• Arne De Boever — Realist Horror — Review of “Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, and Twenty-First-Century Culture”

    Arne De Boever — Realist Horror — Review of “Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, and Twenty-First-Century Culture”

    by Arne De Boever

    Review of Annie McClanahan, Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, and Twenty-First-Century Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017)

    This essay has been peer-reviewed by the boundary 2 editorial collective.

    The Financial Turn

    The financial crisis of 2007-8 has led to a veritable boom of finance novels, that subgenre of the novel that deals with “the economy”.[i] I am thinking of novels such as Jess Walter’s The Financial Lives of the Poets (2009), Jonathan Dee’s The Privileges (2010), Adam Haslett’s Union Atlantic (2010), Teddy Wayne’s Kapitoil (2010), Cristina Alger’s The Darlings (2012), John Lanchester’s Capital (2012), David Foster Wallace’s The Pale King (2012),[ii] Mohsin Hamid’s How To Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia (2013), Nathaniel Rich’s Odds Against Tomorrow (2013), Meg Wolitzer’s The Interestings (2013)—and those are only a few.

    Literary criticism has followed suit. Annie McClanahan’s Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, and Twenty-First Century Culture (published in the post-45 series edited by Kate Marshall and Loren Glass) studies some of those novels. It follows on the heels of Leigh Claire La Berge’s Scandals and Abstraction: Financial Fiction of the Long 1980s (2015) and Anna Kornbluh’s Realizing Capital: Financial and Psychic Economies in Victorian Form (2014), both of which deal with earlier instances of financial fiction. By 2014, McClanahan had already edited (with Hamilton Carroll) a “Fictions of Speculation” special issue of the Journal of American Studies. At the time of my writing, Alison Shonkwiler’s The Financial Imaginary: Economic Mystification and the Limits of Realist Fiction has just appeared, and no doubt, many more will follow. In the Coda to her book, La Berge mentions that scholars are beginning to talk about the “critical studies of finance” to bring together these developments into a thriving field.

    Importantly, Dead Pledges looks not only at novels but also at poetry, conceptual art, photography, and film. Indeed, the “financial turn” involves more than fiction: J.C. Chandor’s Margin Call (2011), Costa-Gavras’ Capital (2012), Martin Scorcese’s The Wolf of Wall Street (2013), and Adam McKay’s The Big Short (2015) were all released in the aftermath of the 2007-8 crisis. American Psycho, the musical, premiered in London in 2013 and moved on to New York in 2016.

    All of this contemporary work builds on and explicitly references earlier instances of thinking and writing about the economy, so it is not as if this interest in the economy is anything new. However, given the finance novel’s particular name one could argue that while the genre of the finance novel—understood more broadly as any novel about the economy–precedes the present, it is only during the financial era, which began in the early 1970s, and especially since the financial crisis of 2007-8 that it has truly come into its own. For the specific challenge that is now set before the finance novel is precisely to render the historic formation of “finance” into fiction. Critics have noted that such a rendering cannot be taken for granted. While capitalism has traditionally been associated with the realist novel (as La Berge and Shonkwiler at the outset of their edited collection Reading Capitalist Realism point out[iii]), literary scholars consider that capitalism’s intensification into financial or finance capitalism or finance tout court also intensifies the challenge to realism that some had already associated with global capitalism.[iv] Abstract and complex, finance exceeds what Julia Breitbach has observed to be some of the key characteristics of realism: “narration”, associated with “readable plots and recognizable characters”; “communication”, allowing “the reader to create meaning and closure”; “reference”, or “language that can refer to external realities, that is, to ‘the world out there’”; and “ethics”, “a return to commitment and empathy”.[v]

    In the late 1980s, and just before the October 19th, 1987 “Black Monday” stock market crash, Tom Wolfe may still have thought that to represent finance, one merely had to flex one’s epistemological muscle: all novelists had to do, Wolfe wrote, is report—to bring “the billion-footed beast of reality” to terms.[vi] However, by the time Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho comes around, that novel presents itself as an explicit response to Wolfe,[vii] proposing a financial surrealism or what could perhaps be called a “psychotic realism” (Antonio Scurati) to capture the lives that finance produces. If (as per a famous analysis) late capitalism’s aesthetic was not so much realist but postmodernist, late late capitalism or just-in-time capitalism has only intensified those developments, leading some to propose post-postmodernism as the next phase in this contemporary history.[viii]

    At the same time, realism seems to have largely survived the postmodernist and post-postmodernist onslaughts: in fact, it too has been experiencing a revival,[ix] and one that is visible in, and in some cases dramatized in, the contemporary finance novel (which thereby exceeds the kind of financial realism that Wolfe proposes). Indeed, one reason for this revival could be that in the aftermath of the financial crisis, novelists have precisely sought to render abstract and complex finance legible, and comprehensible, through literature—to bring a realism to the abstract and complex world of finance.

    Given realism’s close association with capitalism, and its post- and post-postmodern crisis under late capitalism and finance, none of this should come as a surprise. Rather, it means that critics can consider the finance novel in its various historical articulations as a privileged site to test realism’s limits and limitations.

    Finance, Credit, Mortgage

    If Karl Marx’s celebrated formula of capital—M-C-M’, with money leading to money that is worth more via the intermediary of the commodity—is quasi-identified with the realist novel, the formula’s shortened, financial variation—M-M’, money leading to money that is worth more without the intermediary of the commodity[x]—has come to mark its challenges. Perhaps in part reflecting this narrative (though this is not explicitly stated in the book), Dead Pledges’ study of the cultural representations of finance starts with a discussion of the realist novel but quickly moves away from it in order to look elsewhere in search of representations of finance.

    McClanahan’s case-studies concern the early twenty-first century, specifically the aftermath of the 2007-8 crisis. However, the historical-theoretical framework of Dead Pledges focuses on credit and debt. It extends some 40 years before that, to the early 1970s and the transformations of the economy that were set in motion then. Dead Pledges thus takes up the history of financialization, which is usually dated back to that time. Neoliberalism, which is sometimes confused with finance and shares some of its history, comes up a few times in the book’s pages but is not a key term in the analysis.

    One could bring in various reasons for the periodization that McClanahan adopts, including—though with some important caveats—the Nixon administration’s unilateral decision in 1971 to abolish the gold standard, thus ultimately ending the Bretton Woods international exchange agreements that had been in place since World War Two and propelling the international markets into the so-called “Nixon shock.” However, in his key text “Culture and Finance Capital” Fredric Jameson already warned against the false suggestion of solidity and tangibility that such a reference to the gold standard (which was really “an artificial and contradictory system in its own right”, as Jameson points out[xi]) might bring. Certainly for McClanahan, who focuses on credit and debt and is not that interested in money, it would make sense to abandon so-called commodity theories of money and fiat theories of money—which have proposed that the origins of money lie in the exchange of goods or a sovereign fiat—for the credit or debt theory of money which, as per the revisionist analyses of for example David Graeber and Felix Martin,[xii] have exposed those other theories’ limitations. Indeed, McClanahan’s book explicitly mentions Graeber and other contemporary theorists of credit and debt (Richard Dienst, Maurizio Lazzarato, Angela Mitropoulos, Fred Moten and Stefano Harvey, Miranda Joseph, Andrew Ross) as companion thinkers, even if none of those writers is engaged in any detail in the book.

    Since the 1970s, consumer debt has exploded in the United States and Dead Pledges ultimately zooms in on a particular form of credit and debt, namely the home mortgage. McClanahan inherits this focus from the collapse of the home mortgage market, which triggered the 2007-8 crisis. McClanahan rehearses the history, and the complicated technical history, of this collapse at various moments throughout the book. Although this history is likely more or less familiar to readers, the repetition of its technical detail (from various angles, depending on the focus of each of McClanahan’s chapters) is welcome. As McClanahan points out, home mortgages used to be “deposit-financed” (6). While there was always a certain amount of what Marx in Capital: Vol. 3 called “fictitious capital”[xiii] (“fiktives Kapital”) in play—banks can write out more mortgages than they actually have money for based on their credit-worthy borrower’s promise to repay (with interest)—the amount of fictitious capital has increased exponentially since the 1970s. More and more frequently mortgages are being funded not through deposits but “through the sale of speculative financial instruments” (6)—basically, through the sale of a borrower’s promise to repay. This development is enabled by the practice of securitization: many mortgages are bundled together into what is called a tranche, which is then sold as a financial instrument—a mortgage backed security (MBS) or collateralized debt obligation (CDO). These kinds of instruments, so-called derivatives, are the hallmark of what in Giovanni Arrighi’s terms we can understand as the phase of capitalism’s financial expansion (see 14). This refers to an economic cycle during which value is produced not so much through the making of commodities but through value’s “extraction” (as Saskia Sassen puts it[xiv]) beyond what can be realized in the commodity—in this particular case, through the creation and especially the circulation of bundles of mortgages.

    As McClanahan explains, securitization is about “creating a secondary market” (6) for the sale of debt. The value of those kinds of debt-backed “commodities” (if we can still call them that) does not so much come from what they are worth as products—indeed, their value is dubious since for example the already mentioned tranches will include both triple A rated mortgages (mortgages with a low risk of default) and subprime mortgages (like the infamous NINJA mortgages that were granted to people with No Income, No Jobs, No Assets). Nevertheless, those MBSs or CDOs often still received a high rating, based on the flawed idea that the risk of value-loss was lessened by mixing the low risk mortgages with the high risk mortgages. What seemed to have mattered most was not so much the value of an MBS or CDO as product but their circulation, which is the mode of value-generation that Jasper Bernes among others has deemed to be central to the financial era. Ultimately, and while they brought the global financial system to the edge of collapse, they also generated extreme value for those who shorted those financial products. And shorted them big, as Adam McKay’s The Big Short would have it (Paramount, 2015; based on Michael Lewis’ 2010 book by the same title). By betting against them, the protagonists of Lewis’ and McKay’s story made an immense profit while everyone else suffered catastrophic losses.

    “Dematerialization” alone and cognate understandings of finance as “performative” and “linguistic”[xv]—in other words, this story as it could be told using the abolition of the gold standard as the central point of reference—cannot tell the whole truth here, especially not since credit and debt can actually be found at the origin of money. However, through those historico-economic developments of credit and debt there emerges a transformed role of credit and debt in our societies, from a “form of exchange that reinforces social cohesion” (185) to “a regime of securitization and exploitable risk, of expropriation and eviction” (182). Dematerialization—or perhaps better, various rematerializations: for example from gold or real estate to securitized mortgage debt—is important but without the material specifics of the history that McClanahan recounts, it does not tell us all that much.

    Echoing David Harvey’s description of the need for “new markets for [capital’s] goods and less expensive labor to produce them” as a “spatial fix” (Harvey qtd. 12), McClanahan reads the history summarized above as a “temporal fix” because “it allows capital to treat an anticipated realization of value as if it had already happened” (13). In 2007-8, of course, that fix turned out to be an epic fuck-up. McClanahan recalls Arrighi’s periodization (after Fernand Braudel) of capitalism as alternating “between epochs of material expansion (investment in production and manufacturing) and phases of financial expansion (investment in stock and capital markets)” (14) and notes that the 2007-8 crisis seems to have marked the end of the phase of financial expansion.

    In Arrighi’s view, that would mean the time has come for the emergence of a new superpower, one that will step in for the U.S. as the global hegemon. A return of American (U.S.) greatness through a return to an era of material expansion (as the current U.S. President Donald J. Trump is proposing) appears unlikely within this framework: at best, it will have some short-lived, anachronistic success before the new hegemon arrives. However, will that new hegemon arrive? According to some, and McClanahan appears to align herself with those, the current crisis of the system “will not lead to the emergence of a new regime of capitalist accumulation under a different imperial superpower” (15). “Instead, it heralds something akin to a ‘terminal crisis’ in which no renewal of capital profitability is possible” (15). Does this then lead to an eternal winter, as Joshua Clover already asked?[xvi] Alternatively, are we finally done with those phases, and ready for something new?

    The Novel: Scale and Character

    If all of this has been theoretical so far, Dead Pledges’ four chapters stand out first as nuanced readings of works of contemporary culture. As McClanahan sees it, culture is the best site to understand debt as a “ubiquitous yet elusive social form” (2). By that, she does not mean we should forget about economic textbooks; but to understand debt as a “social form”, culture is the go-to place. McClanahan’s inquiry starts out traditionally, with a chapter about the contemporary realist novel. In it, she takes on behavioral economics, a subfield of microeconomics. Unlike macroeconomics, microeconomics focuses on individual human decisions. Whereas microeconomic models tend to assume rational agents, behavioralism does not: non-rational human decisions might cause or result from a market crisis.

    What caused the 2007-8 crisis? There are multiple answers, and McClanahan shows that they are in tension with one another. One answer—the macroeconomic one–is that the crisis was the result of an abstract and complex financial system that caved in on itself. Such an explanation tends to avoid individual responsibility. On the other hand, microeconomics, and behavioralism in particular, blames the crisis on the bad decisions of a few individuals, which exculpates institutions. This seemed to be the dominant mode of explanation. In this explanation too, however, the buck seemed to stop nowhere: how many bankers went to jail for the catastrophic market losses they caused? This leads to a larger question: how should one negotiate, in economics, between the macro and the micro, between the individual and the system—how should one assign blame, enforce accountability? How should one regulate? How should one even think, and represent, the connections between systems and individuals?

    One cultural form that has been particularly good at this negotiation is the novel, which tends to tell a macro-story through its representation of the micro, and so seeks “to capture the reality of a structural, even impersonal, economic and social whole” (24) while also considering “individual investors’ ‘personal impulses’” (31). This is what McClanahan finds in Martha McPhee’s Dear Money (2010), Adam Haslitt’s Union Atlantic, and Jonathan Dee’s The Privileges. These novels marry the macro- and the micro-economical; they accomplish what McClanahan presents as a scalar negotiation. However, one should note that in doing so, they keep the behavioralist model intact—for they suggest that individual bad decisions lie at the origin of macroeconomic events. McClanahan shows, however, that as novels Dear Money, Union Atlantic, and The Privileges take on that behavioralist remainder, in other words: the novel’s characteristic “focus on subjective experience and the meaningfulness of being a subject” (33), through their awareness of their place in the genealogy of the novel. McClanahan’s readings ultimately reveal that the novels she looks at cannot save the individual from what she terms “a kind of ontological attenuation or even annulment” (33) that comes with their account of the 2007-8 crisis. Out go the full characters of the realist novel. The crisis demands it.

    What is left? The chapter culminates in a reading of Dee’s novel in which McClanahan cleverly suggests that the novel explores “the formal limits of sympathetic identification” and tells “money’s” story rather than the story of Adam and Cynthia “Morey” (51), who are the novel’s main characters. Thus, the novel is not so much about behavioralist psychology but about money itself. Capital is remade in the novel, McClanahan argues, “in the image of the human” (52), creating the uncanny effect of human beings who are merely stand-ins for money. Adam Morey/Money “has no agency, and he is all automaton, no autonomy. He has no interiority” (53). McClanahan does not note that this description places Adam in line with American Psycho’s “automated teller”[xvii] Patrick Bateman, who in a famous passage observes that while

    there is an idea of a Patrick Bateman, some kind of abstraction, … there is no real me, only an entity, something illusory, and though I can hide my cold gaze and you can shake my hand and feel flesh gripping yours and maybe you can even sense our lifestyles are probably comparable: I simply am not there”.[xviii]

    Like Bateman’s narrative voice, which echoes the abstraction of finance, The Privileges’ voice is that of “investment itself” (52), which swallows human beings up whole.

    If the neoliberal novel, as per Walter Benn Michaels’ analysis (from which McClanahan quotes; 53) reduces society to individuals (and possibly their families, following Maggie Thatcher’s claim), The Privileges as a finance novel goes beyond that and “liquidat[es]” (53) individuals themselves. We are encountering here the terminal crisis of character that writes, in the guise of the realist novel, our financial present. Rich characterization is out. The poor character is the mark of financial fiction.

    Yet, such depersonalization does not capture the full dynamic of financialization either. In Chapter 2, McClanahan draws this out through a discussion of the credit score and its relation to contemporary literature. Although one’s credit score is supposed to be objective, the fact that one can receive different credit scores from different agencies demonstrates that an instability haunts it—and resubjectifies, if not repersonalizes, it. McClanahan starts out with a reading of an ad campaign for a website selling credit reports that quite literally personalizes the scores one can receive. It probably comes as no surprise that one’s ideal score is personalized as a white, tall, and fit young man; the bad score is represented by a short balding guy with a paunch. He also wears a threatening hockey mask.

    McClanahan suggests that what structures the difference here between the objective and the subjective, the impersonal and the personalized, is the difference between neutral credit and morally shameful debt. The former is objective and impersonal; the latter is subjective and personalized. The problem with this distinction, however, is not only that the supposedly objective credit easily lets the subjective slip back in (as is evident from the ad campaign McClanahan discusses); discussions of subjective debt also often lack quantitative and material evidence (when they ignore, for example, “the return in debt collection to material coercion rather than moral persuasion”; 57). Rather than showing how the personal can become “a corrective for credit’s impersonality” and how “objectivity [can become] a solution to the problem of debt’s personalization” (57)—debt always operates on the side of both–McClanahan considers how contemporary literature and conceptual art have turned those issues into “a compelling set of questions to be pursued” (57).

    If in the finance novel, rich characterization is out, a question arises: what alternatives emerge for characterization at the crossroads of “credit, debt, and personhood” (57)? As McClanahan points out, there is a history to this question in the fact that “the practice of credit evaluation borrowed the realist novel’s ways of describing fictional persons as well as the formal habits of reading and interpretation the novel demanded” (59). The relation went both ways: “the realist novel drew on the credit economy’s models of typification … to produce socially legible characters” (59). Because “quantitative or systematized instruments for evaluating the fiscal soundness” of borrowers were absent, creditors used to rely “on subjective evaluations of personal character” to assess “a borrower’s economic riskiness” (59). Such evaluations used to take a narrative form; in other words, the credit report used to be a story. It provided a detail of characterization that readers of literature would know how to interpret. The novel—the information it provided, the interpretation it required—was the model for this, for the credit report.

    Enter the quantitative revolution: in the early 1970s the credit report becomes a credit score, the result of “an empirical technique that uses statistical methodology to predict the probability of repayment by credit applicants” (63). Narrative and character go out the window; the algorithmically generated score is all that counts. It is the end of the person in credit. As McClanahan is quick to point out, however, the credit score nevertheless cannot quite leave the person behind, as the “creditworthiness” that the credit score sums up ultimately “remains a quality of individuals rather than of data” (65). Therefore, the person inevitably slips back in, leading for example to the behavioralist models that McClanahan discusses in Chapter 1. Persons become numbers, but only to inevitably return as persons. McClanahan’s reading of the credit score negotiates this interchange.

    One can find some of this in Gary Shteyngart’s Super Sad True Love Story (2010). If critics have faulted the novel for its caricatures and stereotypes, which “[decline] the conventions of characterization associated with the realist novel” (68), McClanahan argues that Shteyngart’s characters are in fact “emblematic of the contemporary regime of credit scoring” (68). Shteyngart’s use of caricature “captures the creation of excessively particular data-persons”; his “use of stereotype registers the paradox by which a contemporary credit economy also reifies generalized social categories” (71). While the credit score supposedly does not “discriminate by race, gender, age, or class” (71), in fact it does. McClanahan relies in part on Frank Pasquale’s important work in The Black Box Society to note credit scoring systematizes bias “in hidden ways” (Pasquale qtd. 72)—hidden because black boxed. This leads McClanahan back to the ad campaign with which she opened her chapter, now noting “its racialization” (72). The chapter closes with a discussion of how conceptual art and conceptual writing about credit and debt have negotiated the issue of personalization (and impersonalization). If “the personal” in Chapter 1 was associated first and foremost with microeconomics and behavioralism (which McClanahan criticizes), McClanahan shows that it can also do “radical work” (77) in response to credit’s impersonalization as “a simultaneously expanded and denaturalized category … representing social relations and collective subjects as if they were speaking persons and thus setting into motion a complex dialectic between the personal and the impersonal” (77). She does this through a discussion of the work of conceptual artist Cassie Thornton and the photographs of the “We are the 99%” tumblr. Mathew Timmons’ work of conceptual writing CREDIT, on the other hand, plays with the impersonal to “provide an account of what constitutes the personal in the contemporary credit economy” (89).

    Although McClanahan does not explicitly state this, I read the arch of her Chapters 1 and 2 as a recuperation of the personal from its negative role in behavioralism (as well as its naturalized, racist role in the credit scoring that is discussed in Chapter 2), and more broadly from microeconomics. Following Thornton in particular (whose art also features on the cover of Dead Pledges), McClanahan opens up the personal onto the macro of the social and the collective. In Dead Pledges, the novel and especially the realist novel turn out to be productive sites to pursue such a project due to the scalar negotiation and rich characterization that are typical of the genre—and in the credit-crisis novel both of those are under pressure. If the novel gradually disappears from Dead Pledges to give way to photography and film in Chapters 3 and 4, the concern with realism remains. Indeed, McClanahan’s book ultimately seems to want to tease out a realism of the credit-crisis era, and it is that project to which I now turn.

    Foreclosure Photography and Horror Films

    In Chapters 3 and 4, once the novel is out of the way, McClanahan’s brilliance as a cultural studies scholar finally shines. Dead Pledges’ third chapter looks at post-crisis photography and “foreclosure photography” in particular. The term refers to photography of foreclosed homes but evokes the very practice of photography itself, which depends on a shutter mechanism that closes—or rather opens very quickly–in order to capture a reality. This signals a complicity between foreclosure and photography that McClanahan’s chapter explores, for example in a discussion of photographs of forced eviction by John Moore and Anthony Suau, which allow McClanahan to draw out the complicities between photography and the police—but not just the police. She notes, for example, that “[t]he photographer’s presence on the scene is underwritten by the capacity of both the state and the bank to violate individual privacy” (114). Dead Pledges ties that violation of individual privacy to a broader cultural development towards what McClanahan provocatively calls “unhousing” (115), evident for example in how various TV shows allow the camera to enter into the private sanctuary of the home to show how people live. Here, “the sanctity of domestic space [is defended] precisely by violating it” (115). In parallel, “sacred” real estate, the financial security of the domestic property has become transformed—violated—by the camera seeking to record foreclosure. The home now represents precarity. This development happened due to the creation of mortgage backed securities, which turned real estate into liquidity and the home into an uncanny abode.

    The chapter begins with a comparative discussion of photographs in which the home is “rendered ‘feral’—overrun by nature” (103). McClanahan considers the narratives that such photography evokes: one is that of the disintegration of civilization into a lawless zone of barbarism—the story of the home gone wild. Looking at the mobilization of this narrative in representations of Detroit, she discusses its biopolitical, racial dimensions. Often the economic hardship that the photographs document is presented as something that happens to other people. But the being of debt today is such that it is everywhere—in other words the “othering” of the harm it produces (its location “elsewhere”) has become impossible. So even though the photographs McClanahan discusses “represent the feral houses of the crisis as the signs of racial or economic Otherness, these photographs ultimately reveal that indebtedness is a condition more widely shared than ever before, a condition that can no longer be banished to the margins of either national space or of collective consciousness” (113). It is us—all of us.

    The last two sections of the chapter deal with the uncanny aspects of foreclosure photography—with the foreclosed home as the haunted home and the uncanny architectural landscape as the flipside of the financial phase that was supposed to “surmount” (135) the crisis of industrial production but actually merely provided a temporal fix for it. Ghost cities in China—cities without subjects, cities whose assets have never been realized, marking the failed anticipation of credit itself–are the terminal crisis of capital. The uncanny, in fact, becomes a key theoretical focus of this chapter and sets up the discussion of horror films in the next: real estate (in other words, the familiar and secure), becomes the site where the foreign and unstable emerges, and as such the uncanny becomes a perfect concept for McClanahan to discuss the home mortgage crisis.

    Far from being real estate, the house, and in particular the mortgaged home, is haunted by debt; so-called “homeowners” are haunted by the fact that the bank actually “owns” their home. Property is thus rendered unstable and becomes perceived as a real from which we have become alienated. In McClanahan’s vision, it even becomes a hostile entity (see 127). At stake here is ultimately not just the notion of property, but a criticism of property and “the inhospitable forms of domestic life produced by it” (105), an undermining of property—and with it a certain kind of “family”–as the cornerstone of liberalism. If McClanahan is critical of our era’s sanctification of the private through a culture of unhousing, her response is not to make the case for housing but rather to use unhousing to expose the fundamental uncanniness of property. With that comes the profanation (as opposed to the sanctification) of the private (as a criticism of inhospitable forms of domestic life). The domestic is not sacred. Property is not secure. Time to get out of the fortress of the house and the violence it produces. If the housing crisis has produced the precarization of the house, let us use it to reinvent domestic life.

    Given the horror film’s long-standing relationship with real estate—think of the haunted house–it was only a matter of time before the 2007-8 crisis appeared in contemporary horror films. And indeed, in the films that McClanahan looks at, it does appear—as “explicit content” (151). One has to appreciate here McClanahan’s “vulgar” approach: she is interested in the ways in which the horror films she studies “speak explicitly to the relationship between speculation, gentrification, and the ‘opportunities’ presented to investors by foreclosure” (151). Unlike for example American Psycho, which borrows a thing or two from the horror aesthetic, McClanahan’s horror flicks do not shy away from the nuts and bolts of finance; instead, they “almost [obsessively include] figures and terminology of the speculative economy in real estate” (151). This leads McClanahan to suggest that as horror films, they have “all the power of reportage”: they offer “a systematic account rendered with all the explicit mimetic detail one would expect of a realist novel” (151). At the same time, they do not do the kind of reporting Tom Wolfe was advocating back when: indeed, “they draw on the particular, uncanny capacity of the horror genre to defamiliarize, to turn ideological comfort into embodied fear” (151). McClanahan emphasizes, with a nod to Jameson (and his appropriation of Lévi-Strauss’ account of myth[xix]), that this is not just a performance of the “social contradictions” that always haunt narrative’s “imaginary solutions” (151). Instead, the films “oscillate between the imagined and the real or between ‘true stories’ and ‘crazy’ nightmares” (151). There are contradictions here both at the level of form and of content—both representational and material, McClanahan writes—and they remain without resolution. The credit-crisis era requires this sort of realism.

    Darren Lyn Bouseman’s Mother’s Day (Anchor Bay, 2010), for example, a remake of Charles Kaufman’s 1980 film, oscillates between competing understandings of property: “as labor and sentimental attachment”; “as nontransferable value and the site of hospitality”; “as temporal and personal”; “as primarily a matter of contingent need” (157). If those all contradict each other, McClanahan points out that what they have in common is that “they are all incompatible with the contemporary treatment of the house as fungible property and liquid investment” (157). Upkeep, sentimental investment, and use all become meaningless when a hedge fund buys up large quantities of foreclosed homes to make profit in renting. Such a development marks the end of “ownership society ideology in the wake of the crisis” (158). Like Crawlspace (Karz/Vuguru, 2013), another film McClanahan discusses, Mother’s Day reveals a strong interest in the home as fixed asset, and the changes that his asset has undergone due to securitization. Indeed, the two other films that McClanahan looks at, Drag Me to Hell (Universal, 2009) and Dream Home (Edko, 2010), are “more specifically interested in real estate as a speculative asset and in the transformation of uncertainty into risk” (161-2).

    By the time Dream Home ends, with an explicit reference—from its Hong Kong setting–to “America’s subprime mortgage crisis” (170), it is hard not to be entirely convinced that with the horror film, McClanahan has uncovered the perfect genre and medium for the study of the representation of the home mortgage crisis. It is here that realism undergoes its most effective transformation into a kind of horrific realism or what I propose to call realist horror, an aesthetic that, like so much else when it comes to finance, cannot be easily located but instead oscillates between different realms. Indeed, if Dream Home provides key insights into the home mortgage crisis in the U.S., it is worth noting that it does so from its Chinese setting, which McClanahan takes to indicate that many of the changes that happened as part of financialization from the 1970s to the present in the U.S. in fact “occurred first in Asia” (174). This opens up the American (U.S.) focus of McClanahan’s book onto the rest of the world, raising some questions about the scope of the situation that Dead Pledges analyzes: how global is the gloomy, even horrific picture that McClanahan’s book paints? This seems particularly important when it comes to imagining, as McClanahan does in the final part of her book, political responses to debt.

    Debt and the Revolution

    While the home mortgage is McClanahan’s central concern, Dead Pledges closes with a political Coda about student debt. If McClanahan returns here to student loans (a topic that she had already addressed in Chapter 2), it is because they are perhaps the representative example of the securitized debt markets that she has discussed. Given the staggering amount of student debt, the low-regulation environment of student loans, and the default rate on student loans, it is likely that the next major market crash will result from the collapse of the securitized student debt market. It is worth noting, indeed, that some are already shorting this market in the hopes of making a profit from its collapse a few years down the line (The Bigger Short, anyone?). In this situation, McClanahan proposes “sabotage”: like several others, most prominently the Strike Debt movement, she is calling on students to stop paying their debts. As the Strike Debt movement puts it: “If you owe the bank $10,000, you’re at the mercy of the bank. If you owe the bank $10 million, the bank is at your mercy”.[xx] Today, banks are at the mercy of students through the massive amounts of student credit that have been extended.

    McClanahan arrives at this politics of sabotage through her discussion of the collapse of the home mortgage market, and specifically of foreclosure. In the first part of her Coda, she discusses how people have responded to their homes being foreclosed by “acts of vandalism”, like “punch[ing] holes in the walls”, leaving “dead fish to rot in basements”, or breaking “pipes to flood their houses with water or sewage”, which she singles out as a “clever” way of “turning the problem of their home’s asset illiquidity on its head” (186). If these are acts of sabotage, it is because they “[remove] commodities from circulation or [block] the paths by which they (and money) circulate” (186). McClanahan embraces this tactic. From this vantage point, one can understand why, as someone reported to me recently after a visit to Greece, the banks there are holding off on foreclosing on those who have defaulted on their mortgages: by keeping the owners in their homes, the banks are trying to guarantee the protection of their assets—this is clearly the better option especially in view of the absence of renter or buyer demand for the apartments or homes whose owners have defaulted. For the moment, the banks in Greece are paying their borrowers for the maintenance of the bank’s assets.

    A couple of things are worth noting: first, “vandalism” or the destruction of an object does not necessarily coincide with the destruction of that object as a commodity. Indeed, if to destroy the object as commodity is to take it out of circulation—as McClanahan, following Bernes (following Marx), argues (186)—then the question is first and foremost how to block that circulation—and that might involve acts of vandalism, or not. In fact, one might imagine the situation in Greece, which involves labor being invested in the upkeep of a home, ultimately leading to a property claim—to taking the home out of the circulation that makes the bank its money. McClanahan considers such an understanding of property in her reading of Mother’s Day in Chapter 4. However, McClanahan is taking aim at the root of property (as becomes clear in both Chapters 3 and 4), and so the latter might not be a satisfactory solution since it keeps the notion of property intact. In addition, one might want to ask whether the home is the appropriate target for the vandalism? Why not sabotage the bank’s plumbing instead? Leave some fish to rot in the bank’s basement?

    Secondly, in the case of student loans, what is the asset to vandalize? The asset that students acquire through loans is “education.” It is an asset that the bank cannot reclaim although of course the diploma that formalizes it can be and has been taken away. But it is not inconceivable that, if the home mortgage crisis is the model here, the institutions and people providing an education will be vandalized: universities, professors, administrators—rather than the banks. And some (Trump University comes to mind) would certainly deserve it. At my own (private arts) institution, where tuition is currently set at a whopping $46,830, I have seen posters in which students bitterly thank the university president for their student debt or claim that the only thing that unites them as students is their debt. If the students look at the institute’s budget more closely, they are able to see that it is tuition-driven: specifically, the pie-chart clearly shows that (debt-based) tuition pays the faculty’s salaries. This pitches the students not only against the university president or other administrators (whose salaries, needless to say, far exceed those of the faculty) but ultimately against the faculty. McClanahan also notes that faculty retirement may also be involved in this: Student Loan Asset Backed Securities (or, in finance’s inexhaustible generation of acronyms, SLABS) are “tranched and sold to institutional investors, including many pension funds” and so “it’s possible for a professor at a university to be indirectly invested in the debt of her own students” (189). Not just in the present, through their salary, but also in the future, for their retirement.

    It is important to argue about student debt, and some faculty—like McClanahan–are bringing that argument into their classrooms. But it will be interesting to see how that develops once the student debt market collapses and faculty salaries and retirement implode. Kant’s answer to the question “What is Enlightenment?” was famously split between “Argue all you please” and “Obey.” What happens if, in this particular case, the students stop obeying? Unless they identify the agent of their subjection correctly—faculty? administrator? university president? university? bank? government? President?–, it might ring the death knell of the U.S. university system. Of course, that may have been the project all along–now with the students as its driving force.

    It is the political dimension of McClanahan’s book, which is somewhat disavowed in the introduction–McClanahan notes early on that “Dead Pledges is not a work of political economy” (15)–but then becomes prominent in the Coda, that may leave some readers frustrated. This is, on the one hand, because the Coda makes a comparative move from home mortgages to student loans that does not come with the nuanced discussion of economics that McClanahan develops elsewhere in the book (there is no consideration, for example, of how CDOs and SLABS are different: does it make sense to short SLABS? Why? Why not?). However, the economic specifics may be important when trying to decide on the most effective political response. The specific response that Dead Pledges offers—sabotage—may also leave some readers frustrated. While sabotage can be effective as a politics that would break financialization’s extraction of value through circulation, it remains, ultimately, a negative intervention that temporarily interrupts or destroys (perhaps in some cases definitively) its targets. But it seems obvious that as far as politics goes, that response can hardly be sufficient; some kind of positive engagement would be required to imagine the world that will come after it. It seems one would need to ask about the “affirmative”[xxi] dimension of the sabotage that is proposed here.

    In a review[xxii] of Wendy Brown’s book Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution,[xxiii] McClanahan has criticized Brown on a number of counts, first of all because of her largely negative description of the collective as something that neoliberalism destroys; and second, because through that description, Brown uncritically projects a pre-neoliberal collective that was somehow unaffected by economic pressures. Sarah Brouillette, with whom McClanahan recently teamed up for her response to the Yale hunger strike,[xxiv] has made a similar point.[xxv] As far as positive descriptions of collectivity go, however, McClanahan’s sabotage may also leave one dissatisfied. Furthermore, one may wonder whether the turn to sabotage as a politics is not partly a consequence of Dead Pledges’ focus on the United States. When considering political responses to the debt crisis, it might be the limits and limitations of that focus—a version of the “there is no alternative” that is often associated with neoliberalism–that prevents for example any consideration of, say, the state’s potentially positive roles in processes of financial regulation or even wealth redistribution. Is sabotage the only politics that the left has left in the U.S.? Might not other parts of the world—for example, certain countries in Europe, certain countries in Latin America—offer alternatives from which the left in the U.S. could learn? I am not being naïve here about what I am proposing: it would require fundamental political changes in the U.S. for this to come about. But again, are those changes entirely beyond the American (U.S.) left—so much so that the political imaginary stops at sabotage? Who was it again that rhymed “sabotage” with “mirage”? Sabotage should target the mirage, to be sure; but it raises the question: does their rhyme also evoke sabotage’s complicity with the mirage? Has leftist politics really come down to leaving dead fish to rot in the basements of what used to be our homes? Of course, it may be unfair to expect that those who are defaulting on their mortgages become the agents of the leftist revolution. But what about the students who emerge as the political subjects of our time at the end of McClanahan’s book? Let us focus, post-sabotage, on what other universities they might imagine–what other states.

    I am thinking of what another revolutionary says during that famous rooftop conversation in Gillo Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers (Rizzolo, Rialti Pictures, 1966):

    It’s hard to start a revolution. Even harder to continue it. And hardest of all to win it. But, it’s only afterwards, when we have won, that the true difficulties begin.

    Work in critical finance studies often recalls how it has become easier for us to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.[xxvi] Point taken. But Pontecorvo’s film can help one adjust this position: yes, it is hard to imagine the end of capitalism; but it is even harder to imagine the world that will come after it.

    There is probably no point in worrying, as I will admit I do, about that world and the “true difficulties” that it will bring. Such worrying may prevent one from starting a revolution in the first place. Best to focus on the battle at hand. Certainly, McClanahan’s Dead Pledges provides the perfect impetus.

    I would like to thank Paul Bové and Sarah Brouillette for their generous editing of this review. 

    Notes

    [i] In an article titled “The Plutocratic Imagination”, Jeffrey J. Williams notes for example that “[s]ince the mid-2000s there has also been a spate of novels foregrounding finance” (Williams, “The Plutocratic Imagination.” Dissent 60:1 (2013): 96.

    [ii] David Foster Wallace may appear to be the odd one out in this list but Jeffrey Severs’ recent David Foster Wallace’s Balancing Books: Fictions of Value (New York, Columbia UP, 2017) justifies his inclusion.

    [iii] Berge, Leigh Claire La and Alison Shonkwiler, eds. Reading Capitalist Realism. Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 2014. 1.

    [iv] One can think here of Alberto Toscano and Jeff Kinkle’s book Cartographies of the Absolute (Winchester, Zero Books: 2015), which took its inspiration from Fredric Jameson’s work on these issues.

    [v] Breitbach, Julia. Analog Fictions for the Digital Age: Literary Realism and Photographic Discourses in Novels after 2000. Rochester: Camden House, 2012. 8.

    [vi] Wolfe, Tom. “Stalking the Billion-Footed Beast: A Literary Manifesto for the New Social Novel.” Harper’s Magazine Nov. 1989, 45-56. Here 52. Using a nickname that was used on the Salomon Brothers trading floor to refer to those who had made a monster bonds trade, Michelle Chihara aptly termed this kind of realism “big swinging dick realism” in a review of La Berge and Kornbluh’s books about financial fiction. See: Chihara, Michelle. “What We Talk About When We Talk About Finance.” Los Angeles Review of Books, 09/18/2015, accessible: https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-finance/.

    [vii] See, for example: Berge, Leigh Claire La. “The Men Who Make the Killings: American Psycho and the Genre of the Financial Autobiography”. In: Berge, Scandals and Abstraction: Financial Fiction of the Long 1980s. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015. 113-147. Here in particular 139.

    [viii] Nealon, Jeffrey T. Post-Postmodernism: Or, The Cultural Logic of Just-In-Time Capitalism. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012. The famous analysis evoked in the previous part of the sentence is of course Fredric Jameson’s.

    [ix] Kornbluh’s book, among others, testifies to this: Kornbluh, Anna. Realizing Capital: Financial and Psychic Economies in Victorian Form. New York: Fordham UP, 2014.

    [x] Note that Marx already singled out this shorter version as the formula for “interest-bearing capital”, a situation in which money begets more money without the intermediary of the commodity: Marx, Karl. Capital: Vol. 1. Trans. Ben Fowkes. New York: Penguin, 1990. 257. A discussion of M-M’ as the financial variation of the general formula of capital can be found for example in: Marazzi, Christian. Capital and Language: From the New Economy to the War Economy. Trans. Gregory Conti. Los Angeles: Semiotext (e), 2008.

    [xi] Jameson, Fredric. “Culture and Finance Capital.” In: The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983-1998. New York: Verso, 2009. 154.

    [xii] Graeber, David. Debt: The First 5,000 Years. New York: Melville House, 2011; Martin, Felix. Money: The Unauthorized Biography—From Coinage to Cryptocurrencies. New York: Vintage, 2015.

    [xiii] Marx, Karl. Capital: Vol. 3. Trans. David Fernbach. New York: Penguin, 1991. 596.

    [xiv] Sassen, Saskia. Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy. Cambridge (MA): Harvard UP, 2014.

    [xv] See, for example, the already mentioned book by Marazzi or also: Berardi, Franco “Bifo.” Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of the Post-Alpha Generation. London: Minor Compositions, 2009; Berardi, The Uprising: Poetry and Finance. Los Angeles: Semiotext (e), 2012.

    [xvi] Clover, Joshua. “Autumn of the System: Poetry and Financial Capital.” JNT: Journal of Narrative Theory 41:1 (2011): 34-52.

    [xvii] This is how La Berge has perceptively analyzed American Psycho’s mode of narration: Berge, Scandals, 136.

    [xviii] Ellis, Bret Eason. American Psycho. New York: Vintage, 1991. 376-377.

    [xix] See: Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1981.

    [xx] McKee, Yates. “DEBT: Occupy, Postcontemporary Art, and the Aesthetics of Debt Resistance.” South Atlantic Quarterly 112:4 (2013): 784-803. Here 788.

    [xxi] I borrow the notion of “affirmative sabotage” from Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. See, for example: Evans, Brad (interview with Gayatri Spivak), “When Law is Not Justice”, 07/13/2016, accessible: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/opinion/when-law-is-not-justice.html?_r.

    [xxii] McClanahan, Annie. “On Becoming Non-Economic: Human Capital Theory and Wendy Brown’s Undoing the Demos.” Theory & Event, forthcoming.

    [xxiii] Brown, Wendy. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New York: Zone Books, 2016.

    [xxiv] Brouillette, Sarah, Annie McClanahan, and Snehal Shingavi. “Risk and Reason/The Wrong Side of History: On the Yale University Unionization Efforts”, 05/16/2017, accessible: http://blog.lareviewofbooks.org/essays/risk-reasonthe-wrong-side-history-yale-university-unionization-efforts/.

    [xxv] Brouillette, Sarah. “Neoliberalism and the Demise of the Literary.” In: Huehls, Mitchum and Rachel Greenwald-Smith, eds. Neoliberalism and Contemporary Literature. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, forthcoming. The uncorrected page proofs with which I am working are numbered 277-290.

    [xxvi] The statement is usually attributed to Fredric Jameson.

    Arne De Boever teaches American Studies in the School of Critical Studies at the California Institute of the Arts, where he also directs the MA Aesthetics and Politics program. He is the author of States of Exception in the Contemporary Novel (2012) Narrative Care (2013), and Plastic Sovereignties (2016), and a co-editor of Gilbert Simondon (2012) and The Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism (2013). He edits Parrhesia and the Critical Theory/Philosophy section of the Los Angeles Review of Books and is a member of the boundary 2 collective. His new book, Finance Fictions, is forthcoming with Fordham University Press.

  • Olivier Roy — French elections: Catholics vote Catholic, Muslims vote secular

    Olivier Roy — French elections: Catholics vote Catholic, Muslims vote secular

    by Olivier Roy

    Two days before the first round of France’s presidential elections, a terrorist attack on the Champs-Elysées, claimed by the Islamic State, sent a shock wave through the media: such an attack would surely play into the hands of the “anti-Islam” candidates—namely, the conservative François Fillon and the populist Marine Le Pen. In fact, nothing of the sort happened. Instead, the victor was centrist Emmanuel Macron, who said that France should learn to live with terrorism. The fear of Islam did not work. But religion did play a role, though not in the way that many would have predicted.

    Since the recognition of France’s secular Republic by the Catholic Church in 1890 (Cardinal Lavigerie, on behalf of Pope Leo XIII, made a toast “A la République Française!” after an official banquet in Algiers),therehas never been an avowedly Catholic political party in France. The Church rejected the idea, instead opting to promote its values by “secularizing” them and disseminating them through non-religious political actors. For instance, to same-sex marriage was couched in the 2012 by Cardinal Barbarin (bishop of Lyon) as a refusal to change the “anthropological paradigm” on which society is based; he referred to the natural law and not to the will of God.

    But the effort to reach out to secular circles and even other religious groups, including Jews, Protestants, and Muslims, failed in this case. Even the moderate right wound up endorsing same sex-marriage. As a consequence, militant Catholics took to the streets under their own flag (and cross). The movement, called la Manif pour tous (“the Demo for all”), which took shape in 2013became autonomous from the clerical hierarchy, by entering politics. By 2016, it had developed into its own political branch, called Sens Commun (common sense), which brought together some militants of Les Républicains, the “Gaullist” center-right party, of Chirac and Sarkozy, in order to push the agenda of the Manif pour Tous inside the party. It achieved a big victory with Fillon’s primary victory over Alain Juppé, the favorite. Although Fillon did not explicitly promise to rescind the law on same-sex marriage, he pledged to rewrite it and prevent full adoption by gay couples. Fillon was the only credible candidate for the presidency since the 1958 constitution to present himself as a practicing Catholic, eager to promote Christian identity and values (conversely: De Gaulle, also a devout Catholic, was a strong defender of the separation of Church and State).

    This sudden breakthrough of militant Catholicism took place at a time when the traditional right, in France and throughout Western Europe, had more or less finally but reluctantly endorsed liberal values like feminism, sexual freedom, abortion, gay’s rights, even animal rights. Moreover, even the populist extreme right has also endorsed liberal values where family and sexuality are concerned. Neither the Netherlands’s Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen, or the Austrian Hans Christian Strache are known for attending church, or advocating Christian sexual and family norms, or Christian teachings on love and hospitality. Their definition of Christian identity is purely ethnic and folkloric, not rooted in the teachings of the Church.

    French society is strongly secular—a fact that Le Pen wove into the identity of her National Front (FN) party some time ago. Although the FN is steeped in its anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim fundamentals, from the start of the campaign she has endorsed laïcité—“political secularism,” the official term for the separation of church and state—over Christianity, as the template for French identity. Of course, her version of laïcité is directed against Islam, including banning the veil and halal food from the public space. Le Pen has also extended her particular version of laïcité to exemplifiers of all other religions in the public space, including yarmulke and kosher food.

     Nevertheless, this approach helped Le Pen finish second. But to defeat the centrist Macron in the run off, she will have to attract the Catholic constituency of Fillon and the anti-globalization, anti-capitalist, secularist electorate of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a neo-communist and a “third-worldist,” who has supported Hugo Chavez, Fidel Castro, and the Palestinian people; like Le Pen, he has also been accused of anti-semitism. The former might be attracted by her stance against Islam, and the latter by her anti-European, anti-establishment position.

    Mélenchon, a staunch opponent of religious signs in the public sphere, offered perhaps the first round’s biggest surprise: he was the most-popular candidate among Muslim voters, of which there are between 2 and 4 millions, depending if we refer to believers or people from Muslim origin. Some attribute this to his support for the Palestinians and his open, controversial backing of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. But Palestine did not come up during the campaign. In addition, Mélenchon backs Assad because of his war against Salafist rebels; it’s difficult to see how this would appeal to pro-Salafist French Muslims living on the margins of French society—youth of destitute neighborhoods, the born-again of all kind, and converts. Traditionally, Salafists avoid political participation. In fact Mélenchon never addressed the concerns of faithful Muslims.

    The problem in understanding Muslim support for Mélenchon is that most people tend to think that Muslims vote as a single, undifferentiated faith community. For years, the debate over Islam in France has been oversimplified, reduced to an idea known commonly as communautarisation:by returning to a conservative and normative practice of Islam, the Muslim community is enforcing its own forms of social control in “the lost territories of the republic”—namely, the destitute neighborhoods. That move would lead to some sort of separation from mainstream society. But whether this has actually occurred is far from clear.

    Muslim support of Mélenchon likely had far more to do with class and social exclusion.

    There are, of course, both well-off and less-well-off French Muslims—those stuck in low-wage jobs in the destitute neighborhoods their contract-labor forefathers settled in in the 1960s and 70s, and those who have managed to move into the middle-class. France does not collect voting data by ethnic or religious group, so we cannot say for certain how these people voted; many of these middle-class Muslims likely voted for Macron or the socialist Benoit Hamon in the first round, and are likely to vote for Macron in the second. That’s because they represent middle-class aspirations.

    We know the voting patterns of less-well-off Muslims, by contrast, because they are concentrated in certain electoral precincts. Mélenchon came first in the department of Seine Saint Denis, which has the highest-percentage migrant population in France, with 37 percent; in Dreux, another city with a high percentage of migrants, he also captured 37 percent, and a peak of 57 percent in the electoral precinct with the highest percentage of Muslims. This general pattern was confirmed by an IFOP poll after the second round, which indicated that 37 percent of the French Muslims voted for Mélenchon, far exceeding the other candidates.

    The first round of the presidential elections showed no political expression or symptoms of such a religious separatism—they voted for Mélenchon, a neo-Marxist. On the contrary, despite the ban on voting declared by many Salafists, and despite a traditional disaffection of the youth towards elections, there has been an increase in participation versus the last elections. Mélenchon, then, likely won the Muslim vote on social issues: exclusion, joblessness, and precariousness attributed to capitalism, the free market, globalization and Europe. Muslims—poorer ones, at least—voted because of their social situation, not their religious convictions, choosing a candidate that based his campaign on social issues, while supporting laïcité and opposing the veil.

     Ahead of the second round, it’s interesting that while the Catholic hardliners made a more or less explicit call to vote for the FN, Le Pen is openly trying to court Mélenchon’s electorate without making any reference to the important proportion of Muslims in his electorate. While Mélenchon made it clear that he will vote for Macron, he refused to join the “Republican Front” against extreme right and “fascism” ; and let his supporters decide. Will some poor Muslims vote for Le Pen because they support the FN’s populist agenda? A bit difficult because the FN is still racist. Will they vote for Macron to fight racism? Not necessarily because Macron embodies, according to both Melenchon and Marine Le Pen, the global world of finance. The most probable option is that they will abstain, as many of them told me in Dreux.

    Olivier Roy is a political scientist, professor at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. His most recent book is Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways (Columbia University Press, 2010).

     

     

  • David Thomas — The End of History, In Memoriam

    David Thomas — The End of History, In Memoriam

    by David Thomas

    The West welcomed East Germany to the end-of-history by flying in David Hasselhoff for Berlin’s New Year celebrations. From the top of the fallen wall, clad in a pulsing light-spangled jacket, Hasselhoff regaled half a million people with the period’s unofficial anthem, “Looking for Freedom.” It is still, to date, one of Germany’s bestselling songs.

    Two years earlier, as Margaret Thatcher closed in on her second re-election, Hot Chocolate’s former front man, Errol Brown, had also lent his weight to the liberal cause. During the 1987 Conservative Party Conference, the disco hitmaker stepped up to the podium and led the entire caucus in a rousing rendition of John Lennon’s pop-socialist anthem “Imagine” (Wilson 2013: 41):

       Imagine no possessions

    I wonder if you can

    No need for greed or hunger

    A brotherhood of man

    Imagine all the people

    Sharing all the world

    You, you may say I’m a dreamer,

    But I’m not the only one

    I hope some day you’ll join us

    And the world will live as one           

    Little wonder that irony was the order of the day. Confident in their unassailable position, and wryly indulgent of the counterculture’s crabby idealism, the architects of globalization rested content on their laurels. There was much to celebrate. Liberal democracy had vaulted over the last great hurdle on its pathway to perpetual peace. Francis Fukuyama captured the mood as he sketched out the lineaments of his wildly popular end-of-history thesis:

    What we may be witnessing in not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. (Fukuyama 1989: 4)

    The course of world events allowed Fukuyama to stand by this claim for almost thirty years. Writing in 2007, on the very cusp of the 2008 financial crisis, he offered a confident and largely unqualified reassertion of his fundamental argument:

    I believe that the European Union more accurately reflects what the world will look like at the end of history than the contemporary United States. The EU’s attempt to transcend sovereignty and traditional power politics by establishing a transnational rule of law is much more in line with a ‘post-historical’ world than the Americans’ continuing belief in God, national sovereignty, and their military. (Fukuyama 2007)

    Yet ten years on – as Fukuyama himself has conceded – the same claim has begun to leave behind a bad taste in the mouth. Walls are in vogue again. And as a fragile European Union teeters on the brink of fragmentation, the new political trajectory of the United States seems the more reliable harbinger of the political futures that await us, futures overshadowed by a resurgence of rightwing authoritarianism and a reactive cascade of unpredictable international statecraft. Indeed, as Trump has ridden a wave of anti-establishment discontent into the White House, “Americans’ continuing belief in God, national sovereignty, and their military” now looms large over the old effort to “transcend sovereignty and traditional power politics by establishing a transnational rule of law.”

    Even prior to Brexit and Trump’s election, the new tenor of the times was starting to emerge. As armed guards rolled out the checkpoints and the razor wire, as miles of ad hoc barrier unwound across Europe, it became apparent that the open borders of globalization belonged to another era. The Schengen Agreement was a thing of the past, a bitterly regretted utopian folly. And as the specter of Trump’s “great, great wall” hovered at the outer edge of possibility, it was becoming clearer that other dreams were dying too: You could keep your hungry, your poor, your tired, there was no room for them here.

    The truth was, however, these high-walled fever dreams had been under construction for some time. The work had never really stopped. Long before the “great wall” was rumored, and even as the old Iron Curtain came crashing down, the world’s wealthy had peered out from behind their battlements in the sky. This is Mike Davis writing in the mid-1980s:

    According to its advance publicity, Trump Castle will be a medievalized Bonaventure, with six coned and crenellated cylinders, plated in gold leaf, and surrounded by a real moat with drawbridges. These current designs for fortified skyscrapers indicate a vogue for battlements not seen since the great armoury boom that followed the Labour Rebellion of 1877. In so doing, they also signal the coercive intent of postmodernist architecture in its ambition, not to hegemonize the city in the fashion of the great modernist buildings, but rather to polarize it into radically antagonistic spaces. (Davis 1985: 112-3)

    When Davis wrote, he would probably have been surprised to learn that the proposed owner-occupant of this “medievalised Bonaventure” would one day descend in his golden elevator to lead a populist insurgency against “out-of-touch elites.” He would probably have been less surprised to hear that when he came, he came promising the Rust Belt’s dispossessed fortifications and battlements of their own.

    To understand the success of the strategy, and to understand the strange mismatch of class interests that defines the Trump mandate, one has to dig beneath the concrete partitions of the “postmodern” city and search within the rusting husk of the American factory system to grasp the hidden economic imperatives and political contingencies that produced deindustrialization and financialization as coeval phenomenon. Here – as many of us are belatedly beginning to realize – Robert Brenner’s history of postwar economic development proves an indispensable resource.

    Much of Brenner’s later work has focused on the turbulent transition from the global economy’s belle époque – the period of unprecedented economic dynamism the lasted from the close of the war to the early 1970s – to the “long downturn” that has followed in its wake. His work has drawn attention to a progressive reallocation of capital investments away from industrial manufacturing and into the so-called FIRE (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate) sector. In Brenner’s account of the history, as emerging industrial economies began contesting American manufacturing market dominance struggle for market share reached such a pitch of intensity that companies became accustomed to operating with radically reduced profit margins.

    In response to a corresponding decline in rates of return, investors became shyer of the manufacturing sector and sought to diversify their portfolios. And as fallow capital sought new routes to profit the structural import of the FIRE sector intensified. From the late 1970s through to the first decade of the new millennium the finance industry’s signature methods and investment strategies became more and more computationally sophisticated and systemically pervasive. Among the symptoms of the FIRE sector’s new significance was the rapid reconstitution of urban space that Davis describes. And it was, of course, in the context of the FIRE sector’s expansion that Trump emerged as the popular face of the resurgent real estate industry, whose towering skylines – so adored by Hollywood – became totemic of American greatness in its autumnal phase.

    For the better part of three decades, this increasingly baroque financial system succeeded in restoring dynamism to the world economy, propelling the US beyond a sputtering Soviet regime into the position of uncontested global hegemon. And as the oil and stagflation crises retreated from view, it is perhaps not that surprising that faith in the FIRE sector’s new methods became so strong that creditors began to think themselves so cybernetically insured against loss that they lent in increasingly blithe and unstinting fashion.

    It was in this climate of technocratic hubris that Fukuyama sketched out his thesis, one that expressed the dominant structure of feeling then prevailing in elite circles: The common sense of the period all but dictated that a universal “evolutionary pattern” was just then culminating in the globalization of liberal democracy, as “technologically driven capitalism … free[ed itself] of internal contradictions” (Fukuyama 1993: 91; xi).

    These dreams seem all the more ironic now that one of the FIRE sector’s most notorious figures has begun to wreak havoc with the signal institutions of liberal democracy, questioning the accuracy of the ballot, wielding executive orders in madcap and draconian fashion, intimidating the judiciary, and attempting to bludgeon the free press into abject submission. The ironies deepen when we recall that it was the increasingly risky expansion of the FIRE sector that triggered the 2008 financial crisis, as the securitization of subprime mortgages opened the door to that last round of dispossession that underlies so much of today’s anti-establishment discontent.

    The ramifying consequences of the 2008 financial crisis were evident in this electoral cycle as we saw the two candidates periodically breaking away from the familiar battery of appeals to the middle-class homeowner, to take time to address a dispossessed and precariously employed “working class” who had swelled to such an extent that their political significance could no longer be ignored.

    Yet in its resurrection the figure of the worker seemed to have undergone a subtle transformation. In its return to the mainstage of electoral politics, talk of the worker functioned less as a metonym for the workers movement, and more as a shorthand for the plight of the downwardly mobile “worker-citizen,” one who could no longer count on social state protections, whose stake in the real estate market was gone or imperiled, but who was still the bearer of the full legal rights and privileges of the citizen.

    To understand the increasingly reactionary disposition of this citizen-worker we have to grasp the long downturn’s ongoing effects on the technical and demographic composition of the real economy. This effort again finds us tacking back to the 1970s, to the last great crisis in the capitalist world system, when attempts to restore dynamism to the global economy saw industrial capital fighting to break free of the constraints that social democracy had placed on its agency, unleashing a two-pronged assault on labor. Capital flight saw manufacturing plants flee the blue-collar heartlands, as industry reconstituted its industrial base in the emerging economies where it could exploit a labor force that enjoyed far fewer legal protections. And at one and the same time as the Thatcher and Reagan administrations drove through the legislation that facilitated and policed this new round of capital flight – a series of legislative actions that also undergirded the FIRE sector’s emergence as the new motor of economic dynamism – manufacturers also fended off the labor movement from within, introducing a new round of automation that saw labor’s relative share in the productive process decline, further securing factories against sabotage and slowdown.

    Research collective Endnotes sums up the prevailing political fallout of this double-fronted assault:

    Industrial output continues to swell, but is no longer associated with rapid increases in industrial employment … In this context, masses of proletarians, particularly in countries with young workforces, are not finding steady work; many of them have been shunted from the labour market, surviving only by means of informal economic activity (Endnotes 2015)

    The use of the term “shunted” here evokes the language of Stuart Hall’s Policing the Crisis. And in tracking the early effects of this “shunting from the labour market” Hall identified that the policing of deindustrialization’s dispossessed broke differentially along racial lines. As the economy contracted, white Britons closed ranks, consigning immigrant communities to a greater share of the joblessness that capital flight was leaving behind it. Writing that race was “one of the main mechanisms, by which, inside and outside the work-place itself, th[e] reproduction of an internally divided labour force [was] accomplished” (Hall et al. 1982 [1978]: 346), Hall detailed the advantages that the dominant classes gleaned from these divisions:

    The ‘benefits’ … must therefore be reckoned to include not only the direct and indirect exploitation of the colonial economies overseas, and the vital supplement which this colonial work-force made to the indigenous labour force in the period of economic expansion, but also the internal divisions and conflicts which have kept that labour force segregated along racial lines in a period of economic recession and decline – at a time when the unity of the class as a whole, alone, could have pushed the country into an economic ‘solution’ other than that of unemployment, short-time, cuts in the wage packet and the social wage. (Hall et al. 1982: 346)

    Having identified these developing tendencies – and their role in keeping the “unity of the class as a whole” at bay – Hall went on to explore how black Britons had begun to adapt to their entrapment in the grey and black economies. Explaining the concept of hustling for the benefit of a predominantly white readership, he wrote:

    The hustle is as common, necessary and familiar a survival strategy for ‘colony’ dweller’s as it is alien and strange to those who know nothing of it … Hustlers live by their wits. So they are obliged to move around from one terrain to another, to desert old hustles and set up new ones in order to stay in the game. From time to time, ‘the game’ may involve rackets, pimping, or petty theft. But hustlers are also the people who sustain the connections and keep the infrastructure of ‘colony’ life intact. They are people who always know somebody, who can get things done, have access to scarce goods, who can ‘deal’ and service the less-respectable ‘needs’ of the respectable end of ‘colony’ society. They hang out around the clubs, organise the blues parties, set the domino game up, know what day the illegal white rum distilleries produce. They work the system; they also make it work … When the going is good, hustlers are men about the street with style, visibly displaying their temporary good fortune: ‘cool cats.’ (Hall et al. 1982: 351-2)

    Of course in the days since he offered this account, hip hop’s rise to pop cultural dominance has made the swaggering resourcefulness of the hustler part of the cultural fabric of millennial experience. Few under the age of forty are not intimately familiar with hip hop’s virtuosic chronicling of Black America’s experience of the racialized policing of the long downturn. Part of the enduring value of Hall’s work lies in its ability to tie hip hop’s signature tropes and stances to the determinations against which they emerged, as the policing of capital’s real movement subjected the black proletariat to the worst effects of this new round of capital flight and automation.

    Indeed, in retrospect, it seems that NWA, rather than Hasselhoff, would have been a fitter avatar of the inequities that globalization scattered in its wake as it ground the labor movement beneath its heel. For while Hasselhoff’s words at the Berlin Wall implied that freedom had descended on the former Soviet bloc in a moment of decisive apotheosis, in NWA’s language freedom was difficult to attain; indeed, it was wrestled from the system in the context of an unremitting struggle with occupying powers determined to maintain existing inequities:

    Fucking with me cause I’m a teenager

    With a little bit of gold and a pager

    Searching my car, looking for the product

    Thinking every nigga is selling narcotics

    You’d rather see me in the pen

    Than me and Lorenzo rolling in a Benz-o

    In the crosshairs of the carceral state it was more than evident that history and the struggle for emancipation was far from over.

    Still, when Hall sketched out his typology of the hustler he, like Davis, would probably have been surprised by the uncanniness of subsequent developments. For at one and the same time as policing practices trended along the lines he identified – with a massively disproportionate number of black Americans subject to incarceration and unemployment – we also saw hip hop’s hustler swagger its way deep into the heart of the American culture industry. So deep was the penetration that one of hip hop’s most celebrated dons would one day take to the stage of Carnegie Hall, backed by a 36-piece orchestra, in a full tuxedo and tie, to make a boast of a rags-to-riches tale that dwarfed anything that Dickens ever conceived:

    Momma ain’t raised no fool

    Put me anywhere on God’s green earth,

    I’ll triple my worth

    Motherfucker, I, will, not, lose

    I sell ice in the winter, I sell fire in hell

    I am a hustler baby, I’ll sell water to a well

    I was born to get cake, move on and switch states

    Cop the coupe with the roof, gone and switch plates

    The epic scale of Jay Z’s biography – from resourceful street kid slinging rocks on the corner, to owner of music streaming service valued at $600 million – charts one self-defined hustler’s traversal of the vast wealth disparities that have characterized the global economy in the wake of the belle époque.

    We might pause for a moment here to consider the sociological significance of hip hop’s massive contemporary appeal. Indeed, it might not be too much of a stretch of the imagination to suggest that part of what has driven these accounts of life in the game to the top of the Hot 100 is precisely the more widespread generalization of the conditions of precarity and disenfranchisement that this genre has spent the bulk of its existence recounting and resisting. As the state continues to scale back on the welfarist commitments of the postwar order, and as yet another wave of automation sees the world system further unable to absorb labour into the productive process, a life in the black or grey economy is a very real prospect for increasing numbers of the world’s people. Endnotes write at another juncture:

    The social links that hold people together in the modern world, even if in positions of subjugation, are fraying, and in some places, have broken entirely. All of this is taking place on a planet that is heating up, with concentrations of greenhouse gases rising rapidly since 1950. The connection between global warming and swelling industrial output is clear. The factory system is not the kernel of a future society, but a machine producing no-future. (Endnotes 2015)

    A poignant statement in light of the last electoral cycle, as the Trump campaign implicitly configured the 1950s “factory system” as the locus of America’s lost greatness, promising to “return” the US to a weird Disneyland recapitulation of its Fordist heyday. And as Trump’s executive actions against environmental and energy agencies have demonstrated in the weeks since his inauguration, this back-to-the-future ride will not tolerate any slowdown or inhibition of its propulsive thrust toward “no-future.”

    Endnotes write that today’s left is prone to approach the worker’s movement with the “latecomers’ melancholy reverence” (Endnotes 2015) – a striking phrase that eerily anticipates Trump’s appeal to America’s erstwhile greatness. And these affinities seem capable of identifying a key problematic that has handed the Rust Belt over to Trump, and the British postindustrial zones to the Leave Campaign. For while the architects of globalization succeeded in decimating the worker’s movement, they were markedly less successful in their efforts to subordinate the sovereignty of the nation state to the rigors of transnational law. And thus as citizen-workers look for protection against immiseration, many seem increasingly willing to approve statist measures to both expel noncitizens who “unfairly compete” for scarce jobs, and introduce protectionist regimes designed to shield the nativist worker from the threat of international competition. Unable to organize themselves in a united internationalist front against exploitation, it is hardly surprising that the downwardly mobile worker-citizens of today are instead willing to fall back on the state’s promises to negotiate favorable “deals” on their behalf.

    The background to these tendencies seems to be the declining viability of the global development narrative that has attended postwar international policymaking since the Bretton Woods Agreement. In the context of secular stagnation and economic contraction, advanced economies have been forced to rely on our era’s signature admixture of debt and austerity, scaling back on welfarist provisions even as the nation state continues to function as a macroeconomic stimulator and a guarantor of private property. And increasingly, as development of the world system’s “peripheral” regions also stalls (Barone 2015), the core economies appear to be bracing themselves to resist a rising tide of economic and climate migration. It seems that population growth, economic growth, and industrial productivity have fallen out of sync to such a profound extent that we are increasingly “experiencing modernization of industry without modernity’s attendant social forms: without, that is, the institutional, social, cultural features associated with development, such as universal public education, democratic state institutions” and the humanitarian defense of human rights (Brouillette and Thomas 2016: 511).

    Yet rather than identify the newness of this geopolitical situation, political discourse on these matters more often coalesces around an introverted and melancholic nationalism that understands the immiseration of the worker-citizen in relation to vague but impassioned narratives of national decline. It is telling that Trump’s notorious baseball cap evokes the popular affluence of the belle époque through the allusive figure of “greatness,” a sleight of hand that evades the tricky question of how exactly one goes about turning back the clock on the technological development of the forces of production. For even if Trump’s protectionist policies do manage to lure back some manufacturing plants, the fixed to variable capital ratio will not be as favorable as it was back in the days when America was “great,” which is to say, when it was Fordist.

    Appeals to the figure of the precarious citizen-worker – more often figured in the guise of Thatcher’s “individual, and his family” – thus became a common feature of both campaigns. Yet in Clinton’s case we witnessed the strange spectacle of an establishment standard-bearer attempting to patch together, ad hoc, a fuzzily defined platform that alternately gestured toward the maintenance of the status quo, and toward the construction of a newly “social democratic” pluralism. Trump, meanwhile, staked out a clearly defined appeal to white nativist protectionism, one that was capable of uniting a large cross section of white America around the prospect of a Fordist “restoration,” one that sought to assert the rights and security of the white worker-citizen in the face of intensifying global economic malaise.

    In so doing, the Trump campaign amplified a strategy that has been a mainstay of advanced economies in times of crisis throughout the postwar period. Hall describes this strategy in relation to the structural function that migrant workers performed for British industry from the early-1950s to the mid-1970s:

    In the early 1950s, when British industry was expanding and undermanned, labour was sucked in from the surplus labour of the Caribbean and Asian subcontinent. The correlation in this period between numbers of immigrant workers and employment vacancies is uncannily close. In periods of recession, and especially in the present phase, the numbers of immigrants have fallen; fewer are coming in, and a higher proportion of those already here are shunted into unemployment. In short, the ‘supply’ of black labour in employment has risen and fallen in direct relation to the needs of British capital. (Hall et al. 1982: 343)

    On the one hand, Trump’s wall, Brexit, and the broader European resistance to the Schengen Agreement, faithfully reproduce the pattern that Hall identified, as global conditions of economic contraction have triggered a rising tide of anti-immigration policies.

    Yet what separates the dynamics that Hall describes from those that are unfolding around us now, is the extent to which Trump’s anti-immigration policies are also a feature of a larger enthnonationalist projectionist program, one that signals a full-blooded return to the so-called “beggar-thy-neighbor” economic strategies that last openly prevailed prior to the advent of the Bretton Woods Agreement.

    Writing in 1937, British economist Joan Robinson argued that “in times of worldwide unemployment, it is indeed possible for one country to increase its employment and total output by increasing its trade balance at the expense of other countries. She coined the phrase ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ to describe such policies” (Pasinetti 2008 [1987]). Robinson itemized four beggar-thy-neighbor economic weapons: wage reductions, officially induced exchange depreciation, export subsidies, and import restrictions. In the last month the US government has publicly evoked most, if not all, of these weapons, either accusing other governments of using them against the US, or signaling its intention to use them itself.[i] It is worth stressing that this is more of an escalation of already-existing dynamics than a complete bolt out of the blue – i.e. beggar-thy-neighbor strategies have been quietly on the rise for a decade or more (Barone 2015) – but the additional level of unvarnished aggression that Trump has introduced into the picture cannot but result in further escalations. The underlying dynamic is one in which – under the prevailing conditions of secular stagnation – economic growth risks becoming a zero-sum game, such that the growth of one nation is always talking place at the expense of another.

    Here Robinson’s explanation of the likely geopolitical fallout of beggar-thy-neighbor economics is worth remembering. Robinson wrote that “as soon as one country succeeds in increasing its trade balance at the expense of the rest, others retaliate” and among the economic effects of this cycle of retaliation is a reduced volume of international trade (Robinson 1947, 156).  There are affective consequences to these cycles of retaliation and these increasingly isolationist tendencies. Indeed, Robinson cautions that such policies can “add fuel to the fire” of economic nationalism, as trade wars push nations to the brink of open hostilities (Robinson 1947: 157).

    It should be noted that the intellectual circles that fostered this new ethnonationalism are not averse to an escalation of international armed conflict. Indeed, Steve Bannon is on record as thinking a war with China “inevitable” within the next ten years (Hass 2017). Much like Russia’s Alexander Dugin, Bannon subscribes to a world-historical vision that anticipates the onset of another great war, one that will serve as the crucible from which a revived Judeo-Christian culture will emerge victorious:

    But I strongly believe that whatever the causes of the current drive to the caliphate was — and we can debate them, and people can try to deconstruct them — we have to face a very unpleasant fact. And that unpleasant fact is that there is a major war brewing, a war that’s already global. It’s going global in scale, and today’s technology, today’s media, today’s access to weapons of mass destruction, it’s going to lead to a global conflict that I believe has to be confronted today. Every day that we refuse to look at this as what it is, and the scale of it, and really the viciousness of it, will be a day where you will rue that we didn’t act (qtd. Feder 2016)

    We are, at this juncture, a long way from the condition of universal post-historical secularism that Fukuyama anticipated. Indeed, the surprisingly pervasive appeal of Dugin and Bannon’s millennial creeds seems to have done much to consolidate Trump’s white American base, where a paranoiac strain of conservative religiosity has gained a powerful foothold. In a widely circulated address to a Vatican conference, Bannon appealed to the old counter-reformation concept of the “Church Militant” in an effort to recruit foot soldiers for an apocalyptic culture war, one that was to unfold, simultaneously, on domestic and geopolitical fronts:

    And we’re at the very beginning stages of a very brutal and bloody conflict, of which if the people in this room, the people in the church, do not bind together and really form what I feel is an aspect of the church militant, to really be able to not just stand with our beliefs, but to fight for our beliefs against this new barbarity that’s starting, that will completely eradicate everything that we’ve been bequeathed over the last 2,000, 2,500 years. (qtd. Feder 2016)

    On the international stage, the prime bête noire was the “new barbarity” of “jihadist Islamic fascism” (qtd. Feder 2016). Yet in the same speech in which he made use of this profoundly ironic terminology, Bannon also trained his ire on the architects of globalization, producing a strange taxonomy of “capitalisms” that distinguished between the “enlightened capitalism” of the “Judeo-Christian West,” and the new “crony capitalism” of Davos, one that a “younger generation” had “gravitate[d] to under this kind of rubric of personal freedom” (qtd. Feder 2016).

    As Bannon’s remarks make plain, conservative America’s Christianity and its post-Fordist nostalgia are now all tangled up in each other in ways that speak both to the impact that automation and deindustrialization have had on traditional gender norms, and to the much more widely pervasive and ambient sense of melancholy that results from living under the setting sun of a declining hegemon. Indeed, there is a case to be made that the extinction of the blue-collar “oedipal wage,” and the corresponding structural obsolescence of the “traditional” nuclear family, have been key catalysts of the US’s culture wars. For while conservatives have targeted changing gender norms as “dangerous” symptom of liberalism’s lapsarian hubris, what is actually taking place is arguably much better understood as another case of all that was solid melting into air. Sarah Brouillette puts the matter this way:

    In our current situation of economic turmoil and stagnation, the reproduction of productive labor in couple-based households is no longer a necessity everywhere –indeed, in some countries, the difficulty of keeping people working and keeping the unemployed engaged in work-like activities worries governments greatly, hence conversations about the possibility of a Universal Basic Income. At the same time, an expanding service sector handles some of what used to keep people too busy to develop multiple relationships: housekeeping, childrearing, and elder care, for example. Under these circumstances, it is more possible than ever for ‘alternative’ ways of being to come to the fore, with some even achieving mainstream respectability: think gay marriage, affective disinvestment in parenting, non-couple coparenting, moving back in with your parents, and ‘conscious uncoupling.’ Flip the coin, and the dwindling of the blue-collar industrial workforce, the expansion of domestic and affective caring work in the service sector, and the creeping obsolescence of the traditional nuclear family, have been crucial drivers of the hyper-conservative Men’s Rights Activist or ‘alt-right’ masculinist backlash against changing norms. (Brouillette 2017)

    This is not, however, how this would-be Church Militant understands the situation. And under the leadership of figures like Bannon it has taken up the project of trying to discipline gender norms back into alignment with its particular hierarchy of values and prohibitions, a project that reveals a latently theocratic dimension to the American and Russian branches of ethnonationalism.

    Indeed, insofar as the Trump administration continues to signal its commitment to a new counter-reformation – via the metonyms of its opposition to abortion, trans rights, and gay marriage, and its virulent hostility to Islam – it can count on a large base of support among white American Christians, many of whom seem willing to overlook the refugee camps, the prisons, and the ecocide, just so long as gender norms and national holidays are better aligned with the niceties of canon law. The Trump era thus seems set to catalyze a struggle for the soul of Christianity, as clericalist traditionalists – ever vulnerable to allure of state power – do battle with a charismatic and decidedly anti-clericalist, anti-capitalist Pope:

    In one of the cardinal’s antechambers, amid religious statues and book-lined walls, Cardinal Burke and Mr. Bannon – who is now President Trump’s anti-establishment eminence – bonded over their shared worldview. They saw Islam as threatening to overrun a prostrate West weakened by the erosion of traditional Christian values, and viewed themselves as unjustly ostracized by out-of-touch political elites. ‘When you recognize someone who has sacrificed in order to remain true to his principles and who is fighting the same kind of battles in the cultural arena, in a different section of the battlefield, I’m not surprised there is a meeting of hearts,’ said Benjamin Harnwell, a confidant of Cardinal Burke who arranged the 2014 meeting. (Pierce 2017)

    And thus as the Trump admiration attempts to consolidates its base, it seems set to lean hard on the far right flank of conservative Christianity, as it positions its reactionary, xenophobic, and ecocidal mandate as a noble crusade to save “the West” from external and internal enemies. Early signs suggest that attacks on the press and the liberal academy will intensify in the coming days, as Bannon and company turn their attention to the “enemies within.” The structural position of the press and the academy thus seems set to undergo a seismic shift. Accustomed to offering ambivalent but compliant critiques of neoliberal globalism, the principle organs of the bourgeois sociolect now find themselves thrust into a battle that they had thought consigned to the annals of history, undertaking harried resistance on terrain that is not of their own choosing. The radicalization of the press is already underway as we pass through the looking glass into a world where Teen Vogue and Cosmopolitan join The Guardian in drumming up support for a general strike. And as the Trump administration’s cuts to the NEA and NEH budget take hold, it appears that the liberal humanist academy will have little choice but to join the fray, drawing its post-critical turn to a panicked conclusion.

    It seems that for those who have been shielded from the harsher effects of globalization, it is hard not to feel nostalgic for the days when it was possible to indulge – however ambivalently – in Fukuyama’s dream. Where we go from here is extremely unclear, and one obviously feels dwarfed by the massive scale of these developments. But I suspect we should not spend too long grieving the loss of Fukuyama’s political horizon, for it helped to bring us to the place where we now stand, occluding the intensifying inequities that have resulted from the long downturn, developments that have opened the door to this new round of ethnonationalist insurgency. The Trump administration’s erratic brand of nascent fascism is a very real and present danger, one that we would be naive not to resist by whatever means we are able, but we also have to keep firmly in mind that this administration is not the sole source of our problems. We are in the grip of another of the violent and eruptive crises that capitalism has, throughout its long history, repeatedly thrust upon us.

    And if we find ourselves still burning a candle for some vestige of that dream of unity that Lennon cribbed from the chauvinistic language of the postwar reconstruction, then that may entail putting ourselves on the line in ways that we have been little accustomed to do in recent years. The fight is coming to us whether we like it or not. And in fighting back we will need to rediscover political horizons that extend far beyond the concerns of the individual and his family.

    The value of an individual life a credo they taught us

    to instill fear, and inaction, ‘you only live once’

    a fog in our eyes, we are

    endless as the sea, not separate, we die

    a million times a day, we are born

    a million times, each breath life and death:

    get up, put on your shoes, get

    started, someone will finish     (di Prima 2007 [1971]: 8)

    David Thomas is a Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholar in the Department of English at Carleton University. His thesis explores narrative culture in post-workerist Britain, and unfolds around the twin foci of class and climate change.

    References

    Barone, Barbara. “Protectionism in the G20.” Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies. European Union, Belgium: 2015 https://www.academia.edu/12266435/ Protectionism_in_G20_2015_

    Brenner, Robert. Economics of Global Turbulence. London: Verso, 2006.

    Brouillette, Sarah. “A feminist communist killjoy reads Future Sex,” Public Books. Forthcoming 6 March 2017.

    Brouillette, Sarah, and David Thomas. “Forum: Combined and Uneven Development,” Comparative Literature Studies, No 53, 3, 2016.

    Carter, Shawn. You Don’t Know. New York: Roc-A-Fella Records, 2001.

    Carter, Shawn. “You Don’t Know Lyrics,” Genius, 24 Feb 2017: https://genius.com/Jay-z-u-  dont-know-lyrics

    Davis, Mike. “Urban Renaissance and the Spirit of Postmodernism,” New Left Review, No. 151, May – June 1985: https://newleftreview.org/I/151/mike-davis-urban-renaissance-and-the-spirit-of-postmodernism

    Di Prima, Diane. Revolutionary Letters. San Francisco: Last Gasp of San Francisco, 2007.

    Endnotes. “A History of Separation,” Endnotes 4, October 2015: https://endnotes.org.uk/issues/4/en/endnotes-preface

    Feder, J. Lester. “This Is How Steve Bannon Sees The Entire World,” Buzzfeed, 16 Nov 2016: https://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/this-is-how-steve-bannon-sees-the-entire-world?utm_term=.yxR8RK2gV#.sh1Q6P02E

    Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest, No. 16, 1989: 3-18.

    Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and The Last Man. New York: Harper Perennial, 1993.

    Fukuyama, Francis. “The History at the End of History,” Guardian, 3 April 2007: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/apr/03/thehistoryattheendofhist

    Haas, Benjamin. “Steve Bannon: We’re going to war in the South China Sea … no doubt,” Guardian, 02 Feb 2017: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/02/steve-bannon-donald-trump-war-south-china-sea-no-doubt

    Hall, Stuart, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts. Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order. Hong Kong: MacMillan Press, 1982.

    Jackson, O’Shea, Andre Romell Young, Lorenzo Jerald Patterson, Harry Lamar III Whitaker.

    Fuck Tha Police. Los Angeles: Priority Records, 1988.

    Jackson, O’Shea, Andre Romell Young, Lorenzo Jerald Patterson, Harry Lamar III Whitaker.

    “Fuck Tha Police Lyrics,” Genius, 24 Feb 2017:https://genius.com/Nwa-fuck-tha-police-lyrics

    Lennon, John, and Barrie Carson Turner. Imagine. EMI, 1971.

    Pasinetti, Luigi L. “Robinson, Joan Violet (1903–1983).” The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 14 February 2017:  http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id= pde2008_R000166> doi:10.1057/9780230226203.1450

    Robinson, Joan. Beggar-My-Neighbor Remedies for Unemployment,” Essays in the Theory of Employment. Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott, 1947: 156-172.

    Pierce, Charles C. “For His Next Trick, Steve Bannon Will Undermine the Pope.” Esquire. 07 Feb 2017: http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a52901/bannon-pope-francis/

    Wilson, Scot. “Violence and Love (in Which Yoko Ono Encourages Slavoj Zizek to give Peace a Chance).” Violence and the Limits of Representation. Matthews, Graham, and Sam Goodman, eds. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013: 28-48.

    Notes

    [i] For examples of the Trump administration’s remarks on currency devaluation see:

    http://asia.nikkei.com/Markets/Currencies/Trump-singles-out-Japan-China-Germany-for-currency-attack; and for their current approach to export subsidies, and import restrictions consult: http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/02/economist-explains-9 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38764079

     

  • Video Essay: All That Is Solid Melts Into Data

    Video Essay: All That Is Solid Melts Into Data

    dir. Ryan S. Jeffery and Boaz Levin

    This film is posted in anticipation of boundary 2‘s upcoming special issue –– Bernard Stiegler: Amateur Philosophy (January 2017).

    Equal parts building and machine, a library and a public utility, data centers are the unwitting monuments of knowledge production to the digital turn. This film traces the historical evolution of these structures that make-up “the cloud”, the physical repositories for the exponentially growing amount of human activity and communication taking form as digital data. While our “smart tools” and devices for communication become increasingly smaller, thinner, and sleeker, the digital sphere they require grows larger demanding an ever-growing physical infrastructure, effecting and shaping our physical landscape. This film looks to the often-overlooked materiality of networked technologies in order to elucidate their social, environmental, and economic impact, and calls into question the structures of power that have developed out of the technologies of global computation.

  • Zachary Samalin: Genealogies of Self-Accusation

    Zachary Samalin: Genealogies of Self-Accusation

    by Zachary Samalin

    Response to Bruce Robbins: On the Non-representation of Atrocity

    This essay was peer-reviewed by the editorial board of b2o: an online journal.

    In his V21 symposium keynote lecture, “Atrocity in the Novel, Atrocity in History,” Bruce Robbins asks whether it is reasonable or instead “unacceptably presentist” to “expect the great epoch of European realism to ‘do’ atrocity in the particular, self-accusing sense” he is interested in examining, in which “‘we’ accuse ourselves of doing something outrageously cruel, collective, and indiscriminate to ‘others.’” “Arguably,” Robbins continues, “such representations only became possible after European civilization had been shocked out of its pre-Copernican complacency by the Holocaust and the rise of anti-colonial movements. In the nineteenth century, those shocks were still to come” (Robbins 2016: 4-5). Perhaps not surprisingly in a room full of Victorian literature specialists, the response to Robbins’ lecture during the question and answer session produced a long list of 19th century works that audience members thought would complicate, enrich, trouble or outright repudiate Robbins’ hypothesis that the literature of the 19th century had yet to achieve a certain form of critical self-consciousness, and so was incapable of indicting political brutality and violence. To the contrary, this audience response seemed to suggest, the archive of 19th century literature is rife with examples of just what Robbins is looking for.

    In the following response to Robbins’ lecture, I want to theorize more specifically the tension between these two seemingly irreconcilable positions, by examining one of Robbins’ central theses about the entwinement of politics and aesthetics—namely, that literature can and perhaps ought to lay claim to a privileged role in the articulation of “civilizational self-accusation,” especially in the context of the atrocities of modern imperialism. The notion that the literary has the capacity to register unwanted self-implication in destructive sociopolitical processes is extremely compelling; but, unlike Robbins, it is also an aesthetic innovation that I have come to associate with various currents in 19th century literature. And yet, as half a century of postcolonial literature and theory has helped us to see, this sophisticated innovation, which allowed for the registration, in narrative form, of undesired conditions of immanence, did little to turn the critical gaze of the 19th century novel outwards, that is, towards the ongoing atrocity of the British empire. When we read the literature of the mid- to late-19th century—Little Dorrit (1857), Notes from Underground (1864), The Belly of Paris (1873)—we don’t find a journalistic subjectivity reporting on the turbulent decades of perpetual war in Algeria, Persia, the Crimea, India, Burma, Vietnam, and China; but we do encounter a complex structure of feeling, beginning to emerge as something articulable, that conceived of modernity as a process of regressive self-destruction and of civilization as something unwanted that would soon sour itself from the inside out. In this respect, the question that Robbins’ lecture raises is to my mind not whether it is too ‘presentist’ to expect Flaubert or Dickens to have offered a critique of atrocity, but rather the enduring, perhaps more disturbing question of what specific forms of ideological blindness kept the novel form from extending the implications of its own socially critical and ethico-political insights to the imperial context?

    The first point to make is that, when it came to its atrocities, 19th century Britain left behind an indisputably immense non-literary paper trail. Certain brutal events in the maintenance of the empire—such as the violent responses to the Morant Bay rebellion (1865) and the Indian revolt (1857-8)—were not only voluminously documented, but debated publicly and at length, and did much to bring to the fore the question of what it means to participate in a putatively modern and morally enlightened national culture. More often than not, as has been well established, such debates served to mask the violence intrinsic to imperialism and capitalism, focusing instead on the extent to which particular episodes of brutality and exploitation represented local failures and setbacks in the ongoing civilizing project of the British Empire. Thus while Governor Eyre came under fire in the aftermath of Morant Bay, the terms of public debate set by the Jamaica Committee did little to overturn the entrenched patterns of racist thought and economic opportunism which helped to prop up the central premises of imperial exploitation (see Holt 1992: 278-312). Like a good deal of the public and official reaction to the documentation of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in our own day, Morant Bay provided a space for a limited articulation of civilizational self-accusation in British public discourse—‘we don’t do that’—but only within a larger self-serving framework of disidentification, disavowal and civilizational (which is to say racial and cultural) arrogance that helped keep the inherent injustice of imperial occupation from taking center stage. Indeed, one limitation of framing critique in reference to specific atrocities made apparent through these examples is that the focus on the event of cruelty and violence runs the risk of obscuring patterns of ongoing or systemic exploitation.

    Yet in their most trenchant form, 19th century critiques of imperialist violence did approach the form of self-critique that Robbins holds up as a more modern ideal. Marx’s criticism of the 1855 Report of the Commissioners for the Investigation of Alleged Cases of Torture in the Madras Presidency is exemplary in this respect (see Rao 2001). The report sought to establish the prevalence of physical torture and brutality as a systemic means of extracting tax revenue within British India for the profit of the East India Company, only to disavow responsibility for that violence and to condemn it, with characteristic outrage and condescension, in the racialized language of barbarism. “Our aim,” the report concludes, “is to guard the Natives against themselves” (Report 1855: 70). As Marx summarized the report, “The universal existence of torture as a financial institution of British India is thus officially admitted, but the admission is made in such a manner as to shield the British Government itself” (Marx [1857]1975: 66). Yet as Marx goes on to observe, “a few extracts from the evidence on which the Madras Report professes to be founded, will suffice to refute its assertion that ‘no blame is due to Englishmen,’” and to document instead the systematically exploitative nature of capitalist imperialism. Far from evidencing the need for colonial paternalism, Marx thought the report ought to raise for the “dispassionate and thoughtful men” of Europe the more self-implicating question of “whether a people are not justified in attempting to expel the foreign conquerors who have so abused their subjects” (Marx 1975: 69). Marx’s indictment of the Madras Report may not be precisely what Robbins has in mind when he argues for the cosmopolitan modernity of civilizational self-accusation as a “very special subset of atrocity-response in which ‘we’ accuse ourselves of doing something outrageously cruel, collective, and indiscriminate to ‘others’” (Robbins 2016: 2)—but if not, it is certainly a close relative.

    While Marx’s writings on India often lapse into a more rigidly developmental-teleological mode, according to which capitalism represents the first step necessary for Asian civilizations to catch up with world history, his observations about the Madras Report do more to highlight the complex ways that the question of identification came in this period to animate the representational dynamic of critique. The difference between the critical language of civilizational self-accusation, as Robbins formulates it, and the exculpatory language of civilizational disavowal, as exemplified by the Madras Report, hinges precisely on such vectors of identification—that is, on a speaker’s imagined participation in a particular ideological community. In this respect, while Robbins observes that “the modern weakening of membership” is a prerequisite for the distance needed to understand atrocity as such, I would argue that the unwanted (but inescapable) identification with destructive processes is in fact the crucial psychosocial component he ought to pursue, rather than the fraying of communal bonds more customarily associated with the onset of modernity (Robbins 2016: 1). Due in large part to a post-Enlightenment legacy that idealizes disinterestedness and objective distance, we have yet to provide even the basic outline of a history for this capacity for unwanted identification.

    Understanding how these two opposite movements—towards a desirable disinterest and an undesired involvement—were fused to one another throughout the 19th century is a significant and unfinished task for scholars of the period, in the first place because their fusion accounts for the antithetical attachments to the impulse to document violence and atrocity that I have been describing. The imperialist impulse to represent violence in order to disavow it as something always perpetrated by an other, or to frame it as an exceptionality that justifies rule, cannot be fully distinguished from the self-implicating impulse to expose that violence as immanent to modernity. This is in part because they share the same language, as reflected by Marx’s insistence that blue books are the only evidence of systemic violence one needs. Though we often think of Marxist thought as working to fill in the gaps in the official discourse, I am suggesting instead that we attend to what Marx presupposes is the radical transparency of the language of domination—the presupposition that violence and exploitation had become self-evident, and were written brazenly on the surface of things in the language of the perpetrators. We might therefore take Robbins’ call to place the writing of atrocity within a longue durée of moral development as an invitation to theorize this intersection of the genealogy of self-accusation and unwanted identification with the historical transformations which allowed atrocity to be written legibly and out in the open, rather than hidden or buried in secret.

    At the same time that we see extensive evidence of such a complex public discourse for engaging atrocity in 19th century Britain, we also know that in different national and cultural contexts, literary and artistic production began to develop a wide array of aesthetic strategies for representing atrocity throughout the 19th century while simultaneously problematizing the presumed security of the disinterested observer. Goya’s Disasters of War come to mind, as does the archive of 19th century photographs that Nathan Hensley and Zahid Chaudhary have recently written about; indeed Hensley has helped us to see precisely how these hermeneutic questions about the representation of violence and its implied spectators remain unanswered in the aftermath of empire (see Chaudhury 2012; Hensley 2013). Similarly, slave narrative and abolitionist literature in the United States—which of course tended not to focus only on specific atrocities but on the systemic and juridical nature of slavery under capitalism—bear directly on Robbins’ claims about the 19th century’s representational capacity for moral indictment. However, I present these not so much as counter-examples, but rather as indices of the more particular absence that Robbins has helped us to identify. We know that British imperial atrocities were voluminously documented and often publicly debated as potentially undermining the civilizational project; and we know that the 19th century saw the development of a more radical social scientific and socially critical discourse of self-accusation, that sprouted up out of an official discourse of disavowal; and, finally, we know as well that other aesthetic traditions in other cultural contexts have done a better job than the British novel at representing atrocities through some form of self-accusation or communal indictment.

    So then one question: What to call this kind of ideological absence or moral-aesthetic caesura? How does it work, and how can we grasp its psychosocial dynamics? I put the question this way, since we have previously relied on the vocabulary of symptom and repression to elaborate precisely these absences. And yet it seems clear, today, as it has for some time, that the tools afforded by the vocabulary of cultural neurosis don’t quite satisfy here, given that we are not dealing with an occluded or concealed discourse of atrocity that “returns” from its repression in the interstices of the literary text, but rather with the more disjointed, more deranged fact that this proliferate and public discourse did not find its fullest expression in the exemplary aesthetic form of the period, that is, in the novel. Why not? My sense is that we still need to sharpen and refine our historical account of the ways in which representation functions vis-à-vis the intolerable, the unwanted, the atrocious, and the unrepresentable—a newly sharpened account of the writing of the disaster that takes into account the different species of blindness and specific patterns of resistance endemic to modern literary forms.

    These caesuras in the political consciousness of the Victorian novel become all the more jarring when we consider that, over the 19th century, literary texts, and perhaps the novel in particular, emerged as the cultural laboratory for testing out Enlightenment ideals and for exposing them as violent or vacuous, as cruelty in themselves—whether in the name of reactionary sentiment or liberalizing social critique or some impulses more nihilistic than either of those. I am thinking of earlier works like Juliette and Gulliver’s Travels just as much as later, increasingly socially engaged texts such as Our Mutual Friend, La Terre, Notes from Underground and Jude the Obscure. Considered from this angle, the literary domain in the 19th century was a sophisticated and complex arena for elaborating a deeply affective experience of unwanted self-implication and inevitable participation in a destructive order, founded on tenuous, inverted values.

    Even if the 19th century did not “possess a public capable of demanding or enforcing scrutiny of ourselves from outside” (Robbins 2016: 24), it is clear to my mind that later authors as diverse as Achebe, Vallejo and Sebald returned to this more nihilistic 19th century conception of literature as a privileged space for giving voice to an unwanted relation of immanence in the destructive processes of modernity. Indeed, the outraged self-accusation Robbins describes, in order to transcend mere bad faith or ressentiment, needs to involve a more disturbing set of identifications than simply seeing oneself as though from without. A literary genealogy of civilizational self-accusation, then, might follow unpredictable lines back through unexpected pages, from the mushroom clouds of the 20th century Robbins begins with to the storm-clouds of the 19th. How can we further specify and describe this negative structure of feeling in the novel, give it a longer history that doesn’t stop and start according to the arbitrary constraints of post-hoc periodization, and which attends to its ever-shifting blind spots and its insights alike?

    References

    Chaudhury, Zahid. 2012. Afterimage of Empire: Photography in Nineteenth Century India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Hensley, Nathan. 2013. “Curatorial Reading and Endless War.” Victorian Studies 56, no.1: 59-83.

    Holt, Tom. 1992. The Problem of Freedom. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Marx, Karl. (1857) 1975. “Investigations of Tortures in India.” Reprinted in Marx, The First Indian War of Independence, 1857-1859. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

    Rao, Anupama. 2001. “Problems of Violence, States of Terror: Torture in Colonial India.” Interventions 3, no. 2:186-205

    Report of the Commissioners for the Investigation of Alleged Cases of Torture in the Madras Presidency. 1855. Madras: Fort St. George Gazette Press.

    Robbins, Bruce. “Atrocity as Self-Accusation.” 2016.

     

    CONTRIBUTOR’S NOTE

    Zachary Samalin is Assistant Professor of English at the University of Chicago.  He is currently working on a manuscript, The Masses Are Revolting: Victorian Culture and the Aesthetics of Disgust.

  • Molly Clark Hillard: Literary Subjects

    Molly Clark Hillard: Literary Subjects

    by Molly Clark Hillard

    This essay was peer-reviewed by the editorial board of b2o: an online journal.

    In a recent New York Times article, Ishiguro said “as for Brontë, well, I owe my career, and a lot else besides, to Jane Eyre and Villette” (2015). Speaking at the Seattle Public Library on his 2015 novel, The Buried Giant, Ishiguro elaborated:

    I have loved Jane Eyre and Villette…for some time, but…when I re-read them about three years ago, I suddenly realized how much I had ripped off from those two books…I read [them] with the usual pleasure and admiration, but also with some kind of private embarrassment…and in particular…those two books are absolutely fantastic for that…very coy way of the first person narrator…appearing to confide, very intimately, with the reader and then you suddenly find actually that there is some huge, hugely important, thing that the narrator has just held back…and I realized that that kind of thing had influenced me greatly in the way I write….Moments where you learn that Jane Eyre is crying, not because she the narrator says “I was crying”…but because the person she is talking to…says “what’s that in your eye, Jane…” and I thought “Whoops!” Exactly the same technique. (2015)

    This quote illustrates more than simple literary influence; here Ishiguro avows his interest in the relationships and power dynamics between readers and authors, in both the effect and affect of reading. He is not just aware that Victorian novelists do this too; he indicates that his technique is more than merely analogous to Victorian novelists. He owes, he says, more than just his career to Brontë.  Timothy Bewes has said that “Ishiguro offers no clues about how to read him” (2007: 205), but Ishiguro’s quote, it seems to me, suggests otherwise.  I would at least like to ask whether what happens in certain 21st century novels is something other than, more than, postmodern pastiche.  Perhaps another way to pose the problem is this: what if periodicity becomes unimportant or secondary next to our subjectivity, our constitution of selfhood within a literary history?

    Since the 2005 publications of Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go and Ian McEwan’s Saturday, we have been called to consider the network produced between 19th and 21st century novels.  What do 19th-century novels do for 21st-century readers? What do they do for 21st-century novels? What, in turn, does juxtaposing 19th and 21st-century novels do for our understanding of literature itself? The V21 Collective exhorts us to just these questions; the work issuing from the group offers a collectivity of Victorian and 21st century thinking, as much as a human collective of scholars.  In their manifesto and elsewhere, V21 asks whether Victorian literature still matters. If it does, if we have not “transcended” these plots, these characters, these ideologies and problems, then whither next?  Even more fundamentally, V21 prompts us to consider whether reading itself is still a viable technology.  The query is bound to related concerns about the future of the liberal arts university, which is based in great measure on the art and science of reading, and in corollary beliefs that reading is one thing (of many) that makes us human, and that the activity of reading bridges the division between the personal and the communal.  In light of declining English majors nationwide, such questions are neither axiomatic nor sentimental.

    So, what kinds of projects might the spirit of V21 make possible?  We might, for instance, reflect on Victorian novels that offer scenes of reading and re-reading.  Frankenstein, Jane Eyre, Wuthering Heights, Mill on the Floss, Daniel Deronda: these are all works in which acts of reading begin or escalate the action of the novel, in which books—history books, science books, devotional books—are central to the text’s aims.  The novels feature characters whose acts of reading may make or mar them, but in one way or another seal their fates.  These characters insert themselves into a literary history—not only resonating with it or speaking back to it, but also actually taking the book as literal or real.  Frankenstein’s creature reads Paradise Lost as “a true history”(Shelley 2003: 132); Jane Eyre sees Gulliver’s Travels as “a narrative of facts” (C. Brontë 2003: 28); Maggie Tulliver and Mr. Lockwood are in thrall to found manuscripts with handwritten marginalia that directs or arrests their attention. I would argue that these characters are literary subjects; by calling attention to the books in their hands they remind us of the books in ours, and their fabrication, their materiality. Simultaneously, though, they suggest that all our lives are bound to, subject to, subjects of, the books we read.

    If we were to turn, next, to Anna Kornbluh, for whom in comparative reading, “transtemporality or acontextuality is integral, a thought that gains gravity precisely by virtue of its repetition in history,” we might then look with fresh eyes at certain contemporary British novelists who make returns to Victorian literature, “going back and working on” Victorian plots, genres, and characters over the course of the narration (Ishiguro 2015: 115).  Novels like Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, Ian McEwan’s Saturday, and Zadie Smith’s White Teeth, each in their own way, announce that it is from Victorian literature that they have learned to read.  Their authors present to us a set of palimpsested characters that demand, like their Victorian counterparts, to be read as literary subjects. We are used, perhaps, to define literary subjectivity as does Simon During: “a love of literature, more or less disjunct from explicit identification with political programmes,” the “disposition to engage intensely with [literature],” and the “production of fictions and simulacra and the provision of spaces and occasions for individuals to be communicated to” in a kind of “secular mimesis” (1996: 5).  And in doing so, we generally associate it with an embarrassing lack of critical distance.  But if we were to take literary subjectivity more literally, we might begin to see things differently. We might begin to see things like a character in a Victorian novel.

    Transplanting, recycling, palimpsesting: these are activities to which I suggest we might append the common term “re-read.”  Indeed, the Ishiguro quote that begins this piece highlights re-reading as integral to his writing.  As a re-reader myself, I have begun to wonder exactly what re-reading does for us and to us.  As a Victorianist, I wonder what it did for and to Victorian readerships.  The epistemology of re-reading has gained critical attention in recent years in the fields of affect and empathy studies, educational history, book history, and reader response.[1] Yet no scholar has yet given re-reading quite the metaphoric register that I think it deserves. Re-reading is something that an individual does with a specific text, to be sure, and for many reasons: to memorize, to self-soothe, to amend misprision, to discern anew, to layer interpretations. The very term “re-read” originated in the nineteenth century, and I suspect that the word was coined because re-reading is implicitly connected with the development of the Victorian novel and techniques of reading it. For instance, free indirect discourse necessitates re-reading in order to conceive narrative double valence; and in an age of serial publication, completed novels were collected and bound, in part to be re-read.  Bearing in mind Kornbluh’s call to construct “a grammar of resonance,” I’ve begun to wonder whether “re-reading” could also express the diachronic transference of literary bodies, one into the other, as intertexts.

    One possible outcome of V21’s call for presentist, formalist, and comparative interpretation is for us to recognize in certain novels from Victorian and contemporary periods a community that exists across time as well as space, in the leaves of books as well as in a timestream.  This literary community (network, as Latour would have it) is “sociable” in Rita Felski’s terms, but not homogeneous, not universal. Books do not always offer a “safe space” of warm assimilation.  In recognizing the Victorian literary and cultural material that lives on within them, contemporary novel characters also must recognize their own unoriginality. They are, in some sense, copies. Paradoxically, though, a literary community is also vitally important to constituting their personhood, and to build any kind of human belonging that matters.  These authors suggest, perversely, that we become human through the books we read and re-read, that we carry within. We are, to borrow loosely from Jane Bennett, part book in ways that are pleasurable as well as painful. 

    References

    Ablow, Rachel. 2009. Oscar Wilde’s Fictions of Belief. NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 42, no. 2: 175-182.

    Bennett, Jane. 2010. Vibrant Matter. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

    Best, Stephen and Sharon Marcus. 2009. “Surface Reading: An Introduction.” Representations 108, no. 1: 1-21.

    Bewes, Timothy. 2007. “Editorial Note.” In “Ishiguro’s Unknown Communities.” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 40, no. 3: 205-206.

    Brontë, Charlotte.  2006.  Jane Eyre. London: Penguin.

    Brontë, Emily. 2003. Wuthering Heights. London: Penguin.

    During, Simon. 1996. “Literary Subjectivity.” Journal of the Association for the Study of Australian Literature, NV. 1-12.

    Eliot, George. 1995. Mill on the Floss. London: Penguin.

    Felski, Rita. 2011. “Context Stinks!” New Literary History, 42. no. 4: 573-591.

    Ishiguro, Kazuo. 2015.  “Kazuo Ishiguro: By the Book,” New York Times Sunday Book Review, March 5.

    —–. 2015. “Kazuo Ishiguro reads from his much anticipated new novel, ‘The Buried Giant’.”

    Seattle Public Library, March 30.  http://www.spl.org/library-collection/podcasts/2015-podcasts.

    —–. 2005. Never Let Me Go. New York: Vintage.

    Kornbluh, Anna and Benjamin Morgan, “Manifesto of the V21 Collective.” V21: Victorian

    Studies for the 21st Century. Web. http://v21collective.org/manifesto-of-the-v21-collective-ten-theses/. Accessed 6/2/2016.

    Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

    Moretti, Franco. 2013. Distant Reading. London: Verso.

    O’Gorman, Francis. 2012. “Matthew Arnold and Re-Reading.” The Cambridge Quarterly 41, 2: 245-261.

    Price, Leah. 2013. How to Do Things With Books in Victorian Britain. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    “reread, v.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Accessed 9/3/2016.

    Shelley, Mary. 2003. Frankenstein. London: Penguin.

    Notes

    [1] Rachel Ablow has investigated how (for Oscar Wilde) re-reading fiction enables a kind of vicariousness through which one can “try on” the affective register of belief (2009: 179-180).  Christopher Cannon considers the history of re-reading, tracing it from the Greeks to Locke in the sense of memorization or “knowing by heart” for the educational purposes of self-improvement or the medicinal properties of habit. Similarly focused on the historical mode, Rolf Engelsing describes a late eighteenth-century shift from the “intensive” re-reading of a few prized texts to the “extensive” consumption of many ephemeral ones while Leah Price counters that “some genres—particularly the novel—appear to have elicited a newly intensive reading at precisely the historical moment to which Engelsing traces its decline” (Price 2013: 318). Francis O’Gorman investigates what Matthew Arnold had to say about the effects of returning to a single poetic text over long spans of time; he notes that the poet was conflicted as to whether the purpose of re-reading was “to counter forgetfulness,” or to “investigate new perceptions” (2012: 250).

    CONTRIBUTOR’S NOTE

    Molly Clark Hillard is Associate Professor of English at Seattle University.  She is the author of Spellbound: The Fairy Tale and the Victorians (Ohio State UP, 2014).

  • Nathan K. Hensley: Swinburne’s Oxford Notebook: Violence in/as Form

    Nathan K. Hensley: Swinburne’s Oxford Notebook: Violence in/as Form

    by Nathan K. Hensley

    Figure 2. Poems and Ballads (1866), editions published by Moxon (L) and Hotton (R).

    The book I’ve chosen to describe for this brief position paper is not a book at all, really, but a book in the process of becoming: call it an essay, as in a trial or experiment. It’s one of Swinburne’s notebooks from his undergraduate years at Oxford. Some of this writing would later be “upcycled” into Poems and Ballads, of 1866 (that’s Antoinette and Isabel’s great term, from Ten Books), and in Figure 2 you can see the first, respectable edition of that infamous book, put out by Richard Moxon, alongside the second, pornographic one, issued after the indecency charges, published by John Camden Hotten.

    As is true of all books, the composition, compilation, and publication of Poems and Ballads left in its wake a jumbled collection of cancelled versions, outtakes, and half-formed trials: a train of loose material and juvenilia, spread now across archives in England and the US, some of it miraculously living at my own university, that would never be crystallized into any final public form at all.

    Figures 3, 4, 5. A. C. Swinburne’s Oxford Notebook (1859?). Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Georgetown University.
    Figures 3, 4, 5. A. C. Swinburne’s Oxford Notebook (1859?). Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Georgetown University.

    The non-book depicted above is one such record of abandoned energy or thought-in-motion, a testament, I mean, to writing as a process and not a thing. Orphaned in an archive in Washington, DC, it would have been incapable of “shaping empire” in models of analysis that borrow from Foucault or Althusser or just the intellectual conventions of our field to assess how a text might (in the words of Ten Books) “influence … imperial discourse and power” (Burton and Hofmeyr 2014: 3).

    In my work I’ve tried to pivot away from terms like discourse, influence, and power, and toward another set of conceptual levers — literary form and sovereign violence — to ask how nineteenth century thinkers used literary presentation to conceive their modernity’s uncanny coincidence with brute force. Part of this means expanding what it might mean for a book to be “about” empire, and could (I hope) help shift us away from the usual suspects of our “literature and empire” syllabi and toward the era’s anatomies of harm, catastrophe, and human waste: so Wuthering Heights, The Mill on the Floss, and Our Mutual Friend provisionally in place of Kipling and Conan Doyle. It also might push us to look for conceptual productivity rather than ideological inscription. The question becomes not how common sense circulates, discourses accrue, or ideologies stick, but how literary texts work to imagine the new.

    Of course, one provocation of Ten Books that Shaped the British Empire is to ask whether books shape empire at all, and to answer that we would need to know what a “book” is and what “shaping” means — and the authors address these questions– but also what constitutes “the British empire.” What do we talk about when we talk about empire?  The question is more difficult than it sounds, and I think Swinburne can help.  What you see below is the first page of a never-published poem in the Oxford notebook called “The Birch.”

    Figure 6. A. C. Swinburne’s Oxford Notebook (1859?), detail of “The Birch.” Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Georgetown University.
    Figure 6. A. C. Swinburne’s Oxford Notebook (1859?), detail of “The Birch.” Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Georgetown University.

    In it, Swinburne lovingly describes the pleasures of being beaten with a wooden rod.  He lingers on the opened flesh, the dripping fluids, the sublime pleasures of all this.  Like other of Swinburne’s Sadean flogging poems –dismissed as subliterary by Steven Marcus but expertly read by Yopie Prins– “The Birch” is a poem in praise of being beaten, and in this it well evinces what Ellis Hanson elsewhere in this series of blog posts refers to as “kink.” It is also, as Prins (2013) notes of other Swinburnean flogging poems, a poem about what poetry is and does, and is therefore, I’ll say, a poem not just about desire or violence but about form itself.

    There’s no space for a real reading in this short and telegraphic blog post, but trust me that Swinburne’s speaker mocks the right-minded people who would deny the delights of what the poem with jarring fondness calls “chastise[ment].”

    Figure 7. A. C. Swinburne’s Oxford Notebook (1859?), detail of “The Birch”:“Never again, they cry, shall schoolboy’s blood | Blush on the little twig of the well-work rod.” Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Georgetown University.
    Figure 7. A. C. Swinburne’s Oxford Notebook (1859?), detail of “The Birch”:“Never again, they cry, shall schoolboy’s blood | Blush on the little twig of the well-work rod.” Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Georgetown University.

    Taking this fondness for vexation yet further is my favorite poem and ballad in the published collection of that name, “Anactoria.” That poem places at the literal, mathematical center of its long catalogue of physical vexations what its speaker refers to as “the mystery of the cruelty of things”: the phrase comes from lines 152-154 of the 304 line poem. And like “Anactoria,” “The Birch” puts harm at the very core of its system: physical violence is the dark star around which orbit all its other affects, pleasure included. Swinburne’s early verse, I’m saying, anatomizes violence and understands somatic injury as its conceptual degree zero.

    But like the other Poems and Ballads composed in this period, “The Birch” unfolds within a fantastically rigorous formal structure. Elsewhere it’s roundels and Old French verse forms; here it’s end-stopped couplets, a grid of masculine rhymes and mostly iambs that is slashed over with flaying strokes from Swinburne’s fountain pen. These marks lacerate the tight form of the poetry they overwrite but do not cancel.

    Figure 8. A. C. Swinburne’s Oxford Notebook (1859?), “The Birch,” two details: cancellations (L), lashes (R). Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Georgetown University.
    Figure 8. A. C. Swinburne’s Oxford Notebook (1859?), “The Birch,” two details: cancellations (L), lashes (R). Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Georgetown University.

    In lavish, six inch strokes, Swinburne inscribes onto the manuscript of “The Birch” a tension between extravagant harm and regulative form: a co-traveling of rage and order that this manuscript presentation does not –need not– resolve.  Crucially for my sense of this as an act of materialized political thinking, physical violence is here uncannily bound up with the very regulative ensemble it seems to contravene. The physical capacities of this manuscript enable that suspension.

    Since this is a short post and I discuss these questions at more length in a forthcoming book, I’ll end listwise, with three things that make this object useful to me as a kind of tactical metonymy, the crown for the king, in this conversation about critical engagements with empire now:

    (1) It is singular; no other object on earth is identical with it, and as I’ve only just been able to hint at here, it is not identical with itself either.

    (2) It is — and this should be obvious– material. It is a physical object whose physicality is part of its apparatus for making meaning. As this suggests this object is also highly conscious of itself as form; its effects depend on what George Saintsbury (with Swinburne as an example) understood as “the laws of meter” (1910: 25): I mean the restraining or (in the Kantian sense) regulative functions of form that Swinburne here luxuriously overcodes.

    Finally (3), it is thought. Swinburne is not writing about India, not describing trade routes or troop movements or the suppressions of rebellions. He is instead writing about violence: and the point is that for an empire that routed its self understanding through the concept of law, this effort to think obscene violence and regulative form together makes “The Birch” political theory for the age of liberal empire.

    In its pitiless, I will say diagnostic analysis of how legality and harm travel together, and in its marshaling of poetic form to enact this cotraveling, Swinburne’s notebook pushes us away from vestigially empiricist models of influence and toward an understanding of how literary presentation can enact thought. But this object also does something more, which is to help us know empire as what it is: the targeted application of physical violence against certain bodies for the benefit of others — the mystery of the cruelty of things. As belated readers of documents like this, our tasks might be, first, to show how the Victorian thinkers we love mediate this obscene mystery into form, and second, if we can stomach it, to use those encounters as a way to begin reconceiving the present.

    References

    Burton, Antoinette, and Isobel Hofmeyr, eds. 2014. Ten Books that Shaped the British Empire: Creating an Imperial Commons. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

    Marcus, Steven. 1975. The Other Victorians: A Study of Sexuality and Pornography in Mid-Nineteenth Century England. New York: Basic Books.

    Prins, Yopie. 2013. “Metrical Discipline: Algernon Swinburne on ‘The Flogging Block.’” In Algernon Charles Swinburne: Unofficial Laureate, edited by Catherine Maxwell and Stefano Evangelista. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

    Saintsbury, George. 1910. A History of English Prosody: Volume III, From Blake to Mr. Swinburne. London: Macmillan & Co.

    Swinburne, Algernon Charles. 1859[?] Oxford Notebook. Manuscript notebook, Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Georgetown University.

    —. 1866. Poems and Ballads. London: Edward Moxon.

    —. 1866. Poems and Ballads. London: John Camden Hotten.

    CONTRIBUTOR’S NOTE

    Nathan K. Hensley is assistant professor of English at Georgetown University. He is the author of Forms of Empire: The Poetics of Victorian Sovereignty (2016).

     

  • Sebastian Lecourt: The Light of Asia and the Varieties of Victorian Presentism

    Sebastian Lecourt: The Light of Asia and the Varieties of Victorian Presentism

    by Sebastian Lecourt

    This essay was peer-reviewed by the editorial board of b2o: an online journal.

    The complaint that the term Victorian, with its ambiguous conflation of nation, period, and personage, represents an undo stumbling block for scholars of Dickens or Eliot is hardly new. Indeed, in many ways it belongs to a wider crisis of categories instigated by postcolonial theory. One of the main lessons that figures such as Said taught us, after all, was that so many of the genre and period tags organizing our field – west and east, modern and ancient, novel and epic – are ideological projections that function to pull diverse global histories into the master narratives of western modernity. Over the past two decades, transnationally minded critics have sought to take this critique on board in a number of ways. Some have deliberately explored the ideological freight of western comparative forms through a re-politicized formalism in the tradition of Lukács (Puchner 2006; Slaughter 2007; Esty 2011). Others have embraced a new particularism that examines how individual texts, as they circulate internationally, can be taken up in surprising ways that belie their Eurocentric roots (see the essays in Burton and Hofmeyr 2014). Still other critics have looked toward the world systems that make such circulation possible (Moretti 2000).

    Within Victorian studies itself, Caroline Levine and Priya Joshi have used elements of the latter two approaches to reimagine the term Victorian, not as a national or period marker, but instead as the name of a transnational media network built by Queen Victoria’s agents – a sprawling infrastructure of printing presses, railroads, telegraphs, and educational institutions that disseminated imperial media around the globe (Joshi 2002; Levine 2013). The refreshing thing about this approach is that it expands the idea of the Victorian temporally as well as geographically, opening up a kind of presentist optic that permits us to read Victorian literature beyond the horizon of its immediate historical context. Once you do the legwork of reconstructing this Victorian media network, you discover that a great deal of our contemporary information world, from the Indian public libraries that interest Joshi to the Gothic and Pre-Raphaelite affects haunting contemporary pop music, is built upon Victorian foundations. What is more, you realize that we encounter a striking amount of pre-Victorian culture as it was remediated by Victorian writers. The Oxford philologist Max Müller’s translation of the Upanishads, for example, may yet be found at major bookstores and free online in countless e-editions. Call this historicism as presentism, a historicism that treats today as a reality constituted by multiple deep pasts.

    I have recently explored this critical landscape on the v21 blog and elsewhere.[i] At last October’s V21 Symposium, however, Jesse Rosenthal drew our attention to one danger in such an approach: the danger of too easily privileging those aspects of Victorian media that we fancy make the most natural precursors for ourselves. In this golden age of television, the serial publication of the Victorian novel can seem a lot more interesting than the adaptation of Victorian novels into lavish theatrical productions, a practice that resonates better with the bestseller-to-blockbuster pipeline of 1990s Hollywood. The risk of presentism, in other words, is that we might return to a kind of Whig history in which the past functions primarily to lead to ourselves.

    What I want to suggest here, though, is that Joshi’s brand of diffusionary history also has resources for resisting this kind of circularity. Specifically, I have found it instructive to read Victorian literature, as she defines it, not just through its contemporary afterlives but also through its uptake by subsequent periods – in particular, to revisit nineteenth-century texts that we no longer consider important but represented seminal works to readers in the 1920s or the 1960s. Recently, for instance, I have written on The Light of Asia, an epic poem about the Buddha published by Edwin Arnold in 1879 (Lecourt 2016a; 2016b: 114). Arnold (no relation to Matthew) taught for years in India before returning to London in the seventies to work as a journalist and poet. Although The Light of Asia was but one of several adaptations of Asian religious works that he published over the following years, it would become an especially celebrated bestseller, going through dozens of editions in multiple languages and inspiring both stage and screen versions. Mahatma Gandhi credited The Light of Asia, along with Arnold’s verse translation of the Bhagavad-Gita, with rekindling his interest in Indian religion, while T. S. Eliot would recall the poem fondly as something that had expanded his mental horizons as a young man (Clausen 1973; Franklin 2005). Meanwhile the poem also had a major impact upon emerging Buddhist nationalisms from Ceylon to Japan to Burma.[ii]

    In both metropolitan and colonial contexts, Arnold’s poem helped promulgate a Protestantized construction of Buddhism as a religion that was about neither rituals nor doctrines but rather moral individualism (McMahan 2008). While we think of this vision of Buddhism as a phenomenon of the twentieth century – the modernist rebellion against Victorian religious morality, or postwar Baby Boomer frustrations with middle-class materialism – it might better be described as Victorian Protestant earnestness turning its righteous gaze against Protestantism itself, an evangelical anti-formalist polemic that has latched onto a non-western religion in order to chide its own culture. Recognizing it as such reveals that the line between presentism and historicism, reading the past through the lens of our priorities and assessing it on its own terms, can be quite hard to draw. Not only do we frequently receive the past as mediated by other periods, but the stances from which we criticize particular historical epochs may rest upon foundations built within them. In the case of Arnold’s poem, where once we might have seen a period and its various afterlives, we now perceive a set of constantly mutating preoccupations that are as vital in current-day America and Japan as they were in Victorian England or Ceylon. This is just standard dialectical history, of course, but it reminds us that presentism can never be completely present, and if done self-consciously can encourage a great sensitivity to the complexities of the past.

    Moreover, reading Victorian texts as they influence us through intervening cultural moments can strengthen historicist practice by highlighting how, in reframing the past around our own concerns, we inevitably take part in a certain history. In her paper at last October’s V21 Symposium, Anna Kornbluh championed the power of anachronistic reading to juxtapose different texts from across literary periods and thus rescue us from the myopia of contextual interpretation. “What Susan Stanford Friedman has called ‘cultural parataxis,’ the radical collage of texts from different geohistorical coordinates,” she ventured, “can produce new textual insights and new theoretical insights” (Kornbluh 2015). Tracing the multiple afterlives of something like The Light of Asia, however, puts anachronistic reading itself into a kind of historical perspective by showing that such willful comparison of literary materials out of period is not some gesture against history but rather the latest episode in the history of what Levine calls affordances: the way in which literary forms are both in control of their own history and not, suggesting a certain set of imaginative possibilities that only others can realize for them (Levine 2014: 6-7).

    Indeed, a global, cross-period historicism might actually embolden an anachronistic hermeneutic by letting us compare the ways that we reframe nineteenth-century literary materials with how other periods have done it – letting us see, that is, how our anachronistic readings take part in the ongoing process by which forms are used and reused, disseminated and appropriated. My own copy of The Light of Asia, an 1889 edition published by Roberts Brothers in Boston, belonged a professor at a small religious college in northern California where my mother works. His copy, in turn, was inscribed in pencil by a Margaret Burr back in 1890. I cannot say what either reader made of the poem, though I assume that their takes differed from mine, which is driven both by memories of a teenage interest in Buddhism and by a scholarly preoccupation with the history of religious studies. But it fascinates me that we are part of the same history, dependent in some sense upon that imperial encounter in South Asia a century and a half ago.

     

    References

    Blackburn, Anne. 2010. Locations of Buddhism: Colonialism and Modernity in Sri Lanka. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Burton, Antoinette and Isabel Hofmeyr. 2014. Ten Books That Shaped the British Empire: Creating an Imperial Commons. Durham: Duke University Press.

    Clausen, Christopher. 1973. “Sir Edwin Arnold’s ‘The Light of Asia’ and its Reception.” Literature East and West 17: 174-91.

    Esty, Jed. 2011. Unseasonable Youth: Modernism, Colonialism, and the Fiction of Development. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Franklin, J. Jeffrey. “The Life of the Buddha in Victorian England.” ELH 72 (4): 941-974.

    Gombrich, Richard and Gananath Obeyesekere. 1988. Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Harris, Elizabeth J. 2008. Theravāda Buddhism and the British Encounter. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Joshi, Priya. 2002. In Another Country: Colonialism, Culture, and the English Novel in India. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Kornbluh, Anna. 2015. “History Repeating.” Paper presented at the V21 Colloquium, Chicago, October 9.

    Lecourt, Sebastian. 2015. “Victorian Studies and the Transnational Present.” V21 blog post. http://v21collective.org/sebastian-lecourt-victorian-studies-and-the-transnational-present/

    —–. 2016a. “Idylls of the Buddh’: Buddhist Modernism and Victorian Poetics in Colonial Ceylon.” PMLA 131 (3): forthcoming.

    —–. 2016b. “That Untravell’d World: The Problem of Thinking Globally in Victorian Studies.” Literature Compass 13 (2): 108-17.

    Levine, Caroline. 2013. “From Nation to Network.” Victorian Studies 55 (4): 647-66.

    —–. 2014. Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Malalgoda, Kirsiri. 1976. Buddhism in Sinhalese Society, 1750-1900. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    McMahan, David. 2008. The Making of Buddhist Modernism. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Moretti, Franco. 2000. “Conjectures on World Literature.” New Left Review 1 (January-February): 54-68.

    Puchner, Martin. 2006. Poetry of the Revolution: Marx, Manifestos, and the Avant-Gardes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Rosenthal, Jesse. 2015. “Maintenance Work: On Tradition and Development.” Paper presented at the V21 Colloquium, Chicago, October 9.

    Slaughter, Joseph. 2007. Human Rights, Inc.: The World Novel, Narrative Form, and International Law. New York: Fordham University Press.

    Notes

    [i] See Lecourt 2015 and 2016b.

    [ii] For overviews of the revival, consult Malalgoda 1976; Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988; Seneviratne 1999; Harris 2008; Blackburn 2010.

     

    CONTRIBUTOR’S NOTE

    Sebastian Lecourt is Assistant Professor of English at the University of Houston.  His essays have appeared in PMLA, Victorian Studies, and Victorian Literature and Culture. 

  • Joseph Lavery: Emergency Repairs Are Required On All Our Dams

    Joseph Lavery: Emergency Repairs Are Required On All Our Dams

    by Joseph Lavery

    This essay was peer-reviewed by the editorial board of b2o: an online journal.

    The book I’m proposing as a resource for thinking about empire, historical attachment, and V21 method, is Freud’s late paper “Analysis Terminable and Interminable.”[1] It’s an odd text in a lot of ways – and possibly was never, actually, a book in the usual sense of the word (oops): a return to clinical and technical questions after two decades spent exhibiting psychoanalysis as the centerpiece in a variety of theoretical tableaux; and we find Freud in Vienna, less than a year before the Anschluss would force him to flee to London, doubting at last that the utopian payoff of therapy, as he had understood it, was achievable within the analytic scene. The argument, which must be dramatically over-simplified given the time frame, is that transference, once thought by Freud to be a singular and punctual moment, proves all too often reversible; that the possibility of “terminating” an analytic procedure must be considered a practical one, rather than as an apotheosis. The metaphor to which Freud turns to describe the ongoing work of an interminable analysis is that of repairing dams built in one’s infancy; the “dams” (226) are the repressions and sublimations that protect the ego from the disorienting affects of trauma, built poorly by an as-yet-immature ego.

    For all its technicality and complexity, it is a rich and richly deconstructive text that, were there time (and/or a market) for it, one could doubtless demonstrate the mutual constitution of terminable and interminable analyses. For V21, though, what strikes me is the implicit analogy (no doubt one determined in the final analysis by history: Freud’s increasing awareness of his precarity as an Austrian Jew on the verge of imperial annexation) between analytic work and traumatic repetition itself. That is, whereas analysis had initially claimed itself to be a new and distinct kind of repetition that would substitute for, and eventually displace, the symptomatization of trauma; Freud comes to doubt that this kind of repetition was essentially different at all, that the critical “working through” was potentially indistinguishable from the bad repetition against which he had always contrasted it.

    This suggests to me the possibility of a further analogy – one indeed hinted by Freud in the suggestion that not just individuals, but “races and nations” (TK241 may make fit subjects for analysis – which I shall formulate in my own terms: our collective critical and ethical obligation to the past (whether figured as “reparation,” qua Sedgwick, “redemption,” qua Bersani, or as what “unexpectedly appears to man” qua Benjamin) entails, in its very insistence on historical difference, a de-historicizing of the present.[2] An interminable historicism would begin by abolishing the intrinsic distinction between past and present, and conceptualize therapy as an absolute temporality entailing future no less than past: something of this kind is articulated in Paul Saint-Amour’s Tense Future.[3] When Empire is the name we give to that temporality, we are not setting ourselves the task of fixing one or another dam: all our dams need emergency repair: a collective project.

    To stand this interminable historicism on its feet, a question, and an answer to a different question, both concerning the contemporary “legacies” of British slavery: or, precisely, not “legacies,” in so far as that term assumes the death of a past of which we are legatees, but immanent effects. The question concerns Benedict Cumberbatch, and requires one to know (1) that he is arguably the most visible and fetishized standard-bearer for contemporary neo-Victorianism, through his exquisitely mannered performance as Sherlock in the contemporary-ish BBC adaptations; (2) that his ancestor Abram P. Cumberbatch was, following the 1833 Abolition Act, compensated for the loss of 232 formerly enslaved Barbadians, and a name which, to Sherlock fans connotes a gleeful English quaintness, has long served Barbadians as a synecdoche of plantation rule.[4] The question is: when I read Cumberbatch musing about moving to America because “no one minds so much [about class] over there,” and am reminded of C19 narratives of roguish men seeking their fortunes in the tropics for the same reason, is my paranoia located in the past or in the present?[5] And the answer, from Sir Hilary Beckles, publishing in the Jamaica Observer an open letter to the then Prime Minister David Cameron, himself a descendent of slave owners, on the occasion of his state visit to Jamaica:

    “Dear Honourable Prime Minister,

    I join with the resolute and resilient people of Jamaica and their Government in extending to you a warm and glorious welcome to our homeland. We recognise you, Prime Minister, given your family’s long and significant relationship to our country, as an internal stakeholder with historically assigned credentials.

    To us, therefore, you are more than a prime minister. You are a grandson of the Jamaican soil who has been privileged and enriched by your forebears’ sins of the enslavement of our ancestors.”[6]

    Notes

    [1] Freud, Sigmund. 1967. ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable,’ in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII (1937 – 1939): Moses and Monotheism, An Outline of Psychoanalysis and Other Works. Translated from the German under the General Editorship of James Strachey, in Collab. With Anna Freud, Assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, 209 – 253. London. The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis.

    [2] These three modes of historicist practice nonetheless share, to some degree, a powerfully invested ambivalence concerning the ethics of historical work. See Sedgwick, Eve. ‘Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay Is About You,’ in Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. Bersani, Leo. The Culture of Redemption. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. Benjamin, Walter. ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’ in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt. Translated by Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 1968. p. 255

    [3] Saint-Amour, Paul K. Tense Future: Modernism, Total War, Encyclopedic Form. Oxford: OUP, 2015.

    [4] The Cumberbatch family history was widely reported around the release of Twelve Years a Slave dir. Steve McQueen (Fox Searchlight, 2013), in which Benedict Cumberbatch played the planter William Prince Ford. See, for example, Adams, Guy. ‘How Benedict Cumberbatch’s family made a fortune from slavery (And why his roles in films like 12 Year a Slave are a bid to atone for their sins).’ Daily Mail, 31 January 2014. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2549773/How-Benedict-Cumberbatchs-family-fortune-slavery-And-roles-films-like-12-Years-A-Slave-bid-atone-sins.html

    [5] Benedict Cumberbatch, quoted in Raphael, Amy. “‘I’m definitely middle class… OK maybe I’m upper middle class’: From Sherlock to Star Trek, Benedict Cumberbatch on his meteoric rise to stardom.’ The Mail on Sunday, 27 April 2013. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/event/article-2314671/Star-Trek-returns-Benedict-Cumberbatch-boldly-goes-Sherlock-Trekkie.html

    [6] Beckles, Sir Hilary, ‘Letter to David Cameron,’; see ‘Britain has duty to clean up monumental mess of Empire, Sir Hilary tells Cameron,’ Jamaica Observer. Monday, September 28, 2015. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Britain-has-duty-to-clean-up-monumental-mess-of-Empire–Sir-Hilary-tells-Cameron_19230957

  • Nasser Mufti: Bio-Politics and Greater Britain

    Nasser Mufti: Bio-Politics and Greater Britain

    by Nasser Mufti

    This essay was peer-reviewed by the editorial board of b2o: an online journal.

    In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1976, Michel Foucault proclaims that the emergence of bio-politics was “one of the greatest transformations political right underwent in the nineteenth century” because it overlaid the “sovereign’s old right—to take life or let live” with the power to “make live and let die” (Foucault 2003: 241). Bio-politics, along with its critical vocabulary of “state racism,” “regularized life” (81, 245), “fostering life” and “regulations of the population” (1990: 138, 139), have become essential to understanding what Étienne Balibar, with Foucault in mind, calls the “great ‘transition’ between the world of subjection and the world of right and discipline” (Balibar 1991: 55).

    Overlooked by most students of Foucault’s critique of sovereignty is Morley Roberts’s treatise, Bio-politics: An Essay in Physiology and Politics of the Social and Somatic Organism. Written in 1912 and published in 1938, the book argues for the state’s re-invention as a biological entity. As Roberts explains in the preface, “It is not to be expected that the politician should apply himself to the study of the endocrine organs, or ductless glands of the body, but a little knowledge of them might help him understand more perfectly the nature of his own difficulties in relation with the organized bodies of any kind—from empires and nations down to the turbulent committees among his own constituents […] He might even hear of the Struggle of the Parts and might possibly learn that I had reasonably described the social life of the body as a state of hostile symbiosis” (Roberts 1938: xiii). Roberts’s idea of the state, as it turns out, is imperial through and through. And its vitalism extends from the domestic squabbles of “turbulent committees” to the imperial peripheries. This global polity is seemingly under permanent duress. For it is hard not to read what he calls the “hostile symbiosis” or the “Struggle of the Parts” as the rise of anti-colonial movements in the peripheries (Ireland, India, South Africa, for example), which in 1912 were increasingly crystalizing as nationalist projects that contested British imperial rule.

    Roberts’s text is the outcome of a peculiar intellectual trajectory. He worked for the India Office in the late-1870s, and travelled through much of the British empire in the 1880s, spending much of his time in Australia, Canada, South Africa and the United States. Between 1886 and 1906, Roberts published over two dozen novels, travelogues, numerous short stories, and a biography of George Gissing, who was a friend of his from college. Not unlike the imperial adventure tales of writers like H. Rider Haggard, G. A. Henty, William Henry Hudson and Robert Louis Stevenson, the colonies loom especially large in Roberts’s tales. Roberts stopped writing fiction in the 1910s, focusing instead of publishing texts like Bio-Politics, including also Warfare in the Human Body (1922) and The Behavior of Nations (1941).

    Roberts’s language in Bio-Politics oscillates between the registers of biology and politics so much so that, according to him, nothing is lost in translation. Biological forms map perfectly onto geopolitical forms. The structures that organize an organism’s life, it turns out, are the same as those of politics. The effect of this formal conjuncture is borderline absurd prose. To take one example, in a chapter on “Politics and Colonial Protozoa,” Roberts makes the analogy between Proterospongia Haeckelii and imperial geopolitics. He describes Proterospongia Haeckelii as “a primitive sponge” where “there can be seen on the gelatinous surface of the colony cup-shaped flagellate cells, while, in the interior, there are only non-flagellate amoebae.” On this gelatinous continent are two types of organisms, one at the extremities of the “gelatinous surface,” and the other inside of it. “But these flagellates are not fixed,” Roberts explains, “they are capable of migrating to the surface, where they soon become cup-shaped and flagellate and take up the functions of those they displaced. These again migrate from the surface and return for a time to the primitive amoeba form” (108). Roberts uses the example to argue that the British empire not be seen as a static territory, but as a dynamic relation. The spongy gelatinous “continent” is not a fixed geographic category for Roberts, but is mobile and modular, capable of inverting its coordinates so that interiors become its exteriors, intra-national becomes extra-national, metropole becomes colony, and vice versa.

    What kind of historical context makes it possible for someone like Roberts to conflate the metropolitan center with the periphery, and moreover, conflate these two radically different schemas with no limits? One answer, it seems to me, is “Greater Britain.” During the British empire’s most ambitious years towards the end of the nineteenth century, Britain was often said to have formed an imperial nation-state with its colonies. J. R. Seeley, for example, celebrated the impact of technology on the British empire in a decidedly vitalist key: “Science has given to the political organism a new circulation, which is steam, and a new nervous system, which is electricity” (Seeley 1914: 86-7). In “Saxondom,” Seeley contemplates, “Canada and Australia are to us as Kent and Cornwall,” suggesting a transformation of geographic distance into domestic proximity in a way not unlike Roberts’s Haeckelii (63). That Roberts (and to a lesser degree Seeley) make a space beyond the bounds of the empire unthinkable in the very years Britain’s colonies were first declaring their independence from Britain tells us something about why the geopolitical terrain of Bio-Politics is as mutable and elastic as it is. While Roberts’s turn to biology might seem to “de-center” the British empire (in ways not dissimilar to how scholars of empire have turned to the language of networks, webs and systems), the politics behind his biological tropes is rooted in a familiar imperial paradigm.

    But one thing is certain: Roberts makes it impossible to think of bio-politics outside of an imperial milieu. Scholars like Ann Laura Stoler and Achille Mbembe have in their own ways extended, adapted and decentered Foucault’s genealogy of bio-politics from Europe to the peripheries (see Stoler 1995; Mbembe 2003). But Roberts offers another way to approach the question of bio-politics—namely, through the triumphant, jingoistic discourse of Greater Britain and its other, anti-colonial nationalism.

    References

    Étienne Balibar. 1991. “Citizen Subject.” In Who Comes After the Subject?, edited by Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, Jean-Luc Nancy. London: Routledge.

    Foucault, Michel. 2003. “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-6. Translated by David Macey. New York: Picador.

    Foucault, Michel. 1990. An Introduction. Vol. 1 of The History of Sexuality. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books.

    Mbembe, Achille. 2003. “Necropolitics.” Public Culture 15, no. 1: 11-40.

    Roberts, Morley. 1938. Bio-Politics: An Essay in the Physiology, Pathology and Politics of the Social and Somatic Organism. London: Dent.

    Seeley, J. R. 1914. The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures London: Macmillan and Co..

    Stoler, Laura Ann. 1995. Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things. Durham: Duke University Press.