some sort of absolute sovereignty for literature—autonomy not just from religion or race but nation and state and just about anything else. It’s hard to tell where literary “autonomy” or “sovereignty” does not become in her work a kind of literary “isolationism” or delinking to use a world systems term. Where I differ is that I view that conception of “autonomy” as something that is itself historical and owes something to Flaubert and some versions of nineteenth-century French letters and to some versions of modernism and New Criticism and then to Western Cold War ideology rather than as the given or necessary telos of world literary systems. Put another way, the idea of “autonomy” to which Casanova subscribes belongs to a particular time and place, to a particular configuration of the Western world literary system; I see no reason to accord it the kind of “end of history” status that Casanova seems to grant it. The Soviet world literary system obviously did not assign the same prestige to “autonomy” that the Western Cold War literary system did, and there is no reason why some newly configured world literary system might not create for itself a quite different value system to those associated with either the Soviet or Western literary systems. Autonomy from the authoritarian centralized state and autonomy from capital, the commodity form, and the cultural industries are quite different things, but Casanova appears to conflate them.

    Finally, while I admire the way Casanova ascribes real agency to the élan of great writers like Joyce or Faulkner (and some others) and doesn’t reduce them to mere functions or effects of her system, I’m more cautious of phrases such as that which you cite above. When Casanova says Joyce and Faulkner created “two of the greatest revolutions” in the literary world she ascribes singular agency to them. Revolutions seem to require their Toussaints, Dantons, and Trostkys, so why not accord outstanding writers the stature of their achievements? Nevertheless, the world literary system as such seems only to be structurally changed or radically transformed when there are other geopolitical and geocultural events that, accidentally or otherwise, abet and further the achievements of the great individual writers. Melville’s achievements in the nineteenth century now seem astounding but went largely unrecognized in London or Paris or indeed in the US until the world’s geopolitical circumstances had changed and until more room was made for oddball novels like Moby-Dick. It took the rise of the United States and sea changes in literary taste attributable to modernism for established views on Melville to change significantly. So, yes, Casanova may be largely correct in her sense of Faulkner’s enormous literary influence beyond the United States and in the Global South, but Casanova, like us all perhaps, struggles to keep the dialectics of individual agency and general system in play. By the way, what Casanova says of Faulkner and his conception for writers beyond the US seems analogous in many respects to what Said says of Yeats as poet of decolonization. Yet in Casanova’s Irish schema, Yeats, about whom she has little to say, is only a secondary “rebel” and Beckett a first-rate “revolutionary.”  In my book, I use but also work against her hierarchical valuation of “assimilated,” “rebel” and “revolutionary” writers.

    CT: Even passing familiarity with the Anglo-modernist canon lends credence to Casanova’s big claim: that the system of belles lettres has been organized by transnational literary capitals, metropolitan clearing-houses that vacuum up manuscripts from vast, multi-continental literary peripheries — or that lure the peripheral writers themselves to relocate: the American novelist living in Sussex; the Polish novelist living in Kent; one Irish playwright living in London, a second living in Paris, a third living first in London, then in Paris; the short-story writer from New Zealand moving to England; all those expatriate American poets: Eliot and Pound and H.D. and Stein. One of the ways in which you’ve broken with Casanova, I think, is that you give the impression that the English literary establishment was in some respects quite weak, overwhelmed by all these innovators from abroad, whereas she, despite making some sharp observations about national literary rivalries, tends to emphasize the persistent power of metropolitan cultural institutions (as the arbiters of all things literary). I can put this another way: You make the case that non-English writers, lacking an internationally ratified literary tradition, felt freer to innovate. What you help us see is that modernism could easily carry a certain all but overt national and anti-metropolitan content. Maybe the English had a harder time innovating. And here the economic analogies really do suggest themselves: The English were held back by their very success. They had too much invested in a particular literary infrastructure, too much fixed literary capital. A reader who picked up your book knowing nothing about modernism could perhaps get the impression that there were no English modernists. But then one can’t help but wonder about D.H. Lawrence or Virginia Woolf or Wilfred Owen. So let me ask: You’ve convinced me that modernism has a special affinity for the (rising) periphery. How does that force us to rethink the modernists from the old imperial core?

    JC: Let me make two general comments before coming directly to the English modernists. First, the ways in which various literary metropoles or capitals relate to their peripheries do not necessarily follow some common formulaic rule or pattern. Even if all such relationships involve domination and dependency, the particular dynamics of how London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, Barcelona, Kolkata and so on relate to their peripheries may differ considerably. As such, the relationship between Parisian modernism and the modernisms of France’s peripheries may not be the same as that of London and the Anglosphere’s peripheral modernisms. Second, while there was an earlier tendency in modernist scholarship to identify modernism almost exclusively with world cities, there is good reason to resist shifting to the other extreme to associate modernism exclusively with semi-peripheries or peripheries. Clearly, if we think of modernism not just in terms of major individual writers but also in terms of the avant-gardes, then most of the avant-garde movements are located in the metropoles. If we follow Peter Bürger and think of the avant-gardes as movements that challenged the art institutions and their ideas about what constituted “art” and its function, then there is obvious reason why the avant-gardes were concentrated in major capitals: the institutional complexes that defined what constituted art were located in these capitals and it was there that the avant-gardes made their assault and impact.  If we think in terms of the more commonly cited avant-gardes—the Impressionists, Symbolists, Cubists, Futurists, Constructivists, Dadaists, Expressionists, Surrealists, Bauhaus, Abstract Expressionists, etc.—London is not the world capital that most readily leaps to mind. Many of these avant-gardes are associated more with the visual arts or theater than with the novel or poetry, but the point stands. (The European avant-garde most identified with non-metropolitan affect and association is probably primitivism.)

    As for a specifically English literary modernism, it is important not to reduce the matter simply to numerical headcounts of “great writers.” To think exclusively in these terms—though literary textbooks and companions appear sometimes implicitly to do so—is to say that England produced X-number of great modernist writers, the US Y-number, the Caribbean Z-number, and thus forth. So, one can allow England its Woolfs, Lawrences, Joneses, Buntings, and others, but this doesn’t go anywhere especially useful. The more significant and less studied matter is what modernism meant for different Anglophone national literatures and how national literary histories retrospectively constructed its place in national terms. It is here we can see real differences.

    The Irish, Scottish and American peripheries produced writers in the nineteenth century that exerted international impact. Napoleon read Macpherson’s Ossian in Italian translation, revered it, and allegedly carried it into battle. Baudelaire was famously impressed by Poe and Nietzsche by Emerson. Thomas Moore’s “Irish Melodies” were translated into numerous European languages. So, as Katie Trumpener, in Bardic Nationalism, and others after her have demonstrated, the Anglophone peripheries were already of consequence in the metropolitan centers well before what we now call modernism. That allowed, it is with literary modernism that Irish and US literatures announce themselves with unprecedented literary force on the “world stage.” The modernisms of Yeats, Joyce, O’Casey and Beckett may respond to the Irish Revival in quite different ways, but they appear more or less concurrently with the drive for Irish independence and, as someone like Wyndham Lewis recognized, are tinted by its assertiveness. American modernist writing undoubtedly expresses a range of extremely complex, often aggressively critical responses to American society. However, whether in its elite white or Black internationalist forms, there is some palpable sense that the US’s role in the world is no longer peripheral but rather that of a great power coming into its prime. In the book, I cite Pound, Scott Fitzgerald, Edmund Wilson, John Peale Bishop, Clement Greenberg and others who give explicit expression to this new sense of American arrival and accomplishment in letters and the visual arts, but that brashness is implicit in American modernist forms and ambitions in other ways too.

    In the case of the English, the same period appears one of considerable fertility especially in the novel. Conrad, Wells, Ford, Foster, Woolf, Lewis, Lawrence, Jean Rhys, Rebecca West, Aldous Huxley, Elizabeth Bowen were all born in the nineteenth century; Malcolm Lowry was born in 1909: their collective careers are enough to indicate novelistic liveliness. Nevertheless, some things appear worth observing. On the whole, the English modernists—including for the most part the outstanding figures of Woolf, Lawrence and Lowry—loosen and renovate the conventions of the realist novel. But very few radically transmogrify the novel as form in the manner of Proust, Joyce, Stein, Dos Passos, Broch, Faulkner, or Beckett. To say as much is not to disparage Lawrence or Woolf or the others but only to note a certain difference. Even when Lawrence or Woolf display an extremely modernist sensibility and a keen familiarity with non-English modernisms, they mostly retain considerable attachment to the realist form and its conventions. The same holds for Bowen, West, Ford, Forster, and others. Indeed, if we were to accord Anthony Powell (born 1905) and his 12-volume Dance to the Music of Time, the major stature that Perry Anderson has recently argued for it in Different Speeds, Same Furies: Powell, Proust and Other Literary Forms (2022), then one might well argue that in England the social realist comic or ironic novel of manners and social novel (strengthened in the best instances by contact with modernist writing) remain the dominant forms across the twentieth century—the modes in which English fiction attains and retains its highest accomplishments. If this is so, then what we call “modernism” would not represent the kind of radical rupture with earlier realism in England that it did elsewhere. Viewed in this manner, Woolf’s and Lawrence’s works would not appear lesser but in a different light nonetheless. My suggestion is not that Woolf and Lawrence are merely ‘minor modernists.’ They are both great writers, serious and superb innovators. My point is that English modernism owes more to non-English expatriates and Celtic fringe writers than is commonly allowed—despite Terry Eagleton’s Exiles and Émigrés (1970) making this point a long time ago—and that for various reasons modernism occupies a different place in the English literary canon than in, say, the Irish, American or Scottish ones.

    In the case of poetry, there are modernist poets but no English figures to compare with Yeats, Eliot, Pound, H.D., Carlos Williams, Marianne Moore or Stevens for sheer impact. Mina Loy (born in 1882 as Mina Gertrude Löwy to a Hungarian Jewish refugee father and English mother) was a London-born avant-gardist who lived much of her adult life in Europe and then became an American citizen, living in New York, dying in Colorado. Hope Mirrlees’s (born 1887 in Kent) Paris: A Poem (1920) is a notable work. David Jones’s (also born in Kent in 1895) In Parenthesis (1937) and Anathemata (1952), and Basil Bunting’s (born 1900) Briggflatts (1966) are late modernist works of large ambition. Hugh MacDiarmid was born in Langholm, Scotland, in 1892; A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle (1926) was much influenced by Joyce, Yeats, and the Irish Revival and is a modernist long poem. Mirrlees grew up in Scotland and South Africa, Jones was born in Kent to a Welsh-speaking family and strongly identified with Wales, and Bunting lived much of his adult life as an expatriate in France, Italy, Persia and elsewhere, and was greatly influenced by his friendship with Pound. I mention these details for two reasons. In the case of English or British modernism (the two are often conflated), the role of writers from England’s peripheries—from Ireland, Scotland, and Wales—and of European émigrés or the children of émigrés exceeds that of London and of Bloomsbury. Think of the early importance of translators of advanced European poetry and drama: of Welsh-born Arthur Symonds’s The Symbolist Movement in Literature (1899, revised 1919), of Scottish born William Archer’s and Irish-born G. B. Shaw’s early advocacy for Ibsen in theater and of the role of Eleanor Marx, translator of Madame Bovary and An Enemy of Society in 1887 and The Wild Duck in 1888, in promoting advanced European literature. Or consider Irish-born Oscar Wilde’s Salomé, written in French in 1891 and first produced in Paris in 1896, or of Melbourne-born George Egerton’s (born Mary Elizabeth Annie Dunne in 1859, raised in Dublin, educated for a time in Germany, later moving to New York and Norway) immersion in ‘New Woman’ circles and in Nietzschean philosophy and in the Scandinavian modernism of Hamsun and Strindberg. Then consider the émigrés Henry James, Conrad, Lewis, Eliot, Pound, and Rhys. European modernist literature comes inwards to Britain from its peripheries and from the US and other colonies, not outwards from Bloomsbury.  Second, the period we associate with modernism, from the fin de siècle to World War II say, is also a period when Eliot as poet and critic takes over London in terms of poetry and Shaw as leading playwright and critic in terms of drama. And this is when many of the greatest English writers of the time leave England and take off for elsewhere to find inspiration.  D. H. Lawrence travels the world in the 1920s and spends time in the United States before returning to France to die. After periods in Paris, Germany and Italy, Loy leaves for New York in 1916 and dies in the US in 1966. Well-traveled Lowry leaves for New York, Cuernavaca, Los Angeles and Vancouver, returning to die in England in 1957. Auden leaves England in 1939 for New York, dying in Vienna in 1973. The major works of Grahame Greene, Rebecca West, Lawrence Durrell, or Anthony Burgess are more associated with the colonies, or the Middle East, or the Balkans, than with “Little England.” Woolf and Powell may be the two most significant stay-at-home London-based figures in twentieth century English fiction to keep faith with domestic English society. There may be many reasons for these self-exiles from England and London—a disillusionment with post-war England, a search for new materials—but they clearly signal a sense that London is no longer the center of even the Anglophone world let alone of the world generally.

    The significance of the peripheries to Anglophone reception of modernist currents, to achieved high modernist ambition, and the itchy-feet world-crossing restlessness of many of the greatest English poets and novelists of the twentieth century seem to me to index a loss of England’s and London’s earlier confident centrality. Shelley and Byron, Wordsworth and Scott, Dickens and Thackeray, Charlotte Brönte and George Eliot, Thomas Hardy and Tennyson all travelled but their works remain decisively and securely “English” or “British” and, in the case of the canonical novelists especially, are generally firmly located in England or Scotland. In Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said argues that the nineteenth-century English realist novel is so securely English that the empire and colonies were taken largely for granted, appearing mostly only in peripheral vision or in the novelistic background. However, things are changing by the period we associate with early and high modernism. Writers and dramatists from the peripheries are becoming the dominant forces in the Anglophone novel, poetry and drama, and many of the greatest English writers are by then roving restlessly across the world and making the world beyond England their subject matter—it is as though the world can no longer properly be comprehended or panoptically imagined from England or London. The empire becomes visible to the more prestigious forms of English letters largely in its decline and fall, and the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe and the colonies now have to be more directly reckoned with in English letters—as Michael Denning noted long ago in Cover Stories (1987) we see this new and more paranoid worldview emerging in the English spy novel and thriller. The world literary system had pivoted and the English writer had to adjust. It is not, then, that there is no English modernism. It is that English modernism has to share its lesser share of the international limelight with other Anglophone modernisms in a world where the United Kingdom is contending with the nationalisms, literary and otherwise, of its Celtic peripheries and with its declining stature in the world system. “English literature,” if by this we mean literatures in English everywhere, is becoming more global and transcontinental than ever before; “English literature,” if by this we mean literature written by English-born writers about England, is becoming or has already become for several decades anxiously provincialized.

    CT: In your final chapter, on Derek Walcott, you refer in passing to the “now-American-centered world literary system.” (250) The world literary system once organized from the twin capitals of London and Paris is now organized largely by Americans. It is American literary institutions—and American literary administrators—that enjoy a certain disproportionate say in what counts as world literature. That phrase – “now-American-centered” – stands out because it flags a big geographical mutation in the world literary system, which is a matter that Casanova almost entirely neglects. The phrase also puts me in mind again of Giovanni Arrighi, since his great contribution to world-systems theory was to propose a properly Wallersteinian version of the translatio imperii. If a reader were to take away a single claim from The Long Twentieth Century, it would be that the world system has always been organized around a geographical center, but that the system is nonetheless prone to leaping—prone, that is, to the epochal swapping of centers: from northern Italy to the Dutch Republic to Britain to the United States. Once we’ve cracked open the Arrighi, though, I find myself wanting to ask three interlinked questions:

    1)    Arrighi goes on to explain (in great detail) that the world system reorganizes itself whenever it moves to a new capital. Each geographical shift—from Amsterdam to London, say—has been accompanied by major institutional transformations. I’m wondering if you think the same is true of the literary world system? Is the US-centered world literary system importantly different from the older Anglo-French system, and if so, how?

    2)   Arrighi is also at pains to explain why the world system keeps shifting its headquarters—why, that is, finance capital can’t just find a business district where the coffee is good and stay there indefinitely. Briefly: A given entrepot will slowly lose its competitive advantages as these are adopted across the world system, including by its national rivals, and as it finds itself with a given economic regime’s oldest and most dilapidated physical plant. Eventually, new organizational advantages will have to be devised, and this will be easier to attempt on fresh terrain. I’d like to ask, then, whether this argument can be adapted to literature. You agree with Casanova when she says that the capital of a world literary system needn’t be the same as the capital of the world economic system. But then why does the world literary system ever move to a new metropolitan center? What dislodged it from Paris and London?

    3)  The “now-American-centered world literary system”: Did you mean the now of 1990, when Omeros was published, or the now of 2021, when Modernism, Empire, World Literature was published? Or both? Has the world literary system changed over the last thirty years—and is it still centered on the US? I could also ask the question this way: On p. 47, you write that “change also occurs within the literary system … when peripheral cultures and their emissaries have the audacity and ambition to dispute a declining centre’s consecrating authority.” Is the American-centered world system in decline? Is anyone in the position to dispute its consecrating authority?               

    JC: There are many nested questions here and each one might require a book to address!  Let me start with your Question (2), move back to (1), and end with some sketchy speculations on (3).

    Yes, Arrighi proposes that economic world systems are not merely organized around particular geographical centers but also that the current center’s dominance is only ceded when some successor center can reorganize the entire system not only in its own interests but in a general manner with benefits accruing to the subsidiary states as well. He contends, moreover, that in the case of those systemic transformations he describes—from the Italian city-states to the Dutch United Provinces to the United Kingdom to the United States—the size and reach of the states involved and the expanse of the overall capitalist system it regulates increases. However, he suggests, too, that each successive hegemon enjoys dominance for a shorter period than its predecessor did. He also stresses that serious financial crises and devastating “world wars”  accompany such transfers. It seems worth adding that the “decline” of the former centers as conceived here is relative decline, not absolute. The US may have taken over the role of capitalist world hegemon from the UK after World War II, but the UK is still one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union may have failed in their respective imperial, Nazi and Soviet bids to supersede the US as world hegemon, but all are still leading world states in some respect or other.

    In The World Republic of Letters, Casanova seems to assume that the world economic and world literary systems are structurally similar but separate—or tendentially separate and ideally, in her view, becoming completely so in order that that the production of the most ambitious literatures would be subject to neither church nor nation-state nor capitalist economy. She also swings between defiant assertions that Paris remains in her time the supreme capital of literary capitals for the higher forms of literature—with New York and London merely supervising more upmarket versions of commercially-successful literature—and an elegiac concession that this Anglo-globalization is already or will soon become dominant.

    However, the question you ask is, even if we can imagine a literary world system as roughly analogous to an economic world system, then what motivates its transformation? After all, financial capital and symbolic or cultural capital are not the same and need not follow a similar logic of decreasing returns. So, your question is, why should we suppose that world literary capitals must change even if we accept financial capitals must do so? My response is that there was never a singular all-encompassing world literary system in the manner that Casanova proposes. Even as the Paris-centered system became dominant and arbitrated what was considered passé, “classical”, or “modern” or “avant-garde” in terms of literary value, the older capitals of other world languages and literatures did not cease to matter. And in the twentieth century, a new communist world literary system emerged under Moscow and Beijing. These different literary worlds or sub-systems intersected, collaborated and competed with each other in complex ways. However, it would appear that as different states vie to be supreme world hegemon, they rarely do so in exclusively politico-economic or military terms. To secure their long-term prestige and to convert domination into hegemony they also need to project themselves culturally and intellectually in terms of the arts and sciences. The Italian city-states gave us the Renaissance. The United Provinces give us the Dutch “Golden Age.” This refers not only to transcontinental trade (including the slave trade) and the Dutch East India Company (VOC). It also includes a flourishing of the sciences, philosophy (in the works of Spinoza and Descartes, for instance, who lived in Holland for twenty years and had his leadings works published in Amsterdam and Leiden), the Dutch realist school of painting, and indeed “the Protestant ethic.” The French and British empires give us a different kind of global domination and their modern literatures. That England gave us Mill and Darwin as well as Austen and Dickens and sheltered the émigré Marx. Paris gave us Saint-Simon and Tocqueville and Proudhon and Curie as well as Balzac and Hugo, Stendhal and Zola.

    In the case of the United States, cultural assertion takes the form of anxious “catch up” with Europe well before it achieves either domination or hegemony and is then followed by global cultural projection as it attempts to consolidate its new position after WWII. In the case of New York specifically, its emergence as an international cultural capital was a matter of policy and massive investment. It would seem that a world literary capital requires more than the establishment and cultivation of prestigious literary institutions. To become world capitals, cities have to create whole complexes of institutions in all of the arts—music, dance, opera, theatre, the visual arts, architecture, performance, and in the twentieth century cinema too. Fashion and cuisine are part of the mix. New York achieved this in the form of extravagant galleries, museums, music academies, film institutes, ballet and dance academies, literary and musical bohemian districts (Harlem, Greenwich Village), universities, publishing corporations, arts foundations, high-end newspaper reviews, literary magazines, and so on. Arguably, the visual arts and architecture were more important in the first instance than literature to the construction of new cultural capitals because the visual arts are less linguistically anchored and thus translate quicker and architecture is lived in everyday ways that the other arts are not. Because New York was a more heterogeneous immigrant city than London or Paris were in the early twentieth century, it could, with the help of the Harlem Renaissance and jazz, also appear more “globally modern” sooner than they could. In the same early twentieth-century era, the US also developed and expanded a continent-wide research university system. Nevertheless, it seems likely that without the artistic and intellectual migrations triggered by the Bolshevik Revolution, the victories of Fascism in Western Europe and Japan, and the catastrophe of World War II, the twentieth-century “American Renaissance” might have been far less spectacular. The long-term development of artistic and scientific infrastructure, extensive intellectual and artistic migrations from Europe and elsewhere, and then a more concerted Cold War policy of constructing the US as the guarantor of an imperiled “Western Civilization”—imperiled by communism within and without, and by mass culture—had a cumulative effect. It is too instrumentalist to think of all of this solely as “soft power” but something of that is also involved.

    Nevertheless, even if London—particularly because it shared the same language as the United States—and eventually Paris were ultimately overshadowed by New York, and its satellite cities in Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, the former world capitals didn’t cease to be significant. For one thing, they have centuries of old cultural capital from earlier ages that New York cannot match no matter how much classical or medieval or early modern or non-Western art it mimics or funnels into its galleries. For another, London and Paris had well-developed publishing and intellectual links with their imperial colonies and for much of the twentieth century the artists and intellectuals from these colonies still looked to Paris and London as much or more than to New York. Indeed, it is worth noting that several recent expatriate winners of the Nobel Prize for Literature have been attached to France and England: Abdulrazak Gurnah, Kazuoa Ishiguro, V. S. Naipaul, and Gao Xinjian.  However, relative decline is still decline. Many leading European cultural centers were devastated by civil war (Russia, Spain, Greece) as well as two world wars and the economic and other hardships that followed World War II especially. China and Korea were also shattered by civil wars, Japan was nuked, India and Germany convulsed and partitioned. If American culture flourished spectacularly in the “American century”—Louis Menand offers a lively account of this in Freedom: Art and Thought in the Cold War (2021)—many of the world’s other ancient or modern cultural capitals suffered astonishing adversity in the same half-century, yet without simply becoming culturally impoverished.  So, what we get, I think, is a rearticulation of the old European-dominated Western-leaning system with the US as its new center.

    In more conceptual terms, the answer to your question as to why must literary capitals change at all is they are compelled to change when the capitalist world system changes, when the lingua franca of international elites changes, and when old capitals are actively outbid by bold new ones. These are complex variables mutating at different tempos, and they probably only come into decisive alignment over some considerable durée.

    Your second question is, did the US change the world literary system as it became an ascendant force in that system? I would say yes though not in ways analogous to the politico-economic-military system where command or management of things by institutions like the UN, IMF, World Bank, the WTO and NATO are crucial. Instead, the system changes in less overtly directive manner. The most important change comes with the massification and limited democratization of secondary and higher education, a process accelerating unevenly across the globe after World War II. The modern vernacular literatures didn’t have much toehold in the universities till quite late in the nineteenth century or even later and compulsory secondary education only really became widespread in the twentieth century. With the expansion of national secondary and tertiary education systems, especially after WWII, the institutionalized reading of modern vernacular national literatures by adolescents and undergraduates really takes off. In that context, literary historical scholarship and the criticism of modern literature becomes a credentialed university activity. With its well-endowed universities, mix of domestic American and migrant intellectual talent, and arts foundations and publishing conglomerates, the US gradually exerts real force in terms of literary gatekeeping, analysis, and legitimation. In the same period, we see the cultivation of what Mark McGurl calls “the Program Era,” the training of writers and aspirants through MFA programs and the employment of writers within the university. McGurl contends that these programs allowed writers a buffer from the cruder demands of the market and facilitated the continued cultivation of more advanced or experimental forms of poetry and fiction. The university writing program offers a function that wealthy patrons did in the modernist era or that, according to Jordan Brower in Classical Hollywood, American Modernism: A Literary History of the Studio System (2024), the Hollywood studio earlier did for American writers. That seems true but the university also sucked writers away from bohemias, radio stations, film studios, and so on, sites that had fostered different types of formation and conceptions of “the writer.” In any case, in the Cold War context there was also the promotion of university courses on the “great books of western civilization” and “world literature” and the dissemination of these across the globe in world book sets, encyclopedias, and anthologies. This was the period, too, when American Studies programs were vigorously promoted on several continents (the cultural wing of overseas American military bases, perhaps). In time, as the writing programs expanded and the US universities competed with each other to secure the more prestigious reputation, they became magnets also for writers from around the world. Therefore, it wasn’t just “literary cities” like New York or San Francisco but the university residencies that made the contemporary US a new kind of cosmopolitan cultural center where expatriate writers and intellectuals clustered as they might once have done in London or Paris.

    In Modernism, Empire, World Literature I suggest that what we call “modernist literature” played an important transference and value-reorganizing role in this larger process. Because of its high ambition, esoteric qualities, curious mix of classicism and avant-gardism, and so on, modernism lent twentieth-century literature an aura that mixed intellectual respectability with radicalism, interpretative challenge with a promised profundity. It didn’t seem amiss to read Proust with Augustine, Joyce with Homer, Lawrence with Nietzsche, Woolf with Freud, Mann with Goethe, Beckett with Schopenhauer.

    None of this meant that the US now called all the shots. The Nobel Academy continued to consecrate its literary prize from Sweden; Paris continued to translate writers from Europe and beyond; in the UK, Commonwealth Literature studies and the Booker Prize exerted their own countervailing pressures. Likewise, the Soviet Union essayed its own version of “world literature” and the Chinese and other Asian, Arab and Latin American nations assiduously cultivated their own modern national literatures, often deliberately differentiating these from their classical literatures. However, the combined force of American popular culture, Hollywood, the Ivy League universities, and New York as cultural and publishing center lent the US cultural field a luster that few other national cultures could individually match. Moreover, in the course of this wider transformation currencies of literary distinction didn’t standstill; like everything else, they too gradually changed.

    Your third question is when exactly did this transformation take place and has the system changed much in the last thirty years? Is it still US-centered or is the US-centered system now disputed or even in decline? It seems better to think of these processes as sea changes rather than in terms of particular dates.  In the book, I cite John Peale Bishop’s 1941 Kenyon College address in which he notes the fall of Paris to the Nazis and observes that “it was in Europe that the centers of civilization were to be found,” but now: “The actual center of western culture is no longer in Europe. It is here.” I cite also Sartre’s Les Temps Modernes article, “The Situation of the Writer in 1947,” where he surveys the melancholy condition of the postwar European writer, sandwiched now between new supremacies of the Soviet Union and US, the passing of the European haute bourgeoisie as class, and acknowledges that the great eras of European cultural accomplishment were “tied up with European supremacy and colonialism.”  One might equally cite Erich Auerbach’s 1952 “Philologie der Weltliteratur,” in which he contemplates the dissemination of world English by the victorious Americans and worries about the emergence of a single world language, something that would render comparatist scholarship redundant or certainly impoverished. And I cite Clement Greenberg’s 1955 ‘’American-Type Painting,” in which he observes: “Literature—yes we know we have done great things in that line; the English and French have told us so. Now they can begin to tell us the same about our painting.” These are canny worldly critics; each in his own way suggests a sense of a transformative change in which European cultural ascendancy is finally shattered and American supremacy has already arrived or is imminent.

    Has the American-centered system changed in the last thirty years? Capitalism’s reproductive crises since the 1970s, the rise of the internet since the 1980s, the astonishing economic advances of China and East Asia, the massive expansion of the Asian university systems, the inexorably creeping climate crisis, huge domestic inequalities within states almost everywhere: these are cumulatively undoing the contemporary world order and American hegemony is certainly frayed as never before. The signs are everywhere. Left-wing challenges from below by anti-globalization and ecology movements, by Occupy and Black Lives Matter and Palestinian solidarity movements. And challenges from above by the BRICS states. Powerful challenges everywhere by right-wing nationalists and fascists at both state and populist levels. Add to this the increasing disarray of the American political elites and establishment parties, some turning to right-wing populism and authoritarianism, others purveying an exhausted neoliberalism or moderate Keynesianism with no real solutions remotely in sight. Several of the US’s once more compliant client states—Saudi Arabia, Israel, Pakistan—have been openly thumbing their noses at Washington. Humiliations in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan. The crisis seems enormous at a global level but until or unless some new center can emerge to stabilize the current system or create a new kind of post-capitalist economy that crisis seems only likely to deepen.

    How much does this current instability matter for the world literary system?  For the moment, the more dramatic changes bearing immediately on that system may be technological rather than literary. The expansion of the internet, the creation of Amazon and Alibaba, kindle and audiobooks, now AI: these seem likely to continue to reorganize modes of literary mediation and consumption. In recent decades, peripheral nations attempting to promote themselves internationally appear to focus more on mass culture, sports, cinema or the visual arts rather than on literature. Perhaps this was always so. Certainly, Chinese, Iranian or Turkish cinema, Korean tv series, pop music and cinema, Bollywood, and Saudi and Emirati sports franchises seem to break through onto ‘the world stage’ with more visible impact than national literatures. Peter Vermeulen argues that several of the leading names elevated to become “world figures” in recent decades—Ferrante, Bolanõ, Knausgaard—were translated into English before French and consecrated through New York rather than Paris. Many other big names in the last several decades—Walcott, Heaney, Achebe, Ngȗgȋ, Pamuk, Murakami, Hamid, Adichie—either came through major US writing programs or became attached to such programs in later career. So, the center still holds and writers migrate there or rotate in and out of the US in considerable numbers.

    However, the most important thing to consider is that if the nature of the center has changed in the transition from London and Paris to New York, then what it would mean to challenge the US center may also have changed. Paris and London were the national capitals of rather compact medium-sized nation-states rather than cosmopolitan megacities. Their literary reputations were associated with old and illustrious French and English national literary traditions. Before the downsizing of their empires and the emergence of modernism, France and England made little attempt to cultivate multiracial or multinational imperial literatures. In the American phase of domination, contemporary literatures of the middlebrow or advanced sorts have moved much closer to the university for support and, as mentioned earlier, the decentralized US university system, other US cities and a complex economy of state and foundational supports all contribute to New York’s dominance. So, contemporary equivalents to the American or Irish modernist “sieges of London” that ran from Henry James and Wilde through Yeats and Shaw or Pound and Eliot may be less feasible today. Moreover, Casanova suggests that world-changing literary “revolutions” of the kind associated with Joyce or Beckett or Faulkner came only after “national revolts” or collective “national renaissances” in the periphery or semi-periphery had first laid the foundations and set new heights of ambition. Though nationalist sentiment seems on the rise in both the centers and peripheries of the world system, national literatures are not in favor with Western academies, universities, or awards systems. As James F. English has shown, these now favor more postnationalist and liberal multiculturalist globalist agendas. Perhaps the same is true for the higher-end literary production of the big English-Language publishing conglomerates. All that said, not everything is calm at the center. The influx of critics from the Global South and from East Asia into the US critical establishment is impactful. From the days of Said and Spivak, such critics have consistently challenged the complacency and insularity of the American university humanities. Émigré figures from the peripheries of the Global South may now function as something equivalent to the Henry Jameses or Bernard Shaws of their day. Meanwhile, the European Union is attempting, not with much success apparently, to find a conceptual basis for some reconstructed “European literature” and perhaps we can glimpse attempts to create a new East Asian literary system or force-field involving China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. At the same time, as the US is becoming more deeply politically factionalized, the country is also becoming more bilingual. Some 54 million Americans now use Spanish as a first or second language of everyday communication. Some estimates suggest that somewhere between 20 and 25% of people in the New York metropolitan region speak Spanish at home. New media technologies may mean that Spanish speakers will not assimilate to English culture as earlier immigrant language groups did. Yet the American literary establishment and leading institutions of consecration remain mostly monolingually English and cultural administrations are now under as much pressure from right-wing conservatives or white supremacists as from external forces.

    Perhaps a better question might be to ask not what has changed at the center in the last thirty years but what it would actually take for a new literary center or capital to emerge. Would a new world political conjuncture be a precondition for such change? Would it require a several generations of writers across the world disaffected with the current American-centered literary system and its modes of valuation? A new world literary prize anchored in a foundation in China or India or somewhere in the Global South to compete with the Nobel Prize? An alternative institutional support system to the US university writing program, one that cultivated different conceptions of the “the writer” and new currencies of literary valuation? Even if a new world literary capital or center emerged it would coexist alongside the US-centered one for some extended time, and I suppose writers would navigate between the two.

    One of Casanova’s basic assumptions in The World Republic of Letters concerning the contemporary moment is that there is an ongoing convergence between elite literary publishing and commercial publishing, thus eroding an earlier distinction as theorized by Bourdieu between “art” and “money” or “high literature” and “commercial literature.”  In this view, the earlier modernist attempt to distinguish between aesthetic status or prestige and commercial value diminishes as corporate publishing increases its market influence globally in setting values and shaping careers.  Three is certainly strong evidence for such convergence and literary sociologists such as James English, Sarah Brouillette, and others, tend to support Casanova’s view to this extent at least. Nevertheless, there are, in my view, reasons to resist the idea of some totalizing convergence of value systems. After all, the universities, the Nobel Prize, the small independent literary presses, and the big publishing conglomerates don’t all trade in the same literary-value-currencies and to some extent they depend for their reproduction on differentiating their functions from each other. If the universities mainly taught writers like Stephen King, J. K. Rowling, Tom Clancy, or Danielle Steele, they would soon loose prestige.    Moreover, established tendencies can always generate backlashes and the dual economy of symbolic versus market valuation has certainly not collapsed. It would be interesting to speculate whether some new articulations of literary and aesthetic valuation that replicated neither those consecrated in the Soviet Union or the US during the Cold War era is conceivable in some future less Euro-American centered literary system. And of course there is always the possibility that in a capitalist world some new center might be even more, not less, market-driven than the current one. Therefore, the emergence of a new world center would be interesting only if it really offered some alternative to the current one.

    Overall, for now, rapid changes in technologies of literary transmission, media, and marketing and AI seem to be reconfiguring things with more consequence than any immediate international literary challenges. Yet the center is not stable even in the center. There are not many signs of dramatic new energies in the old literary capitals or of imminent contestations from the rising great literary powers but change often seems to proceed slowly or not at all and then catapults by sudden leaps. As Casanova suggests, it is far more common for writers from the dominated and peripheral cultures to assimilate or largely conform to the dominant metropolitan literary norms and fashions than to do otherwise. Revolts and revolutions, to use her terms, are much less frequent. So it was ever, so it is still. However, the rebellions, even if rarer, are more exciting and consequential for change. There is the old Hemingway joke: How did you go bankrupt? Gradually, then suddenly. Perhaps the declines of the dominant capitals and circuits follow a similar tempo.  Throughout the nineteenth century, London, England and Great Britain remained free from invasion. The only French military boots that landed on United Kingdom territory in the Napoleonic wars did so in Ireland and the English soon repulsed these expeditions. Paris, in contrast, was rocked by repeated domestic uprisings, putsches, and German invasions. Parisian instability and turbulence probably contributed to the rise of the French avant-gardes and to the radicalism of French intellectual and literary innovation. London remained more stable and more artistically conservative. New York and the US’s domestic stability—quite often repressively enforced—have contributed significantly to American cultural hegemony.  However, while stability may help sustain hegemony in the arts, it may also in time corrode it. Nothing lasts forever. The sheer magnitude of American military power might, as Arrighi allows, maintain American domination of the international world system for a long time. But there is no reason to believe that even if this is the case that American literary or cultural power can be sustained in that manner. Domination is not hegemony. Sparta was not Athens. Hannibal did not conquer Rome but it fell anyway. New York and London are not enemy but fraternal cities, yet there is no doubt which of the two has mattered more to global culture and the arts since World War II.

    Writing in a time of counter-revolutionary success, Percy Shelly penned ‘England in 1918,’ which ends:

                                            A people starved and stabbed in th’ untilled field;

    An army, whom liberticide and prey

    Makes as a two-edged sword to all who wield;

    Golden and sanguine laws which tempt and slay;

    Religion Christless, Godless—a book sealed;

    A senate, Time’s worst statute, unrepealed—

    Are graves from which a glorious Phantom may

    Burst, to illumine our tempestuous day.

    The rapid revolutionary change imagined here did not come in England. Despite Chartism and continuous domestic class agitation, no revolutionary “Phantom”’ appeared to “burst” through there (though the “specter of communism” was announced in London thirty years later in 1848 in The Communist Manifesto). As we know, change came anyway, not only in the form of domestic “long revolutions” but also in unexpected ways from dramatic developments in England’s imperial peripheries.

    Christian Thorne is co-editor of boundary 2 and the author, most recently, of Deconstruction is America. He teaches in the English department at Williams College.

    Joe Cleary is professor of English at Yale and author of Modern, Empire, World Literature and The Irish Expatriate Novel in Late Capitalist Globalization.

  • Tobias Keiling and Ian Alexander Moore–Spoiling the Party? Heidegger’s Lectures on Trakl at Spa Bühlerhöhe

    Tobias Keiling and Ian Alexander Moore–Spoiling the Party? Heidegger’s Lectures on Trakl at Spa Bühlerhöhe

    It all began with plans for a birthday party.[1] Gerhard Stroomann, chief physician and charismatic leader of the posh spa resort and sanitarium Bühlerhöhe (imagine Thomas Mann’s character Hofrat Behrens, transplanted to a postwar “magic mountain” in the Black Forest) would be turning sixty-five in 1952, and he wanted to celebrate it with a weekend of events devoted to his beloved poet Georg Trakl. Even more, he wanted to hear the philosopher Martin Heidegger speak about the poet. Heidegger had already given a few lectures at the spa while he was still prohibited from teaching at the university, including one on language under the guise of a commentary on Trakl’s poem “A Winter Evening.” Although irritated by the overeager, elite milieu of the luxury retreat—“it was,” as one eyewitness reported about the event, “very highbrow, […] teeming with counts and princesses, a bit snobbish”[2]—Heidegger accepted Stroomann’s invitation.

    The “Trakl-Celebration” featured readings of Trakl’s work by several authors (including the “conservative revolutionary” Friedrich Georg Jünger, brother of Ernst Jünger). It also marked the start of a lasting friendship between Heidegger and Trakl’s former patron Ludwig von Ficker. Von Ficker’s extemporaneous speech at the event, which moved Heidegger to tears, recounted the collapse and suicide of the twenty-seven-year-old poet, who had been traumatized by his experiences in a field hospital after the gruesome battle of Gródek in the early days of World War I. Yet it was Heidegger’s own lecture, which was published shortly after the celebration in the influential postwar intellectual periodical Merkur, that would become a touchstone for almost all Trakl-scholarship since. In his lecture, Heidegger presented Trakl as a redemptive successor to Hölderlin, the putative poet of the German language. However, while it is true that, as Thomas Mann’s son Klaus once wrote, Trakl “picked up the lyre that Hölderlin had let sink down,”[3] it is difficult, at first blush, to understand how, of all people, Trakl—the drug-addled, Austrian expressionist in love with decay and obsessed with his sister—could become for Heidegger the next “poet of the Germans”[4] and take on the role of savior of the German people and indeed of the entire Occident.

    ***

    This is just one of the contradictions bound up with Bühlerhöhe. The former spa and luxury hotel, located in the northern Black Forest at an altitude of 800 meters near the town of Bühl, was designed by the architect Wilhelm Kreis in the early 1910s as a tribute to Kaiser Wilhelm II. The founder of the institution was Hertha Isenbart (née Schottländer), who wanted to honor her deceased second husband, a major general, by establishing a luxurious convalescent home for officers of the imperial army. Although the adjacent sanatorium could begin accepting patients already in 1913, the main building, due to the onset of war, never served the function for which Isenbart had intended it. This, and the financial ruin her ambitious project caused her, prompted her to take her own life in 1918.

    In the 1920s, the main building was transformed into a successful spa resort. Stroomann, enthusiastic about this “monument” in the “fairyland” of the Black Forest,[5] became one of the first doctors in residence and soon rose to the position of head physician in 1929. He was to remain at Bühlerhöhe for more than three decades, treating prominent figures from politics, art, and culture who traveled there not only for medical reasons but also for recreation. Among them were politicians from various parties of the Weimar Republic, such as Gustav Stresemann, Heinrich Brüning, and Hermann Müller. In 1933, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels met there. Other guests at the spa included Georgy Chicherin, the first foreign minister of the Soviet Union, Nobel Prize winners Carl Bosch and Werner Heisenberg, and actors Gustav Gründgens and Werner Krauß. In the 1950s it was the favorite vacation destination of Konrad Adenauer, then the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

    During the Allied occupation, French soldiers were billeted at Bühlerhöhe. It reopened in March 1949. Just three months later, Stroomann inaugurated a celebrated lecture series at the spa under the title “Wednesday-Evenings,” which would bring many well-known intellectuals and artists to the Black Forest and make Bühlerhöhe synonymous with a place of retreat and discourse for the elite of the young Federal Republic. The “Wednesday-Evenings” also offered a stage for the most famous and controversial German philosopher: Martin Heidegger. In 1933–1934, as Rector of the University of Freiburg, Heidegger had been involved in the National Socialist seizure of power. A denazification committee accordingly banned him from teaching in 1945. Although the ban was lifted in 1949, Heidegger was not able to lecture at the university again until 1951, after he had been granted emeritus status. He therefore sought out other forums in the meantime. He first found them in the elitist “Bremen Club,” where in 1949 he gave a long four-part lecture entitled “Insight into That Which Is” (later known as the “Bremen Lectures”). In a letter to the poet Gottfried Benn, a friend from Bremen tells him what sort of people went to listen to the philosopher there:

    Heidegger was met by a social class that did not exist in such a compact majority in the university towns, the towns of civil servants, or even at Bühlerhöhe: major businessmen, overseas specialists, shipping and shipyard directors—all people for whom a famous thinker is a mythical creature or a demigod.[6]

    ***

    The Black Forest spa was nevertheless attractive enough for Heidegger to repeat his Bremen lecture at Bühlerhöhe in March 1950. Here, too, Heidegger’s performance was a complete success. As Stroomann reports in his memoirs,

    each time there was the utterly exceptional excitement with which people inundated his lecture, his appearance at the lectern, as with no other contemporary figure. … [W]ho can shut themselves off from the prying force of his thinking and knowledge, which becomes evident in a newly creative way with every word: that there are still undiscovered sources? Our Wednesday-Evenings owe so much to him![7]

    To others the lectures seemed scandalous. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who had caused a sensation in 1953 with a critical review of Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, wrote six years later that the “most devoted” of Heidegger’s followers were gathering in places outside the university:

    These small circles, sometimes formed into sects, are scattered across the country and difficult to get an overview of. In one respect they befit the appearance of a thinker who avoids the conferences of his professional colleagues and prefers to face the councils of lay brothers. Among them are the captains of industry who have already achieved proverbial fame seeking relaxation at Bühlerhöhe. Perhaps here, in these charming attempts to interest managers in “field paths,” we have the other side of Heidegger’s contact with reality, the one that is, so to speak, opposite to Being. Detractors see in all this a mysticism meshed with a scam.[8]

    Habermas is right to say that Heidegger was interested in bringing his thought to an influential audience and that, to a certain extent, he ingratiated himself. But what made Heidegger attractive to the “managers” becomes clear only when one works out what Heidegger hardly mentions in his published texts and what Habermas fails to grasp with his criticism of Heidegger’s “scam.” The “Wednesday-Evenings,” whose ideology Heidegger and his style of thinking were representative of, were the attempt of an elite group to find orientation and to work through the events of World War II and its own complicity. These individuals believed themselves to be intellectually and spiritually damaged. Stroomann thought his lecture series could go a long way toward healing them. As he wrote on the invitation to “Insight into That Which Is,” connecting the series’ conversational-therapeutic function with the myth of the post-Nazi “Zero Hour”:

    Everything is a beginning. Anything can arise. Nothing must be undertaken, let alone organized. But we must make progress. Conversation must be enabled in a better way. People must be able to get closer.[9]

    However, if we are to believe the polemical report published in the magazine Der Spiegel, there was no real conversation after Heidegger’s lecture. Heidegger rebuffed questions about human freedom. He castigated a flattering question about the significance of philosophy for the public as a “typical relapse into enframing [Gestell].” To another question, the reporter only says that “Heidegger’s expansive answer gave ample opportunity to return to the solemn silence of the lecture. Then the spell was broken. Outside on the terrace there was sunshine and coffee and cake.”[10]

    The content of Heidegger’s lecture fits into this context of a failed—perhaps never seriously intended—conversation. “Insight into That Which Is” responds to the need for self-assurance by questioning the meaning and possibility of any conscious self-understanding. Heidegger goes all the way back to ancient philosophy to paint a picture of modernity in which technological processes threaten genuine philosophizing, true speech, and human agency in equal measure. In this way, he relieves his audience of personal responsibility for the past. This is particularly clear in the much-quoted passage in which he refers to the Holocaust and to the World War that had just ended—a passage that he removed from the published version of his lecture in 1954. Heidegger considers the Shoah and technological organization to be of essentially equal rank: “Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, in essence the same as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps.”[11] As though nothing could be done about it.

    But Heidegger not only offers to replace responsibility with fate. His lecture also responds to the need for consolation and orientation, not, however, with an appeal to therapeutic conversation, but with an abstract reference to a verse from Hölderlin’s poem “Patmos”: where there is danger—i.e., in Heidegger’s eyes, the technological thinking of modernity—the saving power also grows. Hölderlin was also at the center of Heidegger’s second contribution to the “Wednesday-Evenings,” the lecture “… Poetically Man Dwells ….” The promise of consolation becomes most apparent at the end of this lecture, when Heidegger quotes one of Hölderlin’s late poems in its entirety in order to sketch “‘the life of man’” as “a ‘dwelling life’”:

    des Himmels Höhe glänzet

    Den Menschen dann, wie Bäume Blüth’ umkränzet.

    heaven’s radiant height

    Crowns man, as blossoms crown the trees, with light.[12]

    If Heidegger’s appearances at Bühlerhöhe are indeed characterized by this combination of psychological repression, exculpation through theory, and poetic consolation, then his philosophy reentered the public arena in a manner that is eerily reminiscent of his own biography. Heidegger suffered a mental breakdown in December 1945 and underwent treatment in Schloss Hausbaden, a private psychiatric clinic near Badenweiler. His doctor Victor von Gebsattel provided talk therapy as a means to “Christian serenity [Gelassenheit],” i.e., “the blessed readiness to accept everything as it comes, including pain, disappointment, and above all death,” as von Gebsattel put it in a short book published during the war.[13] In a letter sent from the clinic, Heidegger composed a variation on this theme, in which he makes the sort of healing that his audience was seeking and that Stroomann and von Gebsattel aimed to provide dependent on “whether the dwelling human being is again touched by Being as what is whole and healing, & disaster does not lapse into a mere meaninglessness to be ignored ‘once the war is over.’”[14]

    This interpretation of psychological suffering as the result of an event—whether associated with the promise of bliss or healing through Being—is similar to what fascinated Stroomann about Trakl. In one of his many letters to von Ficker, Stroomann explains why I am summoning the apparition of Georg Trakl: “on a harrowing mission, he signifies, for our generation and for the future, the poetic [das Dichterische], with which, in my view (the view of a physician), humanity, sick humanity, must be permeated”.[15]

    Stroomann was not concerned with the occasional prospect of reconciliation in Trakl’s poetry, regardless of whether one interprets it in Christian terms or, like Heidegger, as another beginning in the history of Being, i.e., as a sign of an epochal break in the deep history of human thought and action. What Stroomann admired was rather Trakl’s ability to maintain spirit and poise (von Gebsattel would have said “serenity”) in the face of the madness of the First World War. In a postcard to Benn, Stroomann explains that Trakl was for him “the phenomenon in which even schizothymia and toxicomania,” unlike in Hölderlin,

    did not break the form. […] Probably Ludwig v. Ficker, certainly Horwitz, and various literary figures call Trakl a Christian poet and make his “reaching into the abyss” a matter of guilt and atonement and grace. I am confronted with a phenomenon of form, the apparition of a biological exception.[16]

    Heidegger, from whose lecture “… Poetically Man Dwells …” Stroomann took the formulation that Trakl’s poetry reaches into the abyss, would have nevertheless rejected Stroomann’s medical interpretation. Yet he shared Stroomann’s opinion that Trakl’s resilience after two world wars was of special importance for the Germans. In a letter to Stroomann, Heidegger even identifies with Trakl to the extent that the latter is the “poet of our generation.”[17] In his philosophy, however, Heidegger does not interpret Trakl’s resilience as the ability of a psychic life to maintain its form. Rather, it is language itself that, as an overarching context, promises to restore the meaning that Heidegger, like his audience, believes to have been lost.

    Heidegger went on to develop these thoughts for a celebration that Stroomann organized in 1950 in memory of the writer and literary scholar Max Kommerell. Heidegger did so by way of a close, idiosyncratic reading of Trakl’s poem “A Winter Evening.” The key verses of this poem clearly refer to Christian salvation:

    Wanderer tritt still herein;

    Schmerz versteinerte die Schwelle.

    Da erglänzt in reiner Helle

    Auf dem Tische Brot und Wein.[18]

     

    Wanderer, step in so still;

    Pain has petrified the threshold.

    Shining there in purest brightness

    On the table bread and wine.

    Yet Heidegger rejects this interpretation. Instead, Trakl’s poem becomes an occasion to articulate the idea that meaning is established in the happening of language itself. Fundamentally, it is not we who speak, nor even the poet; instead, “language speaks.”[19]

    It did not go unnoticed that this idea was also a means of relief from responsibility, since it undermined any need for active communication. In a newspaper article about the Kommerell-memorial at Bühlerhöhe, Adolf Frisé, the later editor of Robert Musil’s literary work, writes that Heidegger’s self-referential language runs the risk of “monologuing, of becoming a thinking which spins about in its own head.” This may well suit those who flocked to the “aseptic and poison-free air up there” and took refuge in “the deceptive security in social conventions that have become problematic.” But this “encapsulation” is also an expression of a need to be told what to think rather than to think for oneself: “Like hardly any other people, we [Germans] tend to absolutize an intellectual-spiritual [geistige] figure without criticism or restraint; Stefan George was an example of this. Today, it looks like Heidegger is the next in line.”[20] Heidegger never gave up on this idea of intellectual-spiritual leadership. On the contrary, in Heidegger’s lecture for the 1952 “Trakl-Celebration” at Bühlerhöhe, it takes on one of its most radical forms.

    ***

    This event in honor of Trakl, whose “vast lyrical substance and form” Stroomann described on the invitation as “expressing much decay and melancholy,”[21] is noteworthy as a problematic case of intellectual history not because of the introductory remarks of Trakl-biographer Eduard Lachmann, nor even because of von Ficker’s moving report about the poet’s final days, but because of Heidegger’s peculiar attempt to situate the entirety of Trakl’s poetry. Some of those present, including von Ficker, praised Heidegger’s lecture. It was, in von Ficker’s words, one of the “irruptions of light that matter today.”[22] Others were more skeptical. Benn refused Stroomann’s repeated invitations “to come to Heidegger.”[23] Ruth Horwitz, daughter of Trakl-editor Kurt Horwitz, considered “this kind of intellectual exchange to be dishonest: it dazzles, still more, it bluffs.”[24] Literary critic Walter Muschg called Heidegger’s interpretation “abracadabra” and “an assassination attempt on the German language.”[25] And although Hannah Arendt defended Heidegger’s attempts to survey the “space of the unsayable,” “from which and for whose sake the whole work emerged and was organized,” she also noted that,

    in the process, of course, the ‘interpreter’ can become more important than what he ‘interprets’; then, but only then, does everything turn ‘violent,’ simply because, instead of making the work come to life, he shatters it. It seems to me that this happened to [Heidegger] with Trakl.[26]

    One year after the celebration, even Stroomann would distance himself from Heidegger, at least when communicating with political scientist and Heidegger-critic Dolf Sternberger: “one thing is now certain to me: the Germans’ vulnerability to the magus.”[27]

    If one reads Heidegger’s Trakl-lecture with these critiques in mind, it will not be difficult to see what caused such offense. Although the explicit subject of the “Trakl-Celebration,” and despite Heidegger’s empathetic reaction to von Ficker’s speech, Trakl’s person disappears behind what Heidegger calls his Gedicht, which is less an individual “poem” than the gathering of a complex body of work around a single catchword. This reading is anticipated by what Heidegger says about his procedure of Erörterung: it is not about “interpretation,” “discussion,” or “exchange,” but about the condensation of language and the concentration of the poetic work into a single point. For Heidegger, the fact that an Erörterung considers the Ort or “place” of the poetry and that Ort in Old High German means the tip of a spear is argument enough to be able to bundle and localize Trakl’s poetry as a whole. The place of Trakl’s poetry, according to Heidegger, is apartness, or a state of perpetual departure (Abgeschiedenheit). The final stanzas of Trakl’s “Autumnal Soul” give us a sense for how Heidegger arrived at this thought:

    Bald entgleitet Fisch und Wild.

    Blaue Seele, dunkles Wandern

    Schied uns bald von Lieben, Andern.

    Abend wechselt Sinn und Bild.

     

    Rechten Lebens Brot und Wein,

    Gott in deine milden Hände

    Legt der Mensch das dunkle Ende,

    Alle Schuld und rote Pein.[28]

     

    Fish and game soon slip away.

    Blue soul, darksome wand’ring, soon did

    Sever us from loved ones, others.

    Evening changes sense and image.

     

    Bread and wine of proper living,

    God, into your mild hands

    Layeth man the darksome ending,

    All the guilt and scarlet torment.

    Although here, too, there are allusions to the Christian hope of redemption, Heidegger understands the departure of the soul not as a flight toward heaven, but as a return to the earth. Taking recourse once again to etymology, Heidegger interprets the word fremd in Trakl’s famous phrase Es ist die Seele ein Fremdes auf Erden[29] not as “foreign” or “strange,” but as “on the way …,” that is, in line with the Old High German fram. The soul is not “something strange on earth,” as anyone who reads the German today would expect. It is “headed toward the earth.” “The soul,” in Heidegger’s gloss, “only seeks the earth; it does not flee from it.”[30] As Heidegger explained during a question-and-answer period at Bühlerhöhe the day after his lecture, the final stanza of “Autumn Soul” thus pertains to the “loved ones” and “others” who are in search of Christian transcendence, not to the earthbound Fremdling who is in the process of severing himself from them.[31]

    Es ist die Seele ein Fremdes auf Erden—Heidegger repeats this verse nine times in his lecture, thereby turning it into an incantation that expresses the distance of its addressees from the present and enlists them in the movement he is describing. This movement does not lead to a specific destination; rather, the departure and the journey are themselves transformed into a new homeland. Heidegger violently pieces together an interpretation from quite different poems. In this interpretation, “Trakl’s poetry” becomes the “song of the soul” that no longer strives for a Beyond, but “is only just about to gain the earth by its wandering, the earth that is the stiller home of the homecoming people [Geschlecht].”[32] Incomprehensibility and remoteness from reality are precisely what makes this idea attractive: “Dreamy romanticism, at the fringe of the technically-economically oriented world of modern mass existence? Or—is it the clear knowledge of the ‘madman’ [‘Wahnsinniger’] who sees and senses [sinnt] other things than the reporters of the latest news”?[33] In Trakl’s poem “Springtime of the Soul,” the line about the soul’s strangeness on (or movement toward) the earth is followed by the words:

    Geistlich dämmert

    Bläue über dem verhauenen Wald.[34]

    Spiritually dawns

    blueness over the thrashed forest.

    Heidegger takes this as an occasion to bring the “clear knowledge of the madman” together with that overdetermined and enigmatic concept which has been claimed again and again for what cannot be lost: Geist. Heidegger inscribes himself in a complex conceptual history when, in the last third of his lecture, he takes “spirit” as the key word for the movement of the soul.

    Among the motifs that Heidegger associates with spirit, three stand out. First, the motif of a unity that overcomes an injured separation; for only in “wandering through the spiritual night” does the “simple oneness of pain’s converse character come into pure play.”[35] Second, the fact that Trakl speaks of spiritual night and spiritual twilight allows Heidegger to reinterpret the topos of departure toward the Occident or ‘Land of Evening’ (Abend-Land) as a spiritual home and to connect it with Friedrich Nietzsche’s apotheosis of descent: “The land of evening concealed in apartness does not go under, but remains, awaiting those who will dwell in it as the land of descent into the spiritual night.”[36] Third, “‘the spirit of one who died early,’”[37] as Heidegger says in the words of another Trakl poem, is in oblique but unmistakable reference to Trakl and to all those who were lost in the two world wars. Instead of the redemption and the dawn of resurrection, which the Christian metaphors suggest, Heidegger offers the promise of twilight, which alone will overcome loss and heal pain, if only we learn to inhabit it. In the third year after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, Heidegger makes Trakl “the poet of the yet concealed evening land”[38]—a poet who promises neither awakening to a new future nor coming clean with the past in which “those who died early” met their demise. Trakl’s “apartness,” his exemplary resilience, contains all the consolation Heidegger and his audience may hope for.

    ***

    It was on account of this promise that Jacques Derrida situated Heidegger’s lecture for the Trakl-Celebration in the history of the “national humanism”[39] of German philosophy and interpreted it as the consummation of the idea that the Germanic should serve as the exemplar of the Occident or even of humanity as such. Heidegger hears in Trakl’s poetry the appeal to a “certain Germany,” which is supposed to become the place of the true Occident.[40] For those who are familiar with Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin during the period of National Socialism—a reading that even Kommerell could not help calling a “train wreck” (albeit a “productive” one)[41]—it should come as little surprise that Heidegger was still looking for a poetic guide after the war. For he wanted to be able to present himself not just as a leader, but as someone who was likewise being led. The Trakl-Celebration shows, in any case, that Heidegger, like many of the conservative elite who went to hear him lecture on that weekend in October 1952, could not manage after the war without a poeta vates or even without a “poet as leader” (to recall the title of a controversial product of the George Circle penned in 1928).[42] Reading Heidegger on Trakl allows us to make sense of what the survivors of his generation had repressed rather than overcome. Stroomann establishes this connection between the two world wars in an invitation to a “Wednesday-Evening” poetry reading that Heidegger would introduce in February 1952. Stroomann explains his choice of topic as follows:

    We wish to begin with the topic: ‘New Poetry.’ Whoever experienced the redevelopment of spirit after the first war will be disconcerted by how little of the poetic has emerged from the chaos this time. “Yet,” as Hölderlin’s words admonish, “what remains, the poets establish.”[43]

    ***

    Yet Trakl and his work do not readily lend themselves to this appropriation. If we are to believe later reports, during the celebration at Bühlerhöhe a question made the rounds as to whether Trakl, if he should come back from the dead, would be granted entry into the illustrious event. Likely not, we answer. But it is not surprising that the question arose. It illustrates the mixture of foreignness and fascination that the audience associated with Trakl. The comforting, if violent, appropriation of the poet’s work responds to a need, but it also avoids accountability and moral judgment, only to half-consciously turn it into a joke.

    Would Trakl have accepted the role he was given in 1952? This is not to be assumed, either. In 1914, Trakl gave von Ficker a slip of paper on which he had written: “Feeling in the moments of death-like being: all humans are worthy of love. Awaking, you feel the bitterness of the world; therein is all your unresolved guilt; your poem an imperfect atonement,” only to add verbally: “But of course no poem can atone for an iniquity.” It is hard to imagine that Trakl would have been allowed to utter these words if he had actually been present at the celebration dedicated to him.

    In any case, things did not end well with the spa resort either. Stroomann, the “intellectual-spiritual mediator” who made Bühlerhöhe a “place of trust,” died in 1957. “If,” as his obituary in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung continues, “one may speak of a class of leaders [Führerschicht] in our country, for decades much of it passed under the unmistakable eyes of this man.”[44] The spa business continued after Stroomann’s death until 1986, at which point it was converted into a luxury hotel. The clinic in the adjacent building is still in operation today. However, the hotel closed in 2010, and the main building has been vacant ever since. Occasionally, it serves as a backdrop for movies. Otherwise, what lives on here is only a spirit from another time.

    Tobias Keiling is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. He is the author of Seinsgeschichte und phänomenologischer Realismus: Eine Interpretation und Kritik von Heideggers Spätphilosophie [The History of Being and Phenomenological Realism: An Interpretation and Critique of Heidegger’s Later Philosophy] (2015).

    Ian Alexander Moore is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola Marymount University. He is the author of Eckhart, Heidegger, and the Imperative of Releasement (2019) and Dialogue on the Threshold: Heidegger and Trakl (2022).

    [1] This text is a slightly modified translation, prepared by the authors, of Tobias Keiling and Ian Alexander Moore, Heidegger (und Trakl) auf der Bühlerhöhe (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 2023).

    [2] Georg Britting, Briefe an Georg Jung 1943 bis 1963, ed. Georg-Britting-Stiftung (Höhenmoos: Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Werke Georg Brittings, 2009), 211. Here and below, translations for which an English edition is not supplied in a footnote are by us.

    [3] Der Wendepunkt: Ein Lebensbericht (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1963), 104.

    [4] Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine,” trans. William McNeill and Julia Ireland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 195, 201.

    [5] Die Geschichte der Bühlerhöhe 1913–1993 (Bühl: Schlosshotel Bühlerhöhe, 1993), 60.

    [6] In Gottfried Benn, Briefe an F.W. Oelze 1950–1956, ed. Harald Steinhagen and Jürgen Schröder (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1982), 342.

    [7] Gerhard Stroomann, Aus meinem roten Notizbuch: Ein Leben als Arzt auf der Bühlerhöhe, 2nd edition, ed. Heinrich W. Petzet (Frankfurt: Societäts-Verlag, 1960), 207.

    [8] Jürgen Habermas, “Martin Heidegger: On the Publication of Lectures from the Year 1935,” trans. Dale Ponikvar, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 6, no. 2 (Fall 1977): 164–65; translation modified.

    [9] Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, HS.1989.0010.07111.

    [10] “Heidegger: Rückfall ins Gestell,” Der Spiegel, April 6, 1950.

    [11] Martin Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 27.

    [12] Cited in Martin Heidegger, “… Poetically Man Dwells …,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Perennial, 2001), 227.

    [13] Viktor Emil von Gebsattel, Von der christlichen Gelassenheit (Würzburg: Werkbund-Verlag, 1940), 5.

    [14] Martin Heidegger, Letters to His Wife 1915–1970, trans. R. D. V. Glasgow (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 197.

    [15] Nachlass Ludwig von Ficker, Forschungsinstitut Brenner-Archiv, 041-048-025-006, http://edition.ficker-gesamtbriefwechsel.net/#/briefe/nach-partnerinnen/5918a905-70df-4122-9b6c-dff94fa96147.

    [16] Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, 86.9760/4.

    [17] As reported in a letter from Stroomann to von Ficker, in Nachlass Ludwig von Ficker, 041-048-025-001, http://edition.ficker-gesamtbriefwechsel.net/#/briefe/nach-partnerinnen/eb9e7a4c-d896-4b88-a6d3-0885d1960072.

    [18] Georg Trakl, Dichtungen und Briefe: Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, ed. Walther Killy and Hans Szklenar, Vol. 1., 3rd edition (Salzburg: Otto Müller, 1974), 57.

    [19] Martin Heidegger, “Language,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, 207.

    [20] Adolf Frisé, Spiegelungen: Berichte, Kommentare, Texte 1933–1998 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2000), 126–27.

    [21] Nachlass Ludwig von Ficker, 48-25-5.

    [22] Ludwig von Ficker, Briefwechsel 1940 –1967, ed. Martin Alber et al. (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1996), 529.

    [23] Benn, Briefe an F.W. Oelze 1950–1956, 142.

    [24] In von Ficker, Briefwechsel 1940–1967, 244.

    [25] Walter Muschg, Die Zerstörung der deutschen Literatur, 3rd edition (Bern: Francke, 1958), 223.

    [26] In Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, Letters, 1925–1975, trans. Andrew Shields (Orlando: Harcourt, 2004), 259–60.

    [27] Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, 1989.0010.07111.

    [28] Trakl, Dichtungen und Briefe, 60.

    [29] Ibid., 78.

    [30] Martin Heidegger, “Language in the Poem: A Discussion on Georg Trakl’s Poetic Work,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 163.

    [31] “Martin Heidegger deutet Georg Trakl. Bühlerhöhe am 4. Oktober 1952,” Forschungsinstitut Brenner-Archiv, 65/33–1, p. 17.

    [32] Heidegger, “Language in the Poem,” 196; translation modified.

    [33] Ibid., 196–97.

    [34] Trakl, Dichtungen und Briefe, 78.

    [35] Heidegger, “Language in the Poem,” 189; translation modified.

    [36] Ibid., 194; translation modified.

    [37] Ibid., 185; translation modified.

    [38] Ibid., 197.

    [39] Jacques Derrida, “Onto-Theology of National Humanism (Prolegomena to a Hypothesis),” Oxford Literary Review 14, no. 1 (1992): 3–23.

    [40] Jacques Derrida, Geschlecht III: Sex, Race, Nation, Humanity, trans. Katie Chenoweth and Rodrigo Therezo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020), 136–37.

    [41] Max Kommerell, Briefe und Aufzeichnungen 1919–1944, ed. Inge Jens (Olten: Walter, 1967), 403.

    [42] Max Kommerell, Der Dichter als Führer in der deutschen Klassik (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1928).

    [43] Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, 23795IV.

    [44] Friedrich Sieburg, “Unter den Tannen von Bühlerhöhe.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (April 15, 1957), 2.

  • Alex Gourevitch—Become the Gods: A Response to Jensen Suther

    Alex Gourevitch—Become the Gods: A Response to Jensen Suther

    This article is a response to a text by Jensen Suther that was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier

    As is too often the case, when I agree with ninety percent of an argument, I spend all my time on the ten percent with which I disagree. I think learning to love the rich, even those as loathsome as the Roys, is a way to understanding the dynamic of love and domination in Succession. But there is a question of how to think about the personal and the impersonal in the show. We can get there indirectly, by way of comparison. I just read Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks and was talking to a friend about the comparison between Buddenbrooks and Succession. Two great works about dynastic succession, but with very different narrative trajectories. The connection between Buddenbrooks and Succession is in the portrayal of patriarchal domination. The institutional fact of succession – who will inherit the family business? – allows that domination to have objective content. Domination is not just an accidental fact of personal psychology, of a father’s ability to morally terrorize or manipulate, but a continual and institutionally stabilized relation. Someone must succeed to the office once occupied by another. The child must succeed the father, not just as father, but also as leader of the enterprise. The power the father has over the child is to confer the title, by which the child becomes something more than mere biological continuity.

    In both Buddenbrooks and Succession, the domination appears at the personal level in the fact that the children fail to measure up to the paterfamilias. In Buddenbrooks, however, the children fail because of the spectral presence of the patriarch’s high moral virtue and its apparent connection to his economic success. The elder Buddenbrook, Johann, was a natural bourgeois. He lived a life of virtue without finding it mere subordination to duty. There is little sense that he had to stifle his basic impulses and inner vitality to the Protestant ethic. Instead he found it spiritually fulfilling, even nourishing. The second-generation Buddenbrooks, however, are inferior in their different ways. None can live as they naturally are. They each find themselves mentally and spiritually stifled, even physically crippled, by their duty to sustain the family in the image of their father’s sober, bourgeois propriety. The naturally impudent and daring daughter, Tony, slowly has the life crushed out of her by the failed attempts to be a good wife and good daughter. The more she tries to carry out her duties the more her life bends and shrinks, like an empty soda can slowly imploding under pressure. Christian, the middle-child, is decadent in mind and body, physically ailing away and economically dissolute: inconsistently employed and endlessly in debt. The eldest and natural successor, Thomas, has neither the will to adapt to the new business conditions nor the spiritual intensity to commit to being a lesser, but proper, businessman. Keeping the business alive means expanding it, but expanding it requires an enterprising spirit at odds with the decency and moderation that he mimics but does not feel. As the unsatisfied and bitter leader of the family enterprise, he is an unworthy successor who fails to sustain the life of his family: the business stagnates and declines while his son and sole heir dies. Buddenbrooks is, therefore, a novel about dynastic decay under a particular kind of social domination. The next generation’s lives are constrained by the unreachable moral example of the previous generation, in the context of a capitalist society that has turned more intensely competitive and, therefore, incompatible with bourgeois moral virtue. Were they to adapt to new conditions, they would violate the example of their father, but to hew to the family morality they must destroy their vitality.

    Succession, however, is not about the same kind of decay because there is no real evolution. Buddenbrooks stretches over three generations, while Succession is almost relentlessly temporally constipated. There is no slow decline from the moral glories of the founding and growth of the enterprise. We start at the peak and are held there for three and a half seasons during which nothing happens. Nothing happens because Logan won’t let “It” happen. Some complain that this temporal stagnation is all in the service of glamorizing the billionaire lifestyle in the guise of prestige TV. All we’re left with is endless shots of private jets, family helicopters, and exclusive residences. But the sclerosis is part of the show’s aesthetic integrity. Logan does not loom over his children by the force of his moral example, like Johann Buddenbrook. Instead – as Jensen observes – Logan sees and despises each of them. He refuses to let them love him.

    But it’s more than that. Logan uses the prospect of succession to ever further crush his children, playing each off the other to keep them all subordinate to him. The children are weak and grasping, not just because they cannot live up to his virtue, but because Logan himself has lost his way. His is a purposeless rule: winning for the sake of winning. “I fucking win!” he screams in the season 3 finale, when he has outmaneuvered his children. When his children ask him why he’s doing this, Logan can only say “because it fucking works.” The dynastic economic project is revealed for what it always was, an exercise in domination. But left with the evidence that his children don’t have the strength and guile to destroy him, he is left only with his will to power now turned inwards, on his own family.

    The reason that the show moves in place, as it were, is because there is still a dynamic tension at the core of Logan’s conflict with his children: the dynasty he created cannot be maintained. He cannot allow a succession to take place because it would mean there is someone worthy of the office. But Logan’s domination of his own family is so complete that there are only children grasping at an inheritance, not worthy of succession. This is not succession as decay, à la Buddenbrooks, but succession as self-annihilation. It is fitting that the only way for a succession to take place, for some kind of historical movement to take place, is Logan dying. It was that or Logan destroying the company by selling it, whichever came first. As it happens, Logan’s will outlives his body. The GoJo deal goes through, Matsson takes over, and the Roy children find themselves outmaneuvered by each other. Roman, ever the truth-teller of the show, explains the result to Kendall: “We are bullshit…You are bullshit, I am bullshit, she is bullshit. It’s all fucking bullshit.” They are bullshit because, though willing to sacrifice each other for their ambition, they are never willing to go all the way, never even quite sure whether they want to succeed their father or want his approval. Shiv’s betrayal, which seals the sale to GoJo, is just the final proof. Matsson was the worthy successor because he was a killer. Even the Roy children know it. They repeatedly accuse Matsson of having killed their father by forcing Logan onto the plane in which he died his ignominious death. It is never clear whether they are more upset at their father’s death or at the dominance Matsson establishes by being responsible for Logan’s end.

    Now I agree that one way to understand Succession is that it is not just a timeless tale of dynastic succession, but one in which that succession is disciplined by its social form: a special kind of social domination. This makes many of the popular comparisons inapt. Some have likened Succession to King Lear. It seems obvious. An increasingly unhinged, aging father tests the love of his three children by rules that make expression of that love impossible. Goneril and Regan’s praise for their father is insincere, not because we know their inner motives, but because of the structure imposed on their speech by Lear. By making their words a test of their worthiness to inherit part of the kingdom, he makes their voice his. Regardless of whether they mean what they say, they cannot mean it. The more they speak, the less they can say. Again, this is not about their true motives but about the conditions under which they speak, conditions determined by their father, who has bound expressions of love to inheritance. In Succession, Roman is the ultimate Goneril-Regan. When Roman pleads with his father, “don’t do this,” in the season 3 finale, Logan asks Roman what he has left. Roman’s pathetic “I don’t know…love?” is so hopeless that it is almost sincere, but also absurd. Love has as little place in a boardroom battle as when inheriting the kingdom. But there is no other conversation Logan understands, no other relation Logan can accept than the struggle to over-power others. The Cordelia option is the one the children left behind at the beginning of season 4: leave the business so that they can be a family. But Cordelia’s silence is not purer. It is just the other side of the domination relationship: she can only express her love for her father by not expressing it. Only further proof that it is the dominator who makes love inexpressible.

    But the Lear comparison withers on further inspection. Lear’s madness is political. He divides the indivisible: a sovereign realm. He compounds the problem by then imagining he can choose his successors. The normal logic of succession, to which he refuses to submit, is that one child – the eldest – inherits it all, because that preserves the integrity of rule. Lear should have as little say as anyone else, yet he wants it all to depend on his will – one kingdom or many, that love should decide, and so on. He is subject to that impersonal political logic, yet wants it all to be personal. Logan Roy, however, is the patriarch of an altogether different enterprise: not the territorially-bound state but the globe-bestriding, multinational corporation. Not Leviathan but Behemoth.

    The universal drama of Succession is mediated by the drama of that social logic – not just of billionaires, but billionaire capitalists, constrained by board-members and shareholders, debt payments and stock prices, conglomerates and subsidiaries. That is why I think Jensen is right to point to capitalist forms of domination in particular. But is this a story about mute compulsion? Where even the very wealthy are as much slaves as everyone else? And where, therefore, we have to root for their love – love them – because it is the only human and emancipatory response to the crushing logic of accumulation?

    It’s true, there is a sense in which the characters are subject to a dynamic they cannot master and that they can only liberate themselves by escaping the social relations they are disciplined by. But I don’t think it’s primarily the silent logic of accumulation that constrains them.

    Now I can imagine a counterargument something like the following. If mute compulsion isn’t the fundamental constraint, then what is? Succession is not itself a timeless logic because it takes different forms. Isn’t that the point of distinguishing between Lear, Buddenbrooks and Succession? Logan’s purposeless rule, of winning for the sake of winning, is as Jensen put it “a late capitalist twist on Lear’s madness.” So Logan has not lost his way in some ethical sense. His is no mere intellectual error. His purposeless rule is an internalization of production for the sake of production, or what Marx called “nothing more than the rationalized motive and aim of the hoarder.”

    I don’t disagree, but there are limits to the mute compulsion reading of Succession. Mute compulsion is the impersonal form of social domination by capital. It is achieved through the discipline the market imposes externally on each of the actors. The clearest account of that domination we have is from volume 1 of Capital. The presentation of that domination as comprehensively impersonal requires assuming, as volume 1 does, that the paradigmatic form of ownership is one in which capital is dispersed across many capitalists. None are in any position to shape the market conditions that discipline them. They are price-takers, in modern parlance, because they are roughly equally situated. (While Marx does later show how capital naturally centralizes and concentrates, that is a natural development of the logic of accumulation that also modifies the nature of those constraints.) When capitalists are in that position vis-à-vis each other Marx does say they are just as much slaves as workers. They are slaves to capital because they are wholly subordinate to the logic of surplus-value extraction. Each particular intersubjective relation is subsumed by this wider social process: exchange-value rules use-value, value accumulation over love and friendship.

    If Succession is an expression of that, we would want it to show us those moments of external discipline, in which characters are forced to adopt the standpoint of capital. And we do sometimes see it. The debt situation in season 1, Stuy Hosseini, proxy battles, desperate attempts to go private, cratering stock prices, hostile takeover threats, the deal with Matsson. Whether the characters want to or not, there are moments when characters must consciously adopt the standpoint of the value-maximizing capitalist, or find themselves and their lives dissolved. This reaches its peak in the first episode of the final season, in the question of whether they will all just cash out. Why not take the billions and be free? Not only do they decide to stay, but never is Kendall prouder than the moment when he gives the successful speech to shareholders on the new value proposition ‘Living Plus.’ He doesn’t want money, he wants to increase value. Cashing out is something close to spiritual death for each of them. But notice one weakness here with the mute compulsion story – they really can cash out. They aren’t petty capitalists, who will go under, and return to the ranks of the working class or whatever. There is nothing really forcing them away from the route Connor takes – spend vast amounts of money on their own vanity projects.

    We might think there is a further form of domination, not external in the sense of market discipline, but social, in the sense of the form that all relations take. This is I think part of what Jensen is getting at. It is not a question of what they are forced to do, but how it is available for them to conceive themselves. Their psychology is already social. For instance, their conception of a family is as an empire not of property but of endlessly accumulating wealth. They can’t imagine the family bond without all being part of the company, making decisions together in the boardroom. They have no experience and no sense of love as its own, independent bond, because who they are as a family and who they are as a business, is inseparable. And that, itself, is product of the social form they are tied up in.

    Now I’m not rejecting that completely. But I don’t quite see the social form of the ‘succession’ as so impersonally capitalist. It is dynastic. The dynastic succession of a commercial empire, not just an ordinary capitalist business. Waystar is a corporate behemoth able to use its economic power to shape and alter markets and to use its political power to anoint or destroy presidents. The Logan family is not subject to the routine discipline of those markets the way, say, a local dry-cleaner or restauranteur or barber is. Succession is also an expression of human power and freedom from within the logic of capitalism. It is an all-too-human form of domination, in which the particular whims of a particular agent – primarily but not only the patriarchal figure – has its own independent existence. And this shapes the dynamic of familial succession. Logan is only willing to hand off to someone like him. The only worthy successor is someone who is equally or even more dominant. And his children routinely wonder what to do with their power. They even seem to celebrate impulsiveness and capriciousness, because they imagine themselves to be exercising Machiavellian virtú just like their father. There is in some sense too much slack, not enough mute compulsion and discipline, which is why they are constantly trying to will themselves into their father’s position. They can never make up their mind and the structure won’t make it up for them.

    So we might say that, while this is a very capitalist form of succession, it is not just a story about impersonal domination, but simultaneously about a highly personal form of domination because it takes place in our particular (Late? Postmodern? Financial?) capitalist society. There is so much wealth and so much market power that it appears like everything depends on the whim and caprice of the patriarch. And personal domination, in the sense of creating the world in one’s own, not just capital’s, image seems like an end in itself.

    That also explains why the trap, the structural logic of the show, is that succession is impossible. Logan has related to his family as to everyone else, as subjects to be manipulated, controlled, dominated – not just used. But those who submit are unsuited to replacing him. Since his children love him, they try to be what he admires – power-seeking, dominant, risk-takers. But they are not really in it to dominate, they are in it for love, so they continuously fail. And Logan, meanwhile, is in it to win. Again, I am not sure we can really get what’s going on with this, without appreciating that the social form of succession is an expression not just of the standard mute compulsion of capital, but of the dynastic form of neoliberal, multinational corporate capitalism. That kind of capitalism creates zones of discretion that add a very personal element to the domination the children experience. It makes the prize they struggle for that much more dramatic, makes Logan seem that much more god-like, and the self-aggrandizement of each not purely delusional or psychologically stunted.

    Which brings me to the politics of the show. Critics complained that we see almost no real people or any of the people doing the work. But that is the genius of the show. It happens in remote and inaccessible areas – private jets and helicopters, Caribbean villas and New York penthouses, Mediterranean yachts and Hampton estates. Even Connor’s private wedding boat has its own private room set aside for the siblings. Over time, the show’s hyper-attention to these exclusive forms of travel, leisure and business, is to make the drama into an Olympian power struggle among pagan gods. Those gods have all the familiar human weaknesses – they are vain and capricious, reckless and indifferent – but coupled to powers no ordinary human beings could have. They choose presidents and they get away with murder. A business (Vaulter) is gutted, whole floors of people unemployed, all because of a petty squabble between two brothers vying for their father’s approval in a boardroom. Or, perhaps the greatest superpower of all, they can just fly over hours-long snarls of plebeian traffic. The emptiness and sterility of most of the settings, the absence not just of anything dirty or even cluttering, but often of any ordinary people, is part of what enhances the sense that these are more than ordinary mortals. When the siblings show up in Sweden to negotiate with Matsson they do so on a literal mountaintop, like lesser Greek divinities locking horns with a Norse deity. Logan’s death was like the death of a Titan, the old gods giving way to the new.

    Some commentators claim that this hyper-stylization glorified the rich, but that is too shallow a reading. The unreachability of the characters, intensified by the remoteness of the settings, was a proper representation of social power in our society. Our capitalist economy is immensely productive and has generated fabulous capacities for social cooperation. But it has done so in a way that makes it seem like, were it not for some foreign power like an employer or financier, we would not cooperate in this social enterprise at all. These immense capacities to shape our material world and determine the rules of cooperation are concentrated in a small number of hands, over whom we exercise little control. We cannot even recognize their social power as our own. It is alien to us. And so it is best represented as the distant powers of a few people who, for that reason, seem more than human. The majority work or don’t work, rest or don’t rest, at their pleasure.

    If that world-shaping power is really a collective one, ours in the broadest national and international sense, then perhaps the real succession story is the one the show doesn’t tell. We are the disinherited. There is a brutal realism to Succession. Only the gods can hurt other gods. There is no Promethean moment. Nobody steals the Roy family’s fire, seizes their property, and brings their power down to earth. And that too is a truth, since nothing seems more remote these days than social transformation. In Greek mythology, the gods begin to die when the people stop worshipping them. In our time, the problem is not one of belief and worship but politics and action. So long as the vast majority does nothing to claim the power that is theirs, then it is not just Gregs all the way down, it is Matssons always on top. Yes, we should love the rich, but we should also want to become the gods. That would be the true succession.

    Alex Gourevitch is an associate professor of political science at Brown University. He is the author of From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century, and is currently working on a book about strikes.

  • Jensen Suther—Learning to Love the Rich in Succession

    Jensen Suther—Learning to Love the Rich in Succession

    This article was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier. The dossier includes a response to this article by Alex Gourevitch.

    Immediately following the finale of the third season of HBO’s Succession—the recent prestige drama about a Murdoch-like media mogul and the struggle among his children over who will succeed him as CEO—screengrabs of a now-famous scene began circulating on social media. The still depicts Jeremy Strong’s emotionally battered Kendall Roy sitting on the ground outside the Italian wedding venue where his mother has just been remarried, his brother Roman (played by a very game Kieran Culkin) bending at the waist to grip his shoulders and his sister Siobhan (or “Shiv,” a role owned by Sarah Snook) lightly touching his head while looking on with evident feeling and concern. To highlight the artistry and painterly composition of the scene, someone had superimposed on the shot of the three Roy siblings a geometric representation of the golden ratio, a spiral within a rectangle. Employed most famously by Italian artist and inventor Leonardo da Vinci, the golden ratio can often be found in paintings from the Renaissance period and was integral to the development of the humanist idea of the harmony, balance, and innate value of the human form. While the Italian setting of the season and portrait-like character of the shot would seem to suggest that this is more than mere coincidence, it is hard to understand what sort of role such an anachronistic gesture could be playing in a series as cruel and as brutally anti-humanist as this one, in which profitability, efficiency and power are “the measure of all things”—rather than humanity, to cite the Renaissance favorite Protagoras. At best, it appears to be a smug, ironic nod to the inhumanity of the Roys; at worst, a case of prestige television freely appropriating from an illustrious phase of art history in order to increase said prestige.

    Yet Succession has consistently centered the human figure—especially, with its snap zooms, the human face—and such cinematographic devices serve to remind us of what very little else in the series’ dialogue or its characters’ acts is able to: their own diminished humanity and value. Understood in this way, the series isn’t engaged in the passé postmodern project of exposing the fraudulence of humanism; its subversiveness rather lies in the way it teaches us to see the humanity in—and thus to love—the rich.

    The series begins with Kendall, the eldest of the three full siblings, preparing to replace his elderly father Logan Roy (Brian Cox) as the CEO of their family company, Waystar Royco, a media and entertainment conglomerate that passingly resembles the Murdoch empire. Yet as the heir apparent is initiated into his role, is widely discussed in the media, and makes the cover of Forbes, Logan begins to suspect that Kendall lacks the “killer instinct,” as Shiv puts it later, that the job requires. A recovering addict with a depressive streak who craves his domineering father’s respect and approval, Kendall fails several implicit tests, like a trick invitation to Logan’s eightieth birthday in the middle of tense acquisition negotiations. Logan’s fateful—yet perhaps prudent—decision to cancel his retirement plans and not step aside is the series’ equivalent to the Big Bang: it births the twisted, post-Shakespearian universe of Succession, in which Kendall, Shiv, and Roman compete against one another for the chief role and thus for their father’s affections.

    By the midpoint of the third season, some of the series’ former champions began to question the point of the endless machinations and to voice concerns about the kinds of sympathies Succession seems made to elicit from its viewers. Why, such commentators wondered, should we feel sorry that the Roys might lose their private jets? Why are their lives given such sumptuous, wide-screen treatment, and not the lives of those their actions destroy? In season one, Roman dangles a million-dollar check before the son of two immigrant staff members, a sum they are promised if the child can hit a homerun in the family’s annual softball game. He of course is outed, his family made to sign an NDA, and they make a brief final appearance just before the credits roll, when it is intimated that, in exchange for their silence, they were given the Patek Philippe watch Logan indifferently received from Shiv’s husband Tom (Matthew Macfadyen) for his birthday. If the actual victims are bit players, silenced and marginalized, then our empathy for Kendall or Roman would appear to reflect our ensnarement in a classical ideological trap: the sentimental identification with a character’s “universal” plight, such as a son’s failure to live up to his father’s expectations.

    In his influential critique of Western theater, Brecht famously decries works that elicit this kind of empathic projection as bourgeois instruments for blocking reflection and anesthetizing thought.[i] Yet the problem is not just that the true victims are elided or relegated to the sidelines; refocusing the narrative on a different struggle would simply reproduce the same difficulty. Rather, what goes missing is “the idea of a man as a function of the environment and the environment as a function of man” (1992: 97). What is elided, in other words, is a sense of the historical specificity of the dramatic action, the social situation that prompts those acts or that struggle at this time. To cite Richard Wright, the point is not to create art “which even bankers’ daughters could read [or watch] and weep over and feel good about”[ii]; the point for Brecht is to create opportunities for understanding the broader systemic reasons that things are as they are. But doesn’t this precisely tell against the mission of Succession, to teach us to “love the rich”?

    At least at first glance, the view of Succession as a show for “bankers’ daughters” is reinforced by the most prominent “critical theory” of the social function of television and by the way that the series is shaped in accordance with the constraints specific to the medium. In the early fifties, Theodor Adorno produced a series of articles on the status of television “as ideology,” based on studies he undertook as the research director of the Hacker Foundation in California.[iii] There is a certain ham-fistedness and predictability to Adorno’s analyses, which largely consist of readings of individual “plays” (“shows,” in our contemporary idiom) as stereotypical representations of everyday life meant to foster conformity. Yet Adorno does begin to sketch a critical theory specific to the medium in elaborating the notion of “pseudo-realism,” which pinpoints the way television substitutes a “pedantically maintained realism in all matters of direct sense perception” for representation of the objective, institutional tendencies responsible for producing our shared reality (1991: 170). This endows television with a unique capacity for smuggling in an ideology of “the normal” advantageous to the capitalist status quo. Adorno cites as a key example the way the medium “personalizes” irreducibly historical and political phenomena. For instance, in a series about a fascist dictator, totalitarianism is represented as the result of the “character defects of ambitious politicians,” the dictator’s fall as a product of the warm personalities of courageous resisters (2005a: 63). This reinforces our sense of society as an aggregate of egos, atoms swirling in a history-less void.

    In the case of Succession, however, this procedure is inverted: the character defects of the rich are like wounds that pique the interest of the morbidly curious and compel them to ask: “how did it happen?” It is precisely by foregoing the prestige sociology of a show like The Wire and by exactingly observing the inner lives and family dynamics of so “undeserving” a subject that the lineaments of distinct historical types (the mogul, the operative, the CEO) are thrown into relief. As a brief, pivotal scene in season one’s emotionally harrowing “Austerlitz” shows, Logan himself is a product of abuse. Shortly after Kendall questions an allusion his father makes to the beatings he endured as a child in Quebec, the camera lingers on Logan’s scarred back during his morning swim in an infinity pool. Yet it would be a mistake to read this scene as aiming to simply elicit the kind of “empathic projection” targeted by Brecht. A hallmark of Succession is its use of handheld cameras to achieve a verité effect, which creator Jesse Armstrong first deployed in his dark comedic masterpiece Peep Show. The series’ verité style is a way of exploiting the “pseudo-realism” of television to bring what is fantastical, sky-scraper high, back down to earth and to shock us with the disclosure that, to cite Marx, “The capitalist is just as enslaved by the relationships of capitalism as is his opposite pole, the worker” (1976: 990). Logan may not live among us, but he does live as one of us, as deformed by the demands of a market society as anyone else. And as we will see, Succession teaches us to love the rich precisely by illuminating the late capitalist web in which we all are caught.

    For Marx, the purpose of capitalist production is the accumulation of value, which is measured in labor time. The drive to accumulation is a matter not of individual greed or miserliness but of a social system that necessitates that one sell one’s labor or buy and employ the labor of others to survive. Succession thus rightly depicts our world as a world of masters and slaves: Shiv is to Logan what Tom is to Shiv; what Tom is to Shiv Greg (Nicholas Braun) is to Tom. And to incentivize his own “slave” to aid him in betraying his master, Shiv, Tom promises Greg “your own Greg.” What Greg’s presence is meant to reveal is that it is in fact Gregs all the way down. Yet it is also Gregs all the way up. It might seem that that degree of wealth (tens of billions) would free anyone so lucky from the “drive to accumulation.”  Logan’s scars help dispel the illusion that, in a family tree splintered into various master-slave relations, he is the “master of the house” standing unfettered at the top. In a reflection on the way marriage under capitalism serves less as a partnership founded on romantic love than as “a community of interests,” Adorno notes that one might think that “marriage without ignominy” is still possible for the rich, those who are “spared the pursuit of interests.” But the privileged, he writes, “are precisely those in whom the pursuit of interests has become second nature—they would not otherwise uphold privilege” (2005b: 31). This is not only apparent from the several weddings (and divorces) depicted in Succession but also from Logan’s neurotic obsession with dynasty, which is less a matter of perpetuating his own line than a matter of perpetuating the line of monopoly capital itself, of which Logan is a mere “character-mask” or representative.

    What Succession dramatizes is the way inter-capitalist competition engenders an intra-capitalist struggle: the struggle within the monopoly itself to ensure its own continuity and the maintenance of its dominance, both within and without. In “Authority and the Family,” Max Horkheimer argues that, “in the golden age of the bourgeois order,” the family functioned as a refuge from the growing antagonisms of a market society and as the lone space in which individuals could still be recognized as autonomous ends. Yet as Horkheimer explains, the family also functioned as an incubator for compliant subjects, obedient to the state and passive in the face of the market just as they were trained to be before the patriarch (1972: 114). In Logan, the distinction between the authority of the patriarch and that of the market collapses. Just as he is subject to market forces beyond his control, which compel him in the end to sell Waystar to the Swedish interloper Lukas Matsson (Alexander Skarsgård), so does he subject his wife and children to the principle of exchange, paying for the loyalty of his wives with Waystar shares and forcing the three siblings to compete against each other not just for his affections but for the position of CEO. Yet because Logan is himself the monopolist, his children become his own competitors. He exploits his own paternal authority to exert his dominance while still expecting one of them to succeed him. Not only is the family enclave irredeemably contaminated by market rationality; it can no longer fulfill its own mission of instilling the (limited) sense of autonomy Kendall and his siblings would require to effectively lead.

    Every master is thus also a slave, and every slave is a would-be master. The “lean-in” feminist ideology that Shiv would mock and disdain and yet that she also lives and breathes renders her a slave to her own drive to maximal empowerment and “independence.” In her (successful) attempt to gaslight Tom into agreeing to a non-monogamous marriage, Shiv reasons that “we’ve torn everything else down […] Love is the last fridge magnet left.” Her wish is fulfilled when, in the season-three finale, her husband finally does as she asks and betrays their marriage to further his own career. Inversely, when Roman “accidentally” sends the dick pic he intended for Gerri (J. Cameron Smith) to Logan’s phone, it could be argued that Roman’s aim has never been truer: on the cusp of success and relative independence, he brings about the ideal scenario for expressing his masochistic tendencies, re-infantilizing himself in Logan’s eyes to ensure his own continued obedience to his true dom, “daddy.” It is the ultimate instance of topping from the bottom. Yet the series itself preempts facile psychoanalytic readings by way of Shiv and Roman’s meta-commentary on the Roy family “family romance.” In a bizarre, truly inspired stretch of dialogue in “Too Much Birthday” in season three, Roman makes so absurdly explicit his psychosexual motivations for competing with Shiv as to render them entirely worthless from the standpoint of the critic: “Turns out he loves it when I do the daddy dance […] He loves fucking me, and he just doesn’t want to fuck you anymore.” In the case of Succession, Oedipal and Electra complexes are not the keys to understanding but the very phenomena to be understood.

    When Succession first premiered, it received a somewhat lukewarm reception because it seemed uncertain about its own generic identity and suffered from tonal problems. But this is by design. In the comedic Succession, our laughter registers our surprise at the ignobility of the nobles. That subversion of expectation is what makes us laugh, but it is also the source of the series’ tragedy—namely that the “good life” after which we all are striving is in actuality the bad one. It is a tragicomedy because the most refined and elite among us are deeply, pathologically, unrefined and broken. According to Henri Bergson, comedy consists in the incursion of the mechanical and autonomic into the realm of the living[iv]; hence the displacement of pseudo-realism in Succession by a Courbet-like realism of decay. In the opening episode of season two, a foul odor pervades the family’s summer home in the Hamptons, spoiling a lavish lunch spread; a later shot establishes a raccoon carcass as the culprit, which a rankled contractor stuffed in the chimney in retaliation for lack of payment. Later, in season three, Tom and Shiv try wine from their private vineyard, only to discover that it tastes of literal shit (Tom, euphemizing, notes its “earthy,” “agricultural,” bouquet). And finally, in accord with Kantorowitz’ famous notion of the “king’s two bodies” (2016), the public, invulnerable one (the monarch) and the private, material one (the man), Logan’s public persona lives parasitically on his ailing body, which suffers a stroke, succumbs to “piss madness” from a UTI, and is jeopardized by a near-heart attack following a walk with his estranged son Kendall and a concerned investor (2016). The clean, corporate spaces are regularly befouled by the Roys, as when Logan urinates on Kendall’s carpet and Roman ejaculates on the office window, suggesting that the “good life” is itself rotten, “bad,” with decadence often coinciding with literal decay.

    Yet as the scene with which we began intimates, it is because the Roys themselves are capital’s slaves that they are worthy of our attention—worthy of our love. When Kendall confesses to his siblings that he was responsible for the death of the waiter at the end of the first season, it is, surprisingly, the darkly impish Roman who listens most attentively. Kendall is motivated to confess because he wants to be confirmed in his understanding of himself as a murderer, a reckless elite, but Roman contests this self-conception and tries to highlight the good intentions evident in Kendall’s acts—that he tried to save the waiter, that he acted as a hero. Kendall’s struggle to be known results in a shift in his own self-knowledge. In treating Kendall as a moral agent, Roman enables him, for the first time in the series, to actually be one rather than just play one. The scene inverts a moment from the season’s second episode, when Kendall had sought to sway his siblings to join his moral crusade against Logan’s stewardship of the company. Whereas Kendall’s self-deceived, self-aggrandizing proposal then proved less than palatable, here his vulnerable disclosure of his role in the death of the waiter at the end of season one amounts to an authentic appeal for community that only Shiv and Roman could satisfy. It is because Kendall has finally and truly given up on being Logan’s son that he is able to become a brother. A further result of Roman’s struggle in the prior scene to know his brother is that, in acknowledging what Roman knows, Kendall enables Roman to learn something about himself, namely that he can be trusted and is capable of love. Roman’s masochistic kink may be an attempt to master his feelings of inadequacy behind closed doors, but his severe allergy to any form of intimacy—especially with his romantic partners—reflects both his fear of being known and his fear of being the knower, one who must trust and one who must be trusted. In recognizing Roman’s capacity as a recognizer, Kendall thus enables his brother to be the sort of person who loves, as we will shortly see.

    But the Utopian dream of their mutual coordination of the company, the flushing out of the fascists at the Fox News-like ATN, and the democracy-minded righting of the corporate ship, is short-lived. As we discover, Tom has betrayed Shiv to Logan on account of her multi-layered betrayal of Tom, enabling Logan to call the bluff of the Roy children and to block their veto of the Waystar sale. When an enraged Logan exclaims that their guns have “turned into sausages” and asks what leverage they have left, Roman repeats Kendall’s confessional gesture and, inelegantly but effectively, asks: “I don’t know—fucking love?” But this appeal for community falls on deaf ears; the struggle for recognition and mutual understanding in which Roman is now trying to engage is misread by Logan as “the Game” the family has been playing since the very first episode. Logan cannot bear the demand that is being made of him, the demand that he act out of love for his children, and so does not just refuse to reciprocate Roman’s gesture but casts doubt on the authenticity of what he has just expressed. This ultimate skeptical act, Logan’s insinuation that Roman is speaking in bad faith, is what undermines the recognitive edifice the siblings had begun to build, by undermining Roman’s new and fragile sense of self. The tragedy of the scene lies in the way that Roman loses his father by finally attempting to genuinely be his son and in the way Logan’s attempt to outmaneuver doom is what—it seems—will ultimately doom him. Logan is constitutionally unable to make the one non-strategic choice that might well destroy the company (and thus himself) but help make his children (and thus himself) a different, non-pecuniary kind of “whole.” As the episode and season draw to a close, the shot with which we began is inverted: Kendall and Shiv now stand over a devastated Roman. It is difficult to watch—all the more so because there is no sense of schadenfreude, no sense of a “rich asshole” getting what he deserves. What the use of such a “humanistic” frame is meant to teach us in such anxiety-provoking scenes, what we are meant to learn from this acknowledgement of us, the viewers, is precisely “how to love the rich.”

    But surely, one might object, we also do have good reasons for hating the rich. While they may be dominated by the law of value, they are, after all, the beneficiaries of that law. Yet just as Adorno observes that “one must have tradition in oneself to hate it properly” (2005b: 52), so must one first learn to love the rich. It is only in recognizing the source of our shared domination that we come to understand the structural necessity of the domination of one class by another—and thus the “badness” of the rich. Over the course of Succession’s four seasons, it becomes increasingly clear that Logan’s children precisely aren’t “killers,” are too mutilated to do what needs to be done: to “succeed” Logan by moving on from Waystar and building something of their own or by toppling their father and running the business themselves. At the same time, it is also exactly what they are formed to do. In the final scene between the siblings in the fourth season, when Shiv chooses not to back Kendall as CEO but to back her estranged husband Tom, Kendall pleads with his sister not to betray him and delivers perhaps the most haunting line of the entire series: “I am like a cog built to fit only one machine. It’s the one thing I know how to do.” The metaphor captures the subsumption of acculturation, Bildung, growing up, under the drive to accumulation. Hence Kendall’s virtuosic—if morally repugnant—attempt to sell what in effect is a glorified retirement facility as a life-extending utopia (“Living+”), just to boost the Waystar valuation. Or Roman’s installation of the fascism-adjacent Mencken as president, just to insure his continued control of the family business. But the tragedy is that, while Kendall is built for this machine only, he is just thereby misshapen, deformed, unable to competently do the job. Time and again his desire to succeed his father as CEO has led him to jeopardize the very company he is supposed to lead. Meanwhile, Shiv blocks Kendall not only because she has negotiated a better deal for herself and because she’ll have a modicum of influence with Tom as CEO. Rather, Shiv cannot but block Kendall, because of the principle of competition Logan has instilled in his children. Shiv may be reasoning strategically, choosing self-interest over fraternal love, but the principle of self-interest has itself become an end in its own right or “highest good”—what Kant once identified as “radical evil” itself.

    The ethical culpability and “badness” of the Roys—the principle of their unlovability—are what lend several of the most moving scenes in the series finale their pathos. When, for example, Shiv and Roman finally relent to Kendall’s desire to be CEO and crown him as “king” in their mother’s kitchen, the scene reads as a kind of “pre-oedipal fantasy.” There is a nostalgia in the scene for a reciprocity, fraternity, and satisfaction the siblings actually never knew—as the cold hearth (or empty refrigerator) of their mother’s home intimates. It isn’t a depiction of the “real” siblings, of their real feelings of love outside the corporate drama; it is the fantasy of a world without or prior to Logan—a world in which Kendall, Roman, and Shiv would not be who they are. This is also why, as the siblings watch a home movie of Logan having dinner with their half-brother Connor (Alan Ruck), the television acts as a “window” onto a reality they can never inhabit. Logan, for them, can only play “father” on TV, or as in Kendall’s “Living+” presentation, as a digitized ghost that finally gives Kendall the approval he has craved—but only because Kendall has paid a technician to manipulate his father’s words. We love the Roys, in a sense, because we are gripped by the tragedy of their inability to love one another. By the same token, it is only by learning to love the Roys that we “can hate them properly,” through a critique of the monopoly form of capital that necessitates the dynastic succession (and thus the existence of the Roys). Nowhere is the iniquity of the rich (and of their indomitable master) more on display than in the series’ final moments. As Lacan famously observed, the true father is the dead one because it is only as dead that the father is “internalized” and thereby able to fully realize his psychological function.[v] The end of Succession bears this out: Shiv has never been more her father’s daughter than when—in an act as loathsome as it is necessary—she destroys Logan’s son.

    In its earlier seasons, in addition to objecting to the series’ overly sympathetic treatment of the rich, critics of Succession often complained that the show had run out of ideas and had nowhere left to go. While this proved untrue in the end, the series’ critics also weren’t exactly wrong. By way of conclusion, it’s worth noting the meta-televisual dimension of the series as reflected in its title, which designates the medium’s principle of motion: seriality or successiveness. In a lesser-known companion essay (“The Fact of Television”) to his justly famous, discipline-founding work on film, The World Viewed, Stanley Cavell attempts the deduction of this defining principle of the medium, alongside the principle that television is meant for “monitoring” rather than “viewing” (as in film). According to Cavell,

    Serial procedure can be thought of as the establishing of a stable condition punctuated by repeated crises or events that are not developments of the situation requiring a single resolution, but intrusions or emergencies—or humor, or adventure, or talent, or misery—each of which runs a natural course and thereupon rejoins the realm of the uneventful; which is perhaps to say, serial procedure is undialectical. (1982: 89)

    In watching television, we “monitor” the normal and the uneventful, the “way of the world,” which the serial format itself embodies. This is why, Cavell remarks, people often leave their TVs on in the background, not unlike the monitors utilized by security companies. What Cavell calls the “fear of television”—still encapsulated today in the common refrain that “I don’t even own a TV”—lies in the way it makes “intuitive the failure of [the world’s] survival of me,” in the way it seems to monitor the “growing uninhabitability of the world, the irreversible pollution of the earth” (1982: 95). If television captures the way the world stands outside me and is in some sense independent of me, what we fear is that the world it is monitoring is a world that will not survive us: the medium has itself become the fearful suggestion of the end of the company we keep. In the age of new media, Cavell’s analysis might seem quaint. But what is “doom scrolling” if not a fearful anticipation of “the failure of [the world’s] survival of me”?

    Succession may have once appeared to be merely spinning its wheels, going nowhere, but it was arguably in just this respect that it fulfilled its medium’s mandate. What the series so grippingly “monitored” was the treadmill of capital itself, the way it spins its wheels, is going nowhere. Succession thereby relayed the submerged tragedy of this uneventful repetition. Yet it is also because it asked of us that we learn to love the Roys that we might begin to see that—despite what they themselves would have us believe—the realm of freedom is not a private enclave in the Hamptons, reachable only by helicopter.

    References

    Adorno, Theodor. 2005a. Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. Translated by Henry Pickford. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Adorno, Theodor. 1991. The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture. Edited by J.M. Bernstein. New York: Routledge.

    Adorno, Theodor. 2005b. Minima Moralia: Reflections on Damaged Life. Translated by E.F.N. Jephcott. New York: Verso.

    Armstrong, Jesse, et al. 2018-2023. Succession. HBO Entertainment, Gary Sanchez Productions, Hyperobject Industries, Project Zeus.

    Brecht, Bertolt. 1992. Brecht on Theater: The Development of an Aesthetic. Edited and translated by John Willet. New York: Hill and Wang.

    Cavell, Stanley. 1979. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Cavell, Stanley. 1982. The Fact of Television. Daedelus 111, no. 4: 75-96.

    Horkheimer, Max. 1972. Critical Theory: Selected Essays. Translated by Matthew J. O’Connell et al. New York: Continuum.

    Kantorowicz, Ernst. 2016. The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Lacan, Jacques. 1992. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960. Translated by Dennis Porter. New York: W.W. Norton.

    Marx, Karl. 1976. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Vol. I). Translated by Ben Fowkes. New York: Penguin Books.

    Warren, Kenneth. 2016. “Rankine’s Elite Status.” Los Angeles Review of Books, January.    https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/reconsidering-claudia-rankines-citizen-an-american-  lyric-a-symposium-part-ii/

    Jensen Suther is a former Fulbright Scholar and received his PhD from Yale University. He is currently a Junior Fellow in the Harvard Society of Fellows. His writing has appeared or is forthcoming in a range of academic and public-facing venues, including Modernism/modernity, Representations, the Los Angeles Review of Books, and the New Statesman. He is currently working on two books—Spirit Disfigured and Hegel’s Bio-Aesthetics—which explore Hegel’s legacy for Marxism in aesthetic, political, and philosophical contexts.

    [i] See the well-known “Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting” in Brecht (1992).

    [ii] Quoted in Warren (2016).

    [iii] See “Prologue to Television” and “Television as Ideology” in Adorno (2005a).

    [iv] As noted in Cavell 1979, 415.

    [v] See, for instance, Lacan 1992, 309.

  • Charles Bernstein — Poem-A-Day, Poem-A-Day, Jiggety Zam: The Academy of American Poets Keeps Poetry Safe from Poetry

    Charles Bernstein — Poem-A-Day, Poem-A-Day, Jiggety Zam: The Academy of American Poets Keeps Poetry Safe from Poetry

    by Charles Bernstein

    A poem of mine was selected for the “Poem-a-Day” series at the Academy of American Poets, which claims 300,000 readers. The producers of the show told me it was mandatory to submit an “About this Poem” statement along with an audio recording – “whether that statement is a full-blown exegesis or simply reportage on when and where the poem was written, or what compelled you to write the poem, etc., etc., is completely up to you.” (Audio of the poem itself was optional.) Because my possibly sardonic poem was about not substituting anything for the poem (a line could have been: “If you love the poem for what it’s about, then you don’t love the poem but what it’s about”), I wrote a sentence that echoed a series of related poems I’ve written (one of which even made it in the Norton Anthology of Poetry): “This commentary intentionally left blank.” I also attached an enhanced audio version of the line. The staff producers wrote back that what I sent did not meet their “standards.” Evidently, I misunderstood what “completely up to you” meant. Even so, I wrote a commentary explaining my point of view – why I preferred not to write an “about” statement –– and I attached an enhanced audio of this new commentary. I was informed by the producers that my audio would not be “accessible” to those who relied on the audio version of Poem-a-Day posts, even though my enhanced audio is entirely accessible, albeit slightly aesthetically challenging. The producers said they would make the needed audio themselves.

    Just before publication, I received a proof with the opening — and key — sentences of my commentary redacted: without those sentences, the commentary lost its motivation and so its sense. The producers sent a recording of the poem followed by the mangled commentary. I couldn’t tell if the recording was done by a first-gen digital reader or a person imitating one. I had to act immediately as there was no time for back and forth. Within an hour I had made a new, “straight” recording of the poem, restoring only a version of the first redacted sentence of the original commentary, assuming, correctly, that this would meet Poets.Org standards, even if it still lobotomized my comment.

    And that, well, was that.

    In one of their emails, “The Academy” expressed its appreciation for my “being an important part of our work.” “We . . . would love” to sell you a membership. At a discount.

    Making the purchase was left entirely up to me.

    Here’s the rejected audio of the extended commentary, together with my initial audio and the redacted commentary (the four initial sentences deleted by the producers are crossed out):

    MP3

    This commentary intentionally left blank.

    That’s the “about” statement I initially submitted. However, the editors told me this response didn’t “meet our standards.” My poem is about not meeting standards. The kind of poetry I want doesn’t follow rules: it makes up its own rules. Perhaps my commentary needs a commentary? The poem is itself a series of commentaries. The idea of “blank” — letting the work stand for itself — is my commentary on the poem. In other words, if you love the poem for what it is about, you don’t love the poem but what it’s about. Or perhaps you could say the commentary is the poem and the poem the commentary. I get things all, well, Topsy-Turvy.

  • Tessel Veneboer — Penetration as Philosophy (Review of McKenzie Wark’s Philosophy for Spiders: on the Low Theory of Kathy Acker)

    Tessel Veneboer — Penetration as Philosophy (Review of McKenzie Wark’s Philosophy for Spiders: on the Low Theory of Kathy Acker)

    a review of McKenzie Wark’s Philosophy for Spiders: on the Low Theory of Kathy Acker (Duke University Press, 2021) 

    by Tessel Veneboer

    In Philosophy for Spiders McKenzie Wark reads the novels of the punk avant-garde writer Kathy Acker as philosophical texts, or as the title proposes: as “low theory.” Low theory rejects the privileged terms of “high theory” and likes to remind the reader that the philosopher has a body. This theory “from below” often talks about sex and makes theoretical thinking a bodily task. Wark also finds this kind of thinking in Kathy Acker’s literary experimentation. Acker’s “null philosophy” comes from below – from the body and self of the author – while undoing that same self.

    As scholar and writer, Wark has made significant contributions to the fields of media theory and cultural studies with Hacker Manifesto (2004), Molecular Red (2015) and Capital is Dead: is this something worse? (2019). More recently, she turned to gender theory and memoir writing with Reverse Cowgirl (2019) and now she has published this personal-critical reading of Acker’s experimental prose. Philosophy for Spiders comes with a content warning for “sex, violence, sexual violence and spiders” as well as a form warning: “this book has elements of memoir and criticism but is neither” (4). As the subtitle of the book suggests, Wark proposes to read Acker’s work as philosophy, more specifically as low theory, a term first used to describe the work of cultural theorist Stuart Hall and popularized by Jack Halberstam in The Queer Art of Failure (2011). Wark follows Acker in her view that perhaps she was not writing novels: “they’re big chunks of prose, but are they novels? More groups of stories. Some of them aren’t even that” (54). Rejecting a clear-cut division between the novel and a philosophical text allows Wark to read Acker’s prose as “philosophical treatises” (54). The reader might wonder what the low in low theory reacts to: is it the dominance of the “master discourse” of high theory, or does the complicated content of high theory make the genre inaccessible? Developing low theory as an aspirational genre, Wark longs for a kind of philosophy that emerges outside of a (patriarchal; and even matriarchal) tradition:

    It is a philosophy without fathers (or even mothers), and so no more of their Proper Names will be mentioned. This philosophy for spiders is not a philosophy in which gentlemen discourse on the nature of the beautiful, the good, and the true. It is philosophy for those who were nameless as they had to spend their time working for the money. A philosophy not by those who could arise from their place to announce it, because their place was to be on their knees, their mouths full of cock. A theory in which otherwise quite tractable bad girls and punk boys go off campus and conduct base experiments in making sense and nonsense out of situations. “Recruited due to our good intentions, V and I’ve instead learned a brutal philosophy: ignorance of all rational facts and concepts; raging for personal physical pleasure; may the whole Western intellectual world go to hell.” (81)

    Where Wark aims for a philosophy without “Proper Names” Acker turns to the literary and philosophical canon to think with and write through. Acker’s work refers to (but never cites) a wide range of canonical thinkers such as Jacques Lacan, Georges Bataille, Marquis de Sade, Paul Verlaine and Arthur Rimbaud who inspire her to question the primacy of rationality and the Cartesian subject. In one of her first novellas Kathy Acker writes: “I’m trying to get away from self-expression but not from personal life. I hate creativity” (Acker 1998, 86) and in her short story New York City in 1979 the character Janey “believes it is necessary to blast open her mind constantly and destroy every particle of memory that she likes” (Acker 1981, 6-7)  Acker’s work rejects the idea that an author should have an original voice, which for her is a bourgeois conception of literature that only serves to support the capitalist “cult” of individuality. For Acker there is no creativity involved in creation. As Wark asserts, “the bourgeois writer is an acquisitive animal. A creature of power, ownership, and control. What it writes, it owns; that which writes is the kind of being that can own. Kathy was a different beast – or beasts” (5). Acker’s interest in anti-creativity stimulates her appropriation of “found” material such as canonical texts, overheard conversations and dreams – for Acker they are all as “real” as any other event. Throughout her work Acker compulsively recounts and repeats events from her life; her mother’s death, painful romantic encounters, unrequited crushes, dreams, gossip, and jobs she did. At the same time, Acker consistently lies about all of those aspects of her life – to the extent that even her date of birth is contested.[1] Treating events of her own life in a similar manner to the texts she plagiarizes, everything is part of Acker’s “anti-creative” project. Her work is sometimes seen as aggressively opposing meaning-making – thanks to her oft-cited mantra of “Get rid of meaning. Now eat your mind.” But Acker’s ambitious rewriting of the literary canon is not simply a postmodern displacement of meaning. Her literary experiments are concerned with procedure, method, and memory.

    One of the ways Acker explored her interest in (and suspicion of) memory was writing “fake autobiography”: a rewriting of her life interwoven with found materials, like conversations she overheard and texts she copied. In her early text “Politics” (1972) for example, she collages conversations between her stripper-colleagues together with scripts she wrote for a live sex show on 42nd Street with (clearly fictional) incestuous lesbian fantasies. In her biography of Acker Chris Kraus suggests that Kathy Acker’s numerous lies must be seen as a fundamental part of both her life and work. She even goes as far as to propose that her consistent lying was a condition for writing:

    Because in a certain sense, Acker lied all the time. She was rich, she was poor, she was the mother of twins, she’d been a stripper for years, a guest editor of Film Comment magazine at the age of fourteen, a graduate student of Herbert Marcuse’s. She lied when it was clearly beneficial to her, and she lied even when it was not. […] But then again, didn’t she do what all writers must do? Create a position from which to write? (Kraus 2017, 14)

    In Wark’s recounting of their shared past (Wark and Acker met in Australia in 1995 and embarked on a short affair) she is fully aware of Acker’s self-mythologizing tendencies. Wark fictionalizes their meeting and points to the gaps in her own memory as well as Acker’s habit to treat her life and her literature the same:

    Not everything Kathy ever said to me was—strictly speaking—true. Particularly when we got to New York. It was as if we were inside a Kathy Acker book, written on flesh and city. […] I knew nothing about New York at the time. Anything Kathy told me could be true to me, was true to me. She showed me the New York of myth. We wandered from Central Park toward the East River, to Sutton Place. Sutton Place, she told me, was her childhood home. In the psychogeography of New York, it is certainly a place from which a Kathy Acker should hail. It is in countless movies, from How to Marry a Millionaire to Black Caesar. Lou Reed has a song that mentions not walking there. It’s in Catcher in the Rye; it’s in Great Expectations and My Life My Death by Pier Paolo Pasolini—by Kathy Acker—and some of her other books. (33)

    Considering all the ways in which Acker put herself on the line in her work, her body as a performer, autobiographical material, her creation of the persona, makes it possible for Wark to read Acker’s life and work as a spider web of narratives, identities, and concepts. In the early 1970s Acker started publishing her first appropriative texts under the pseudonym “The Black Tarantula” and copying from the Marquis de Sade and a book of portraits of female serial killers. In her work Acker often puts everything she copies in the first person but she did not only steal from other texts, she also stole from her own life. Wark’s construction of a spider web of Ackers takes its cue from Martino Scioliona’s suggestion that Acker’s auto-plagiarism becomes a narrative web in which “Acker always recounted her own life story as if it, too, was a stolen text” (in Wark 2021, 5).

    Weaving a web of Acker’s selves, Wark unwraps herself too, at least the selves that Acker made possible in their affair and in her texts. Wark met Acker in 1995 at a reading in Sydney. At the dinner after the reading the two writers connected and started a short affair. An email correspondence followed their meeting and was published in 2015 as I’m Very Into You: an intimate document of the flirty and intellectual emails they exchanged over a period of a few weeks. Both I’m Very Into You and the memoir part of Philosophy for Spiders reveal how Wark felt seen in her femininity in this meeting with Acker in the 1990s and how this might have informed her recent gender transition. In 1995 Wark wrote in an email to Acker: “There are reaches of me that I can only put in language as feminine, and those reaches exposed themselves to you, felt comfortable next to you sometimes. That doesn’t happen very often” and now in her Philosophy for Spiders Wark says she wanted to escape masculinity and that “reading Kathy again helped to transition” (7). Wark remembers: “who I was starting to be with Kathy. I was starting to be her girlfriend. That concept” (22). In search of more concepts, Wark (re)reads Acker’s complete body of work almost thirty years after their initial meeting in Australia. From Acker’s texts Wark assembles phrases and claims around different concepts like “love,” “capitalism” and “penetration.” In so doing Philosophy for Spiders sketches a web of Acker’s selves along with concepts Wark finds in Acker’s work, providing a glimpse into what might turn out to be a philosophical system.

    Wark rightly points out that Acker’s texts are “studded with philosophical questions” (56) and that these questions predominantly center around desire, subjectivity, form, and the failure of language. Her novel Great Expectations (1982) is exemplary for how Acker’s philosophical mode, if we can detect one, rejects the linearity of logical thinking:

    Stylistically: simultaneous contrasts, extravagancies, incoherences, half-formed misshapen thoughts, lousy spelling, what signifies what? What is the secret of this chaos? (Since there is no possibility, there’s play. Elegance and completely filthy sex fit together. Expectations that aren’t satiated.) Questioning is our mode.” (Acker 1982, 107)

    Acker’s philosophical mode questions hierarchies of knowledge by asking the “big” questions of philosophy as if they were dumb questions. Moreover, this questioning mode is inherently tied to the body, and thus to sex and gender. In her essay “Seeing Gender” (1997 [1995]) Acker reflects on her writing practice and directly responds to the work of “high theorists” like Judith Butler and Luce Irigaray. In the essay she looks back on her writing practice, the (gender) politics of plagiarism, and her ambition to find what she called “the languages of the body.” In a typical Ackerian manner, she takes the figure of the young girl ­­– in this essay she uses Alice from Alice in Wonderland –who has yet to discover the limits of her being and knowledge. As a child, the girl wanted to become a pirate – the only way to see the world – but since “I wasn’t a stupid child, I knew that I couldn’t.” Still, she knows what “the pirates know”, namely that in writing and being “I do not see, for there is no I to see” (Acker 1997, 159). Instead, “to see was to be an eye, not an I.” The essay progresses as a theoretical inquiry into gender and the body through Luce Irigaray’s This Sex Which Is Not One (1979) and Butler’s reading of that text in Bodies that Matter (1996). Acker’s ambitious quest for self-knowledge and knowledge of the world come together in her observation of the self: this conflation of the eye and the I, consistently destabilizing the second through the first. In Acker’s logic then, a feeling is a concept. This doesn’t mean that experiencing an emotion will directly lead to knowledge, but that to see is a way of knowing. Since Acker’s girls don’t have a language of their own, they can’t know themselves except through feelings. In Don Quixote (1986) Acker writes that “real teaching happens via feelings” (159) and “my feelings’re my brains” (17). Barred entrance to the world of knowledge, the “stupid” girl as philosopher can make sense of her own subjectivity through sensuality, not rationality. Quoting a letter from the Romantic poet John Keats from 1817, Acker reflects in Great Expectations:

    Only sensations. What the imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth – whether it exists materially or not – for I have the same Idea of all our Passions as of Love they are all, in their sublime, creative of essential Beauty… The imagination may be compared to Adam’s dream – he awoke and found it truth. I am the more zealous in this affair, because I have never yet been able to perceive how anything can be known for truth by consecutive reasoning – and yet it must be. Can it be that even the greatest philosopher ever arrived at his goal without putting aside numerous objections? However it may be Oh, for a Life of Sensations rather than of Thoughts! (Acker 1982, 64)

    Acker rewrites Keats but keeps his opposing two notions of truth here: the reasoned truth of the philosopher and the truth of the artist which, for Keats, can only emerge through sensations and passions, through the imagination. As Wark’s Acker web suggests, Acker is not interested in a mastering feelings with language, rather the opposite: “I feel I feel I feel I have no language, any emotion for me is a prison” (Acker 1982, 24).

    Wark follows Acker in that she lets the intensity of their mutual crush precede the thinking. In the first chapters Wark serves the reader queer sex scenes before she turns to Acker’s philosophy. Both the story of their affair and Wark’s readings of Acker are tied to questions of gender and a dysphoric experience of the body. In “The City of Memory” Wark recalls:

    In our room at the Gramercy, sometimes I was Kathy’s girl. I wanted to watch her strap himself into her cocks. The leather harness was all black straps and shiny buckles. Its odor an appealing blend of leather, lube, and sweat. Kathy did not want my help with it, but she took her time. Choosing cocks. Inserting a cock in the harness, another in his cunt. Strapping on the harness without either falling back out again. Even after a few drinks Kathy was deft at this. I Just lay back and admired her technique, his presence. (35)

    Using this descriptive mode for a “phenomenology of the body” (81) allows Wark to narrate Acker’s genderqueerness too, underscored by the use of alternating he/she pronouns. Wark shows how remembering their encounter will always also be a rewriting of the meeting. Throughout the book Wark’s receptiveness and passivity are important–in bed but also in their shared thinking: “She had philosophical questions. I could only describe things” (22). In Philosophy for Spiders Wark connects Acker’s multiplication of the authorial self to gender and what she calls a “penetration theory” (92). Acker’s appropriative and autoplagiaristic writing becomes a practice of “selving: reproducing self-ness” (54). Wark shows how thinking about gender in terms of penetration destabilizes a coherent sense of the self as gendered. This is also a textual concern because reading and writing turn out to be processes of penetration too. In Reverse Cowgirl, Wark finds that “the great asymmetry of human being” is the division between the penetrators and the penetrated and this asymmetry allows for trans identifications:

    If I could not know who I was from the world touching me from the outside, prodding ‘til I felt a self; then I would become one by being touched from the inside. Edward’s cock would press my insides against their boundaries, pushing what would become, when pressed, against skin from the inside, a being I could call, a being I could call I. This coming into being, this inside out subjectivity, would change things between us. (Wark 2020, 53)

    Both the penetrator and the penetrated are “involuntary agents” but allow for different experiences of gender. In Reverse Cowgirl penetrative sex makes it possible for Wark to feel a “temporary non-masculinity” (Wark 2020, 176). In this space of “non-existence” the body comes first, negotiating power dynamics and identity through a relationality of being penetrated, penetrating and penetrable. Acker too was interested in penetration, particularly the penetrable body as a site of knowledge. In her experimentation Acker soughtliterary forms for “the languages of the body” (Acker 1997, 143) by way of masturbatory writing, bodybuilding and writing pornography. Foregrounding the body creates an articulation of gender as an asymmetry of sex rather than a binary position. This allows Wark to read the bodies in Acker’s work as “potentially trans:”

    Just as the eye and I, or sensation and desire, differ, so too the fucker and the fucked. This asymmetry of sex might be just one of the zones in which to think about gender, although in the Acker-text the asymmetries of sex acts can arise in all sorts of ways out of all sorts of bodies. There’s no essential diagram of gendered bodies. In that sense all Acker bodies are potentially trans. (90)

    Bodies are trans here to the extent that they are assumed as not-cis. Still, assuming that desire always destabilizes sexual difference doesn’t necessarily illuminate our understanding of what gender is, because as Wark writes in Reverse Cowgirl “there is never any symmetry to what wants” (26). To desire is to not know or understand that desire. Both in Reverse Cowgirl and in Philosophy for Spiders, Wark is interested in the way penetration potentiates a different experience of the body and self-consciousness: “being-penetrated creates a node around which every other difference— sensations, selves, genders—can disperse” (Wark 2021, 91).

    In Acker’s logic, penetration centers the self and makes thinking possible. In Wark’s words, to be penetrable and penetrated is “to have an axis for sensation in the world” as opposed to those who do the penetrating. They “act as subjects in the world but they don’t react, they don’t let the world in much” which leads Wark to claim that to penetrate is “just not that interesting” (92).  The question left unanswered here is: uninteresting for whom? And how are we expected to view Acker’s role of the penetrator in the sex scenes Wark describes? An obvious answer would be that switching positions allows access to both experiences but in this book being penetrated appears to be the privileged position because the penetrable body has access to a specific form of knowledge as it “comes to know itself, not its penetrator” (153).

    For Acker, the question of penetration is a problem of language. In her early text Breaking through memories into desire (2019 [1973]) Acker asks: “Language. How do I, fucked, use the language? I don’t want to be doing this writing” (381) and in My Mother: Demonology (1993) Acker writes that “the more I try to describe myself, the more I find a hole” (in Wark, 154). A temporary centralized subject emerges in the destabilizing encounter of sexual penetration. This is where Wark finds a first philosophical concept in Acker’s work: a phenomenology of the body or what she calls Acker’s “phenomenology without the subject” (54).

    Wark’s reading of Acker’s “languages of the body” as low theory raises the crucial question of how sex relates to knowledge.  To theorize through sex is to choose confusion over rationality, non-knowledge over knowledge and to problematize the subject’s relation to knowledge. Sexuality clearly interests Acker, not necessarily because it precedes patriarchal discourse or cannot translate the experience of sexuality to language, but because sex does not affirm a self or one’s personal pleasures. For Acker, sex is a crucial site of negativity: her texts reveal the failure of language to express identity and introduces sex as a question of the (incoherence) of subjecthood. Sex is the moment in which the self is destabilized, displaced once more, and thus where knowledge breaks down.[2]

    Acker’s recurring character Janey fails to be a sovereign subject in the patriarchal structures imposed on her. Her obsession with sex ruins her education as a proper young woman because rationalized knowledge is inaccessible to a “stupid” young girl like Janey. Her failure to know how to use language, how to behave properly, how to be, illustrates the typical young girl’s experience of inhabiting available structures of knowing and their limits. Stupidity in Acker’s work is not necessarily non-knowledge or absence of knowledge, it is more an investigation of the unknowability of the subject herself and the limits of her language. Avital Ronell has pointed out how Acker’s texts explore the emancipatory potential of stupidity.[3] Acker’s characters embrace stupidity in that they refuse knowledge in the form it is given to them. In her book Stupidity (2002) Ronell proposes to take stupidity seriously as a philosophical position because it does not “stand in the way of wisdom” (5) and asks how it can be turned into a productive category of thought and as a locus for the unmaking of language – one of Acker’s literary concerns too. Stupidity, Ronell writes, is a “political problem hailing from the father; it combines with conservative desires for stability, comfort, and authenticity, but it also opens up other spaces of knowing” (16). Wark makes a similar point:

    A philosophy of emotions, like a philosophy of language or sensations, has to start from doubt, uncertainly, confusion – with nonknowledge. “My emotional limbs stuck out as if they were broken and unfixable.” (GE 58) And: “I don’t think I’m crazy. There’s just no reality in my head and my emotions fly all over the place.” (63)

    The problem of the speaking subject in Acker’s work becomes a project of asking the “stupid” questions. This way, Acker’s project is concerned with a philosophical position from which to think “stupidly.” Reading Acker’s texts as philosophy should therefore not be a question of what ideological tendencies or feminist politics are being thought or taught, but a much narrower question: how to establish a thinking self without relying on the Cartesian model of the subject. Acker asks: “But what if I isn’t the subject, but the object?” (in Wark, 142).

    As her literary experiments started to take shape in the early 1970s, Acker sought words and ideas to understand what she was doing. Considering her radical decentralizing approach to identity, Acker found a home in the thinkers of poststructuralism. But any attempt to uncover intentionality in her work is tricky because she successfully mystified her own methods and theoretical influences in interviews. In an interview with her publisher Sylvère Lotringer, Acker claims she started to understand her experimental writings strategies when she got to know poststructuralist thought through Lotringer’s publishing house Semiotext(e). Interestingly, Acker places herself on the same level as the French philosophers she admired and was even surprised they didn’t know her work:

    I was like a death-dumb-and-blind person for years, I just did what I did but had no way of telling anyone about it, or talking about it. And then when I read ANTI-OEDIPUS and Foucault’s work, suddenly I had this whole language at my disposal. I could say, Hi! And that other people were doing the same thing. I remember thinking, why don’t they know me? I know exactly what they’re talking about. And I could go farther. (Acker 1991, 10)

    Whether Acker really was not aware of “French theory” before meeting Lotringer is disputed by Chris Kraus, but the typically poststructuralist concern with identity and desire through the fragmentation or decentralization of the “I” is present from her earliest published work in the 1970s. In 1975 Acker did take her place among the philosophers: at the “Schizo-culture” conference Lotringer organized with French thinkers like Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Jean-François Lyotard as well as American artists and writers like Richard Foreman, Philip Glass, and Acker’s literary idol William Burroughs. Lotringer’s introduction of the “then unknown radical philosophies of post-’68 France” (as MIT Press retroactively describes the event) to the American avant-garde marked a shift in how Acker relates to theory in her work. Acker’s poststructuralist tendencies were a perfect fit for the academic zeitgeist and appear to have contributed to the “meteoric rise of her academic reputation” (Punday 2003). Her texts proved popular among academics who aimed to lay bare the ways in which Acker engaged with theory: in her rewriting of film scripts, one might find a reflection of Baudrillard’s ideas; her wild science fiction novel Empire of the Senseless must be the result of reading Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. But as the Acker scholar Tyler Bradway recently pointed out, these theoretical readings of Acker “obscure her ultimate frustration with the way that these discourses, particularly deconstruction, made her writing too narrowly readable, rendering it ironically subordinate to and exemplary of an external master discourse” (Bradway 2017, 106). Still, Acker’s typically fragmented and “unreadable” texts continue to resist such theoretical interpretations – hence Wark’s interest in reading her as low theory.

    To render the text unreadable, to think non-intelligibly, writing stupidly, obviously implies a questioning of the distinction between false and true knowledge. Embracing stupidity as a philosophical mode blurs the line between true and false statements, but also informs Acker’s ambition to develop a non-authoritarian use of language. In 1984 Acker writes in Art Forum:

    I write. I want to write I want my writing to be meaningless I want my writing to be stupid. But the language I use isn’t what I want and make, it’s what’s given to me. Language is always a community. Language is what I know and is my cry.” (Acker 1984)

    Writing the immediacy of thought through a nontransparent use of language – language as a “cry” rather than expressive of an idea – leads to a “false clarity” (Harper 1987) and in Acker’s case results in a logic that sounds consciously contradictory and finds a ground in excessive affect. Acker’s writing of sex and romantic crushes seems personal and very intimate but the feelings she describes are not “hers” in the way that they belong to Kathy Acker, they are taken from or inspired by the texts she reads while writing. Wark proposes that in Acker’s work, “emotions, feelings, affect, might be keys to a certain kind of understanding that is subjective but not necessarily individuated” and that “feelings can become concepts” (63). The question of desire and self-reflection in narrative is crucial for Acker. In Great Expectations (1982) Acker writes that “narrative is an emotional moving” and in Eurydice in the Underworld (1997) that “as if reality was emotional, I perceived solely by feeling” (in Wark, 63). Acker works consistently against the idea that feeling opposes knowing. We can “know” our feelings but the feelings are not pieces of knowledge themselves, at least not in the kind of “high theory for whom Plato is daddy” (Wark, 54).

    To understand how Acker’s texts both work with and reject philosophy as high theory, it is worth considering her contribution to the Lotringer’s Schizo-culture conference, which was neither theoretical nor particularly literary. At the conference Acker presented translation exercises: Janey’s “Persian Poems” which would later become part of Janey’s education from age ten to fourteen in Blood and Guts in High School (1984). The translation exercise is short but unambiguous about Janey’s position as object: “to have Janey / to buy Janey / to want Janey / to see Janey / to come Janey / to beat up Janey” (1984, 84). In these evidently false translations Acker reaffirms her concern with how language constrains rather than liberates. The only possible agency for Acker’s recurring protagonist Janey is to surrender to the position of object. In these translation exercises and throughout Acker’s work, Janey is doomed to be the predicate of the sentence, the object to the subject. The first numbered lines are succeeded by a translated line that overflows, exceeding the initial format as it turns into a passionate address:

    5. The streets are black. You haven’t fucked for a long time. You forget how incredibly sensitive you are. You hurt. Hurt hurt hurt hurt hurt. You meet the nicest guy in the world and you fall in love with him you do and you manage to get into his house and you stand before him. A girl who puts herself out on a line. A girl who asks for trouble and forgets that she has feelings and doesn’t even remember what fucking’s about or how she’s supposed to go about it because she wasn’t fucked in so long and now she’s naïve and stupid. So like a dope she sticks herself in front of the guy: here I am; understood: do you want me? No, thank you. She did it. There she is. What does she do now? Where does she go? She was a stupid girl: she went and offered herself, awkwardly, to someone who didn’t want her. That’s not stupid. The biggest pain in the world is feeling but sharper is the pain of the self.

    6. Is there any fresh meat? (Acker 1984, 88-92)

    The turn from the interpellating “you” to the descriptive “a girl” signals a shift from an intimate address to a distant observation of the girl’s being as defined by rejection. The “there she is” is characteristic of the way the figure of the girl features as an ontological negation throughout Acker’s work; she momentarily comes into being through an encounter with lack, in this case simple and clear rejection, and thus when she starts questioning her own desires. These painful desires reveal how feelings are a problem for Acker’s subject: “the biggest pain in the world is feeling but sharper is the pain of the self.” In Wark’s reading the only agency Acker’s girls have is their “amorality and ability to exploit their own desirability” (151):

    Girls are, among other things, objects that power perceives as a thing to desire. As if they had no subjectivity. Rather than claiming to be subjects, girls in the Acker-web escape into unknowability, as far as power’s gaze is concerned. Their bodies may be penetrable, and that is the function assigned them as objects, but otherwise they can choose not to be known at all. The girl too is not an identity but an event, something produced by chance and fluid time. Lulu: “you can’t change me cause there’s nothing to change. I’ve never been.” (151)

    Acker’s radical determinism about the symbolic absence of woman in language and literature generated a wide range of feminist interpretations of her work, particularly as being exemplary of écriture féminine by studying Acker’s experimental literary form as a critique of the male canon (which it undoubtedly is) and her sex writing as expressive of a female voice. Even if Acker’s texts themselves appear to reject academic interpretations, Acker herself was a fanatic reader of philosophy, including “French feminists” like Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva and Helène Cixous. As she writes in “Seeing Gender”, philosophy pointed her towards knowledge she had experienced intuitively herself, namely that “woman” does not exist: “She has no essence, for all that comes into being, according to Plato, partakes of form. I knew this as a child, before I had ever read Plato, Irigaray, Butler. That, as a girl, I was outside the world. I wasn’t. I had no name. For me, language was being.” (Acker 1997, 161) Acker’s concern with the linguistic “I” as a being that always lacks, and thus must copy if she is to speak, also reveals the role that sex plays to understand the failure of language.

    Wark is not the first to suspect that Acker’s interest in the immediacy of language and sex can function as a form of theorizing. Martina Sciolino pointed out in 1990 that we might read Acker’s fiction as performative philosophy: “A writer of innovative narratives that converse with theorists as diverse in their constructions of desire as Georges Bataille and Andrea Dworkin, Acker creates fictions that are theories-in-performance” (Sciolino 1990, 438). Acker’s “theories-in-performance” reveal different ways in which lines can be drawn between the author and her theoretical material. To see how this kind of “performative philosophy” can function outside of an already established philosophical discourse, it might be helpful to turn to Chris Kraus again who reads the diaries of the French philosopher Simone Weil as philosophical investigations. For Kraus, the only condition for a text to be philosophical, to read these “personal” texts beyond memoir, is that the text must be concerned with rhetoric: “In Weil’s philosophy, just like in narrative or phone sex, it’s not the story that we’re really hearing, it is the fact and act of telling it” (Kraus 2004, 77).

    Considering the significant reception of Acker’s texts in the world of “high theory” and Wark’s reaction to these readings through the concept of low theory, the question of the intentionality of Acker’s project lingers. It is complicated because, for Acker, the subject always emerges as a being of language for whom no “genuine” agency is possible; in Acker’s world agency is limited to being a receptacle. To do is always a being done to. In this sense, it might not be particularly helpful to look at the influence of theory on Acker’s work because it assumes a text outside of, or a “before” reading theory, while Acker’s writing practice itself is a reading practice as much as it is a writing practice.

    Leslie Dick has observed how Acker’s writing functioned as an extension of her reading, that “her plagiarism was a way of reading, or re-reading, appropriating and customizing what she read, writing herself, so to speak, into the fabric of the original text” (Scholder et al. 2006, 1). Her writing consists of readings of texts that provoke her reaction, evoke a fantasy or stimulate her to rewrite the texts she is consuming. In this sense, her writing has always been a form of critical writing. In Learning for the Revolution (2011), Spencer Dew reads Acker’s work as instructive, labelling it a “pedagogical project,” and Martina Sciolino describes Acker’s work as “materially didactic” (437). Harper (1987) specifies Acker’s critical project further as “less a conscious political philosophy than a pursuit of the immediate the unregulated present” but argues that Acker “consciously participates in the poststructuralist project of the liberation of the signifier from fixed meaning” (47).  In Philosophy for Spiders, Wark smartly avoids the question of intentionality by emphasizing the inseparability of reading and writing and how that relation creates subjectivity in the text. Wark frames this as a relation of passivity and, again, penetration:

    The Acker-field is a sequence of books about—no, not about. They are not about anything. They don’t mean, they do. What do they do? Get rid of the self. Among other things. For writer but also reader. If you let them in. You have to want it to fuck you. It happens when there’s a hole. Rather than say one reads, one could say that one is booked. A body can be booked a bit like the way it can be fucked. A body uses its agency to give access to itself to another. A body lets go of its boundedness, its self, its selfishness, and through opening to sensation disappears into the turbulent real. (156)

    For Wark the reader as well as the writer is a hole, ready to be penetrated by other texts. Not that the author has no agency at all but in writing she is also being written. This is how Acker’s philosophy can be understood in terms of stupidity and unknowledge; it rejects the idea that anything we think we know or want is “ours.” Acker’s naïve lyrical I is also a displacement of the position of the philosopher.

    This penetrative relation between self and text is also what Wark scrutinizes with Acker’s words in Philosophy for Spiders. Wark’s reading of Acker is clearly this kind of “penetrated writing:” Wark herself does not emerge as a particularly original thinker here but instead lets Acker do the thinking. For Acker the impossibility to speak as an authentic self is at the center of her work and Wark’s proposition to let Acker talk to herself creates an interesting encounter of voices but is oftentimes awkward, especially when the reading lacks interpretative strength. Wark offers us Ackers on a plate but does not interpret this group of texts. The voices in Wark’s web of Ackers sometimes sound detached, as isolated sound bites. Wark appears to share the view of the artist Vanessa Place, who she cites early in the book: “citation is always castration: the author’s lack of authority made manifest by the phallus, presence of another authority” (7) but Wark does not really do the work of using the citations to create a different text. This makes it at times difficult to feel where Philosophy for Spiders is going with this mapping of concepts and raises the question what is exactly at stake in this low-theoretical reading of Acker. Is it to make way for other, more detailed, theoretical readings of Acker’s work, or for Wark to create a personal encounter with Acker’s texts? Both are of course possible and fair reasons to write the book, but the wide range of concepts and citations at times are puzzling when they are not brought together in a reading.

    The sex scenes in the book offer a way to read the book: Wark’s reading of Acker lets itself be penetrated by Acker. The meeting of texts as the meeting of bodies:

    Maybe gender is transitive in another sense. Between any two bodies is a difference. Maybe that difference is gender even when it is not, actually, gender. It’s what top and bottom imply, a difference. Maybe the genders could be transitive verbs, and can be applied in any situation where part of a person acts on another through that gender as an action: Kathy manned me. (29)

    This difference that is not sexual difference leads Wark to formulate an “asymmetrical” theory of penetration which can be mapped onto gendered bodies: “the body penetrating is often (but not always) male and the body penetrated is often (but not always) female” (93). Wark’s interest in penetration and penetrability sounds almost instructive when she tells us that “everyone ought to know how to top: ethics” (22). The lesson for the reader here seems to be that these dynamics in sex reveal “gender as an action” which in turn affirms the action of passive and active in terms of feminine and masculine – at least Wark herself when Acker “manned” her. Wark’s reading of Acker’s texts as making space for transness relies on this evocation of the “dysphoric body” and its needs and desires, “a category that maybe overlaps a lot with the trans body but is not ever identical to it” (178). Wark develops three “philosophies” of Acker in the book. The first is a “null philosophy” centered around the question of the self. Wark finds this philosophy in Acker’s questions around emotions, memory, and exteriority. The second philosophy is the encounter with the other, with sections ranging from “library” and “rape” to “fathers” and “death.” The third philosophy that Wark discerns is concerned with capitalism and Acker’s questions around sex work, the commercialization of art, and Acker’s fame.

    Acker’s legacy has had many faces. First as punk and transgressive in the NYC art and performance world, then the critical reception with poststructuralism in the 1980s and 1990s and today we are seeing another one of Acker’s afterlives in contemporary (auto)fiction, for which she functions as some sort of precursor, like in the works of Olivia Laing and Kate Zambreno.[4] Perhaps together with the publication of the emails I’m Very Into You these books stimulate the cultivation of Acker’s persona. In her blurb for Philosophy for Spiders, Sarah Schulman asserts that Wark’s “highly personal sex memoir evolves the growing ‘My Kathy’ genre in trans directions.”  One recent publication in this supposed ‘My Kathy’ genre is Olivia Laing’s novel Crudo (2018), whose fictional narrator is called “Kathy” and bears some characteristics of what we know of Acker’s life but at the same time functions as a placeholder for Laing to talk about developments in her own personal life: her approaching marriage to an older well-known poet during a summer holiday in an Italian villa. This kind of autobiographical writing would undoubtedly be the classic bourgeois novel form for Acker, despite the appropriation of the voice of “Kathy.”[5] In The Gentrification of the Mind: Witness to a Lost Imagination (2012) Schulman positions Acker as a central figure in an art scene that was “radically queer” and describes how Acker’s fiction “faded from view” due to gentrification: “[H]er context is gone. Not that she was a gay male icon, but rather that she was a founder and product of an oppositional class of artists, those who spoke back to the system rather than replicating its vanities” (Schulman 2012, 53). Even though Schulman is referring to a post-1980s gentrification, we might ask if the growing ‘My Kathy’ genre indicates a new kind of Acker reception. Now that Acker is no longer “fading from view” because of gentrification, might her renewed popularity point towards a new kind of gentrification? To see how Acker’s persona is being used today raises the question if she, as the typical transgressive and outcast writer, functions as some sort of token for radical literature in personal memoir and autofiction writing. And where can we situate Philosophy for Spiders in the web of Kathy Acker’s afterlives?

    In the afterword Wark claims that she wants to “push her back in the direction of a minor literature – trans lit: the writing of and by and for trans people” (170). Not to retroactively label Acker’s person as trans, but to think of her texts as a writing “among those for whom being cis gendered is not their state, their homeland, their family, their fantasy” (170). Wark wants to make space for Acker in a genre she calls “trans girl lit.” Wark’s own autofictional undertaking in Reverse Cowgirl might give us a clue as to how an author can be the “involuntary agent” of her own writing when Wark, high on shrooms, reflects on the narrative web she has created à la Acker: “Reverse Cowgirl made sense to me, finally, as a sort of autofiction account of someone who was trans all along and did not know it yet. In this case, even the writer didn’t know the shape of the web she made” (175). Like in Acker’s appropriative writing, other people’s texts have authorial agency and Wark’s own life is reframed as a web of unconscious narrative turns. Penetrating or penetrated, neither the life story nor the texts are in the author’s hands.

    Now that the reputation and position of Acker’s work is moving towards canonization and perhaps even gentrification, can we view Wark’s book indeed as a pushback against the canonization of Acker? Wark’s reading of Acker as “minor literature” provokes a shift in the reception of her work in two ways: to consider Acker as a theorist, which I’m sure will bring about various new Acker readings, as well as to pose the question of the “non-cisness” of Acker’s work.

    As such, Wark’s move does secure Acker’s radical work from being completely assimilated into a literary world where bourgeois story lines, plot development and stable subject-positions still reign – even if Wark does this work in the very contemporary self-reflective autofictional mode. On a more theoretical level, Wark’s reading of Acker is slightly opaque in a style we might call “after Kathy Acker,” namely dealing with (philosophical) knowledge as a question of subjectivation and sex. The knowledge in the text does not belong to the author-philosopher or the reader when the theorist refuses to engage with her material in a straightforward top-bottom relationship. Perhaps “theory” as a label is even outdated. Wark writes, with Acker:

    There’s no consistent and self-same subject that can be the author of theory from on high, and who could survey history, discover its hidden concept, and announce its destiny. “Since all acts, including expressive acts, are interdependent, paradise cannot be an absolute. Theory doesn’t work.” (138)

    As “switchy philosophers” Wark and Acker want to be topped and penetrated by the texts they encounter but in so doing they do not get rid of mastery completely. It cannot be denied that in the top/bottom difference Wark explores, the bottom has power too and can even be a form of mastery in itself,[6] especially in this case, when producing a new text. This is perhaps how the genre of low theory can function as a form of mastery as well. Even if we accept that low theory is accessible and not pretentious like classic high theory, it imposes a reading that is hard to object to. Whereas the critical reader can oppose high theory with arguments, low theory does not allow for a similar debate because it already preempts theoretical objections. Using the terms of penetration theory we might say that low theory works with the power of the bottom. A seduction that can hardly be countered – surely not with theoretical arguments. And this seems to be what Wark has learned from Acker and Philosophy for Spiders shows in a smart way: to think about and with the penetrable body as a site of power and (self)knowledge. In Kathy Acker’s texts the lyrical I as theorist emerges as an inarticulate subject who cries stupid phrases and expresses illogical desires: a girl. And even if “theory doesn’t work,” Acker’s girls and Wark’s web of Ackers remind us that as long as there is feeling, there will be thinking.

    _____

    Tessel Veneboer is a PhD candidate in English Literature at Ghent University. She specializes in queer theory and experimental literature. She is currently working on a dissertation on Kathy Acker (supported by the Research Foundation Flanders).

    Back to the essay

    _____

    Notes

    [1] Library of Congress gives her birth date as 1948 while most obituaries used 1944 as date of birth.

    [2] In her book What is Sex (2017), philosopher Alenka Zupančič takes psychoanalysis as a philosophical problem and proposes that sex is the missing link between epistemology and ontology: “sex is messy because it appears at the point of the breaking down of the signifying consistency, or logic (its point of impossibility), not because it is in itself illogical and messy: its messiness is the result of the attempt to invent a logic at the very point of the impasse of such logic. Its “irrationality” is the summit of its efforts to establish a sexual rationale” (What IS Sex, 43).

    [3] See “Kathy Goes to Hell: On the Irresolvable Stupidity of Acker’s Death” by Avital Ronell in Lust for Life: On the Writings of Kathy Acker (2006).

    [4] See Olivia Laing’s Crudo (2018) and Kate Zambreno’s Screen Tests (2019).

    [5] In an interview with Sylvère Lotringer Acker explains that she “always hated the bourgeois story-line because the real content of that novel is the property structure of reality. It’s about ownership. That isn’t my world-reality. My world isn’t about ownership. In my world people don’t even remember their names, they aren’t sure of their sexuality, they aren’t sure if they can define their genders.” (Acker 1991, 23).

    [6] In Homos (1995) Leo Bersani shows how S/M relations demonstrate the power of the bottom over the top and as such S/M practices have “helped to empower a position traditionally associated with female sexuality” (82). In light of Wark’s “penetration theory” this would mean that the position of the bottom is not necessarily female or powerless because for Bersani “the reversibility of roles in S/M does allow everyone to get his or her moment in the exalted position of Masculinity (and, if everyone can be a bottom, no one owns the top or dominant position), but this can be a relatively mild challenge to social hierarchies of power” (86).

    _____

    Works Cited

    • Acker, Kathy. Blood and Guts in High School. 1984. New York: Grove Press.
    • —. Bodies of Work: Essays. 1997. London: Serpent’s Tail.
    • —. Don Quixote. 1986. New York: Grove Press.
    • —. Great Expectations. 1982. New York: Grove Press.
    • —. Hannibal Lecter, My Father. 1991 New York: Semiotext(e).
    • —. “Models of our present.” Art Forum. February 1984.
    • —. My Mother: Demonology. 1993. New York: Grove Press.
    • —. Portrait of an Eye. 1982. New York: Grove Press.
    • Bersani, Leo. 1996. Homos. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    • Bradway, Tyler. 2017. Queer Experimental Literature: The Affective Politics of Bad Reading. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Gajoux, Justin. Ed. 2019. Acker 1971-1975. Paris: Editions Ismael.
    • Harper, Glenn A. 1987. “The Subversive Power of Sexual Difference in The Work of Kathy        Acker.” Substance 16, no. 3: 44-56.
    • Kraus, Chris. 2017. After Kathy Acker: A Biography. London: Allen Lane.
    • Punday, Daniel. 2003. Narrative After Deconstruction. Albany: State University of New York Press.
    • Ronell, Avital. 2002. Stupidity. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.
    • Scholder, Amy, Carla Harryman, Avital Ronell, eds. 2006. Lust for Life: On the Writings of Kathy Acker. London: Verso Books.
    • Schulman, Sarah. 2012. The Gentrification of the Mind. Berkely: California University Press.
    • Sciolino, Martina. 1990. “Kathy Acker and the Postmodern Subject of Feminism.” College English 52 (4), 437-445. http://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/7342.
    • Scott, Gail, Robert Glück, Camille Roy, eds. 2000. Biting the Error: Writers Explore Narrative. Toronto: Coach House Books.
    • Wark, Mckenzie. 2020. Reverse Cowgirl. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e)
    • Wark, Mckenzie. 2021. Philosophy for Spiders: on the Low Theory of Kathy Acker. Durham: Duke University Press.

     

  • Zachary Loeb — Where We’re Going, We’ll Still Probably Need Roads (Review of Paris Marx, Road to Nowhere: What Silicon Valley Gets Wrong about the Future of Transportation)

    Zachary Loeb — Where We’re Going, We’ll Still Probably Need Roads (Review of Paris Marx, Road to Nowhere: What Silicon Valley Gets Wrong about the Future of Transportation)

    a review of Paris Marx, Road to Nowhere: What Silicon Valley Gets Wrong about the Future of Transportation (Verso, 2022)

    by Zachary Loeb

    You can learn a lot about your society’s relationship to technology by looking at its streets. Are the roads filled with personal automobiles or trolley-cars, bike lanes or occupied parking spaces, are there navigable sidewalks or is this the sort of place where a car is a requirement, does a subway rumble beneath the street or is the only sound the honking of cars stuck in traffic, are the people standing on the corner waiting for the bus or for the car they just booked through an app, or is it some kind of strange combination of many of these things simultaneously? The roadways we traverse on a regular basis can come to seem quite banal in their familiarity, yet they capture a complex tale of past decisions, current priorities, as well as a range of competing visions of the future.

    Our streets not only provide us with a literal path by which to get where we are going, they also represent an essential space in which debates about where we are going as a society play out. All of which is to say, as we hurtle down the road towards the future, it is important to pay attention to the fight for control of the steering wheel, and it’s worth paying attention to the sort of vehicle in which we find ourselves.

    In Road to Nowhere: What Silicon Valley Gets Wrong about the Future of Transportation, Paris Marx analyzes the social forces that have been responsible for making our roads (and by extension our cities, towns, and suburbs) function the way they do, while providing particular emphasis on the groups and individuals trying to determine what the roads of the future will look like. It is a cutting assessment that examines the ways in which tech companies are seeking to take over the streets, and sidewalks, as well as the space above and below them: with gig-economy drivers, self-driving cars, new tunnels, delivery robots, and much else. To the extent that technological solutions are frequently touted as the only possible response to complex social/political/economic problems, Marx moves beyond the flashy headlines to consider what those technological solutions actually look like when the proverbial rubber hits the road. In Road to Nowhere the streets and sidewalks appear as sites of political contestation, and Marx delivers an urgent warning against surrendering those spaces to big tech. After all, as Marx documents, the lords of the information superhighway are leaving plenty of flaming debris along the literal highways.

    The primary focus of Road to Nowhere is on the particular vision of mobility being put forth by contemporary tech companies, but Marx takes care to explore the industries and interests that had been enforcing their view of mobility long before anyone had ever held a smartphone. As Marx explains, the street and the city were not always the possession of the personal automobile, indeed the automobile was at one time “the dominant technology that ‘disrupted’ our society” (10). The introduction of the automobile saw these vehicles careening down streets that were once shared by many other groups, and as automobiles left destruction in their wake, the push for safety was one that was won by ostensibly protecting pedestrians by handing the streets over to the automobile. Marx connects the rise of the personal automobile to “a much longer trend of elites remaking the city to serve their interests” (11), and emphasizes how policies favoring automobiles undermined other ways of moving about cities (including walking and streetcars). As the personal automobile grew in popularity, and mass production made it a product available not only to the wealthy, physical spaces were further transformed such that an automobile became less and less of a luxury and more and more of a need. From the interstate highway system to the growth of suburbs to under-investment in public transit to the development of a popular mythos connecting the car to freedom—Marx argues that the auto-oriented society is not the inevitable result flowing from the introduction of the automobile, but the result of policies and priorities that gradually remade streets and cities in the automobile’s image.

    Even as the automobile established its dominance in the mid-twentieth century, a new sort of technology began to appear that promised (and threatened) to further remake society: the computer. Pivoting for a moment away from the automobile, Marx considers the ideological foundations of many tech companies, with their blend of techno-utopian hopefulness and anti-government sentiment wherein “faith was also put in technology itself as the means to address social and economic challenges” (44). While the mythology of Silicon Valley often lauds the rebellious geek, hacking away in a garage, Marx highlights the ways in which Silicon Valley (and the computing industry more generally) owes its early success to a massive influx of government money. Cold War military funding was very good—indeed, essential—for the nascent computing sector. Despite the significance of government backing, Silicon Valley became a hotbed for an ideology that sneered at democratic institutions while elevating the computer (and its advocates) as the bringer(s) of societal change. Thus, the very existence of complex social/political/economic problems became evidence of the failures of democracy and proof of the need for high-tech solutions—this was not only an ahistorical and narrow worldview, but one wherein a group of mostly-wealthy, mostly-white, mostly-cis-male tech lovers saw themselves as the saviors society had been waiting for. And while this worldview was reified in various gadgets, apps, and platforms “as tech companies seek to extend their footprint into the physical world” this same ideology—alongside an agenda that places “growth, profits, and power ahead of the common good”—is what undergirds Silicon Valley’s mobility project (62).

    One of the challenges in wrestling with tech companies’ visions is to not be swept away by the shiny high-tech vision of the future they disseminate. And one area where this can be particularly difficult is when it comes to electric cars. After all, amongst the climate conscious, the electric car appears as an essential solution in the fight against climate change. Yet, beyond the fact that “electric vehicles are not a new invention” (64), the electric car appears as an almost perfect example of the ways in which tech companies attempt to advance a seemingly progressive vision of the future while further entrenching the status quo. Much of the green messaging around electric vehicles “narrowly focuses on tailpipe emissions, ignoring the harms that pervades the supply chain and the unsustainable nature of auto-oriented development” (71). Too often the electric car appears as a way for individuals of means to feel that they are doing their part to “personal responsibility” their way out of climate change, even as the continued focus on the personal automobile blocks the transition towards public transit that is needed. Furthermore, the shift towards electric vehicles does not end destructive extraction, it just shifts the extraction from fossil fuels to minerals like copper, nickel, cobalt, lithium, and coltan. The electric car risks being a way of preserving auto-centric society, and this “does not solve how the existing transportation system fuels the climate crisis and the destruction of local environments all around the world” (88).

    If personal ownership of a car is such a problem, perhaps the solution is to simply have an app on your phone that lets you summon a vehicle (complete with a driver) when you need one, right? Not so fast. Companies like Uber sold themselves to the public on a promise of making cars available when needed, especially for urban dwellers who did not necessarily have a car of their own. The pitch was one of increased mobility, where those in need of a ride could easily hire one, while cash-strapped car owners could have a new opportunity to earn a few extra bucks driving in the evenings. Far from solving congestion, empowering drivers, and increasing everyone’s mobility, “the Uber model adds vehicles to the road and creates more traffic, especially since the app incentivizes drivers to be active during peak times when traffic is already backed up” (99). Despite claims that their app based services would solve a host of issues, Uber (and its ilk) have added to urban congestion, failed to provide their drivers with a stable income, and have not truly increased the mobility options for underserved communities.

    If gig-drivers wind up being such an issue, why not try to construct a world where drivers are not necessary? And thus, perhaps few ideas related to the future of mobility have as firm a grasp on the popular imagination as the idea of the self-driving car. A fantasy that seems straight out of science fiction. Albeit, with good reason. After all, what a science fiction writer can dream up, and what a special effects team can mock up for a movie, face serious obstacles in the real world. The story of tech companies and autonomous vehicles is one of grandiose hype (that often generates numerous glowing headlines), followed by significantly diminished plans once the challenges of introducing self-driving cars are recognized. While much of the infrastructure we encounter is built with automobiles in mind, autonomous cars require a variety of other sorts of not-currently existing infrastructure. Just as “automobiles required a social reconstruction in addition to a physical reconstruction, so too will autonomous vehicles” (125), and this will entail transforming infrastructure and habits that have been built up over decades. Attempts to introduce autonomous vehicles have revealed the clash between the tech company vision of the world and the complexities of the actually existing world—which is a major reason why many tech companies are quietly backing away from the exuberance with which they once hyped autonomous cars.

    Well, if the already existing roads are such a challenge, why not think abstractly? Instead of looking at the road, look above the road and below the road! Thus, plans such as Boring’s proposed tunnels, and ideas about “flying cars,” seek to get around many of the challenges the tech industry is encountering in the streets by attempting to capitalize on seemingly unused space. At first glance, such ideas may seem like clear examples of the sort of “out of the box thinking” for which tech companies are famed, yet “the span of time between the initial bold claims of prominent tech figures and the general realization that they are fraudulent appears to be shrinking” (159). And once more, in contrast to the original framing that seeks to treat new tunnels and flying cars as emancipatory routes, what becomes clear is that these are just another area in which wealthy tech elites are fantasizing about ways of avoiding getting stuck in traffic with the hoi polloi.

    Much of the history of the automobile that Marx recounts, involves pedestrians being deprived of more and more space, and this is a story that continues as new battles for the sidewalk intensify. As with other tech company interventions in mobility, micromobility solutions that cover sidewalks in scooters and bikes that are rentable via app, present themselves with a veneer of green accessibility. Yet littering cities with cheap bikes and scooters that wear out quickly while clogging the sidewalks, turn out to be just another service “designed to benefit the company” without genuinely assessing the mobility needs of particular communities (166). Besides, all of those sidewalk scooters are also finding that they need to compete for space with swarms of delivery robots that make sidewalks more difficult to use.

    From the electric car to the app summoned chauffeur to the autonomous car to the flying car, tech companies have no shortage of high-tech ideas for the future of mobility. And yet, “the truth is that when we look at the world that is actually being created by the tech industry’s interventions, we find that the bold promises are in fact a cover for a society that is both more unequal and one where that inequality is even more fundamentally built into the infrastructure and services we interact with every single day” (185). While the built environment is filled with genuine mobility issues, the solutions put forward by tech companies ignore the complexity of how these issues came about in favor of techno-fixes designed to favor tech companies’ bottom lines while simultaneously feeding them new data streams to capitalize. The gleaming city envisioned by tech elites and their companies may be broadcast to all, but these cities are playgrounds for the wealthy tech elite, not for the rest of us.

    The hope that tech companies will come along and sort everything out with some sort of nifty high-tech program speaks to a lack of faith in societies’ ability to tackle the complex issues they face. Yet, to make mobility work for everyone, what is essential is not to flee from politics, but to truly address politics. The tech companies are working to reshape our streets and cities to better fit their needs, but this demands that people counter by insisting that their streets and cities be made to actually meet people’s needs. Instead of looking to cities with roads clogged with Ubers and sidewalks blocked by broken scooters, we need to be paying attention to the cities that have devoted resources (and space) to pedestrians while improving and expanding public transit. The point is not to reject technology but to reject the tech companies’ narrow definition of what technology is and how it can be used, “we need to utilize technology where it can serve us, while ensuring power remains firmly in the hands of a democratic public” (223).

    After all, “better futures are possible, but they will not be delivered through technological advancement alone” (225). We can no longer sit idle in the passenger seat, we need to take the wheel, and the wheels.

    ***

    Contrary to its somewhat playful title, Road to Nowhere lays out a very clear case that Silicon Valley’s vision of the future of mobility is in fact a road to somewhere—the problem is that it’s not a good somewhere. While the excited pronouncements of tech CEOs (and the oft-uncritical coverage of those pronouncements) may evoke images of gleaming high tech utopias, a more critical and grounded assessment of these pipedreams reveals them to be unrealistic fantasies mixed with ideas that are designed to primarily meet the needs of tech CEOs over the genuine mobility needs of most people. As Paris Marx makes clear throughout the chapters of Road to Nowhere, it is essential to stop taking the plans of tech companies at face value and to instead do the discomforting work of facing up to the realities of these plans. The way our streets and cities have been built certainly present a range of very real problems to solve, but in the choice of which problems to address it makes a difference whether the challenges being considered are those facing a minimum-wage worker or a billionaire mogul furious about sitting in traffic. Or, to put it somewhat differently, there are flying cars in the movie Blade Runner, but that does not mean we should attempt to build that world.

    Road to Nowhere: Silicon Valley and the Future of Mobility provides a thoughtful analysis and impassioned denunciation of Silicon Valley’s mobility efforts up to this point, and pivots from this consideration of the past and the present to cast doubt on Silicon Valley’s future efforts. Throughout the book, Marx writes with the same punchy eloquence that has made Marx such a lively host of the Tech Won’t Save Us podcast. And while Marx has staked out an important space in the world of contemporary tech critique thanks to that podcast, this book makes it clear that Marx is not only a dynamic interviewer of other critics, but a vital critic in their own right. With its wide-ranging analysis, and clear consideration of the route we find ourselves on unless we change course, Road to Nowhere presents an important read for those concerned with where Silicon Valley is driving us.

    The structure of the book provides a clear argument that briskly builds momentum, and even as the chapters focus on certain specific topics they flow seamlessly from one to the next. Having started by providing a quick history of the auto-centric city, and the roots of Silicon Valley’s ideology, Marx’s chapters follow a clear path through mobility issues. If the problem is pollution, why not electric cars? If the problem is individual cars, even electric ones, why not make it easy to summon someone else’s car? If the problem is the treatment of the drivers of those cars, why not cars without drivers? If autonomous vehicles are unrealistic because of already existing infrastructure, why not wholly new infrastructure? If creating wholly new infrastructure (below and above ground) is more difficult than it may seem, what about flooding cities with cheap bikes? Part of what makes Road to Nowhere’s critique of Silicon Valley’s ideas so successful is that Marx does not get bogged down in just one of Silicon Valley’s areas of interest, and instead provides a critique that captures that it is not only a matter of Silicon Valley’s response to this or that problem, but that the issues is the way that Silicon Valley frames problems and envisions solutions. To the extent that the auto-centric world is reflective of a world that was remade in the shape of the automobile, Silicon Valley is currently hard at work attempting to remake the world in its own shape, and as Marx makes clear the needs of Silicon Valley companies and the needs of people trying to get around are not the same.

    At the core of Marx’s analysis is a sense that the worldview of Silicon Valley is one that is no longer so easily confined to certain geographical boundaries in California. As the tech companies have been permitted to present themselves as the shiny saviors of society, that ideology has often overwhelmed faith in democratic solutions. Marx notes that “as the neoliberal political system gave up on bold policies in favor of managing a worsening status quo, they left the door open to techno-utopians to fill the void” (5). When people no longer believe that a democratic society can even maintain the bridges and roads, it opens up a space in which tech companies can drive into town and announce an ambitious project to remake the roads. Marx further argues, “too often, governments stand back and allow the tech industry to roll out whatever ideas its executives and engineers can dream up,” this belief if undergirded by a sense that “whatever tech companies want is inevitable…and that neither governments, traditional companies, nor even the public should stand in their way” (178). Part of the danger of this sense of inevitability is that it cedes the future of mobility to the tech companies, robbing the municipalities both of initiative and of the responsibility to meet the mobility needs of the people who live there. Granted, as the many failures Marx documents show, just  because a tech company says that it will do something does not necessarily mean that it will be able to do it.

    Published by Verso Books and written in a clear comprehensive voice, Road to Nowhere stands as an intervention into broad discussions about the future of mobility, particularly those currently taking place on the political left. Thus, even as many readers are likely to cheer at Marx’s skewering of Musk, it is likely that many of those same readers will chafe at the book’s refusal to treat electric cars as a solution. Sure, it’s one thing to lambast Elon Musk (and by extension Tesla), but to critique electric cars as such? Here Marx makes it very clear that we cannot be taken in by too neat techno-fixes, whether they are touted by a specific company (such as Tesla), or whether they are made about a certain class of technologies (electric cars). As Marx makes clear, all of the minerals in those electric cars come from somewhere, and what’s more the issues that we face (in terms of mobility and environmental ones) are not simply the result of one particular technology (such as the gas-powered car) but the way in which we have built our societies around certain technologies and the infrastructure that those technologies require. Therefore, the matter of mobility is about which questions we are willing to ask, and recognizing that we need to be asking a different set of questions.

    Road to Nowhere is at its best when Marx does this work by moving past the particular tech companies to consider the deeper matters of the underlying technologies. Certainly, readers of the book will find plenty of consideration of Tesla and Uber (alongside their famous leaders), but the strength of Road to Nowhere is that the book does not act as though the problem is simply Tesla or Uber. Rather, Marx considers the way in which the problem forces us to think about automobiles themselves, about the long history of automobiles, and about the ways in which so much physical infrastructure has been built to prioritize the use of automobiles. This is, obviously, not to give Uber or Tesla a pass—but Marx does the essential work of emphasizing that this isn’t just about a handful of tech companies and their bombastic CEOs, this is a question about the ways in which societies orient themselves around particular sets of technologies. And Marx’s response is not a call for a return to some romanticized pastoral landscape, but is instead an argument in favor of placing the needs of people above the needs of technologies (and the people selling those technologies). Much of our built environment has been constructed around the automobile, what if we started building that environment around the needs of the human being?

    The challenge of what it would mean to construct our cities around the needs of people, rather than the needs of profit (or the needs of machines), is not a new question. And while Marx briefly considers some past figures who have wrestled with this matter—such as Jane Jacobs and Murray Bookchin—it might have been worthwhile to spend a little more time engaging more fully with past critics. At risk of becoming too much of a caricature of myself as a reviewer, it does seem like an unfortunate missed opportunity in a book about technology and cities not to engage with the prominent technological critic Lewis Mumford whose oeuvre includes numerous books specifically on the topic of technology and cities (he won the National Book Award for his volume The City in History). And these matters of cities, speed, and vehicles have been topics with which many other critics of technology engaged in the twentieth century. Indeed, the rise of the auto-centric society has had its critics all along the way, and it could have been fascinating to engage with more of those figures. Marx certainly makes a strong case for the ways in which Silicon Valley’s designs on the city are informed by its particular ideology, but engaging more closely with earlier critics of technology could have opened up other spaces for considering broader problems about ideologies surrounding technology that predate Silicon Valley. Of course, it is unfair to criticize an author for the book they did not write, and the intention is not to take away from Marx’s important book—but contemporary criticism of technology has much to gain not just from the history of technology but from the history of technological criticism.

    Road to Nowhere is a challenging book in the best sense of that word, for it discomforts the reader and pushes them to see the world around them in a new light. Marx achieves this particularly well by refusing to be taken in by easy solutions, and by recognizing that even as techno-fixes may be the standard offering from Silicon Valley, that a belief in such fixes permeates beyond just the pitches by tech firms. Nevertheless, Marx is also clear in recognizing that even as many of our problems flow from and have been exacerbated by technology, that technology needs to be seen as part of the solution. And here, Marx is deft at considering the way in which technology represents a much more robust and wide-ranging category than the too simplistic version that it is often reduced to when conversations turn to “tech.” Thus, the matter is nothing so ridiculous as conversations about being “pro-technology” or “anti-technology” but recognizing “that technology is not the primary driver in creating fairer and more equitable cities and transportation systems” what is necessary is “deeper and more fundamental change to give people more power over the decision that are made about their communities” (8). The matter is not just about technology (as such), but about the value systems embedded in particular sorts of technologies, and recognizing that certain sets of technologies are going to be better for achieving particular social goals. After all, “the technologies unleashed by Silicon Valley are not neutral,” (179) though the same is also very much true of the technologies that were unleashed before Silicon Valley. Constructing a different world thus requires us to consider not only how we can remake that world, but how we can remake our technologies. As Marx wonderfully puts it, “when we assume that technology can only develop in one way, we accept the power of the people who control that process, but there is no guarantee that their ideal world is one that truly works for everyone” (179).

    You can learn a lot about your society’s relationship to technology by looking at its streets. And Road to Nowhere is a powerful reminder, that those streets do not have to look the way they do, and that we have a role to play in determining what future those streets are taking us towards.

    _____

    Zachary Loeb earned his MSIS from the University of Texas at Austin, an MA from the Media, Culture, and Communications department at NYU, and is currently a PhD candidate in the History and Sociology of Science department at the University of Pennsylvania. Loeb works at the intersection of the history of technology and disaster studies, and his research focusses on the ways that complex technological systems amplify risk, as well as the history of technological doom-saying. He is working on a dissertation on Y2K. Loeb writes at the blog Librarianshipwreck, and is a frequent contributor to The b2o Review Digital Studies section.

    Back to the essay

  • Zachary Loeb — Is Big Data the Message? (Review of Natasha Lushetich, ed., Big Data—A New Medium?)

    Zachary Loeb — Is Big Data the Message? (Review of Natasha Lushetich, ed., Big Data—A New Medium?)

    a review of Natasha Lushetich, ed. Big Data—A New Medium? (Routledge, 2021)

    by Zachary Loeb

    When discussing the digital, conversations can quickly shift towards talk of quantity. Just how many images are being uploaded every hour, how many meticulously monitored purchases are being made on a particular e-commerce platform every day, how many vehicles are being booked through a ride-sharing app at 3 p.m. on Tuesday afternoon, how many people are streaming how many shows/movies/albums at any given time? The specific answer to the “how much?” and “how many?” will obviously vary depending upon the rest of the question, yet if one wanted to give a general response across these questions it would likely be fair to answer with some version of “a heck of a lot.” Yet from this flows another, perhaps more complicated and significant question, namely: given the massive amount of information being generated by seemingly every online activity, where does all of that information actually go, and how is that information rendered usable and useful? To this the simple answer may be “big data,” but this in turn just serves to raise the question of what we mean by “big data.”

    “Big data” denotes the point at which data begins to be talked about in terms of scale, not merely gigabytes but zettabytes. And, to be clear, a zettabyte represents a trillion gigabytes—and big data is dealing with zettabytes, plural. Beyond the sheer scale of the quantity in question, considering big data “as process and product” involves a consideration of “the seven Vs: volume” (the amount of data previously generated and newly generated), “variety” (the various sorts of data being generated), “velocity” (the highly accelerated rate at which data is being generated), “variability” (the range of types of information that make up big data), “visualization” (how this data can be visually represented to a user), “value” (how much all of that data is worth, especially once it can be processed in a useful way), and “veracity” (3) (the reliability, trustworthiness, and authenticity of the data being generated). In addition to these “seven Vs” there are also the “three Hs: high dimension, high complexity, and high uncertainty” (3). Granted, “many of these terms remain debatable” (3). Big data is both “process and product” (3), its applications vary from undergirding the sorts of real-time analysis that makes it possible to detect viral outbreaks as they are happening to the directions app that is able to suggest an alternative route before you hit traffic to the recommendation software (be it banal or nefarious) that forecast future behavior based on past actions.

    To the extent that discussions around the digital generally focus on the end(s) results of big data, the means remain fairly occluded both from public view and from many of the discussants. And while big data has largely been accepted as an essential aspect of our digital lives by some, for many others it remains highly fraught.

    As Natasha Lushetich notes, “in the arts and (digital) humanities…the use of big data remains a contentious issue not only because data architectures are increasingly determining classificatory systems in the educational, social, and medical realms, but because they reduce political and ethical questions to technical management” (4). And it is this contentiousness that is at the heart of Lushetich’s edited volume Big Data—A New Medium? (Routledge, 2021). Drawing together scholars from a variety of different disciplines ranging across “the arts and (digital) humanities,” this book moves beyond an analysis of what big data is to a complex considerations of what big data could be (and may be in the process of currently becoming). In engaging with the perils and potentialities of big data, the book (as its title suggests) wrestles with the question as to whether or not big data can be seen as constituting “a new medium.” Through engaging with big data as a medium, the contributors to the volume grapple not only with how big data “conjugates human existence” but also how it “(re)articulates time, space, the material and immaterial world, the knowable and the unknowable; how it navigates or alters, hierarchies of importance” and how it “enhances, obsolesces, retrieves and pushes to the limits of potentiality” (8). Across four sections, the contributors grapple with big data in terms of knowledge and time, use and extraction, cultural heritage and memory, as well as people.

    “Patterning Knowledge and Time” begins with a chapter by Ingrid M. Hoofd that places big data in the broader trajectory of the university’s attempt to make the whole of the world knowable. Considering how “big data renders its object of analysis simultaneously more unknowable (or superficial) and more knowable (or deep)” (18), Hoofd’s chapter examines how big data replicates and reinforces the ways in which that which becomes legitimated as knowable are the very things that can be known through the university’s (and big data’s) techniques. Following Hoofd, Franco “Bifo” Berardi provocatively engages with the power embedded in big data, treating it as an attempt to assert computerized control over a chaotic future by forcing it into a predictable model. Here big data is treated as a potential constraint wherein “the future is no longer  a possibility, but the implementation of a logical necessity inscribed in the present” (43), as participation in society becomes bound up with making one’s self and one’s actions legible and analyzable to the very systems that enclose one’s future horizons. Shifting towards the visual and the environmental, Abelardo Gil-Fournier and Jussi Parikka consider the interweaving of images and environments and how data impacts this. As Gil-Fournier and Parikka explore, as a result of developments in machine learning and computer vision “meteorological changes” are increasingly “not only observable but also predictable as images” (56).

    The second part of the book, “Patterning Use and Existence” starts with Btihaj Ajana reflecting on the ways in which “surveillance technologies are now embedded in our everyday products and services” (64). By juxtaposing the biometric control of refugees with the quantified-self movement, Ajana explores the datafication of society and the differences (as well as similarities) between willing participation and forced participation in regimes of surveillance of the self. Highlighting a range of well-known gig-economy platforms (such as Uber, Deliveroo, and Amazon Mechanical Turk), Tim Christaens examines the ways that “the speed of the platform’s algorithms exceeds the capacities of human bodies” (81). While offering a thorough critique of the inhuman speed imposed by gig economy platforms/algorithms, Christaens also offers a hopeful argument for the possibility that by making their software open source some of these gig platforms could “become a vehicle for social emancipation instead of machinic subjugation” (90). While aesthetic and artistic considerations appear in earlier chapters, Lonce Wyse’s chapter pushes fully into this area through looking at the ways that deep learning systems create the sorts of works of art “that, when recognized in humans, are thought of as creative” (95). Wyse provides a rich, and yet succinct, examination of how these systems function while highlighting the sorts of patterns that emerge (sometimes accidentally) in the process of training these systems.

    At the outset of the book’s third section, “Patterning cultural heritage and memory,” Craig J. Saper approaches the magazine The Smart Set as an object of analysis and proceeds to zoom in and zoom out to reveal what is revealed and what is obfuscated at different scales. Highlighting that “one cannot arbitrarily discount or dismiss particular types of data, big or intimate, or approaches to reading, distant or close” Saper’s chapter demonstrates how “all scales carry intellectual weight” (124). Moving away from the academic and the artist, Nicola Horsley’s chapter reckons with the work of archivists and the ways in which their intellectual labor and the tasks of their profession have been challenged by digital shifts. While archival training teaches archivists that “the historical record, on which collective memory is based, is a process not a product” (140) and in interacting with researchers archivists seek to convey that lesson, Horsley’s considers the ways in which the shift away from the physical archive and towards the digital archive (wherein a researcher may never directly interact with an archivist or librarian) means this “process” risks going unseen. From the archive to the work of art, Natasha Lushetich and Masaki Fujihata’s chapter explores Fujihata’s project BeHere: The Past in the Present and how augmented reality opens up the space for new artistic experience and challenges how individual memory is constructed. Through its engagement with “images obtained through data processing and digital frottage” the BeHere project reveals “new configurations of machinically (rather than humanly) perceived existents” and thus can “shed light on that which eludes the (naked) human eye” (151).

    The fourth and final section of the volume, begins with Dominic Smith’s exploration of the aesthetics of big data. While referring back to the “Seven Vs” of big data, Smith argues that to imagine big data as a “new medium” requires considering “how we make sense of data” in regards to both “how we produce it” and “how we perceive it” (164). A matter which Smith explores through an analysis of “surfaces and depths” of oceanic images. Though big data is closely connected with sheer scale (hence the “big”), Mitra Azar observes that “it is never enough as it is always possible to generate new data and make more comprehensive data sets” (180). Tangling with this in a visual registry, Azar contrasts the cinematic point of view with that of the big data enabled “data double” of the individual (which is meant to stand in for that user). Considering several of his own artistic installations—Babel, Dark Matter, and Heteropticon—Simon Biggs examines the ways in which big data reveals “the everyday and trivial and how it offers insights into the dense ambient noise that is our daily lives” (192). In contrast to treating big data as a revelator of the sublime, Biggs discusses big data’s capacity to show “the infra-ordinary” and to show the value of seemingly banal daily details. The book concludes with Warren Neidich’s speculative gaze to what the future of big data might portend, couched in a belief that “we are at the beginning of a transition from knowledge-based economics to a neural or brain-based economy” (207). Surveying current big data technologies and the trajectories they may suggest, Neidich forecasts “a gradual accumulation of telepathic technocueticals” such that “at some moment a critical point might be reached when telepathy could become a necessary skill for successful adaptation…similar to being able to read in today’s society” (218).

    In the introduction to the book, Natasha Lushetich grounds the discussion in a recognition that “it is also important to ask how big data (re)articulates time, space, the material and immaterial world, the knowable and the unknowable; how it navigates or alters, hierarchies of importance” (8), and over the course of this fascinating and challenging volume, the many contributors do just that.

    ***

    The term big data captures the way in which massive troves of digitally sourced information are made legible and understandable. Yet one of the challenges of discussing big data is trying to figure out a way to make big data itself legible and understandable. In discussions around the digital, big data is often gestured at rather obliquely as the way to explain a lot of mysterious technological activity in the background. We may not find ourselves capable, for a variety of reasons, of prying open the various black boxes of a host of different digital systems but stamped in large letters on the outside of that box are the words “big data.” When shopping online or using a particular app, a user may be aware that the information being gathered from their activities is feeding into big data and that the recommendations being promoted to them come courtesy of the same. Or they may be obliquely aware that there is some sort of connection between the mystery shrouded algorithms and big data. Or the very evocation of “big” when twinned with a recognition of surveillance technologies may serve as a discomforting reminder of “big brother.” Or “big data” might simply sound like a non-existent episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation in which Lieutenant Commander Data is somehow turned into a giant. All of which is to say, that though big data is not a new matter, the question of how to think about it (which is not the same as how to use and be used by it) remains a challenging issue.

    With Big Data—A New Medium?, Natasha Lushetich has assembled an impressive group of thinkers to engage with big data in a novel way. By raising the question of big data as “a new medium,” the contributors shift the discussion away from considerations focused on surveillance and algorithms to wrestle with the ways that big data might be similar and distinct from other mediums. While this shift does not represent a rejection, or move to ignore, the important matters related to issues like surveillance, the focus on big data as a medium raises a different set of questions. What are the aesthetics of big data? As a medium what are the affordances of big data? And what does it mean for other mediums that in the digital era so many of those mediums are themselves being subsumed by big data? After all, so many of the older mediums that theorists have grown so accustomed to discussing have undergone some not insignificant changes as a result of big data. And yet to engage with big data as a medium also opens up a potential space for engaging with big data that does not treat it as being wholly captured and controlled by large tech firms.

    The contributors to the volume do not seem to be fully in agreement with one another about whether big data represents poison or panacea, but the chapters are clearly speaking to one another instead of shouting over each other. There are certainly some contributions to the book, notably Berardi’s, with its evocation of a “new century suspended between two opposite polarities: chaos and automaton” (44), that seem a bit more pessimistic. While other contributors, such as Christaens, engage with the unsavory realities of contemporary data gathering regimes but envision the ways that these can be repurposed to serve users instead of large companies. And such optimistic and pessimistic assessments come up against multiple contributions that eschew such positive/negative framings in favor of an artistically minded aesthetic engagement with what it means to treat big data as a medium for the creation of works of art. Taken together, the chapters in the book provide a wide-ranging assessment of big data, one which is grounded in larger discussions around matters such as surveillance and algorithmic bias, but which pushes readers to think of big data beyond those established frameworks.

    As an edited volume, one of the major strengths of Big Data—A New Medium? is the way it brings together perspectives from such a variety of fields and specialties. As part of Routledge’s “studies in science, technology, and society” series, the volume demonstrates the sort of interdisciplinary mixing that makes STS such a vital space for discussions of the digital. Granted, this very interdisciplinary richness can serve to be as much benefit as burden, as some readers will wish there had been slightly more representation of their particular subfield, or wish that the particular scholarly techniques of a particular discipline had seen greater use. Case in point: Horsley’s contribution will be of great interest to those approaching this book from the world of libraries and archives (and information schools more generally), and some of those same readers will wish that other chapters in the book had been equally attentive to the work done by archive professionals. Similarly those who approach the book from fields more grounded in historical techniques may wish that more of the authors had spent more time engaging with “how we got here” instead of focusing so heavily on the exploration of the present and the possible future. Of course, these are always the challenges with edited interdisciplinary volumes, and it is a major credit to Lushetich as an editor that this volume provides readers from so many different backgrounds with so much to mull over. Beyond presenting numerous perspectives on the titular question, the book is also an invitation to artists and academics to join in discussion about that titular question.

    Those who are broadly interested in discussions around big data will find much in this volume of significance, and will likely find their own thinking pushed in novel directions. That being said, this book will likely be most productively read by those who are already somewhat conversant in debates around big data/the digital humanities/the arts/and STS more generally. While contributors are consistently careful in clearly defining their terms and referencing the theorists from whom they are drawing, from Benjamin to Foucault to Baudrillard to Marx to Deleuze and Guattari (to name but a few), the contributors to this book couch much of their commentary in theory, and a reader of this volume will be best able to engage with these chapters if they have at least some passing familiarity with those theorists themselves. Many of the contributors to this volume are also clearly engaging with arguments made by Shoshana Zuboff in Surveillance Capitalism and this book can be very productively read as critique and complement to Zuboff’s tome. Academics in and around STS, and artists who incorporate the digital into their practice, will find that this book makes a worthwhile intervention into current discourse around big data. And though the book seems to assume a fairly academically engaged readership, this book will certainly work well in graduate seminars (or advanced undergraduate classrooms)—many of the chapter will stand quite well on their own, though much of the book’s strength is in the way the chapters work in tandem.

    One of the claims that is frequently made about big data is that—for better or worse—it will allow us to see the world from a fresh perspective. And what Big Data—A New Medium? does is allow us to see big data itself from a fresh perspective.

    _____

    Zachary Loeb earned his MSIS from the University of Texas at Austin, an MA from the Media, Culture, and Communications department at NYU, and is currently a PhD candidate in the History and Sociology of Science department at the University of Pennsylvania. Loeb works at the intersection of the history of technology and disaster studies, and his research focusses on the ways that complex technological systems amplify risk, as well as the history of technological doom-saying. He is working on a dissertation on Y2K. Loeb writes at the blog Librarianshipwreck, and is a frequent contributor to The b2o Review Digital Studies section.

    Back to the essay

  • David Gerard — Creationism on the Blockchain (review of George Gilder, Life After Google)

    David Gerard — Creationism on the Blockchain (review of George Gilder, Life After Google)

    a review of George Gilder, Life After Google: The Fall of Big Data and the Rise of the Blockchain Economy (Regnery, 2018)

    by David Gerard

    George Gilder is most famous as a conservative author and speechwriter. He also knows his stuff about technology, and has a few things to say.

    But what he has to say about blockchain in his book Life After Google is rambling, ill-connected and unconvincing — and falls prey to the fixed points in his thinking.

    Gilder predicts that the Google and Silicon Valley approach — big data, machine learning, artificial intelligence, not charging users per transaction — is failing to scale, and will collapse under its own contradictions.

    The Silicon Valley giants will be replaced by a world built around cryptocurrency, blockchains, sound money … and the obsolescence of philosophical materialism — the theory that thought and consciousness needs only physical reality. That last one turns out to be Gilder’s main point.

    At his best, as in his 1990 book Life After Television, Gilder explains consequences following from historical materialism — Marx and Engels’ theory that historical events emerge from economic developments and changes to the mode of production — to a conservative readership enamoured with the obsolete Great Man theory of history.

    (That said, Gilder sure does love his Great Men. Men specifically.)

    Life After Google purports to be about material forces that follow directly from technology. Gilder then mixes in his religious beliefs as, literally, claims about mathematics.

    Gilder has a vastly better understanding of technology than most pop science writers. If Gilder talks tech, you should listen. He did a heck of a lot of work on getting out there and talking to experts for this book.

    But Gilder never quite makes his case that blockchains are the solutions to the problems he presents — he just presents the existence of blockchains, then talks as if they’ll obviously solve everything.

    Blockchains promise Gilder comfort in certainty: “The new era will move beyond Markov chains of disconnected probabilistic states to blockchain hashes of history and futurity, trust and truth,” apparently.

    The book was recommended to me by a conservative friend, who sent me a link to an interview with Gilder on the Hoover Institution’s Uncommon Knowledge podcast. My first thought was “another sad victim of blockchain white papers.” You see this a lot — people tremendously excited by blockchain’s fabulous promises, with no idea that none of this stuff works or can work.

    Gilder’s particular errors are more interesting. And — given his real technical expertise — less forgivable.

    Despite its many structural issues — the book seems to have been left in dire need of proper editing — Life After Google was a hit with conservatives. Peter Thiel is a noteworthy fan. So we may need to pay attention. Fortunately, I’ve read it so you don’t have to.

    About the Author

    Gilder is fêted in conservative circles. His 1981 book Wealth and Poverty was a favourite of supply-side economics proponents in the Reagan era. He owned conservative magazine The American Spectator from 2000 to 2002.

    Gilder is frequently claimed to have been Ronald Reagan’s favourite living author — mainly in his own publicity: “According to a study of presidential speeches, Mr. Gilder was President Reagan’s most frequently quoted living author.”

    I tried tracking down this claim — and all citations I could find trace back to just one article: “The Gilder Effect” by Larissa MacFarquhar, in The New Yorker, 29 May 2000.

    The claim is one sentence in passing: “It is no accident that Gilder — scourge of feminists, unrepentant supply-sider, and now, at sixty, a technology prophet — was the living author Reagan most often quoted.” The claim isn’t substantiated further in the New Yorker article — it reads like the journalist was told this and just put it in for colour.

    Gilder despises feminism, and has described himself as “America’s number-one antifeminist.” He has written two books — Sexual Suicide, updated as Men and Marriage, and Naked Nomads — on this topic alone.

    Also, per Gilder, Native American culture collapsed because it’s “a corrupt and unsuccessful culture,” as is Black culture — and not because of, e.g., massive systemic racism.

    Gilder believes the biological theory of evolution is wrong. He co-founded the Discovery Institute in 1990, as an offshoot of the Hudson Institute. The Discovery Institute started out with papers on economic issues, but rapidly pivoted to promoting “intelligent design” — the claim that all living creatures were designed by “a rational agent,” and not evolved through natural processes. It’s a fancy term for creationism.

    Gilder insisted for years that the Discovery Institute’s promotion of intelligent design totally wasn’t religious — even as judges ruled that intelligent design in schools was promotion of religion. Unfortunately for Gilder, we have the smoking gun documents showing that the Discovery Institute was explicitly trying to push religion into schools — the leaked Wedge Strategy document literally says: “Design theory promises to reverse the stifling dominance of the materialist worldview, and to replace it with a science consonant with Christian and theistic convictions.”

    Gilder’s politics are approximately the polar opposite of mine. But the problems I had with Life After Google are problems his fans have also had. Real Clear Marketsreview is a typical example — it’s from the conservative media sphere and written by a huge Gilder fan, and he’s very disappointed at how badly the book makes its case for blockchain.

    Gilder’s still worth taking seriously on tech, because he’s got a past record of insight — particularly his 1990s books Life After Television and Telecosm.

    Life After Television

    Life After Television: The Coming Transformation of Media and American Life is why people take Gilder seriously as a technology pundit. First published in 1990, it was expanded in 1992 and again in 1994.

    The book predicts television’s replacement with computers on networks — the downfall of the top-down system of television broadcasting and the cultural hegemony it implies. “A new age of individualism is coming, and it will bring an eruption of culture unprecedented in human history.” Gilder does pretty well — his 1990 vision of working from home is a snapshot of 2020, complete with your boss on Zoom.

    You could say this was obvious to anyone paying attention — Gilder’s thesis rests on technology that had already shown itself capable of supporting the future he spelt out — but not a lot of people in the mainstream were paying attention, and the industry was in blank denial. Even Wired, a few years later, was mostly still just terribly excited that the Internet was coming at all.

    Life After Television talks way more about the fall of the television industry than the coming future network. In the present decade, it’s best read as a historical record of past visions of the astounding future.

    If you remember the first two or three years of Wired magazine, that’s the world Gilder’s writing from. Gilder mentored Wired and executive editor Kevin Kelly in its first few years, and appeared on the cover of the March 1996 edition. Journalist and author Paulina Borsook detailed Gilder’s involvement in Wired in her classic 2000 book Cyberselfish: A Critical Romp through the Terribly Libertarian Culture of High Tech, (also see an earlier article of the same name in Mother Jones) which critiques his politics including his gender politics at length, noting that “Gilder worshipped entrepreneurs and inventors and appeared to have found God in a microchip” (132-3) and describing “a phallus worship he has in common with Ayn Rand” (143).

    The only issue I have with Gilder’s cultural predictions in Life After Television is that he doesn’t mention the future network’s negative side-effects — which is a glaring miss in a world where E. M. Forster predicted social media and some of its effects in The Machine Stops in 1909.

    The 1994 edition of Life After Television goes in quite a bit harder than the 1990 edition. The book doesn’t say “Internet,” doesn’t mention the Linux computer operating system — which was already starting to be a game-changer — and only says “worldwide web” in the sense of “the global ganglion of computers and cables, the new worldwide web of glass and light.” (p23) But then there’s the occasional blinder of a paragraph, such as his famous prediction of the iPhone and its descendants:

    Indeed, the most common personal computer of the next decade will be a digital cellular phone. Called personal digital assistants, among many other coinages, they will be as portable as a watch and as personal as a wallet; they will recognise speech and navigate streets, open the door and start the car, collect the mail and the news and the paycheck, connecting to thousands of databases of all kinds. (p20)

    Gilder’s 1996 followup Telecosm is about what unlimited bandwidth would mean. It came just in time for a minor bubble in telecom stocks, because the Internet was just getting popular. Gilder made quite a bit of money in stock-picking, and so did subscribers to his newsletter — everyone’s a financial genius in a bubble. Then that bubble popped, and Gilder and his subscribers lost their shirts. But his main error was just being years early.

    So if Gilder talks tech, he’s worth paying attention to. Is he right, wrong, or just early?

    Gilder, Bitcoin and Gold

    Gilder used to publish through larger generalist publishers. But since around 2000, he’s published through small conservative presses such as Regnery, small conservative think tanks, or his own Discovery Institute. Regnery, the publisher of Life After Google, is functionally a vanity press for the US far right, famous for, among other things, promising to publish a book by US Senator Josh Hawley after Simon & Schuster dropped it due to Hawley’s involvement with the January 6th capital insurrection.

    Gilder caught on to Bitcoin around 2014. He told Reason that Bitcoin was “the perfect libertarian solution to the money enigma.”

    In 2015, his monograph The 21st Century Case for Gold: A New Information Theory of Money was published by the American Principles Project — a pro-religious conservative think tank that advocates a gold standard and “hard money.”

    This earlier book uses Bitcoin as a source of reasons that an economy based on gold could work in the 21st century:

    Researches in Bitcoin and other digital currencies have shown that the real source of the value of any money is its authenticity and reliability as a measuring stick of economic activity. A measuring stick cannot be part of what it measures. The theorists of Bitcoin explicitly tied its value to the passage of time, which proceeds relentlessly beyond the reach of central banks.

    Gilder drops ideas and catch-phrases from The 21st Century Case for Gold all through Life After Google without explaining himself — he just seems to assume you’re fully up on the Gilder Cinematic Universe. An editor should have caught this — a book needs to work as a stand-alone.

    Life After Google’s Theses

    The theses of Life After Google are:

    • Google and Silicon Valley’s hegemony is bad.
    • Google and Silicon Valley do capitalism wrong, and this is why they will collapse from their internal contradictions.
    • Blockchain will solve the problems with Silicon Valley.
    • Artificial intelligence is impossible, because Gödel, Turing and Shannon proved mathematically that creativity cannot result without human consciousness that comes from God.

    This last claim is the real point of the book. Gilder affirmed that this was the book’s point in an interview with WND.

    I should note, by the way, that Gödel, Turing and Shannon proved nothing of the sort. Gilder claims repeatedly that they and other mathematicians did, however.

    Marxism for Billionaires

    Gilder’s objections to Silicon Valley were reasonably mainstream and obvious by 2018. They don’t go much beyond what Clifford Stoll said in Silicon Snake Oil in 1995. And Stoll was speaking to his fellow insiders. (Gilder cites Stoll, though he calls him “Ira Stoll.”) But Gilder finds the points still worth making to his conservative audience, as in this early 2018 Forbes interview:

    A lot of people have an incredible longing to reduce human intelligence to some measurable crystallization that can be grasped, calculated, projected and mechanized. I think this is a different dimension of the kind of Silicon Valley delusion that I describe in my upcoming book.

    Gilder’s scepticism of Silicon Valley is quite reasonable … though he describes Silicon Valley as having adopted “what can best be described as a neo-Marxist political ideology and technological vision.”

    There is no thing, no school of thought, that is properly denoted “neo-Marxism.” In the wild, it’s usually a catch-all for everything the speaker doesn’t like. It’s a boo-word.

    Gilder probably realises that it comes across as inane to label the ridiculously successful billionaire and near-trillionaire capitalists of the present day as any form of “Marxist.” He attempts to justify his usage:

    Marx’s essential tenet was that in the future, the key problem of economics would become not production amid scarcity but redistribution of abundance.

    That’s not really regarded as the key defining point of Marxism by anyone else anywhere. (Maybe Elon Musk, when he’s tweeting words he hasn’t looked up.) I expect the libertarian post-scarcity transhumanists of the Bay Area, heavily funded by Gilder’s friend Peter Thiel, would be disconcerted too.

    “Neo-Marxism” doesn’t rate further mention in the book — though Gilder does use the term in the Uncommon Knowledge podcast interview. Y’know, there’s red-baiting to get in.

    So — Silicon Valley’s “neo-marxism” sucks. “It is time for a new information architecture for a globally distributed economy. Fortunately, it is on its way.” Can you guess what it is?

    You’re Doing Capitalism Wrong

    Did you know that Isaac Newton was the first Austrian economist? I didn’t. (I still don’t.)

    Gilder doesn’t say this outright. He does speak of Newton’s work in physics, as a “system of the world,” a phrase he confesses to having lifted from Neal Stephenson.

    But Gilder is most interested in Newton’s work as Master of the Mint — “Newton’s biographers typically underestimate his achievement in establishing the information theory of money on a firm foundation.”

    There is no such thing as “the information theory of money” — this is a Gilder coinage from his 2015 book The 21st Century Case for Gold.

    Gilder’s economic ideas aren’t quite Austrian economics, but he’s fond of their jargon, and remains a huge fan of gold:

    The failure of his alchemy gave him — and the world — precious knowledge that no rival state or private bank, wielding whatever philosopher’s stone, would succeed in making a better money. For two hundred years, beginning with Newton’s appointment to the Royal Mint in 1696, the pound, based on the chemical irreversibility of gold, was a stable and reliable monetary Polaris.

    I’m pretty sure this is not how it happened, and that the ascendancy of Great Britain’s pound sterling had everything to do with it being backed by a world-spanning empire, and not any other factor. But Gilder goes one better:

    Fortunately the lineaments of a new system of the world have emerged. It could be said to have been born in early September 1930, when a gold-based Reichsmark was beginning to subdue the gales of hyperinflation that had ravaged Germany since the mid-1920s.

    I am unconvinced that this quite explains Germany in the 1930s. The name of an obvious and well-known political figure, who pretty much everyone else considers quite important in discussing Germany in the 1930s, is not mentioned in this book.

    The rest of the chapter is a puréed slurry of physics, some actual information theory, a lot of alleged information theory, and Austrian economics jargon, giving the impression that these are all the same thing as far as Gilder is concerned.

    Gilder describes what he thinks is Google’s “System of the World” — “The Google theory of knowledge, nicknamed ‘big data,’ is as radical as Newton’s and as intimidating as Newton’s was liberating.” There’s an “AI priesthood” too.

    A lot of people were concerned early on about Google-like data sponges. Here’s Gilder on the forces at play:

    Google’s idea of progress stems from its technological vision. Newton and his fellows, inspired by their Judeo-Christian world view, unleashed a theory of progress with human creativity and free will at its core. Google must demur.

    … Finally, Google proposes, and must propose, an economic standard, a theory of money and value, of transactions and the information they convey, radically opposed to what Newton wrought by giving the world a reliable gold standard.

    So Google’s failures include not proposing a gold standard, or perhaps the opposite.

    Open source software is also part of this evil Silicon Valley plot — the very concept of open source. Because you don’t pay for each copy. Google is evil for participating in “a cult of the commons (rooted in ‘open source’ software)”.

    I can’t find anywhere that Gilder has commented on Richard M. Stallman’s promotion of Free Software, of which “open source” was a business-friendly politics-washed rebranding — but I expect that if he had, the explosion would have been visible from space.

    Gilder’s real problem with Google is how the company conducts its capitalism — how it applies creativity to the goal of actually making money. He seems to consider the successful billionaires of our age “neo-Marxist” because they don’t do capitalism the way he thinks they should.

    I’m reminded of Bitcoin Austrians — Saifedean Ammous in The Bitcoin Standard is a good example — who argue with the behaviour of the real-life markets, when said markets are so rude as not to follow the script in their heads. Bitcoin maximalists regard Bitcoin as qualitatively unique, unable to be treated in any way like the hodgepodge of other things called “cryptos,” and a separate market of its own.

    But the real-life crypto markets treat this as all one big pile of stuff, and trade it all on much the same basis. The market does not care about your ideology, only its own.

    Gilder mixes up his issues with the Silicon Valley ideology — the Californian Ideology, or cyberlibertarianism, as it’s variously termed in academia — with a visceral hatred of capitalists who don’t do capitalism his way. He seems to despise the capitalists who don’t do it his way more than he despises people who don’t do capitalism at all.

    (Gilder was co-author of the 1994 document “Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age” that spurred Langdon Winner to come up with the term “cyberlibertarianism” in the first place.)

    Burning Man is bad because it’s a “commons cult” too. Gilder seems to be partially mapping out the Californian Ideology from the other side.

    Gilder is outraged by Google’s lack of attention to security, in multiple senses of the word — customer security, software security, military security. Blockchain will fix all of this — somehow. It just does, okay?

    Ads are apparently dying. Google runs on ads — but they’re on their way out. People looking to buy things search on Amazon itself first, then purchase things for money — in the proper businesslike manner.

    Gilder doesn’t mention the sizable share of Amazon’s 2018 income that came from sales of advertising on its own platform. Nor does Gilder mention that Amazon’s entire general store business, which he approves of, posted huge losses in 2018, and was subsidised by Amazon’s cash-positive business line, the Amazon Web Services computing cloud.

    Gilder visits Google’s data centre in The Dalles, Oregon. He notes that Google embodies Sun Microsystems’ old slogan “The Network is the Computer,” coined by John Gage of Sun in 1984 — though Gilder attributes this insight to Eric Schmidt, later of Google, based on an email that Schmidt sent Gilder when he was at Sun in 1993.

    All successful technologies develop on an S-curve, a sigmoid function. They take off, raise in what looks like exponential growth … and then they level off. This is normal and expected. Gilder knows this. Correctly calling the levelling-off stage is good and useful tech punditry.

    Gilder notes the siren call temptations of having vastly more computing power than anyone else — then claims that Google will therefore surely fail. Nothing lasts forever; but Gilder doesn’t make the case for his claimed reasons.

    Gilder details Google’s scaling problems at length — but at no point addresses blockchains’ scaling problems: a blockchain open to all participants can’t scale and stay fast and secure (the “blockchain trilemma”). I have no idea how he missed this one. If he could see that Google has scaling problems, how could he not even mention that public blockchains have scaling problems?

    Gilder has the technical knowledge to be able to understand this is a key question, ask it and answer it. But he just doesn’t.

    How would a blockchain system do the jobs presently done by the large companies he’s talking about? What makes Amazon good when Google is bad? The mere act of selling goods? Gilder resorts entirely to extrapolation from axioms, and never bothers with the step where you’d expect him to compare his results to the real world. Why would any of this work?

    Gilder is fascinated by the use of Markov chains to statistically predict the next element of a series: “By every measure, the most widespread, immense, and influential of Markov chains today is Google’s foundational algorithm, PageRank, which encompasses the petabyte reaches of the entire World Wide Web.”

    Gilder interviews Robert Mercer — the billionaire whose Mercer Family Foundation helped bankroll Trump, Bannon, Brexit, and those parts of the alt-right that Peter Thiel didn’t fund.

    Mercer started as a computer scientist. He made his money on Markov-related algorithms for financial trading — automating tiny trades that made no human sense, only statistical sense.

    This offends Gilder’s sensibilities:

    This is the financial counterpart of Markov models at Google translating languages with no knowledge of them. Believing as I do in the centrality of knowledge and learning in capitalism, I found this fact of life and leverage absurd. If no new knowledge was generated, no real wealth was created. As Peter Drucker said, ‘It is less important to do things right than to do the right things.’

    Gilder is faced with a stupendously successful man, whose ideologies he largely concurs with, and who’s won hugely at capitalism — “Mercer and his consort of superstar scholars have, mutatis mutandis, excelled everyone else in the history of finance” — but in a way that is jarringly at odds with his own deeply-held beliefs.

    Gilder believes Mercer’s system, like Google’s, “is based on big data that will face diminishing returns. It is founded on frequencies of trading that fail to correspond to any real economic activity.”

    Gilder holds that it’s significant that Mercer’s model can’t last forever. But this is hardly a revelation — nothing lasts forever, and especially not an edge in the market. It’s the curse of hedge funds that any process that exploits inefficiencies will run out of other people’s inefficiencies in a few years, as the rest of the market catches on. Gilder doesn’t make the case that Mercer’s trick will fail any faster than it would be expected to just by being an edge in a market.

    Ten Laws of the Cryptocosm

    Chapter 5 is “Ten Laws of the Cryptocosm”. These aren’t from anywhere else — Gilder just made them up for this book.

    “Cryptocosm” is a variant on Gilder’s earlier coinage “Telecosm,” the title of his 1996 book.

    Blockchain spectators should be able to spot the magical foreshadowing term in rule four:

    The fourth rule is “Nothing is free. This rule is fundamental to human dignity and worth. Capitalism requires companies to serve their customers and to accept their proof of work, which is money. Banishing money, companies devalue their customers.

    Rules six and nine are straight out of The Bitcoin Standard:

    The sixth rule: ‘Stable money endows humans with dignity and control.’ Stable money reflects the scarcity of time. Without stable money, an economy is governed only by time and power.

    The ninth rule is ‘Private keys are held by individual human beings, not by governments or Google.’ … Ownership of private keys distributes power.

    In a later chapter, Gilder critiques The Bitcoin Standard, which he broadly approves of.

    Gödel’s Incompetence Theorem

    Purveyors of pseudoscience frequently drop the word “quantum” or “chaos theory” to back their woo-mongering in areas that aren’t physics or mathematics. There’s a strain of doing the same thing with Gödel’s incompleteness theorems to make remarkable claims in areas that aren’t maths.

    What Kurt Gödel actually said was that if you use logic to build your mathematical theorems, you have a simple choice: either your system is incomplete, meaning you can’t prove every statement that is true, and you can’t know which of the unproven statements are true — or you introduce internal contradictions. So you can have holes in your maths, or you can be wrong.

    Gödel’s incompleteness theorems had a huge impact on the philosophy of mathematics. They seriously affected Bertrand Russell’s work on the logicism programme, to model all of mathematics as formal logic, and caused issues for Hilbert’s second problem, which sought a proof that arithmetic is consistent — that is, free of any internal contradictions.

    It’s important to note that Gödel’s theorems only apply in a particular technical sense, to particular very specific mathematical constructs. All the words are mathematical jargon, and not English.

    But humans have never been able to resist a good metaphor — so, as with quantum physics, chaos theory and Turing completeness, people seized upon “Gödel” and ran off in all directions.

    One particular fascination was what the theorems meant for the idea of philosophical materialism — whether interesting creatures like humans could really be completely explained by ordinary mathematics-based physics, or if there was something more in there. Gödel himself essayed haltingly in the direction of saying he thought there might be more than physics there — though he was slightly constrained by knowing what the mathematics actually said.

    Compare the metaphor abuse surrounding blockchains. Deploy a mundane data structure and a proof-of-work system to determine who adds the next bit of data, and thus provide technically-defined, constrained and limited versions of “trustlessness,” “irreversibility” and “decentralisation.” People saw these words, and attributed their favoured shade of meaning of the plain-language words to anything even roughly descended from the mundane data structure — or that claimed it would be descended from it some time in the future.

    Gilder takes Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, adds Claude Shannon on information theory, and mixes in his own religious views. He asserts that the mathematics of Shannon’s information theory and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems prove that creativity can only come from a human consciousness, created by God. Therefore, artificial intelligence is impossible.

    This startling conclusion isn’t generally accepted. Torkel Franzén’s excellent Gödel’s Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to Its Use and Abuse, chapter 4, spends several pages bludgeoning variations on this dumb and bad idea to death:

    there is no such thing as the formally defined language, the axioms, and the rules of inference of “human thought,” and so it makes no sense to speak of applying the incompleteness theorem to human thought.

    If something is not literally a mathematical “formal system,” Gödel doesn’t apply to it.

    The free Google searches and the fiat currencies are side issues — what Gilder really loathes is the very concept of artificial intelligence. It offends him.

    Gilder leans heavily on the ideas of Gregory Chaitin — one of the few mathematicians with a track record of achievement in information theory who also buys into the idea that Gödel’s incompleteness theorem may disprove philosophical materialism. Of the few people convinced by Chaitin’s arguments, most happen to have matching religious beliefs.

    It’s one thing to evaluate technologies according to an ethical framework informed by your religion. It’s quite another to make technological pronouncements directly from your religious views, and to claim mathematical backing for your religious views.

    Your Plastic Pal Who’s Fun to Be With

    Chapter 7 talks about artificial intelligence, and throwing hardware at the problem of machine learning. But it’s really about Gilder’s loathing of the notion of a general artificial intelligence that would be meaningfully comparable to a human being.

    The term “artificial intelligence” has never denoted any particular technology — it’s the compelling science-fictional vision of your plastic pal who’s fun to be with, especially when he’s your unpaid employee. This image has been used through the past few decades to market a wide range of systems that do a small amount of the work a human might otherwise do.

    But throughout Life After Google, Gilder conflates the hypothetical concept of human-equivalent general artificial intelligence with the statistical machine learning products that are presently marketed as “artificial intelligence.”

    Gilder’s next book, Gaming AI: Why AI Can’t Think but Can Transform Jobs (Discovery Institute, 2020), confuses the two somewhat less — but still hammers on his completely wrong ideas about Gödel.

    Gilder ends the chapter with three paragraphs setting out the book’s core thesis:

    The current generation in Silicon Valley has yet to come to terms with the findings of von Neumann and Gödel early in the last century or with the breakthroughs in information theory of Claude Shannon, Gregory Chaitin, Anton Kolmogorov, and John R. Pierce. In a series of powerful arguments, Chaitin, the inventor of algorithmic information theory, has translated Gödel into modern terms. When Silicon Valley’s AI theorists push the logic of their case to explosive extremes, they defy the most crucial findings of twentieth-century mathematics and computer science. All logical schemes are incomplete and depend on propositions that they cannot prove. Pushing any logical or mathematical argument to extremes — whether ‘renormalized’ infinities or parallel universe multiplicities — scientists impel it off the cliffs of Gödelian incompleteness.

    Chaitin’s ‘mathematics of creativity’ suggests that in order to push the technology forward it will be necessary to transcend the deterministic mathematical logic that pervades existing computers. Anything deterministic prohibits the very surprises that define information and reflect real creation. Gödel dictates a mathematics of creativity.

    This mathematics will first encounter a major obstacle in the stunning successes of the prevailing system of the world not only in Silicon Valley but also in finance.

    There’s a lot to unpack here. (That’s an academic jargon phrase meaning “yikes!”) But fundamentally, Gilder believes that Gödel’s incompleteness theorems mean that artificial intelligence can’t come up with true creativity. Because Gilder is a creationist.

    The only place I can find Chaitin using a phrase akin to “mathematics of creativity” is in his 2012 book of intelligent design advocacy, Proving Darwin: Making Biology Mathematical, which Gilder cites. Chaitin writes:

    To repeat: Life is plastic, creative! How can we build this out of static, perfect mathematics? We shall use postmodern math, the mathematics that comes after Gödel, 1931, and Turing, 1936, open not closed math, the math of creativity, in fact.

    Whenever you see Gilder talk about “information theory,” remember that he’s using the special creationist sense of the term — a claim that biological complexity without God pushing it along would require new information being added, and that this is impossible.

    Real information theory doesn’t say anything of the sort — the creationist version is a made-up pseudotheory, developed at the Discovery Institute. It’s the abuse of a scientific metaphor to claim that a loose analogy from an unrelated field is a solid scientific claim.

    Gilder’s doing the thing that bitcoiners, anarchocapitalists and neoreactionaries do — where they ask a lot of the right questions, but come up with answers that are completely on crack, based on abuse of theories that they didn’t bother understanding.

    Chapter 9 is about libertarian transhumanists of the LessWrong tendency, at the 2017 Future Of Life conference on hypothetical future artificial intelligences, hosted by physicist Max Tegmark.

    Eliezer Yudkowsky, the founder of LessWrong, isn’t named or quoted, but the concerns are all reheated Yudkowsky: that a human-equivalent general artificial intelligence will have intelligence but not human values, will rapidly increase its intelligence, and thus its power, vastly beyond human levels, and so will doom us all. Therefore, we must program artificial intelligence to have human values — whatever those are.

    Yudkowsky is not a programmer, but an amateur philosopher. His charity, the Machine Intelligence Research Institute (MIRI), does no programming, and its research outputs are occasional papers in mathematics. Until recently, MIRI was funded by Peter Thiel, but it’s now substantially funded by large Ethereum holders.

    Gilder doesn’t buy Yudkowsky’s AI doomsday theory at all — he firmly believes that artificial intelligence cannot form a mind because, uh, Gödel: “The blind spot of AI is that consciousness does not emerge from thought; it is the source of it.”

    Gilder doesn’t mention that this is because, as a creationist, he believes that true intelligence lies in souls. But he does say “The materialist superstition is a strange growth in an age of information.” So this chapter turns into an exposition of creationist “information theory”:

    This materialist superstition keeps the entire Google generation from understanding mind and creation. Consciousness depends on faith—the ability to act without full knowledge and thus the ability to be surprised and to surprise. A machine by definition lacks consciousness. A machine is part of a determinist order. Lacking surprise or the ability to be surprised, it is self-contained and determined.

    That is: Gilder defines consciousness as whatever it is a machine cannot have, therefore a machine cannot achieve consciousness.

    Real science shows that the universe is a singularity and thus a creation. Creation is an entropic product of a higher consciousness echoed by human consciousness. This higher consciousness, which throughout human history we have found it convenient to call God, endows human creators with the space to originate surprising things.

    You will be unsurprised to hear that “real science” does not say anything like this. But that paragraph is the closest Gilder comes in this book to naming the creationism that drives his outlook.

    The roots of nearly a half-century of frustration reach back to the meeting in Königsberg in 1930, where von Neumann met Gödel and launched the computer age by showing that determinist mathematics could not produce creative consciousness.

    You will be further unsurprised to hear that von Neumann and Gödel never produced a work saying any such thing.

    We’re nine chapters in, a third of the way through the book, and someone from the blockchain world finally shows up — and, indeed, the first appearance of the word “blockchain” in the book at all. Vitalik Buterin, founder of Ethereum and MIRI’s largest individual donor, attends Tegmark’s AI conference: “Buterin succinctly described his company, Ethereum, launched in July 2015, as a ‘blockchain app platform.’”

    The blockchain is “an open, distributed, unhackable ledger devised in 2008 by the unknown person (or perhaps group) known as ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’ to support his cryptocurrency, bitcoin.” This is the closest Gilder comes at any point in the book to saying what a blockchain in fact is.

    Gilder says the AI guys are ignoring the power of blockchain — but they’ll get theirs, oh yes they will:

    Google and its world are looking in the wrong direction. They are actually in jeopardy, not from an all-powerful artificial intelligence, but from a distributed, peer-to-peer revolution supporting human intelligence — the blockchain and new crypto-efflorescence … Google’s security foibles and AI fantasies are unlikely to survive the onslaught of this new generation of cryptocosmic technology.

    Gilder asserts later in the book:

    They see the advance of automation, machine learning, and artificial intelligence as occupying a limited landscape of human dominance and control that ultimately will be exhausted in a robotic universe — Life 3.0. But Charles Sanders Peirce, Kurt Gödel, Alonzo Church, Alan Turing, Emil Post, and Gregory Chaitin disproved this assumption on the most fundamental level of mathematical logic itself.

    These mathematicians still didn’t do any such thing.

    Gilder’s forthcoming book Life after Capitalism (Regnery, 2022), with a 2021 National Review essay as a taster, asserts that his favoured mode of capitalism will reassert itself. Its thesis invokes Gilder’s notions of what he thinks information theory says.

    How Does Blockchain Do All This?

    Gilder has explained the present-day world, and his problems with it. The middle section of the book then goes through several blockchain-related companies and people who catch Gilder’s attention.

    It’s around here that we’d expect Gilder to start explaining what the blockchain is, how it works, and precisely how it will break the Google paradigm of big data, machine learning and artificial intelligence — the way he did when talking about the downfall of television.

    Gilder doesn’t even bother — he just starts talking about bitcoin and blockchains as Google-beaters, and carries through on the assumption that this is understood.

    But he can’t get away with this — he claims to be making a case for the successor to the Google paradigm, a technological case … and he just doesn’t ever do so.

    By the end of this section, Gilder seems to think he’s made his point clear that Google is having trouble scaling up — because they don’t charge a micro-payment for each interaction, or something — therefore various blockchain promises will win.

    The trouble with this syllogism is that the second part doesn’t follow. Gilder presents blockchain projects he thinks have potential — but that’s all. He makes the first case, and just doesn’t make the second.

    Peter Thiel Hates Universities Very Much

    Instead, let’s go to the 1517 Fund — “led by venture capitalist-hackers Danielle Strachman and Mike Gibson and partly financed by Peter Thiel.” Gilder is also a founding partner.

    Gilder is a massive Thiel fan, calling him “the master investor-philosopher Peter Thiel”:

    Thiel is the leading critic of Silicon Valley’s prevailing philosophy of ‘inevitable’ innovation. [Larry] Page, on the other hand, is a machine-learning maximalist who believes that silicon will soon outperform human beings, however you want to define the difference.

    Thiel is a fan of Gilder, and Life After Google, in turn.

    The 1517 Fund’s name comes from “another historic decentralization” — 31 October 1517 was the day that Martin Luther put up his ninety-five theses on a church door in Wittenberg.

    The 1517 team want to take down the government conspiracy of paperwork university credentials, which ties into the fiat-currency-based system of the world. Peter Thiel offers Thiel Fellowships, where he pays young geniuses not to go to college. Vitalik Buterin, founder of Ethereum, got a Thiel Fellowship.

    1517 also invests in the artificial intelligence stuff that Gilder derided in the previous section, but let’s never mind that.

    The Universidad Francisco Marroquín in Guatemala is a university for Austrian and Chicago School economics. Gilder uses UFM as a launch pad for a rant about US academia, and the 1517 Fund’s “New 95” theses about how much Thiel hates the US university system. Again: they ask some good questions, but their premises are bizarre, and their answers are on crack.

    Fictional Evidence

    Gilder rambles about author Neal Stephenson, who he’s a massive fan of. The MacGuffin of Stephenson’s 1999 novel Cryptonomicon is a cryptographic currency backed by gold. Stephenson’s REAMDE (2011) is set in a Second Life-style virtual world whose currency is based on gold, and which includes something very like Bitcoin mining:

    Like gold standards through most of human history — look it up — T’Rain’s virtual gold standard is an engine of wealth. T’Rain prospers mightily. Even though its money is metafictional, it is in fact more stable than currencies in the real world of floating exchange rates and fiat money.

    Thus, fiction proves Austrian economics correct! Because reality certainly doesn’t — which is why Ludwig von Mises repudiated empirical testing of his monetary theories early on.

    Is There Anything Bitcoin Can’t Do?

    Gilder asserts that “Bitcoin has already fostered thousands of new apps and firms and jobs.” His example is cryptocurrency mining, which is notoriously light on labour requirements. Even as of 2022, the blockchain sector employed 18,000 software developers — or 0.07% of all developers.

    “Perhaps someone should be building an ark. Or perhaps bitcoin is our ark — a new monetary covenant containing the seeds of a new system of the world.” I wonder why the story of the ark sprang to his mind.

    One chapter is a dialogue, in which Gilder speaks to an imaginary Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin’s pseudonymous creator, about how makework — Bitcoin mining — can possibly create value. “Think of this as a proposed screenplay for a historic docudrama on Satoshi. It is based entirely on recorded posts by Satoshi, interlarded with pleasantries and other expedients characteristic of historical fictions.”

    Gilder fingers cryptographer Nick Szabo as the most likely candidate for Bitcoin’s pseudonymous creator, Satoshi Nakamoto — “the answer to three sophisticated textual searches that found Szabo’s prose statistically more akin to Nakomoto’s than that of any other suspected Satoshista.”

    In the blockchain world, any amazing headline that would turn the world upside-down were it true is unlikely to be true. Gilder has referenced a CoinDesk article, which references research from Aston University’s Centre for Forensic Linguistics.

    I tracked this down to an Aston University press release. The press release does not link to any research outputs — the “study” was an exercise that Jack Grieve at Aston gave his final-year students, then wrote up as a splashy bit of university press-release-ware.

    The press release doesn’t make its case either: “Furthermore, the researchers found that the bitcoin whitepaper was drafted using Latex, an open-source document preparation system. Latex is also used by Szabo for all his publications.” LaTeX is used by most computer scientists anywhere for their publications — but the Bitcoin white paper was written in OpenOffice 2.4, not LaTeX.

    This press release is still routinely used by lazy writers to claim that Szabo is Satoshi, ’cos they heard that linguistic analysis says so. Gilder could have dived an inch below the surface on this remarkable claim, and just didn’t.

    Gilder then spends a chapter on Craig Wright, who — unlike Szabo — claims to be Satoshi. This is based on Andrew O’Hagan’s lengthy biographical piece on Wright, “The Satoshi Affair” for the London Review of Books, reprinted in his book The Secret Life: Three True Stories. This is largely a launch pad for how much better Vitalik Buterin’s ideas are than Wright’s.

    Blockstack

    We’re now into a list of blockchainy companies that Gilder is impressed with. This chapter introduces Muneeb Ali and his blockchain startup, Blockstack, whose pitch is a parallel internet where you own all your data, in some unspecified sense. Sounds great!

    Ali wants a two-layer network: “monolith, the predictable carriers of the blockchain underneath, and metaverse, the inventive and surprising operations of its users above.” So, Ethereum then — a blockchain platform, with applications running on top.

    Gilder recites the press release description of Blockstack and what it can do — i.e., might hypothetically do in the astounding future.

    Under its new name, Stacks, the system is being used as a platform for CityCoins — local currencies on a blockchain — which was started in the 2021 crypto bubble. MiamiCoin notably collapsed in price a few months after its 2021 launch, and the city only didn’t show a massive loss on the cryptocurrency because Stacks bailed them out on their losses.

    Brendan Eich and Brave

    Brendan Eich is famous in the technical world as one of the key visionaries behind the Netscape web browser, the Mozilla Foundation, and the Firefox web browser, and as the inventor of the JavaScript programming language.

    Eich is most famous in the non-technical world for his 2008 donation to Proposition 8, to make gay marriage against the California constitution. This donation came to light in 2012, and made international press at the time.

    Techies can get away with believing the most awful things, as long as they stay locked away in their basement — but Eich was made CEO of Mozilla in 2014, and somehow the board thought the donation against gay marriage wouldn’t immediately become 100% of the story.

    One programmer, whose own marriage had been directly messed up by Proposition 8, said he couldn’t in good conscience keep working on Firefox-related projects — and this started a worldwide boycott of Mozilla and Firefox. Eich refused to walk back his donation in any manner — though he did promise not to actively seek to violate California discrimination law in the course of his work at Mozilla, so that’s nice — and quit a few weeks later.

    Eich went off to found Brave, a new web browser that promises to solve the Internet advertising problem using Basic Attention Tokens, a token that promises a decentralised future for paying publishers that is only slightly 100% centralised in all functional respects.

    Gilder uses Eich mostly to launch into a paean to Initial Coin Offerings — specifically, in their rôle as unregistered penny stock offerings. Gilder approves of ICOs bypassing regulation, and doesn’t even mention how the area was suffused with fraud, nor the scarcity of ICOs that delivered on any of their promises. The ICO market collapsed after multiple SEC actions against these blatant securities frauds.

    Gilder also approves of Brave’s promise to combat Google’s advertising monopoly, by, er, replacing Google’s ads with Brave’s own ads.

    Goodbye Digital

    Dan Berninger’s internet phone startup Hello Digital is, or was, an enterprise so insignificant it isn’t in the first twenty companies returned by a Google search on “hello digital”. Gilder loves it.

    Berninger’s startup idea involved end-to-end non-neutral precedence for Hello Digital’s data. And the US’s net neutrality rules apparently preclude this. Berninger sued the FCC to make it possible to set up high-precedence private clearways for Hello Digital’s data on the public Internet.

    This turns out to be Berninger’s suit against the FCC to protest “net neutrality” — on which the Supreme Court denied certiorari in December 2018.

    Somehow, Skype and many other applications managed enormously successful voice-over-internet a decade previously on a data-neutral Internet. But these other systems “fail to take advantage of the spontaneous convergence of interests on particular websites. They provide no additional sources of revenue for Web pages with independent content. And they fail to add the magic of high-definition voice.” Apparently, all of this requires proprietary clearways for such data on the public network? Huge if true.

    Gilder brings up 5G mobile Internet. I think it’s supposed to be in Google’s interests? Therefore it must be bad. Nothing blockchainy here, this chapter’s just “Google bad, regulation bad”.

    The Empire Strikes Back

    Old world big money guys — Jamie Dimon, Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger, Paul Krugman — say Bitcoin is trash. Gilder maintains that this is good news for Bitcoin.

    Blockchain fans and critics — and nobody else — will have seen Kai Stinchcombe’s blog post of December 2017, “Ten years in, nobody has come up with a use for blockchain.” Stinchcombe points out that “after years of tireless effort and billions of dollars invested, nobody has actually come up with a use for the blockchain — besides currency speculation and illegal transactions.” It’s a good post, and you should read it.

    Gilder spends an entire chapter on this blog post. Some guy who wrote a blog post is a mid-level boss in this book.

    Gilder concedes that Stinchcombe’s points are hard to argue with. But Stinchcome merely being, you know, right, is irrelevant — because, astounding future!

    Stinchcombe writes from the womb of the incumbent financial establishment, which has recently crippled world capitalism with a ten-year global recession.

    One day a bitcoiner will come up with an argument that isn’t “but what about those other guys” — but today is not that day.

    At Last, We Escape

    We’ve made it to the last chapter. Gilder summarises how great the blockchain future will be:

    The revolution in cryptography has caused a great unbundling of the roles of money, promising to reverse the doldrums of the Google Age, which has been an epoch of bundling together, aggregating, all the digital assets of the world.

    Gilder confidently asserts ongoing present-day processes that are not, here in tawdry reality, happening:

    Companies are abandoning hierarchy and pursuing heterarchy because, as the Tapscotts put it, ‘blockchain technology offers a credible and effective means not only of cutting out intermediaries, but also of radically lowering transaction costs, turning firms into networks, distributing economic power, and enabling both wealth creation and a more prosperous future.’

    If you read Don and Alex Tapscott’s Blockchain Revolution (Random House, 2016), you’ll see that they too fail to demonstrate any of these claims in the existing present rather than the astounding future. Instead, the Tapscotts spend several hundred pages talking about how great it’s all going to be potentially, and only note blockchain’s severe technical limitations in passing at the very end of the book.

    We finish with some stirring blockchain triumphalism:

    Most important, the crypto movement led by bitcoin has reasserted the principle of scarcity, unveiling the fallacy of the prodigal free goods and free money of the Google era. Made obsolete will be all the lavish Google prodigies given away and Google mines and minuses promoted as ads, as well as Google Minds fantasizing superminds in conscious machines.

    Bitcoin promoters routinely tout “scarcity” as a key advantage of their Internet magic beans — ignoring, as Gilder consistently does, that anyone can create a whole new magical Internet money by cut’n’paste, and they do. Austrian economics advocates had noted that issue ever since it started happening with altcoins in the early 2010s.

    The Google era is coming to an end because Google tries to cheat the constraints of economic scarcity and security by making its goods and services free. Google’s Free World is a way of brazenly defying the centrality of time in economics and reaching beyond the wallets of its customers directly to seize their time.

    The only ways in which the Google era has been shown to be “coming to an end” is that their technologies are reaching the tops of their S-curves. This absolutely counts as an end point as Gilder describes technological innovation, and he might even be right that Google’s era is ending — but his claimed reasons have just been asserted, and not at all shown.

    By reestablishing the connections between computation, finance, and AI on the inexorable metrics of time and space, the great unbundling of the blockchain movement can restore economic reality.

    The word “can” is doing all the work there. It was nine years at this book’s publication, and thirteen years now, and there’s a visible lack of progress on this front.

    Everything will apparently decentralise naturally, because at last it can:

    Disaggregated will be all the GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft conglomerates) — the clouds of concentrated computing and commerce.

    The trouble with this claim is that the whole crypto and blockchain middleman infrastructure is full of monopolies, rentiers and central points of failure — because centralisation is always more economically efficient than decentralisation.

    We see recentralisation over and over. Bitcoin mining recentralised by 2014. Ethereum mining was always even more centralised than Bitcoin mining, and almost all practical use of Ethereum has long been dependent on ConsenSys’ proprietary Infura network. “Decentralisation” has always been a legal excuse to say “can’t sue me, bro,” and not any sort of operational reality.

    Gilder concludes:

    The final test is whether the new regime serves the human mind and consciousness. The measure of all artificial intelligence is the human mind. It is low-power, distributed globally, low-latency in proximity to its environment, inexorably bounded in time and space, and creative in the image of its creator.

    Gilder wants you to know that he really, really hates the idea of artificial intelligence, for religious reasons.

    Epilogue: The New System of the World

    Gilder tries virtual reality goggles and likes them: “Virtual reality is the opposite of artificial intelligence, which tries to enhance learning by machines. Virtual reality asserts the primacy of mind over matter. It is founded on the singularity of human minds rather than a spurious singularity of machines.”

    There’s a bit of murky restating of his theses: “The opposite of memoryless Markov chains is blockchains.” I’m unconvinced this sentence is any less meaningless with the entire book as context.

    And Another Thing!

    “Some Terms of Art and Information for Life after Google” at the end of the book isn’t a glossary — it’s a section for idiosyncratic assertions without justification that Gilder couldn’t fit in elsewhere, e.g.:

    Chaitin’s Law: Gregory Chaitin, inventor of algorithmic information theory, ordains that you cannot use static, eternal, perfect mathematics to model dynamic creative life. Determinist math traps the mathematician in a mechanical process that cannot yield innovation or surprise, learning or life. You need to transcend the Newtonian mathematics of physics and adopt post-modern mathematics — the mathematics that follows Gödel (1931) and Turing (1936), the mathematics of creativity.

    There doesn’t appear to be such a thing as “Chaitin’s Law” — all Google hits on the term are quotes of Gilder’s book.

    Gilder also uses this section for claims that only make sense if you already buy into the jargon of goldbug economics that failed out in the real world:

    Economic growth: Learning tested by falsifiability or possible bankruptcy. This understanding of economic growth follows from Karl Popper’s insight that a scientific proposition must be framed in terms that are falsifiable or refutable. Government guarantees prevent learning and thus thwart economic growth.

    Summary

    Gilder is sharp as a tack in interviews. I can only hope to be that sharp when I’m seventy-nine. But Life After Google fails in important ways — ways that Regnery bothering to bless the book with an editorial axe might have remedied. Gilder should have known better, in so many directions, and so should Regnery.

    Gilder keeps making technological and mathematical claims based directly on his religious beliefs. This does none of his other ideas any favours.

    Gilder is sincere. (Apart from that time he was busted lying about intelligent design not being intended to promote religion.) I think Gilder really does believe that Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and Shannon’s information theory, as further developed by Chaitin, mathematically prove that intelligence requires the hand of God. He just doesn’t show it, and nor has anyone else — particularly not any of the names he drops.

    This book will not inform you as to the future of the blockchain. It’s worse than typical ill-informed blockchain advocacy text, because Gilder’s track record means we expect more of him. Gilder misses key points he has no excuse for missing.

    The book may be of use in its rôle as some of what’s informing the technically incoherent blockchain dreams of billionaires. But it’s a slog.

    Those interested in blockchain — for or against — aren’t going to get anything useful from this book. Bitcoin advocates may see new avenues and memes for evangelism. Gilder fans appear disappointed so far.

    _____

    David Gerard is a writer, technologist, and leading critic of bitcoin and blockchain. He is the author of Attack of the 50-Foot Blockchain: Bitcoin, Blockchain, Ethereum and Smart Contracts (2017) and Libra Shrugged: How Facebook Tried to Take Over the Money (2020), and blogs at https://davidgerard.co.uk/blockchain/.

    Back to the essay