The b2o Review is a non-peer reviewed publication, published and edited by the boundary 2 editorial collective and specific topic editors, featuring book reviews, interventions, videos, and collaborative projects.  

  • Oded Nir–Palestine, Israel and the Problem of Naming

    Oded Nir–Palestine, Israel and the Problem of Naming

    Palestine, Israel, and the Problem of Naming

    Oded Nir

    Problems of naming are many times seen as moral issues: we try to fix a bias hardcoded into the way we write or speak by inventing new names for people and things. But names are also historical problems disguised as simple words, problems that are sometimes much more intractable than what can be fixed by naming itself. I would like here to offer a brief example for the problem of naming which recently plagues any mention of Palestine and Israel in writing on the left: that slight hesitation, about whether to write “Palestine”, “Israel/Palestine”, or some other combination. One tends to swallow that hesitation and move on to whatever one had been planning to write. But this is clearly a case of repression, of however minor a kind. The act of naming in this case threatens to open up a hornet’s nest: a host of narratives and ideological positions that don’t quite fit what one means to say. The name one chooses seems constantly in danger of failing to capture its object—a kind of approximation that ends up letting what it names slip away.

    I use here the Greimassian rectangle, as Fredric Jameson and Phillip Wegner developed it, to propose a structure for thinking about this problem of naming “Israel-Palestine”. The Greimassian rectangle allows us to think of binary oppositions as opening up to include two kinds of negation: A primary one, in which one term is the strong, determinate negation of its opposite; this kind of opposition operates between our initial two terms. And a second negation for each one of these terms, a weaker and more general one, that indicates what is simply not-it.  In the following diagram, S and -S designate the initial two terms; while the terms  designate, diagonally, the weaker negations of each of the initial terms of the opposition:

    At its best, the Greimassian rectangle can help us discern the structure of categories that underpin a narrative or discursive scene. This discerning does not necessarily solve anything, but should help us formulate new problems and redefine situations. To do that, the terms of the initial opposition and their weaker negations must be polyvalent enough to generate different kinds of synonyms and opposites.

    Here I would like to plot the different, common enough, possibilities for naming “Israel/Palestine” on the square. It should be emphasized that there is nothing frivolous about using the square in the context of an urgent political problem. Political urgency should never trump thinking. The last few years surely teach us that there is nothing obvious about how to fight rising fascism or how to overcome the liberal capitalism from which the former emerges (and with which fascism entertains deeper affinities, as Adorno and Horkheimer argue in Dialectic of Enlightenment). And to repress thinking with moralization doesn’t seem like a useful option either. My use of the square here is an attempt to think through a political situation; maybe it is a failed attempt, but there is nothing frivolous about the effort itself.

    As a point of departure, each one of these name-combinations for Israel/Palestine should be seen as a historical narrative in reified form. To turn a name back into a narrative means to be able to see it as self-contradictory, or as having a gap or discontinuity at its core. The Greimassian rectangle’s power resides precisely in that it operates somewhat like Walter Benjamin’s constellation: the seemingly arbitrary process of contrasting different names, as if they were external to each other, ends up exposing each name’s internal contradictions. That said, to narrativize each term is not just to recount the history of its use. The task, rather, is to eke out the narrative that each term seems to insinuate in the current situation. Teasing these out is a matter for intuition, an operation that remains outside any empirical verifiability, though it may be complemented later with a more dialectical form of historical inquiry, in which terms come to take on retroactively different meaning as time moves and paradigms shift. Insofar as each name will come to designate a narrative form, this is where History, and futurity, will be articulated with all their urgency.

    For the initial opposition, I suggest we take the two names “Israel/Palestine” and “Israel-Palestine”. What distinguishes these is only the difference between a separator and a hyphen. But this small change designates a crucial difference of historical and narrative relationship. “Israel/Palestine”, I think, designates today a narrative in which an antagonism is affirmed between Israel and Palestine. Palestine is here narrated as Israel’s other, some resistant element to it, while Israel itself is seen as a positive geopolitical unit. This antagonism may be regarded as either external, with Palestine constituting some external threat, or as internal, with Palestine serving as constitutive aberration, the “concrete universal” exception to Israel, on which the latter’s wholeness actually depends. Here belong both Golda Meir’s paradoxical “there is no such thing as Palestinian people”, and, on the more literary side, Amos Oz’s early stories, in which the Kibbutz is spatially threatened by external Palestinian presence.

    As its opposite, “Israel-Palestine” is where the antagonism between the two is either denied or reconciled (after its assertion), in favor of a flat equivalence or continuity, either in an idealistic-humanist terms or in some cynical assertion that national difference is mere illusion. This continuity and equivalence is an important element in the horizon of the Oslo and 1990s peace process, in which, of course, the hope for peace was unfortunately constructed through a completely uneven (future) arrangement: the establishment of a Palestinian state subservient to Israel. Negativity itself is banished here: the continuity and equivalence are asserted immediately, with no labor of negation. Here belong, as well, sundry humanistic pronouncements on the “Israeli-Palestinian” conflict, ones whose explicit or implicit message is general regret over the loss of life and an ideological commitment to “balanced perspectives”—which, of course, is another name for supporting the status quo. This continuity between or equivalence of “Israel-Palestine” is politically shunned today on the left, as some well-meaning but ultimately misguided and thoughtless lip-service to peace.

    These, then, form our initial opposition, in which an initial recognition of antagonism is replaced by arbitrary equivalence. The third term will then also be a negation of the first term, “Israel/Palestine” (diagonally represented in the square), but a more general one, designating what is simply not-it. I would like to suggest the name “Palestine/Israel” for exactly this term. It may seem like a simple transposition, in which the terms just switch places around the divider, which still affirms the antagonism between them. But the order here matters qualitatively, and neither “Palestine” nor “Israel” in “Palestine/Israel” mean the same thing as they do in “Israel/Palestine.” What “Palestine/Israel” invokes, I think, is a narrative in which Israel is a contingent, historical imposition on a preexisting Palestine. But Palestine here does not immediately designate an existing geopolitical entity, on which political scientists can wax boringly. Rather, it opens up the way to imagining a past collectivity that must impossibly be recovered, or a speculative collective project to come, free from external oppression. Meanwhile, Israel in this option is not some internal exception, but an external imposition, a dominant and oppressive one. This is the place of the colonial or settler-colonial narrative, in which the settler’s eliminationist tendencies must be defeated at all costs, as a precondition for any recovery of collectivity. Thus, we get the following basic square:

    Once we place these options in the rectangle, what becomes clear is that there is one corner that remains yet unnamed: the bottom-left one. This fourth narrative option is the one that, for Jameson and Phil Wegner, is reserved for the Hegelian negation of the negation. It cannot be determined simply by a logical procedure out of the other three names, which are relatively easy to isolate, as Jameson notes. Positing it requires an imaginative leap and a wager of thought. It is a term that is not only the general negation of “Israel-Palestine” but also of the imaginative space opened up by the other two names: it is impossibly self-contradictory and unstable. In the context of our square, it is a term that requires something like a negation on two fronts: it subtracts itself from the easy continuity of “Israel-Palestine”, but it also refuses both the splitting of Palestine from Israel, or the past or future projection of a whole Palestine, free of Israel.

    I want to suggest that what names this fourth option is to be found in our relationship to the aftermath to the horrible events of October 7, 2023. That these have come to mark in our symbolic order some decisive shift, some end of a previous status quo (itself hideously oppressive to Palestinians), should be clear enough, even if the precise contours of a new narrative have not yet fully emerged. One can see the signs of this potential shift in our responses to the new situation. The student encampment movement is a good example: its emergence seems to mark some new imaginary relationship to Palestinian struggle and Israel, the uncompromising demands for decolonizing Palestine and US institutions now seem to hold some stronger, more direct possibilities for identification. Institutional responses to these new challenges also seem to have something new about them: the crackdown on the protesters, the suspicion that any criticism of Israel is somehow antisemitic—a suspicion not dispelled by insistence on the difference between the two—all attest to the emergence of some new allegorical structuring to the events in our imagination (their signifying of something more than just themselves).  Intellectual responses within the left also seem to signal some new situation waiting to be named, insofar as they waver between a condemnation of the Palestinian attacks and of the Israeli response, to a doubling down on an established narrative of anti-colonial struggle, itself borrowed from mid-20th century struggles. What I argue below is that the contradictory historical options opened up by this newness are the ones that inspire in us simultaneously both genuine hope and terrible fear: on the one hand, the symbolic revival of the possibility of Palestinian—and universal—liberation invoked by the October 7 attacks, expressed for example in Jodi Dean’s commentary. And on the other, the genocide of Palestinians by Israel, already underway, and the stemming of all hope for Palestinian liberation; but also the genuine Israeli or Jewish fear of elimination (unjustifiable, perhaps, but a real fear even so).

    Thus, “The aftermath of October 7” comes to designate, impossibly, both negations that I mentioned: it decisively subtracts from the list of available categories the flat, unproblematic, continuity or equivalence of “Israel-Palestine” – the very antagonism (the Palestinian attacks or the genocidal Israeli response) cannot be plausibly contained in some notion of “business as usual.”  But on the other hand, “October 7” also takes its distance from “Israel/Palestine” and “Palestine/Israel”: overt Israeli eliminationist glee towards Palestinian suffering cannot possibly anymore designate a repressed, Palestinian, “concrete universal” exception to supposedly universal Israeli law; it is instead Israel’s retreat into unapologetic particularism. Meanwhile, the celebration of the October 7 attacks threatens to collapse into an eliminationism of its own: misgivings about the emancipatory horizon of Hamas and about the denial of Jewish self-determination, and hesitation over whether to support of the attack itself—all of which mark the current moment’s distance from the “Palestine/Israel” option. Thus, “October 7’s aftermath” is, if anything, a figure for insistent negativity, one to which the previous names have trouble adhering. In other words, it is a textbook eruption of the Real into the Symbolic.

    But what can this eruption mean? Since a new symbolic code has yet to emerge, the answer to this question requires us willfully to arrest the play of synonyms that fuels any process of naming—requires, indeed, that reification be allowed to take hold again, but hopefully in a novel and suggestive way, making concrete some new Historical horizons. Thus, as a way of answering this question, I return to the rectangle. So far, I’ve only charted the internal terms of the rectangle. But it offers us four other positions, external ones, as my initial chart discloses. These four external options allow us to position different combinations of the four initial terms, as contradictory as these initial terms may seem. And so I would like to suggest the following full Greimassan rectangle:

    Of particular importance in this chart is the status of the top and bottom terms, called the complex and the neutral term, respectively. The top term is reserved for the operation of ideology: the imagined reconciliation of contradiction (a formulation that has its roots both in Levi-Strauss and Althusser). This is where “Israel/Palestine” and “Israel-Palestine” find their symbolic reconciliation: admitting a historical antagonism between Israel and Palestine, but asserting too quickly and idealistically the possibility of their equivalent coexistence as separate states. This is precisely the imagined reconciliation of the 1990s failed peace effort, which still functions as some hollow “common ground” to signal peaceful intentions. It is clear, today, that such splitting into two states is not really possible any longer, considering Israeli land theft, and that its implicit content is nothing but a formalization of a relation of subordination of Palestine to Israel—as it did back in the 1990s. That today world leaders can overtly express their support for the peace of a two-state solution, yet directly contribute to Israeli oppression, is perhaps the best demonstration of this position’s quintessentially ideological function.

    But a new option has recently emerged to occupy this reconciliatory position: the confederation, which has gained some support in recent months. The confederative solution, in its many variants, seems to be even a more effective reconciliatory (or ideological) option than the two-state solution.  The way core issues are addressed—territory, the Palestinian right of return and reparations, the degree of Palestine’s independence, etc.—is immediately revealed to be no different than how they’re imagined in either a two-state or that option on which I haven’t touched yet, that of the one-state framework (as for example in one variant’s positing of an open border, which is borrowed from the one-state paradigm, but with each state deciding on the differential rights of the various  groups in its territory, which again returns us to all the familiar problems of the two-state solution). The confederation’s main novelty seems to reside in the establishment of a common governmental order, which in fact becomes its sole characteristic in the documents of The Israeli Palestinian Confederacy.[1] [2]

    Here, only the coordinating governmental order is elaborated in a proposed constitution, and engagement with any important disagreements is refused and deferred to the future. Here, then, we have nothing but the last turning of the screw of an eternal present, extending from the oppression of Palestinians into what was supposed to end it—peace negotiations. To put it bluntly, in this confederated non-solution, we are permitted to have the dessert of eternal oppression as long as we eat the heaped up greens of eternal negotiation—the governmental institutions of the confederation.

    But perhaps the biggest problem with the proposed confederation, one not addressed by any of its adherents or critics, is the absence in it of what Jameson calls collective feeling or Ibn Khaldun’s asabiyya: federalism “does not seem to work as a concept, as a value. Perhaps it still carries a little too much of the atmosphere of tolerance and altruism and too little of a vital narcissism to be viscerally attractive.”[3] In An American Utopia, Jameson offers a more sustained discussion of federalism as a solution and a problem in its own right, thematized precisely as one of envy and the theft of jouissance (which is just another way to get at the absence of collective feeling). He then offers a Fourieresque “non-solution” for it: the “Psychoanalytic Placement Bureau,”[4] which allows for people to chance occupations  and forms of life as well as absorbing of therapy, both individual and collective, into a centralized state apparatus.[5] Yet, such an ambitious centralized supplement to federalism is precisely what is barred in Palestine/Israel confederation proposals, in positing differential rights of residents and citizens. My point here is that to the degree that one is able to imagine libidinal investment in a confederation (as a properly utopian narrative might do), it would become indistinguishable from the truly Utopian possibility, both threatening and promising, haunting our ideologues today: that of the single-state solution. The speculative rise of a different “collective feeling,” then, immediately implies a commonality of fate that today is still hard to imagine except as a single nation-state.

    But before I address this option, which appears in the bottom corner of the outer square, a few words are in order about its outer left and right corners: “Israel without Palestine” and “Palestine without Israel.” One should remember here that “Israel” is not identical to “Israel without Palestine”: to mark an absence is itself a presence in the latter case. The latter differs from the former in that it introduces the exclusion of Palestine into the very notion of Israel. Such barring of Palestine is clearly a solution of sorts for the combination of “Israel/Palestine” and “October 7 Aftermath”: the continued genocide of Palestinians—murderous oppression, slow or fast, of a kind that no longer pays even symbolic homage to a just, peaceful, resolution, becomes part of what Israel means. It signifies the eradication of the Palestinian “exception” to Israel, implied by Israel/Palestine. Trump’s “peace plan,” which includes the barbaric intention of the forcing Palestinians into exile from Gaza, also belongs in this outer right corner.

    But the opposite corner, that of “Palestine without Israel” as the combination of “Israel-Palestine” and “Palestine/Israel,” is less self-explanatory. This possibility may be counterintuitive, since it operates through a different valence of the equivalence asserted by “Israel-Palestine.” (In passing it should be noted that such switching of valences takes place in any Greimassian square worth its salt). Here, instead of the too-quick equivalence of an unjust peace, equivalence designates an equivalence of struggle, borrowed from the underlying materialism of “Palestine/Israel,” in which what is insisted upon is Israel’s continued “struggle” against the very existence of Palestine. The equivalence is then an assertion of continued struggle against Israel as such, when we see the latter’s entire existence as one predicated on the oppression of Palestine. Hence we get “Palestine without Israel”: the refusal of Israel’s “right to exist” or even the use of its name.

    But the most interesting option is the bottom corner of the square, usually called the neutral term. Here, one is no longer dealing with a reconciliation, but with an uneasy shifting between irreconcilable options, which is identified by Jameson as the Utopian itself, and by Wegner as an equivalent of the Lacanian Real. The Utopian—“solutions without problems”—is the place of the possibility of a single state: that still hard-to-imagine, both material and ideological, decolonization of Israel (a cultural revolution would be the precise term here). It spells the symbolic end of Israel as such, already predicted by Ilan Pappe, Shir Hever, and others;[6] but at the same time, impossibly, it spells the end of a future return to indigeneity, as well—to a whole, self-identical Palestine. It weakly promises Palestinian emancipation without an independent Palestine; but also Jewish self-determination without a state predicted on Jewish exceptionalism. To be sure, the one-state solution poses a challenge to our imagination, challenging our ability to construct something new while simultaneously flushing out the limitations of what we can currently imagine. As a properly Utopian term, all existing historical tendencies seem to work against its realization, making far more likely that the sharpening contradictions collapse this Utopian possibility into one of its horrific doppelgangers: the fascist Israeli right’s “Greater Israel” vision,[7] in which not only does the genocide of Palestinians continues, alongside the annexation of Palestinian territory, but Israel seizes territory from adjacent countries, as well.

    Maintaining’s one’s fidelity to the Utopian option of a One State has another name: a belief in a communist collective horizon, and its necessary insistence on a confrontation with the capitalist system that conditions the current situation in the aftermath of October 7 (a proposition that I will not be able to defend here). If there is a final referent to our response to the eruption of the Real on October 7, it can be speculatively identified with the sudden appearance of the anxieties produced by life under capitalism, overlaying the violent events and investing them with our most intimate fears. Whether such sudden eruption can turn into a revolutionary political program—whether it becomes a genuine Event—is still to be seen. It should be insisted that one should not forsake this horizon because of the general anti-utopianism that still has its ideological chokehold over our collective imaginations. Rather, we live in a time in which what was considered ideologically impossible until recently can suddenly become real options again (the global rise of authoritarianism, but also of flashes of socialist politics, are obvious examples). Thus, to insist on this utopian horizon is to take part in this slow, hesitant and anti-anti-utopian trend. 

    Oded Nir is the author of Signatures of Struggle, a 2018 book on “the figuration of collectivity in Israeli fiction.” He has edited volumes on Marxist approaches to Israel/Palestine and on the literatures of the capitalist periphery. He teaches courses on Israeli culture and literature at Queens College.

    [1] “Israeli Palestinian Confederation Mission Statement,” Israeli Palestinian Confederation, accessed March 19, 2025, https://ipconfederation.org/mission/.

    [2] https://ipconfederation.org/

    [3] Fredric Jameson, Allegory and Ideology (London; New York: Verso, 2019), 195.

    [4] Fredric Jameson, An American Utopia: Dual Power and the Universal Army (London; New York: Verso, 2016), 81.

    [5] Jameson, 82–85.

    [6] Ilan Pappe, “The Collapse of Zionism,” Sidecar (blog), June 21, 2024, https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/the-collapse-of-zionism; Shir Hever, “The End of Israel’s Economy,” Mondoweiss, July 19, 2024, https://mondoweiss.net/2024/07/the-end-of-israels-economy/.

    [7] Qassam Muaddi, “Inside ‘Greater Israel’: Myths and Truths behind the Long-Time Zionist Fantasy,” Mondoweiss, December 17, 2024, https://mondoweiss.net/2024/12/inside-greater-israel-myths-and-truths-behind-the-long-time-zionist-fantasy/.

  • Caddie Alford–Witnessing Corecore as an Epideictic Call to Care

    Caddie Alford–Witnessing Corecore as an Epideictic Call to Care

    This text is published as part of a special b2o issue titled “Critique as Care”, edited by Norberto Gomez, Frankie Mastrangelo, Jonathan Nichols, and Paul Robertson, and published in honor of our b2o and b2 colleague and friend, the late David Golumbia.

    Witnessing Corecore as an Epideictic Call to Care

    Caddie Alford 

    It’s early January 2023. You’re on TikTok. Comedian Bo Burnham’s song “Microwave Popcorn” has become viral audio.[1] Banking on that virality, user @sebastianvalencia.mp4’s video starts with Burnham’s unmistakable “I put the,” but before “packet on the glass” plays, the video skips to another “Microwave Popcorn” video, then another, then another, and then a high-pitched buzzing gets louder over a scrolling blur of videos from a “sad Family Guy edits” playlist. The video cuts to black and the words “Wake up” appear. Some lilting piano notes begin to play over a shot from the 1998 film The Truman Show, which transitions into an interview with comedian Hasan Minhaj saying, “The internet and technology created an idea of infinity. And the reason why life is beautiful is because it is fundamentally limited.” That quote tees up animations from the 2008 Disney Pixar film WALL-E of humans glued to devices and media, spliced with clips of actual humans walking around head down with their phones in front of them. Mark Zuckerberg’s infamous 2021 brand change announcement starts playing—“Today, we’re gonna talk about the Metaverse”—but only long enough to cut back in time to his somber and shaky 2018 testimony to Congress: “it’s clear now that we didn’t do enough to prevent these tools from being used for harm as well.” More from Minhaj’s interview rounds everything out before cutting back to black. The video—this stew of obvious yet idiosyncratic contrasts—has 2.1 million likes.

    Screenshots of two cuts in sequential order from @sebastianvalencia.mp4’s corecore TikTok video, 2023.

    The above style of editing on TikTok is called “corecore,” which is a genre that dramatizes a fraught relationship with TikTok’s -cores, or suffix tags that index micro aesthetics. Corecores elicit the platformization of feeling—“vibes”—ranging from poignant to maudlin. Corecore edits can be disorienting like other odd editing trends, but they’re somewhat outside trend categories. Since #corecore is, as post-disciplinary duo Y7 explain, “a category defined by the very act of categorization,” there isn’t the same “immediate implication of an aesthetic” as you might see with a weirdcore edit or meme, which is an aesthetic that consistently pulls from early internet graphics (Y7 2023). No, corecore “took trends and trending as its subject” (Y7 2023).

    On January 1, 2021, user @masonoelle may have been the first to create a corecore with, as always, a fairly slapdash compilation of clips on “the climate crisis (polar ice caps melting, deforestation, major flooding), critiques of the United States Army, and the oversaturation of media” (Mendez 2023). By late 2022, corecore videos had amassed enough of a following and recognition that journalists started reporting on it. Kiernan Press-Reynolds’ account became the blueprint, describing the “anti-trend” trend of corecore as an “algorithmically-generated craze that boils down to an amorphous intangible “vibe,” a free-floating aesthetic with no roots outside TikTok” (Press-Reynolds 2022). Cultural critics, journalists, and everyday TikTok users have debated whether corecore was a profound aesthetic intervention or just elementary shitposting.[2] Press-Reynolds notes that the discourse surrounding corecore has almost been more interesting than the videos themselves: “people argue corecore is more than memes: it’s a politically charged art movement critical of capitalism and technology’s atomizing effect on society. The other camp says the videos are all about surreal humor and vibes; the amorphous essence of subjective interpretation; intangible emotions” (Press-Reynolds 2023). Corecore videos often make either niche sense or too much polemic sense.

    Eventually, as is the way of all trends on TikTok, corecore slowly ran its course. Offshoots like #hopecore emerged and they, too, ran their course. Both gave way in late 2024 to a mutt aesthetic—“hopelesscore”—which is known for depicting negative, anti-social, and/or depressive quote animations via fonts and over visuals typically associated with motivation, like footage of a sunset at a beach.[3] As I develop in this essay, corecore gave way to a significant lifeworld, full of substantial audience interest as well as aesthetic appropriation. This ongoing lifeworld suggests that corecore is less a question of signification, or a question of “content” and meaning, and more a rhetorical question of effect and reception: a critical mass of these unruly “anti-trend” aesthetics indicate rhetorical heft and cultural significance at a time when the future of TikTok in the US both as a platform and a political topos remains unclear.

    This interdisciplinary essay draws from rhetorical studies, tech reporting, and media studies to argue that corecore could be productively thought of as a contemporary version of the epideictic, which is the rhetorical genre of praising or blaming. In Debra Hawhee’s words, the main objective of the epideictic is “to render explicit something already known, and then to intensify preexisting commitments” (2023, 27). One of the three Aristotelian genres of rhetoric, the epideictic is demonstrative and often ceremonial oratory. The epideictic helps shape “the basic codes of value and belief by which a society or culture lives” (Walker 2000, 9). Common scenes for the epideictic are funerals, weddings, roasts, holidays, and so on. A typical example is someone giving a retirement speech for their colleague. By collectively honoring their colleague’s attributes and past actions, the retirement speech also solidifies that specific community’s (surface-level) majority values vis-à-vis work, career paths, expressions of collegiality, and so on. The conventions and strategies of the epideictic genre are in the service of all parties walking away feeling at least affirmed in their convictions.

    For the purposes of this essay, however, I am most interested in the connections between the epideictic and the act of witnessing. Hawhee defines witnessing as “weighty assertions of material presence that lay bare injustices and demand a reckoning” (2023, 8). Witnessing “foregrounds justice and morality,” so “keeping witnessing front and center” is crucial for addressing ecological breakdown (2023, 8). She uses the word “keeping” there deliberately, to be in line with arguments that “identify witnessing as the defining act of our time” (2023, 154). In the face of ecocide and the widespread denial of that ecocide, the act of witnessing is an increasingly salient process by which to respond to—and emphasize—precarity. Witnessing is front of mind for scholars responding to precarity. Current scholarship like Michael Richardson’s Nonhuman Witnessing: War, Data, and Ecology After the End of the World (2024), for instance, expands the scope of traditional articulations of witnessing to include nonhuman witnesses like image recognition systems. In this conception, witnessing is a relational project that necessarily exceeds the “capacity to “know” inherited from Western epistemologies” (2024, 8). The genre of the epideictic both ritualizes and mobilizes that relational project through memorializing, capturing, eulogizing, and bearing responsibility,[4] all of which are essential to witnessing.

    Each corecore can be thought of as a witnessing because each corecore is an attempt to make “a core out of the collective consciousness” (Townsend 2023). Aesthetics scholar Mitch Therieau comments that the videos ‘“have a sheen of smoothness and detachment, but it’s like people are screaming underneath”’ (Glossop 2023). Corecore is the dark, ironic -core, documenting and making salient the ecocidal fallout from, in corecore’s POV, digitality: “racial capitalism” (Robinson 1983; Kelley 2017), techno-solutionism (Kneese 2023), cyberlibertarianism (Golumbia 2024), and all the other asymmetries that inhere in how the internet and digital technologies have been both symptoms and drivers of crisis.

    And still, while corecore videos are tender, often scrambled efforts, reframing corecore as epideictic witnessing reveals a key yet obscured component: platforms. For this special issue “Critique as Care” in memory of my dearly missed former colleague David Golumbia, “to hold space,” as the CFP asked, “for simultaneity and contradiction,” I want to posit that the opposite of corecore—TikTok LIVE and its commercial livestream program—is a window into how the platform witnesses us witnessing it through such “disobedient aesthetics” as corecore.[5] After all, it would not be a piece in honor of Golumbia without an interrogation of the antidemocratic politics of the technics themselves. I felt strongly about critiquing TikTok LIVE when I wrote this piece in 2024, but in 2025, after the law banning TikTok did not go into effect and US users received not one, but two notifications of shameless propaganda, I feel compelled. Through an analysis of livestream by way of leaked documents, reporting, and outputs, I will suggest that TikTok witnessed corecore through what Anna Munster and Adrian Mackenzie term “platform seeing” (2019), or a platform’s modality of perception “produced through the distributive events and technocultural processes performed by, on and as image collections are engaged by deep learning assemblages” (2019, 10). Through these assemblages, TikTok observed corecore and continues to turn those values back onto themselves. Moreover, these platform-seeing assemblages will always bear witness and therefore always absorb and warp user-generated epideictic truths, which confirms the need to protect platformed epideictic witnessing. In this essay, I articulate the epideictic functionality of aesthetic interventions to claim that they are acts of witnessing. Ultimately, in doing so, I reach for connections between a praxis of care, critique, and scholarly witnessing.

    The Epideictic Witnessing of Corecore: Fatigue

    Writing about the development of twenty-first century art and performance as they’ve been shaped by digital technology, Claire Bishop states that there are new conditions of spectatorship (2024, 4). Bishop attends to those terrains through examining how attention has been historically and culturally defined as a normative value and practice in relation to art and artistic interventions.[6] Just like media and technologies, we know that art structures ways of seeing that support and run counter to dominant expectations for how to express and cultivate aesthetic taste.[7] “Spectatorial conventions” form from repeated interactions with artistic strategies, “individual inclinations, and unforeseen contextual eventualities” (2024, 35). With this appreciation for the rhetorical contingencies of mediated and distributed attention, Bishop questions whether there is a hierarchical difference between attentional modes. She cites dance theorist André Lepecki (2016) who argues that the “spectators” of social media are more passive than “witnesses:” “only the witness sees the whole performance and is embodied and emotionally in touch with what they are seeing” (2024, 79). With fluctuating conditions of spectatorship, however, it is just not that simple.

    Within digitality, hierarchical paradigms of observing do not apply, if they ever did. Social media users are constantly toggling between modes of spectating, from platform specific modes to occasion specific modes, through and beside interfaces. We are at once spectators and Lepecki’s witnesses: such distinctions break down in participatory publics where we are all performing and negotiating multiple appeals to ethos, only for algorithmic visibility filtering to displace or gather views. While detachment is a part of these modalities, social media spectatorship is not reducible to detachment or distraction.

    Part of why I was drawn to put the epideictic into conversation with corecore and witnessing is that it offers a figuration of spectating that anticipates these fluid conditions of spectatorship. Intriguingly, the figuration that the epideictic offers is related to theory and theorizing. As Sharon Crowley explains, in ancient Greek the verb theorein meant ‘“to observe from afar”; it refers to someone sitting in the topmost row of the theater. A theorist is the spectator who is most distant from the scene being enacted on stage and whose body is thus in one sense the least involved in the production but who nonetheless affects and is affected by it” (2006, 27). The implication is that distance—distraction, perhaps, or mediation—does not necessarily entail a lessened audience experience. This hybrid, bodily, and slightly detached theorein was precisely what was expected from epideictic audiences. Christine Oravec confirms that theoria—observation—was the “function assigned to the epideictic audience” (1976, 164). The epideictic audience were there to receive the disclosed values and unearthed truths from rhetorics of display: “theoroi means one who looks at, views, beholds, contemplates, speculates, or theorizes. These various translations indicate a kind of insight or power of generalization, as well as a passive viewing” (1976, 164). There were three different varieties of theoria and all invoked a journey: Andrea Wilson Nightingale explains that “the first two involved pilgrimages to religious oracles or festivals and, in the third, the theoros travelled abroad as a researcher or tourist” (2001, 29). Distance and detachment are crucial to all three versions of what Nightingale calls these “envoys” of meaning. Audiences for the epideictic weren’t given an immediate call to arms so much as primed to feel—the warm camaraderie from mutual recognition, certainly, but also an appreciation, both analytic and intuitive, for the artistry of what they were observing.

    Scores of scholars have pointed out that the epideictic is a unique and slippery force—it compels engagement with its strange temporality, for instance[8]—but I mainly want to focus on its connection to aesthetics. Dale Sullivan accounts for at least four purposes of the epideictic: “preservation, education, celebration, and aesthetic creation” (1993, 116). Each of these purposes require attention to style; the epideictic rhetor was expected to use “many kinds of amplification” and magnification (Aristotle 1368a). In fact, part of the audience’s job in fulfilling theorein was to observe the rhetor’s skill: was the rhetoric effective at being affective? The audience was invited to “respond to the speech itself as an aesthetic object” (Oravec 1976, 168) by opening themselves up to “the sensory qualities of the speech itself” (Oravec 1976, 163)—the qualities and strategies that most stimulate “through the senses” (Oravec 1976, 171). This nexus of disinterested detachment, sensitized senses, and judgment speaks to a lineage of aesthetics as sensory persuasion, in the doubled passive and active act of beholding: as Matthew Fuller and Eyal Weizman elaborate, “aesthetics is not only about sensation or receiving information understood as a passive act; it is also about perception, the making sense of what is sensed” (2021, 34). Sensory persuasion encompasses how epideictic amplification makes values and revelations matter.

    In sum, the epideictic aims to surface commitments by creating an occasion wherein audiences re-view these commitments through aesthetic sense-making. Aesthetic sense-making is a significant modality for uncovering value paradigms even as they potentially emerge from, or refuse, hegemonic value paradigms. The tension from that relationality produces ambient anxieties and the aesthetic sense-making of the contemporary epideictic are how we might witness those anxieties. Platforms are indeed technologies of control as well as extractive systems—a “hellscape of dreary stimuli”—and still, user-generated epideictic efforts—“an oasis of unthinking vibes” (Press-Reynolds 2022)—bring to light misdeeds and unease.

    In response to that “hellscape,” many of us have no other recourse but to bear witness. And in the context of TikTok as in the tradition of the epideictic, bearing witness will always be aestheticized. For example, the main rhetorical strategy across corecore videos is aesthetic juxtaposition. Take this popular corecore video, bookmarked 266 thousand times. It begins with a kid being asked about how much money they want to make when they grow up to which they respond they want to help people feel okay. That innocence influences the viewer to receive every other clip as evidence that we are not, in fact, OK: sped-up footage of a traffic intersection, Ryan Gosling’s character in Blade Runner 2049 screaming, a row of elderly people monotonously pressing slot machines in a casino, and a violent crowd pushing into some big box retail store. The drone of an organ pad orchestrates a melancholic vibe.

    The comments on this corecore, as with many corecores, express mutuality—a chorus of users commenting “real” or “thank you” or “this is why…”—because in the truest sense of the epideictic everyone gathered and compelled to receive the display enters a “timeless, consubstantial space carved out by their mutual contemplation of reality” (Sullivan 1993, 128). Although the phrasing of “consubstantial space” might imply a flattening of difference, Jodie Nicotra clarifies that platformed epideictic “does not issue from and to an already-constituted community; rather, by virtue of a process, it enacts a community” (Nicotra 2016). The corecore contrasts are aesthetic stimulants that work to unravel a new-old value, some heretofore muted or jumbled realization on the tip of our tongues. Even with all the alterity of a shifting online “audience,” corecore edits initiate aesthetic sense-making that discover, over and over, one particularly salient shared truth: fatigue.

    Fatigue sounds about right because it is right. Broadly, Sianne Ngai notes, “aesthetic experience has been transformed by the hypercommodified, information-saturated, performance-driven conditions of late capitalism” (Ngai 2015, 1). As a result, aesthetic categories and aestheticization are, as McKenzie Wark summarizes, “in-between play and labor, and they signal an era in which work becomes play and play becomes work” (2020, 16). The imperative to self-optimize while negotiating an overwhelming lack of boundaries, infrastructure, trust—the list goes on—is exhausting. Indiscriminate monetization levels all content, and that leveling is traumatizing when political and economic hierarchies could not be more pronounced in most contexts. The constant transmission of Black trauma through the “trope” and “trap” of what Legacy Russell calls the “Black meme” remains especially unbearable (2024, 8). And for a while we spoke to and out of this despair, relying on what Nathan Schneider terms “affective voice,” or the feeling that you are speaking truth to power, which platforms purposefully confuse with “effective voice,” or the actual “instrumental power to change something” (2024, 20). But given years of outrage and never seeing much happen, years of hyper-algorithmic feeds that prioritize hot takes amid the capitalist fracturing of communities and relationships, we’re now plagued with, to borrow from Kate Lindsay, “opinion fatigue:” users are increasingly making “the choice to opt out or otherwise radically alter how they post their thoughts online” (Lindsay 2023). Lindsay speculates that context collapse has been a part of this shift because “Public opinion around a topic can shift but is then sometimes retroactively applied to internet opinions formed long before this new consensus” (Lindsay 2023). It’s all too much. We’re tired.

    The aesthetic collisions of efforts like corecore inclined us to witness this ambient anxiety. It’s not that the young and the online are sensitive, triggered by every politically incorrect message. Not even close. Their fatigue is an existential kind of fatigue. Witnessing this fatigue—displaying and holding this fatigue in common—should have been the start of us coming together to agree on one simple point: never again will we let tech companies perform historical reenactments of feudalisms at the expense of our health, our environment, our institutions, our democracies—again, the list goes on. And while fatigue doesn’t seem like the most effective tool for profound witnessing, I’m reminded of Tamika L. Carey’s 2023 Feminisms and Rhetorics Conference keynote in which she draws from Black feminist thought and narratives to trace and reimagine the concept of fatigue. Carey argues that “conversations about fatigue invite us to refine our approaches to listening, to deepen our understanding of relationships, and to invest in reparative practices” (2023, 3). Fatigue, Carey points out, can be marshalled into a resistant form of impatience, or a productive refusal to participate in harmful practices and systems. Fatigue can help us find an in-road into repair: Carey perceives the potential to allow fatigue to orient praxis toward restorative justice, rest, and community-oriented self-care. Witnessing fatigue—really coming to terms with what this fatigue means and how it was wrought—might have been the first rhetorical step toward emancipation from Big Tech. The problem is, they witnessed us witnessing fatigue and they also said: never again.

    The Platform Witnessing of Corecore: Engagement

    In October 2024, the public was given a rare window into internal TikTok research findings and communications, including information about the degree of effectiveness of remedial measures, how the app more than appeals to young users, content regulation practices, and so on. Fourteen attorneys general led an investigation into TikTok; attendant lawsuits from more than a dozen states claim that the app knowingly hooks children and younger users. Each lawsuit contained redactions due to confidentiality agreements with TikTok. However, the lawsuit filed by the Kentucky Attorney’s General used digital redactions that Kentucky Public Radio could read. These redactions “appeared to primarily quote and summarize findings from internal TikTok documents and communications” (Goodman 2024).

    These documents say the quiet part out loud. TikTok’s own research “states that “compulsive usage correlates with a slew of negative mental health effects like loss of analytical skills, memory formation, contextual thinking, conversational depth, empathy, and increased anxiety”’ (Allyn et al. 2024). The NPR report continues: the time limit tool, which lets parents set daily screen time limits, was not implemented to help teens reduce their time on the app. TikTok was curious whether the tool could, in their words, improve “public trust”’ (Allyn et al. 2024). Kentucky investigators also found that TikTok made changes to their algorithm to address ‘“a high volume of…not attractive subjects”’ (Allyn et al. 2024). The algorithm had been retooled to boost content from creators the company deemed attractive. TikTok’s content moderation is faulty and inconsistent. They rely on artificial intelligence for the first go around and human moderators come in “only if the video has a certain amount of views” (Allyn et al. 2024). Internally, TikTok acknowledges “substantial “leakage” rates of violating content that’s not removed. Those leakage rates include: 35.71% of “Normalization of Pedophilia;” 33.33% of “Minor Sexual Solicitation;” 39.13% of “Minor Physical Abuse;” 30.36% of “leading minors off platform;” 50% of “Glorification of Minor Sexual Assault;” and “100% of “Fetishizing Minors” (Allyn et al. 2024). And yet, a presentation for top company officials “revealed that an internal document “instructed moderators to not take action on reports on underage users unless their bio specifically states they are 13 or younger” (Allyn et al. 2024). An unnamed TikTok executive said the reason kids are on TikTok is because the app’s algorithm is so powerful that it “keeps them from “sleep, and eating, and moving around the room, and looking at someone in the eyes” (Allyn et al. 2024).

    The technicity of this platform—how it moderates and curates content, how its algorithm (micro)manages what users encounter, and how the interface is designed to prioritize video and deprioritize everything else, including context—is a technicity inseparable from cyberlibertarianism in that those logics have afforded this technicity just as much as this technicity furthers those logics. Golumbia specifies that cyberlibertarianism is not a coherent dogma: just like fascism, many of its tenants and appeals are contradictory. Cyberlibertarianism is, however, a useful concept for identifying doctrine based on “anti-democracy” and pro-corporate foundations (2024, 16): a cyberlibertarian faith in tech wants to reconfigure “social and cultural phenomena into free market terms” (2024, 36) so that it can do away with democratic institutions, expertise, and governments even while claiming such ideals as “democratization,” “community,” “voice,” “access,” and “engagement” (2024, 46). Golumbia explains that this rhetoric looks both ways: “we seem to be talking about copyright, freedom of speech, or the “democratization” of information or some technology. But if we listen closely, we hear a different conversation that questions our right and ability to govern ourselves” (xxiii). Are the conditions on TikTok, for example, democratic if its algorithm places users into “‘filter bubbles’ after 30 minutes of use in one sitting”’ (Allyn et al. 2024)? Can we claim democratic conditions after “As a result of President Trump’s efforts, TikTok is back in the U.S.!” was broadcast on every US TikTok user’s interface?[9]

    As I see it, cyberlibertarianism is of a piece of other naming projects that attempt to capture how digitality promotes a deregulated market that will somehow take care of hate speech, disinformation, doxing, AI sludge—everything. Schneider, for instance, argues that the design of platforms is feudalistic because the politics of this design increasingly nudges users “toward autocratic or oligarchic forms of community governance” while simultaneously profiting off their habits and behaviors (2024, 44). I also think of Damien Smith Pfister and Misti Yang’s conceptualization of technoliberalism (2018), which they define as a governing rationality in which digital technologies assume complete democratic and epistemic power to siphon technical expertise and resources while jettisoning democratic opportunities for deliberation. While these concepts have precise histories and trajectories, all three illuminate digitality’s translation of democratic principles into economic imperatives and concentrations of power.

    The technicity of TikTok is a product of this twisted cyberlibertarianism x feudalism x technoliberalism collab. It’s the same collab that corecore bore witness to, but it’s also the same collab that witnessed and reabsorbed corecore. Both Hawhee and Richardson note in their work on witnessing that in both senses of the word “arts and acts of witnessing, fortified with the clarifying power of insistence that they gathered over the course of the last century, are expanding to include nonhumans as well as humans” (Hawhee 2024, 4). Witnessing is not a singular project, but something that multiple agents enact. “The human viewpoint,” Joanna Zylinska reminds us, is “precisely a viewpoint”—one of and through many (Zylinska 2023, 129). The transformation and industrialization of vision during the twentieth century turned “vision” into what it is in the twenty-first century: “machine-based process” (Zylinska 2023, 10). Platforms like TikTok “see” through what Munster and Mackenzie call “observation events” that are “distributed throughout and across devices, hardware, human agents and artificial networked architectures such as deep learning networks” (2019, 5). Even without humans and even without datasets of visuals, platforms deploy observation to collect, process, and analyze data. These “observation events” bear witness, a form of “computational spectatorship” (Heras 2019, 180).

    Corecore edits were perceived by platform observation assemblages. Composites of cylberlibertarian-feudal-technoliberal logics repurposed corecore creations into acts of platform witnessing. The fruits of the original epideictic witnessing—the value of really dwelling with what collective fatigue might mean, for instance—were seen for what they were only to be absorbed to serve antithetical purposes. As one of the original corecore creators wrote on an Instagram story: “The whole point of this stuff is to create something that can’t be categorized, commodified, made into clickbait, or moderated—something immune to the functions of control that dictate the content we consume and the ideas we are allowed to hold” (Mendez 2023). Although the effects of creating, witnessing, engaging, and circulating corecore can’t all be commodified, these acts of witnessing were still subject to platform seeing. The closest existing theorization of platformed epideictic is Nicotra’s in which she attends to the architecture of mid 2000s Twitter to argue that “epideictic acts of public shaming demonstrate the inexorably technological nature of all rhetorical acts—that the technologies are not separate or supplemental to the rhetorical acts, but are rather co-constitutive” (Nicotra 2016). Attention to technologies is the reason Nicotra refashioned the epideictic, turning what was mostly considered a rhetorical genre into a potential. Unfortunately, the algorithmic systems of platform architectures “tam[e] potential into probability” (Richardson 2024, 87).

    If corecore presents one end of a spectrum of TikTok content—as radical as the moderation is going to allow—the opposite end of that same spectrum is TikTok Live and its livestream program, which is widely experienced as the “unregulated underbelly of the app” (Press-Reynolds 2023). For example, Forbes reporter Alexandra S. Levine released a damning account of TikTok Live in 2022—“How TikTok Live Became ‘A Strip Club Filled with 15-Year-Olds”—exposing how the livestream function has enabled predatory behaviors toward vulnerable users. Live is “one of the darker manifestations of the gig economy to date” (Press-Reynolds 2023). Creators want “gifts”—money—and TikTok doesn’t care how they earn that money because TikTok will take a huge cut from every transaction. Press-Reynolds explains that this structure is different from a structure like Twitch where creators build up a fanbase. Fanbases can be built on TikTok, too, but mostly live-streaming creators just throw everything under the kitchen sink to “hook viewers and coax donations” (Press-Reynolds 2023). It is no accident that these “donations” are designed to look like things rather than money: hearts, cars, flowers, animals…many of them are AI slop, from “money gun” for 500 coins to “naughty chicken” for 299 coins. Viewers buy and give these “gifts” for all kinds of reasons, but you can see how the habit of giving could result in chemical responses: will the creator acknowledge me if I send a gift? What about now? What if I send a gift to this creator? Livestream banks on a tempting—and sometimes expensive—mode of parasociality.

    Since creators do receive some funds from “gifts,” the BBC reported in 2022 that displaced people and families in Syrian camps were begging for hours at a time on livestream. This begging created a mini economy, with people in the middle supported by “live agencies” in China working directly with TikTok to help unblock accounts while the agents in the middle take a cut of the profits by providing streaming equipment (Gelbart et al. 2022). BBC monitored gift streams of $1,000 an hour, but creators only received a fraction. The reporters note that “TikTok said it would take prompt action against “exploitative begging” (Gelbart et al. 2022), diverting attention away from the real problem. 

    Users have wildly different experiences on Live, which has produced a variety of what Motahhare Eslami et al. term “folk theories” (2016), or sense-making narratives that social media users form from their experiences on black-boxed platforms. On one YouTube video about the “dark side” of Lives, a user comments that they’ve “seen other types of streams, where a man forces a disabled man who lives in what looks like a hut, to dance to tiktok audios in a dress.”[10] Another writes about one that was streaming, without context, a baby with macrocephaly. One person confirms in the comment section: “I’m from Syria, and yes the situation there is very very very rough, money, jobs, food, water, and electricity are in very very short supply.”[11] In the subreddit r/changemyview, a user writes a post titled “TikTok’s live feature is immoral. It gets clicks by putting disabled people on the feed like animals at a zoo.”[12] This “folk theory” is an attempt to bear witness to what they’re observing. However, someone responded, “this isn’t how that works; the application you were speaking about tends to display content that associates to your previous history/what it thinks you may have interest in.” Someone else writes: “On my TikTok all my lives are musicians and anime cosplayers.”[13] While this particular subreddit is designed to expand and often correct the original poster, such countering and sometimes moralizing of “folk theories” from other users is part of why “disobedient aesthetics” like corecore edits are so vital: they provide another layer of mediation to “folk theories,” toward honoring the ambiguities of platformed living. The long and short of it is that no one has any real idea about how Live works, in general and for other people: it’s sometimes neat (musicians playing the piano) and sometimes cozy (work from home employees inviting body doubling). It’s also unexpected (“Yea this shit is hella weird, i saw one where some guy was just slowly peeling away boiled eggs and kept spamming “tap tap tap tap thank you thank you send gift”) or gives dystopic vibes (“I keep seeing one [sic] with people laying on clinical beds, rocking side to side. My mind takes me to weird places”).[14] Given the structure, we cannot control where we will end up. As one TikTok official stated in the redacted documents, “a major challenge with Live business is that the content that gets the highest engagement may not be the content we want on our platform” (Allyn et al. 2024). Sexualization of teens…refugees begging…babies with macrocephaly—I think I’ve seen this corecore before.

    Corecore used aesthetic juxtapositions to reveal fatigue with Big Tech platformization. Those aesthetic collisions intended aestheticism—a more sensitive orientation—through the shock of dissonance and layers of mediation. TikTok used platform seeing to digest these aesthetic collisions, spitting them back out as more monetized livestreams. Those events, however, intended anesthetizing, or the kind of numbing that keeps you transferring funds and doomscrolling. TikTok’s livestreams took the chaotic user-generated epideictic witnessing of fatigue and forced it to become a witnessing of the Big Tech value of engagement. In a turn of events that writes itself, Tim Cook announced the “newest iPad Air” in March 2025 by showing a mock-up “trend report” on, you guessed it, #corecore.[15] Years later and Big Tech continues to commodify what was never meant to be commodified.

    Scholarly Witnessing: Care

    The 2024 Oxford Word of the Year was “brain rot,” defined as “the supposed deterioration of a person’s mental or intellectual state, especially viewed as the result of overconsumption of material (now particularly online content) considered to be trivial or unchallenging.”[16] At a moment in time when platforms are rolling out AI features that no one asked for and that no one is really ready for, only for AI generated images to become “evidence” of falsehoods,[17] “brain rot” encapsulates a growing, but ironicized concern about the content we’re taking in. “Technolibertarian notions that technologies are value neutral and that information wants to be free,” Jonathan Carter and Misti Yang emphasize, position “the general intellect as a boundless frontier to be exploited” (2023, 367). For “brain rot” to get chosen as the 2024 Oxford Word of the Year means that there is now a much broader recognition of that exploitation. Since aesthetics stick around longer than trends, we’re surrounded by the remnants of witnessing that were unceremoniously churned into revenue streams. Where epideictic content like corecore might have rhetorically positioned us as observers—theoroi—social media rhetorics like the functionality of LIVE position us to rot.

    This special issue asked us to bring nuance to critique—to perform scholarly critique from a place of care or caring even while actively discrediting computational solutionism, as Golumbia stressed time and time again. Critique as care is my effort to come to terms with the original display of corecore for what users wanted it to be, not for how the algorithmic systems witnessed and twisted them. Critique as care, then, is an articulation of the scholarly version of witnessing that can bear out from observing—theorizing—user-generated rhetorics as meaningful attempts to navigate unfair power dynamics. By attending to corecore, I extend theories of epideictic rhetoric to better accommodate platformization and its effects on rhetorical acts. By forwarding “platform seeing,” I think alongside Richardson’s question: “If algorithms are themselves witnessing, making knowledge, and forging worlds of their own design, what might it mean to witness their workings?” (2024, 81). In calling attention to leaked documents demonstrating TikTok’s internal culture and praxis, I take seriously Shannon Vallor’s provocation that if Big Tech ultimately remakes our world in its image, scholars might pay for our “habit of epistemic caution with our lives and our children’s futures” (2024, 162). By that she does not mean to undermine best practices for responsible scholarship as much as she means to encourage scholars to, once ready, inhabit force, passion, and courage—to just say, “this is cyberlibertarianism.” And it is fucked. Romeo García and coauthors echo that provocation, writing that “scholars are also guilty—sometimes unconsciously—of re-subjecting those they write and think about to the same epistemic violence they wish to trace, critique, and/or unsettle” (2024, 294). It is not, they write, that the scholar is “the observer merely observing.” Rather, “because the scholar engages in human work (wording) and human projects (worlding), they are indeed active actor-agents who have the capacity to engage in doings otherwise” (2024, 294).

    Now would be a good time to quote Golumbia’s close friend, George Justice, who wrote the forward for Cyberlibertarianism. Justice calls Golumbia the “most optimistic pessimist you could ever meet” (2024, ix). He goes on to say that the pages of Cyberlibertarianism “are dark in their insistence that the technologies we deploy in nearly all aspects of our lives have been built on fundamentally antidemocratic, antihuman premises,” and yet the “richness of his thought betrays an essentially hopeful belief in powers of the human mind to contemplate, understand, and attempt to change the world for the better” (2024, ix-x). As a scholar, I have not always understood that you can do both: you can hold these systems accountable and you can still be curious. You can practice sound citational politics and you can hone a unique voice and you can seek traditional venues and you can innovate. Something I have always appreciated about rhetorical training is that it exercises your capacity to find nuance, but in the past that training has prevented me from also finding certainties. I came to Virginia Commonwealth University in 2018, attempting to start a book project that was curious—not certain—about what was happening to opinions vis-à-vis social media. Golumbia, on the other hand, had just published a  article earlier that year titled “Social Media Has Hijacked Our Brains and Threatens Global Democracy.”[18] He had already predicted brain rot.

    I’m reminded of that expression of two ships passing in the night. But I eventually arrived to a place still informed by care, but very certain that things were as bad as Golumbia had known them to be. My last correspondence with him was to thank him for a talk he did on fascisms and to send a book review I had just written of a rhetorical studies collection on fascism. He was thrilled that I was doing research and teaching about these topics. He wrote, “I would love to talk some of these things over when we both have a free second…,” because while fascism is certain, scholarly care is boundless.

    Caddie Alford (she/her/hers) is associate professor of rhetoric and writing at Virginia Commonwealth University. She is a digital rhetoric scholar whose interdisciplinary research examines emergent forms of information, communication, and sociality. Her recent book—Entitled Opinions: Doxa After Digitality—addresses social media rhetorics by creating an affirmative theory of opinions to identify and repurpose a spectrum of truths. Some of her work has appeared in The Quarterly Journal of SpeechRhetoric Review; and enculturation.

    Bibliography

    Allyn, Bobby, Sylvia Goodman, and Dara Kerr. 2024. “TikTok Executives Know about App’s Effect on Teens, Lawsuit Documents Allege.” NPR, October 22, 2024. https://www.npr.org/2024/10/11/g-s1-27676/tiktok-redacted-documents-in-teen-safety-lawsuit-revealed.

    Allyn, Bobby, Sylvia Goodman, and Dara Kerr. 2024. “Inside the TikTok Documents: Stripping Teens and Boosting ‘Attractive’ People.” NPR, October 16, 2024. https://www.npr.org/2024/10/12/g-s1-28040/teens-tiktok-addiction-lawsuit-investigation-documents.

    Aristotle. On Rhetoric. Translated by George Kennedy. 1991. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Bishop, Claire. 2024. Disordered Attention: How We Look at Art and Performance Today. Verso.

    Carey, Tamika L. 2023. “The Uses of Fatigue: Invitations, Impatience, and Investments.” Keynote Address, Feminisms and Rhetorics Conference. https://cfshrc.org/article/the-uses-of-fatigue-invitations-impatience-and-investments/.

    Carter, Jonathan S. and Misti Yang. 2023. “Sophie vs. the Machine: Neo-Luddism as Response to Technical-Colonial Corruption of the General Intellect.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 53:3: 366-378. https://doi.org/10.1080/02773945.2023.2200699.

    Crowley, Sharon. 2006. Toward A Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and Fundamentalism. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

    Eslami, Motahhare, Karrie Karaholios, Christian Sandvig, Kristen Vaccaro, Aimee Rickman, Kevin Hamilton, Alex Kirlik. 2016. “First I “Like” it, then I Hide it: Folk Theories of Social Feeds.” In Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’16). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 2371–2382. https://doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858494.

    Fuller, Matthew and Eyal Weizman. 2021. Investigative Aesthetics: Conflicts and Commons in the Politics of Truth. Verso.

    García, Romeo, Jenna Zan, Muath Qadous, Mitzi Ceballos, Keith L. McDonald, and Sabita Bastakoti. 2024. “Collective Rewor(l)ding in the Wreckage of Hauntings and Haunting Situations.” In The Routledge Handbook of Rhetoric and Power. Edited by Nathan Crick. Routledge. 293-310.

    Gelbart, Hannah, Mamdouh Akbiek, and Ziad Al-Qattan. 2022. “TikTok Profits from Livestreams of Families Begging.” BBC, October 11, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-63213567.

    Glossup, Ella. 2023. “Corecore is the Screaming-Into-Void TikTok Trend We Deserve.” Vice, January 23, 2023. https://www.vice.com/en/article/corecore-tiktok-trend-explained/.

    Golumbia, David. 2024. Cyberlibertarianism: The Right-Wing Politics of Digital Technology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Goodman, Sylvia. 2024. “AG Coleman Sues TikTok, Says Internal Documents Show Company Knowingly Addicted KY Youth.” Kentucky Public Radio, October 9, 2024. https://www.lpm.org/news/2024-10-09/ag-coleman-sues-tiktok-says-internal-documents-show-company-knowingly-addicted-ky-youth.

    Hawhee, Debra. 2023. A Sense of Urgency: How the Climate Change is Changing Rhetoric. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Heras, Daniel Chávez. 2019. “Spectacular Machinery and Encrypted Spectatorship.” Machine Feeling, 8(1), 170-182. https://doi.org/10.7146/aprja.v8i1.115423.

    Kelley, Robin D. G. 2017. “What Did Cedric Robinson Mean by Racial Capitalism?” Boston Review, January 12, 2017. https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/robin-d-g-kelley-introduction-race-capitalism-justice/.

    Kneese, Tamara. 2023. Death Glitch: How Techno-Solutionism Fails Us in this Life and Beyond. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Lepecki, André. 2016. Singularities. Dance in the Age of Performance. London: Routledge. 

    Levine, Alexandra S. 2022. “How TikTok Live Became ‘A Strip Club Filled with 15-Year-Olds.” Forbes, April 27, 2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandralevine/2022/04/27/how-tiktok-live-became-a-strip-club-filled-with-15-year-olds/.

    Lindsay, Kate. 2023. “Is it Time to Embrace “Opinion Fatigue”?” Bustle, August 8, 2023. https://www.bustle.com/entertainment/online-takes-twitter-debates-opinion-fatigue.

    MacKenzie, Adrian and Anna Munster. 2019. “Platform Seeing: Image Ensembles and Their Invisualities.” Theory, Culture & Society, 36(5), 3-22. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276419847508

    Mendez, Moises II. 2023. “What to Know About Corecore, the Latest Aesthetic Taking Over.” Time, January 20, 2023. https://time.com/6248637/corecore-tiktok-aesthetic/.

    Nayyar, Rhea. 2023. “What Does TikTok’s “Corecore” Have to Do with Dada?” Hyperallergic, January 26, 2023. https://hyperallergic.com/795957/what-does-tiktoks-corecore-have-to-do-with-dada/.

    Ngai, Sianne. 2015. Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Nicotra, Jodie. 2016. “Disgust, Distributed: Virtual Public Shaming as Epideictic Assemblage.” Enculturation, July 6, 2016. https://enculturation.net/disgust-distributed.

    Nightingale, Andrea Wilson. 2001. “On Wandering and Wondering: ‘Theôria’ in Greek Philosophy and Culture.” Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics 9, no. 2: 23–58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20163840.

    Oravec, Christine. 1976. “‘Observation’ in Aristotle’s Theory of Epideictic.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 9, no. 3: 162–74. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40236982.

    Ore, Ersula J. 2019. Lynching: Violence, Rhetoric, and American Identity. Oxford: University Press of Mississippi.

    Pfister, Damien Smith and Misti Yang. 2018. “Five Theses on Technoliberalism and the Networked Public Sphere.” Communication and the Public3(3), 247-262. https://doi.org/10.1177/2057047318794963

    Press-Reynolds, Kieran. 2022. “This is Corecore (We’re not Kidding).” Nobells, November 29, 2022. https://nobells.blog/corecore/.

    Press-Reynolds, Kieran. 2023. “Is Corecore Radical Art or Gibberish Shitposts?” Nobells, January 20, 2023. https://nobells.blog/what-is-corecore/.

    Press-Reynolds, Kieran. 2023. “I Spent All Night on TikTok Live, and Discovered a Wasteland of Clickbait, Scams, and Other Oddities. It got Stranger and Darker by the Hour.” Business Insider, February 22, 2023. https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-live-all-night-clickbait-grifts-scams-sleep-streamers-twitch-2023-2.

    Richardson, Michael. 2024. Nonhuman Witnessing: War, Data, and Ecology After the End of the World. Durham: Duke University Press.

    Robinson, Cedric J. 1983. Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

    Russell, Legacy. 2024. Black Meme: A History of the Images that Make Us. Verso.

    Schneider, Nathan. 2024. Governable Spaces: Democratic Design for Online Life. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Sheard, Cynthia Miecznikowski. 1996. “The Public Value of Epideictic Rhetoric.” College English 58, no. 7: 765–94. https://doi.org/10.2307/378414.

    Sullivan, Dale L. 1993. “The Ethos of Epideictic Encounter.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 26, no. 2: 113–33. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237759.

    Townsend, Chase. 2024. “Explaining Corecore: How TikTok’s Newest Trend may be a Genuine Gen-Z Art Form.” Mashable, January 14, 2023. https://mashable.com/article/explaining-corecore-tiktok https://mashable.com/article/explaining-corecore-tiktok.

    Vallor, Shannon. 2024. The AI Mirror: How to Reclaim our Humanity in an Age of Machine Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Vallor, Shannon. 2024. “The Danger of Superhuman AI is not What You Think.” Noema, May 23, 2024. https://www.noemamag.com/the-danger-of-superhuman-ai-is-not-what-you-think/.

    Vivian, Bradford J. 2012. “Up from Memory: Epideictic Forgetting in Booker T. Washington’s Cotton States Exposition Address.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 45, no. 2: 189-212. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/475261.

    Walker, Jeffrey. 2000. Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Wark, McKenzie. 2020. Sensoria: Thinkers for the Twenty-First Century. Verso.

    Y7. 2023. “A Postmortem of #corecore.” Flash Art, Summer 2023. https://flash—art.com/article/corecore/.

    Zylinska, Joanna. 2023. The Perception Machine: Our Photographic Future Between the Eye and AI. Boston: MIT Press.

    [1] Creators were making lip dub videos with the moment in the song when Burnham stages an increasingly frustrated dialogue with himself: 

    I put the packet on the glass (What glass?)
    The little glass dish in the microwave (Got it)
    I close the door (Which door?)
    The door to the microwave! What is wrong with you?!

    [2] “To me, Corecore’s “aesthetic” reads as an art school freshman’s first found-footage project in Adobe Premiere Pro (no, I’m not projecting) presented with the societal dread induced from doom-scrolling on one’s phone at 2am after one too many bong rips on a weeknight (again, not projecting …)” (Nayyar 2023).

    [3] For a smart analysis of hopelesscore, see Adam Aleksic’s 2025 substack essay, “How Hopelesscore Became even More Hopeless.” https://etymology.substack.com/p/how-hopelesscore-became-even-more.

    [4] Bradford Vivian confirms that witnessing as a mode of communication and rhetorical goal is “generally epideictic in nature” (2012, 191). And as Hawhee writes: “the documentary work endemic to the epideictic genre, in short, serves the rhetorical purpose of witnessing” (2023, 28).

    [5] Borrowing apt language here from Anthony Stagliano’s Disobedient Aesthetics: Surveillance, Bodies, Control (Alabama University Press, 2024).

    [6] The book’s main project “aims to move beyond the moralizing binary of attention/distraction, to dispense with attention’s economic framing to jettison plenitudinous modern attention as an impossible ideal, and to rethink contemporary spectatorship as neither good nor bad but perpetually hybrid and collective” (2024, 35).

    [7] To start, John Berger Ways of Seeing (1972).

    [8] As Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard articulates, “By bringing together images of both the real—what is or at least appears to be—and the fictive or imaginary—what might be—epideictic discourse allows speaker and audience to envision possible, new, or at least different worlds” (1996, 770).

    [9] Quote is from the second notification that US TikTok users received on January 19.

    [10] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5Cb6bznQYI&t=319s

    [11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5Cb6bznQYI&t=319s

    [12]https://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/comments/p95po4/cmv_tiktoks_live_feature_is_immoral_it_gets/

    [13] https://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/comments/p95po4/cmv_tiktoks_live_feature_is_immoral_it_gets/

    [14] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5Cb6bznQYI&t=319s

    [15] https://x.com/tim_cook/status/1896951716517662999

    [16] https://corp.oup.com/news/brain-rot-named-oxford-word-of-the-year-2024/

    [17] https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/ai-girl-maga-hurricane-helene-1235125285/

    [18] https://www.vice.com/en/article/social-media-threatens-global-democracy/ 

  • Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury, Shrobona Shafique Dipti and Naveeda Khan–How to Reclaim a University:  Further Lessons from Dhaka

    Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury, Shrobona Shafique Dipti and Naveeda Khan–How to Reclaim a University: Further Lessons from Dhaka

    Figure 1, © Reesham Shahab Tirtho, Calendric Rendition of the Events of July 2024

    This post is Part Four of “The Bangladesh Chapter” of the b2o review’s “The University in Turmoil: Global Perspectives” dossier.

    How to Reclaim a University: Further Lessons from Dhaka

    Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury, Shrobona Shafique Dipti and Naveeda Khan 

    Introduction 

    On 5 August 2024, the student-led Anti-Quota Movement that lasted the “36 days” of July culminated in a large gathering of people in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh.[1] The Long March to Dhaka (as it was called) indicated the tremendous support that the students had from ordinary Bangladeshis. It effectively brought about the fall of the Awami League-led government that had ruled Bangladesh with an iron fist since 2009. Sheikh Hasina, the then Prime Minister, was compelled by the military to flee the country, fearing the force of popular anger against her. The July Uprising has since gone down in Bangladesh’s short history as one of the most important student-led movements. Whether it has changed or will change the course of the nation’s history is still being deliberated. 

    Several points are important to underline with respect to this movement. The movement took shape and built momentum within Dhaka University, the premier public university of Bangladesh, which (as we showed in our earlier installment) was thoroughly captured by the student wing of the ruling party, the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL). The university-based origin of the movement might surprise us given the extent to which party hacks and thugs were entrenched within the university administration and the student body. However, it ought not to be surprising given the long history of general student dissatisfaction with the intrusion of national politics into the university. Furthermore, student commitment to collective action had been repeatedly demonstrated from the 1990s onwards. The real surprise, rather, lay in the movement’s successful toppling of a political regime, an outcome which went well beyond the movement’s seemingly modest intent of reforming the quota system for government jobs.[2]

    In this fourth installment of the “Bangladesh Chapter” of the b2o review’s “University in Turmoil” dossier, we provide a careful plotting of the events marking the month of July leading to the August 5 denouement to track how the movement built momentum, how it spread to other educational institutions, and how Dhaka University was ultimately reclaimed. As we will show, attention to the micropolitics of organizing, including the mobilization of symbols and symbolic behavior, can shed light on the success of this movement, while nevertheless retaining the perspective that the movement’s ultimate success was a surprise to all. We want to emphasize how different sections of the population came to exert ownership over the movement even if the issue which launched it was not theirs. After all, the issue of getting government jobs was surely of remote interest to the young secondary school children or working-class people who came to be involved in the protests. The enthusiastic participation of female university students in the Anti-Quota Movement was even more paradoxical, as they were effectively asking for the removal of gender-based quotas, a mode of affirmative action long vaunted for ensuring women’s participation in the workforce; their removal could only harm those women students. While we have written about these women’s understanding of their participation earlier and will dive deeper into it in a future installment, in this submission we focus on certain events and deaths during the movement that produced pathos and an inadvertent alignment of sympathies across different constituencies of Bangladeshi society, leading to broad based support for an initially more limited movement.

    Figure 2, Downloaded from Facebook “Medha Chottor,” Quota Movement 2013

    Figure 3, ©Rahat Chowdhury, Quota Movement 2018

    Figure 4, ©Palash Khan, Quota Movement 2024 

    Grounds of Protest

    The 2024 Anti-Quota Movement was the third of its kind. The first in 2013 was entirely scuttled by government forces. The second in 2018 also encountered state violence but eked out a concession from the government to scale back quotas from 56% to 35% and to scrap the quota for freedom fighters, a decision that was announced through a governmental circular. However, following the High Court of Bangladesh’s 2024 decision to “revert” the government circular and reinstate quotas on government jobs, including the controversial 30% quota for freedom fighters and their children and grandchildren, the students again took to the streets.  

    An entrenched quota system deprived youth in the general population of access to desired governmental jobs. A quarter of Bangladesh’s population of 171.5 million people are youth, that is, 45.9 million people are between the ages of 15 and 29. The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics’ 2023 Labor Force Survey estimates that there were almost 2 million unemployed youth in the country. As not all youth sought employment in the formal sector, with many in agriculture and the informal economy, this number of unemployed youths was considered very high. Of this number, 31.5% had completed higher education beyond the secondary level. The percentage of those with higher education indexed aspiration to employment either in government or the private sector, with a preference for governmental jobs, as these have typically provided job security and benefits.[3] 

    Governmental jobs were also desirable for being endowed with a high status that derived from the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) originating in the Imperial Civil Service in colonial India. The British put into effect an elaborate structure by which to bring Indians into government, investing the bureaucracy and its competitive entrance exam with considerable exclusivity and entitlement. It effectively produced a new class of Muslims within Indian society deemed the salariat, a class whose aura surrounds government employees even today. Consequently, the exam for entry into BCS exerted tremendous attraction and pressure on the youth population as a means of upward mobility, with many taking years out of their lives to prepare for the test, taking the exam repeatedly, if necessary, in order to keep alive the opportunity of entering government service.[4] 

    To compound youth unemployment rates at this moment, there were several worrying trends that undermined the ruling party’s long-standing narrative of development, growth and prosperity, suggesting, indeed, that the Awami League’s much vaunted economic development was illusory. Until this point, the AL government had extolled 6% annual growth, positioning itself as the party of development, with its development agenda heavy in infrastructural works, specifically bridges and tunnels, to improve the interconnectivity of the country. However, inequality had risen over the past few decades, followed by a cost-of-living crisis since 2022, itself intensified by rising food and energy prices, all of which the government had failed to so much as acknowledge. And Bangladesh was not immune from the global economic slowdown in the aftermath of the Covid 19 pandemic. Those in the middle class who had experienced prosperity and higher standards of living suddenly felt themselves banging against a hard ceiling. Those who had come out of poverty fell back into it. Beggars whose presence on the streets of Dhaka had waned once again grew in numbers. It appeared that the AL’s economic miracle was on shaky ground.

    In the University and Outwards: The Events of 2024

    The students who led the 2024 Anti-Quota Movement began as a group calling themselves the Students Against Discrimination (SAD). While the leadership of the prior 2018 Anti-Quota movement had moved on to national politics, the young who had participated in that earlier movement now provided the leadership of SAD. SAD came to be reinforced by more youth who had been exposed to other social movements throughout their young lives, often against the inadequacies and injustices of the authoritarian state. Notable among these was the Road Safety Movement of 2018. SAD operated with a new understanding of organization, that there would be no centralized structure or leadership hierarchy within the movement. These reforms came out of the movement prior experience of state violence. As we have explored in an earlier installment, this decentralization may have been the key to sustaining the movement in the face of heavy repression. In the rest of this section, we explore, by recounting the events of the summer of 2024, the other elements that also came into play when scaling up the movement into a mass protest.[5]  

    Figure 5, ©Debashish Chakrabarty, Poster used by Protestors, “Who am I Who are you Razakar, Razakar Who Said This? Who Said This? The Dictator, The Dictator”

    Figure 6, ©Debashish Chakrabarty, Poster used by Protestors, “Upon Asking [You] for Rights, You Say, Razakar”

    Figure 7, ©Debashish Chakrabarty, Poster used by Protestors, “Accused by Command” 

    Following the High Court’s decision in early June, university students across the country took part in peaceful protests, with Dhaka University serving as the center of dissent. Female students at Dhaka University took the lead here. The protests gradually escalated over the course of the month until in early July, SAD called for the “Bangla Blockade,” the name given to the street sit-ins that blocked roads. Among other sites, this blockage took place on the Shahbagh intersection adjacent to the university campus. On 14 July, at a press conference held to mark her return from a state visit to China, which had ended none too well, with the prime minister returning early on the pretext that her adult daughter was sick at home, Sheikh Hasina was asked her opinion about the student unrest, specifically about the fact that the students were seeking to scrap the quota for freedom fighters. Hasina exasperatedly said “Why do they have so much resentment towards freedom fighters? If the grandchildren of the freedom fighters don’t get quota benefits, should the grandchildren of Razakars get the benefit?” In Bangladesh, the term “razakar” (literally collaborator) is used as a pejorative term to mean “traitor” in order to refer to those who collaborated with the Pakistan Army during the 1971 War of Liberation. Hasina’s trivializing of the protests enraged the students, and in a remarkable reversal of the usual repulsion felt towards the category of the “razakar,” they decided to embrace it. They demonstrated with the slogan “Tumi ke, Ami ke, Rajakar, Rajakar,” (Who are you, Who am I, Razakar, Razakar), followed by the slogan “Key Bolechey, Key Bolechey, Shoyirachar, Shoyirachar” (Who said this, Who said this, The Dictator, the Dictator). In taking on the label of razakar, in defiance of its bad associations, they marked Sheikh Hasina as a capricious authoritarian figure who delegitimized her opponents and dissidents by calling them razakars. Their words also questioned the right of the Awami League to serve as the custodian of the Liberation War if it was going to instrumentalize the liberation struggle to stifle criticism. Hasina’s thoughtless comments recruited a new round of protestors, and soon the above slogan unfurled everywhere.  

    In a clear indication that the standing government conflated the party’s muscle with the nation’s police forces, the General Secretary of Awami League (Obaidul Quader) and the President of BCL (Saddam Hossain) called on Dhaka University BCL students to control the student protestors. BCL members openly declared their intent to teach a lesson to the student protestors for what they claimed was their disrespect towards Sheikh Hasina, freedom fighters and “the spirit” of the war of independence.  

    On 15 July, quota reform protesters gathered and set off from the Raju Memorial Sculpture near the Teachers Students Center (TSC) on campus.  This memorial was erected in 1997 in memory of the 1992 student protests against the political capture of their campus. Consequently, the gathering around it at this moment was seen to reanimate the call for an education without political interference. The location and organization of the protest were redolent with choreographed symbolism.

    Figure 8, Downloaded from Jamhoor, Image of BCL Violence on Women that Went Viral

    The student protestors were ambushed by BCL members who carried sticks, hockey sticks, rods, GI pipes, and other weapons. At least five individuals were observed firing pistols on campus. Student protestors received beatings at various locations of the university. In flagrant disregard for university governance, beatings occurred in full view of the Vice Chancellor’s residence. BCL members even stood outside of nearby hospitals, such as the Dhaka Medical College, attacking wounded demonstrators as they were taken there for treatment, at one point even entering the emergency department to attack protesters and eject them from the premises. Although both men and women protestors were hurt, the images of women being attacked were most shocking for onlookers. An image went viral showing a young woman wincing, her face covered in blood, while a BCL member raised a stick to beat her. This incident, along with others at which mostly women were beaten by the BCL, sparked public outrage and incited strong sentiment against the group.

    On 16 July, the protesters came prepared to fight back, gathering at the Shahid Minar, the memorial to the martyred student activists of the 1952 language movement, also on the Dhaka University campus. This choice of memorial may be seen as communicating a symbolism different from the Raju Memorial’s, as it expressed resistance to foreign occupation, indicating a growing sense of the Awami League government as an occupying force. The police, who had finally joined the fray, stood between the students gathered at the Shahid Minar and the BCL members who held the area around the Raju Memorial, having seized it from the student protestors the day before. They were gathered to stop the students from marching on the Raju Memorial and to prevent further bloodshed, since the protesting students were by now resolved to return the beating that they had been getting. However, the police were soon causing the very bloodshed they had been deployed to prevent.

    Figure 9, ©Zabed Hasnain Chowdhury, Women of Ruqayyah Hall, Dhaka University                                                                   

    Figure 10, ©Zabed Hasnain Chowdhury, Women of Ruqayyah Hall, Dhaka University

    On the night of 16 July, the women students took the lead in the pushback against BCL. In one instance, the women residents of Dhaka University’s Ruqayyah Hall chased BCL leaders out of their “halls,” as their dormitories on campus were called. Once vacated, the rooms occupied by BCL student leaders showed the luxury in which they had been living while subjecting their fellow students to deprivation and intimidation. Students enraged by this sight destroyed the rooms. Whereas they had up until this point engaged historic sites and symbols (razakar, Raju Memorial, Shahid Minar) to place their movement on a continuum with known history, their mode of protest now shifted into an iconoclastic mode—instead of mobilizing symbols and images, the protestors began destroying symbols of power and desecrating images.

    Typically, such women’s halls maintained strict curfews, with the gates to their halls locked by a certain time at night. On that night, the residents of Ruqayyah Hall also broke the locks to pour out into the streets to protest. Other halls soon followed in chasing out BCL leaders and taking their protests to the streets, joined by their male counterparts. 

    Student protests spread and intensified across the country. Jahangirnagar University, the University of Rajshahi, Begum Rokeya University in Rangpur, and many other universities joined. And reports of fatalities began to surface of students either killed at the hands of the BCL or the police.[6] In the city of Rangpur, Abu Sayeed, a student of English at Begum Rokeya University, was shot dead while he stood with his arms spread, clearly unarmed, as if daring the police to shoot. He was killed by rubber bullets shot at close range. He was the first to be martyred in the Anti-Quota Movement, which was quickly earning the moniker of the July Uprising or Bloody July. A total of six people across the country were killed that day.

    Figure 11, ©Faysal Zaman, Gayebana Janaza

    On 17 July, in keeping with the use of symbolism to affect a politics of protest, the Anti-Quota Movement organized a gayebi janaza, an absentee funeral for those who had disappeared or were killed to draw attention to the deaths of protestors. In Dhaka University, it was performed in front of the Vice Chancellor’s residence to shame the university administration for its failure to protect its wards. In many places the police prevented this service from being performed, which was taken to be a stark act of erasure. And in a show of yet more shameful dereliction of its duties towards its students, the university administration announced the shutdown of Dhaka University, ordering students to vacate their residential halls. The students tried to resist by barricading the gates to the dormitories. In a now familiar modality of mocking through mimicking, they sent a counter-notice to all university administrators requesting them to vacate their official housing on the grounds of failing to uphold their duty as guardian. Ultimately, sound grenades and tear gas were mobilized to force students to vacate, with many seen leaving in a hurry with their bags and baggage. If previously the government had merely attempted to swat away the movement using their student forces, now their efforts to dismantle the Anti-Quota Movement were in full swing, with the police, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB, an elite paramilitary force), and the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) stationed in major cities around the country. The army was not brought in until later.  

    From 18 July onwards, the scene of action shifted from Dhaka University, vacated of students, to other sites of confrontation. For instance, we have already seen how students in major cities such as Chittagong and Rajshahi were involved. They were now joined by students in tertiary cities such as Rangpur, Khulna, Comilla, and Sylhet. It is notable that the universities initially central to the movement in Dhaka, Chittagong and Rajshahi were public institutions. But now students from smaller, private universities joined the protest wave.  

    On 18 July, the big private universities in the Rampura-Badda area of Dhaka brought out large solidarity protests, congregating in front of BRAC University.  Universities serving the children of the country’s elite came out in solidarity with public university students.  The private universities, having outlawed political parties from their premises, were historically known for their apolitical nature. And the students themselves were seen as largely apolitical, more oriented towards starting international careers than the less privileged students, who were both more committed and more entrenched within the Bangladeshi context. This congregation of private university students was met with police violence and threats of open fire – an unprecedented attack on the children of wealth, who had previously been exempt from this type of state brutality. While other private schools in the area kept their gates closed to student protestors, BRAC University opened its gates to them and converted their space into a makeshift medical bay. One protester from the nearby Imperial College died on the BRAC University campus, one of at least 30 who were reported dead on that day from across the country.

    How do we understand the spread of the movement from DU to other institutions and across the country? As we have pointed out earlier, one reason the was able to fan out when faced with blockages from the state was its decentralized organization, with multiple coordinators stationed autonomously across the country. However, this cannot be the full story. For how are we to understand the coming on board of the students of private, elite institutions, who were not part of the initial planning of the movement? How, too, can we explain the participation of children from secondary schools?  It was in all likelihood the graphic death and martyrdom of Abu Sayeed and the others who soon followed him that fueled the expansion of the movement to include many more students and ultimately ordinary working people. 

    Figure 12, Downloaded from Wikipedia “Abu Sayeed”, Artistic Rendition of Abu Sayeed, one of 100s                    

    Figure 13, Downloaded from Mahadi Mishu Instagram, Artistic Rendition of Mir Mughdo, one of scores

    Figure 14, Downloaded from Reform Bangla, Artistic Rendition of Shaykh Ashabul Yamin

    Figure 15, ©Hrifat Mollik, Artistic Rendition of a Member of the Security Force, Whose Green Blood Shows Him to be an Alien

    Abu Sayeed was killed in Rangpur on 16 July. The video of his murder went viral in no time: it showed him being shot repeatedly by police in riot gear, with him flinching, yet stretching out his arms several times, falling into a crouch on the ground, and finally having his prone, presumably dead body hauled off by a group of young men. This video had a profound impact on the minds of people, including the young. Almost immediately the students at secondary schools, such as the Residential Model College in Mohammadpur in Dhaka, came out in protest. And the shock and pathos of Abu Sayeed’s unprovoked death was amplified by the death of one of these young students, Farhan Faiyaz, on 18 July. Farhan Faiyaz’s death was followed by the death of a university student activist Mir Mugdho, a student at the Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP), who was killed in the act of handing out water to protestors in Dhaka. Dhaka’s Military Institute of Science and Technology student, Shaykh Ashabul Yamin’s death in several parts is probably seared in people’s minds as the most terrifying display of state violence in recent memory. In videos and photographs we see how he was thrown from the top of an armored personnel carrier. He fell on the road with his arms outstretched, and his legs folded behind him, still visibly alive. The police then dragged him across the road and hurled him across the divider onto the service lane at which point he likely died. As mentioned above, this was the most brutal day of the movement thus far, with thirty dead the country over.

    Figure 16, ©Doha Chowdhury, The Daily Star.  Students Renaming the Gate Rudro Arcade

    These deaths galvanized the country into reacting with tremendous grief and anger openly voiced. Of course, Bangladeshi society was no stranger to the deaths of its citizens in the hands of state forces. To understand why these deaths would produce such outpourings it may be necessary to investigate the antipathy that had built against Sheikh Hasina’s repressive and violent regime but most immediately it would appear to be the senselessness of the deaths. Student protesters immediately started to give gates and streets the names of those killed, as if to restore meaning to these deaths. On 17 July, right after Abu Sayeed’s death, students demanded that Rangpur Park be renamed Abu Sayeed Chottor (Square). At Shahjalal University of Science and Technology (SUST), a gate was renamed Rudro Toron (Arcade) for Rudra Sen, killed on 18 July, while Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP) renamed a floating bridge Shaheed (Martyr) Mir Mughdo Bridge. These were not just tributes. They were refusals to let the state dictate who was to be mourned and how. On 30 July, when Sheikh Hasina attempted to grasp the reigns of memorialization by declaring it the day of mourning or “Jatiya Shokh,” students rejected her bit outright, saying “Rokter daag ekhono shukay ni,” (the stains of blood have not yet dried) and turning all their profile pictures on various social media platforms red in protest.

    By this time, it was clear that social media was by far the most important media element within the movement, getting images, videos and commentary out before news media were even alerted. On the evening of 18 July, the government imposed a shutdown on social media and internet access, which extended to mobile and broadband internet, and platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and WhatsApp. However, through various technical workarounds and diasporic connections, videos of protests and state violence continued to be distributed abroad, although inaccessible to those within the country. At home, all one could do was watch TV and read the dailies, which reported assiduously, though given the extent of censorship in the country, official coverage was treated skeptically. Many reported feeling that the established media made them doubt the veracity of what they were themselves seeing and experiencing at the time.  

    The international media gave the events some sputtering attention, being more captivated by the transfer of candidacy from Biden to Harris in the United States. However, a few reporters of Bangladesh origin such as Tanvir Chowdury of Al Jazeera and Shafiqul Alam of Agence France Press (AFP) Press kept their focus on the country.  Al Jazeera covered Yamin’s brutal death, for one thing. Offshore news outlets, such as Netra News, and overseas bloggers, such as David Bergman, Zulkarnaen Saer and Tasneem Khalil, kept snippets of news flowing.  

    Diaspora Bangladeshis, including students, came out in the hundreds to draw attention to the death-dealing activities of the AL government. There were massive protests in front of the Bangladesh consulates in New York City, London and Berlin. Some risked punishment to protest, such as a group of migrant workers in the UAE who were promptly put to jail (they were later released upon the intervention of Muhammad Yunus, the head of the interim government that came to replace the AL-led government). Migrant workers stopped sending remittances through official channels to express their anger against the government, effectively compounding the pressure on the government, making its survival even less likely. 

    Figure 17, ©Mehedi Haque

    In Bangladesh, opposition political parties, such as BNP and Jamaat-i Islami called for general protests. Civil war raged in the cities, with the burning of several official establishments. Newspapers reported Sheikh Hasina’s eyes tearing up seeing the damage done to a Dhaka Metro Station newly inaugurated by her regime. These tears prompted many rebukes and jokes about her love for property over people. The police effort to dismantle the movement now took the shape of intimidating student leaders. Nahid Islam, a student coordinator who had been particularly visible in the press, was picked up on 19 July and found unconscious with clear marks of abuse on his body on 25 July. He was again detained and kept in police custody with five others between 26 July and 2 August. The army was deployed on 19 July, but it was reported that the army would not shoot; instead, it would provide protection to the police and RAB. This effectively allowed the security forces to use lethal force without fear of being overwhelmed by the increasingly angry masses as the army stood guard over them. The police took to the skies in helicopters and snipers to the tops of skyscrapers to shoot indiscriminately upon gathered protestors, even hitting those sheltering in their homes, including young children.[7]

    On 21 July, a rattled Awami League government began to seek compromise, saying that they would abide by whatever the Supreme Court decided regarding quota reforms. On 22 July, the appellate division of the Supreme Court reduced quotas from a total of 56% to 7%, with 5% reserved for freedom fighters and 2% for ethnic minorities, transgender people and those with disabilities. But by this time many more people had died.[8]   

    The sense of the moment was that quota reform could no longer be an adequate appeasement for the sheer numbers who had given their lives in protest. The nine-point demands that were articulated at this moment were: PM taking blame and formally apologizing for the mass killings, the resignation of various ministers who were also in the AL leadership, the firing of police officers present at the areas where students were killed, the resignation of the Vice Chancellors of Dhaka University, Jahangiranagar University and Rajshahi University, the arrest of those police and individuals who attacked or instigated attacks on students, compensation for families of those who were killed or injured, the banning of BCL, the opening of university halls, and an end to the harassment of protestors.

    At the same time, SAD announced a suspension of the movement after the appellate decision on 22 July, while demanding the lifting of the ban on the internet. Between 22 and 28 July, there were no student protests. Instead, there was an efflorescence of many small protests by teachers, lawyers, artists, and other members of civil society, including actors and celebrities. Various figures called press conferences asking for student leaders to be released and student demands to be heard and constructively engaged. Between 22 and 26 July, the government declared that the student movement had been infiltrated by external forces, hinting that the USA was inciting the protests. It turned its focus on opposition parties, such as BNP, Jatiyo Party, even the small parties, such as Gono Odhikar, that had emerged from the 2018 Anti-Quota Movement. It declared a ban on the religious party Jamaat-i Islami. Everyone in the leadership of these parties was picked up and jailed through dramatic and terrifying block raids at their places of residence and neighborhoods. The government imposed a curfew from 26 July onwards, with street traffic allowed for just a few hours each day to allow people to get necessities.

    From 29 July onwards the momentum of the movement, which had left Dhaka University to enter the streets, returned to the university, this time through the agency of teachers.  On 29 July, teachers across campuses and political divides organized as the Teachers Platform Against Oppression to hold a rally at the foot of the Aparajeyo Bangla monument on the campus of Dhaka University. The choice of this monument commemorating the 1971 Liberation War struggle as the place of gathering and criticism of the government suggested that no one, much less the Awami League, could claim a monopoly over the Liberation War. One teacher even gave the example of a teacher, Professor Shamsuzzoha, who had died protecting his students in 1969, claiming him as their inspiration, thus putting this rally in a direct line of continuity with the struggle against Pakistan. Teacher after teacher gave moving speeches on the right of students to protest, excoriated the inordinate violence against them, and demanded the release of those detained. And, most significantly, they called on ordinary people to fight their fear and come onto the streets.  

    On 2 August, thousands convened in front of the National Press Club close to the university before slowly marching to the Shahid Minar as part of the Droho Jatra (literally, Rebellion/Revolt Journey). Here the variously changing demands coalesced into one calling for Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. On 3 August, the gathering at the Shahid Minar was even bigger. The student anti-quota movement originating in Dhaka University had met with state violence, been forcefully evicted from the campus, and now returned to the premises with tens of thousands from all sections of society behind the students. 

    Figure 18, ©Abdul Karim Khan, Gathering for the Long March

    On 4 August, there was a nationwide call for a Long March to Dhaka for 6 August, later brought forward to 5 August. The Awami League government continued its violence against protestors, which now included more ordinary people than students. The BCL famously took to social media to declare it would take “7 minutes” to clear the protesters in a defiant last stand. The battle raged on the streets across Dhaka and the country. A 100 people lost their lives on 4 August, more than half of whom were BCL and AL activists and the police.  

    Ultimately the public turned to burning police stations to express their anger at the indiscriminate use of lethal force against those unarmed and the cruel disposal of the dead and in some cases yet living bodies. On 5 August, hundreds of thousands of people poured into the city of Dhaka despite attempts to prevent entry, an imposition of curfew and a short internet blackout in the morning. The army refrained from shooting, despite Sheikh Hasina’s pleading for it to do so. Instead, the Head of Army Staff and Hasina’s family persuaded her to get into a helicopter that flew her and her sister to India, her departure leading to the fall of the AL government. 

    Conclusion

    Through plotting the events of July 2024, we hope to have shown how a student led movement, which started within a university thoroughly captured by the state, and with only a limited goal of winning a few compromises from the state, ended up overturning the state. At each point as the students encountered state violence where they expected state engagement, their demands ratcheted up to keep faith with those amongst them who died simply trying to get the state’s attention. The strategic arrangement of student leaders across the country ensured that the movement continued even as the most visible figures within it were taken into “safe custody” by the security forces. The pathos surrounding those killed unprovoked and senselessly brought more and more students and ultimately the general populace into the protests. And, at one point, the sacrifice in human lives became so steep as to make nonsense of the initial demand for quota reform, bringing on the demand for Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. 

    A further set of perspectives on the nature of Sheikh Hasina’s regime may be culled from our focus on Dhaka University as the site of capture by the ruling party’s student wing, the BCL, and the subsequent efforts to reclaim it. In some respects, by trying to establish their authority within the university and take control over its resources, the BCL was only doing what student groups associated with national level political parties had always done. Afterall, it was assumed that the ruling party, any ruling party, and their affiliates would engage in extortion as a benefit of being in power.[9] But what was different in this instance of Sheikh Hasina’s rule was her determination that AL would rule in perpetuity and that its control over all resources and opportunities would be absolute. And the BCL in Dhaka University projected this sense of permanence in its thoroughness of extortion, providing an important vantage on the thinking and workings of the government. It also made the BCL not only the object of fear and loathing but a proxy for the government. Thus, attacking the BCL was felt to be tantamount to launching an attack at the state, with the defeat of the BCL making the downfall of the state a real possibility. 

    The student-BCL inter-dynamics and conflicts within the university played out in miniature relations between civil society and state, going so far as to provide a template for how civil society may resist an oppressive state. As the capture of the university had taken place one site after another, one cherished student tradition after another, so was its reclamation site by site, starting with the female students throwing the BCL out of residence halls to be followed by others. Some within the BCL even flipped sides, while others who stayed loyal targeted for reprisals after 5 August. After the fall of the government, it was disclosed that several members of BCL’s leadership were students of other political groups who had infiltrated the group to undermine it from within, but that is a story for another time.

    The students, first seeking to advocate for administrative reform and later to withstand the force of the state embodied by the BCL and then the police and RAB, deployed a range of well-known techniques within the activist’s toolkit. For instance, they undertook peaceful demonstrations and marches. They took advantage of the symbolic importance of monuments and other historic sites within their campus at which to express themselves, associating their struggles with prior moments and struggles. They maintained a unified voice albeit refracted through many different leaders and coordinators. And in a venerable tactic, not only did they resort to violence to defend themselves, they, along with the general populace instigated destruction, including the burning of police stations and the killing of the police, to express their anger at the violence directed at them.   

    They also introduced new elements into the revolutionary’s toolkit by ventriloquizing those who sought to discredit them, a risky discursive strategy in the best of times, such as when they took on the slur of razakar. They performed funeral services for those who had been disappeared, giving their movement not just the ebullience of resistance but also a funereal affect. They widely used social media not just for the purposes of reportage but for bearing witness and bringing onlookers into the tragedy of death and the proliferation of martyrs, which had the effect of drawing sympathizers into the protests.  

    Since 5 August 2024, Dhaka University has once again become the political center of the city. Shortly after the fall of the government, there have been many Bijoy Michil or victory marches in Shahbag. Chobir Hat, a place of gathering of progressive students, reopened after being shut for over a decade with a concert honoring those who had died. There have been enumerable academic and journalistic events hosted on campus inquiring into different dimensions of the uprising, such as enforced disappearances or the art of the uprising. There has even been a concert by the rap artist who had been persecuted by the regime because he was an early and vocal supporter of the Anti-Quota Movement. Most importantly, it has become a place where everyone returns to stage their protests directed at the current interim government. The protests are to be found at the base of the Raju Memorial. 

    Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury is a campaigner working for the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association on climate, policy, renewable energy and human rights. 

    Shrobona Shafique Dipti, a graduate of the University of Dhaka, is an urban anthropologist and lecturer at the University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh with an interest in environmental humanities and multi-species entanglements. 

    Naveeda Khan is professor of anthropology at Johns Hopkins University. She has worked on religious violence and everyday life in urban Pakistan. Her more recent work is on riverine lives in Bangladesh and UN-led global climate negotiations. Her field dispatches from Dhaka in the middle of the July Uprising may be found here.

    [1] It was colloquially said that July did not end until the movement ended and, as such, 5 August has come to be referred to as 36 July.

    [2] To remind the reader, this demand was brought on by the criticism of the large quota for the freedom fighters associated with the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh and their family members, one considered to be widely abused to favor Sheikh Hasina’s party members. Despite the increasing authoritarianism of the AL government, previous student movements had been able to eke out limited compromises from the government, which spurred the 2024 Anti-Quota Movement.

    [3]  It is noteworthy that there had been a meteoric rise of private educational institutions across the country to manage the rising numbers of people desirous of social mobility through education and employment, particularly as public education systems had either started failing due to governmental disinvestment or being structurally unable to absorb the growing numbers.

    [4] Among the reforms the interim government, in place after the fall of Hasina’s government, has undertaken to the BCS exam is to raise the age cap to 32 from 30 but to restrict the number of times a candidate may take the exam to three. See: https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/exams-public-jobs-govt-raise-age-limit-32-years-3735386?fbclid=IwY2xjawGG8P9leHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHe2vaTdmMKINRzH8CFYZYD5EbAMmfx6UbgzFoUMLux5sqr12-VZT_Y3zRg_aem_dl61jR5NJn2sdGRHtAn7lg

    [5] There are by now several important accounts with timelines of the July Uprising. Our intention in providing yet another one is to more self-consciously center the Dhaka University in these accounts and timelines in order to ultimately show how the university was reclaimed. 

    [6] It is notable that several BCL activists were also killed in retaliation, which led them to be outraged at the leaders of Awami League who they felt had effectively set them up.

    [7] The deaths in the July Uprising included a disproportionate number of young people, including very young children. 

    [8] Later speculation about the numbers killed over the course of long July would bring the number to 1000, later marked up to 1400+ by the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner and 1500+ by the Students Against Discrimination.

    [9] And in keeping with that practice, no sooner did the AL led government collapse, than BNP members stepped into the extortion rackets abandoned by fleeing AL party members.

  • Arne De Boever–G for Glossary: Some Thoughts on Finance Aesthetics as Cultural Logic

    Arne De Boever–G for Glossary: Some Thoughts on Finance Aesthetics as Cultural Logic

    This review was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier.

    G for Glossary: Some Thoughts on Finance Aesthetics as Cultural Logic

    Arne De Boever

    A Missing Term

    In what follows I propose to reflect on a term that I consider to be missing from Finance Aesthetics: A Critical Glossary, a book that one of the editors of this dossier, Mikkel Krause Frantzen, co-edited, and to which I contributed a term.

    That missing term is the term “glossary” itself.

    Indeed, I would like to posit that a critical glossary of the kind that Frantzen and his co-editors have generated—a critical glossary of finance aesthetics–is symptomatic of the financial era itself, part and parcel of the financial mindset. I posit this based on the number of books published in the field of critical finance studies that come with a glossary. I haven’t encountered this phenomenon in any of the other fields I’ve worked in, each of which are quite technical (as any academic field is perhaps bound to be). But finance really takes the cake: it seems that it is so abstract and complex in its language that almost every book that is published about it requires a glossary. Even if you’re unfamiliar with the field, you may have come across the phenomenon in popular culture about finance: Adam McKay’s film The Big Short, for example, compiles something like a glossary over the course of its narrative, splicing in segments in which certain financial terms are explained:

    This glossary phenomenon also exceeds the realm of finance. In recent years, a remarkable lot of glossaries or glossary-like books have been published, making me wonder whether it’s not just finance but the world at large that has become so abstract and complex that more and more glossaries are needed. The glossary has become something like a cultural form, perhaps reflecting or producing something like a glossary brain as the symptom (if you want to talk not just critically but also clinically) of what’s been called “the information era” and “the network society”: our contemporary, highly digitized times dominated by a form of both input and organization that doesn’t narrate but merely counts, as the philosopher Byung-Chul Han has it in his book The Disappearance of Rituals (2020). Going against the invitation of such a form, then, I propose to ask: what story does the glossary allow us to tell? What does it allow us to think?[1]

    Glossary as Cultural Form

    Readers of the Marxist cultural critic Fredric Jameson will recognize that kind of approach. First in an article published in New Left Review in 1984, and then later in a book published in 1991 with Duke University Press, Jameson presented “postmodernism” as “the cultural logic of late capitalism” (Jameson). A big, ambitious book that ranged across “culture”, “ideology”, “video”, “architecture”, “sentences”, “space”, “theory”, “economics”, and “film”, Postmodernism fit right in with some of the novels—say Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow or Roberto Bolaño’s 2666—that are considered textbook examples of the cultural logic that Jameson considers. If I bring up Jameson’s book, it’s not to engage the text in any detail but because the question it raises—what is the cultural logic that attends any given economic formation?—is important for thinking through our contemporary moment and the glossary’s role within it.

    In the Introduction to his book Glossary of Cognitive Activism (For A Not So Distant Future)—another recent example of the glossary form–the artist and theorist Warren Neidich suggests that we are now living in late cognitive capitalism (he writes specifically of a “late stage cognitive capitalism”). That era, which brings “another transformation and crisis of labor and the laborer”, is one

    in which the subject will become “unsituated” and agentless. No longer posed between sensation and perception, information arising, for instance, from the Internet and virtual displays, will directly engage with the brain’s higher cortical centers, like the frontal and parietal cortices. As such it will bypass the bidirectional sensory-motor-affective schemas, embedded in its thalamocortical networks, which had facilitated its relations to the material world in the past. As a result a non-thinking zombie controlled by streams of analyzed and activated data without free choice will emerge. This constitutes the endpoint of an ontogenesis of tool use that begins in aiding the laborer to accomplish their job faster and more efficiently to one that makes them obsolete [sic]. This is especially true for the cognitive laborer or cognitariat. (Neidich xi)  

    Let us accept this as a more or less adequate clinical description (from a neuro-aesthetic point of view) of our current economic formation. After Jameson—an “after” that Neidich’s own Marxist orientation in this passage and his Introduction at large invites–, one would then be inclined to ask what might be the “cultural logic” that attends that formation. What is the cultural logic of the late cognitive capitalism that Neidich diagnoses?

    This is where the glossary comes in. Defined as “an alphabetical list of terms or words found in or relating to a specific subject, text, or dialect, with explanations”, a glossary is effectively “a brief dictionary”, and in that sense it has some connection to the encyclopedic form that is related to the maximalist novels of postmodernism that I mentioned before. (Lists, by the way, are a typical feature of such novels—consider, for instance, Bolaño.) Etymologically, “glossary” goes back to the word “gloss”, defined as “luster or shine on a smooth surface”; “a superficially attractive appearance or impression”. The verb “gloss over” for example—“to conceal or disguise something unfavorable by treating it briefly or representing it misleadingly”—is related to “gloss” and ultimately to “glossary”, a form of writing that thus, by its very name and in its very form, treats terms briefly, perhaps even in a superficially attractive way that looks smooth and shiny, but may in fact be hiding something else.

    Those descriptions could also be applied to some of Neidich’s recent artistic work: say, The Statisticon Neon (2016-2020), a sculpture that in its various iterations includes many of the terms included in Neidich’s later glossary.[2]

    In the sculpture, however, those terms are diagrammed on a wall, as the glossy realization of an artwork that looks shiny and lustrous, smooth even, but is in fact showing us through the diagram it provides the dark underside of our contemporary economic, political, and aesthetic era. It’s Jeremy Bentham’s troubling panopticon—in Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault’s diagram for disciplinary power (1978)–rethought for our age, and rendered in neon. There is a lot to unpack here, and a serious consideration of the glossary-form can guide us in that direction.

    I mention all of this not to criticize Neidich’s artwork and book, but to draw out a dimension of those works that we would (after Jameson) do well to consider if we are interested in the cultural logic of late cognitive capitalism. Indeed, I want to propose that the glossary, and more broadly speaking the list, is a key component in that cultural logic, to the extent that the list-like form of Finance Aesthetics: A Critical Glossary can be said to call up a veritable listomania that is the pathological condition of late cognitive capitalist societies—from the list of unanswered emails and text messages that awaits us when we turn on our phones in the morning (this is assuming—optimistically–that you had turned it off at night), to the X feeds we generate and follow, to Amazon’s suggestions for what we may want to buy next, to Spotify’s music streaming recommendations, to the episodes of television series waiting to be binge-watched (let’s just get it over with…), to—yes—books that read like lists.

    It would be wrong, of course, to limit the form of the list to the era of what Neidich calls “late cognitive capitalism”. I already pointed out that as a phenomenon of late cognitive capitalism, the list can be traced back to postmodernism and the era of late capitalism that Neidich’s phrase references, and that was Jameson’s era of focus. But any consideration of for example literary lists, which are an ancient writerly device going back in the Western literary tradition to Homeric and even Biblical times (think of the ship catalogues in Book 2 of Homer’s war epic The Iliad or the genealogical list in Genesis 10 and 11), will immediately reveal the fallacy of uniquely associating the list to the era of late capitalism, and thus marking it as postmodern, as well. Indeed, and staying with the literary for now, lists also feature in realist novels, whose aesthetic is often placed in tension with postmodernism. Clearly, it simply will not do to locate the list in any particular literary period, or associate it with any particular literary aesthetic—late capitalist, late cognitive capitalist, or whatever.

    And yet, there are ways in which the list, and specifically the glossary, stand out as a typical form of our time, to the extent that the form of our lives under late cognitive capitalism at times appears to be list-like, or glossary-like: doesn’t your life sometimes begin to feel like a list of brief impressions or superficial appearances that project the shine or luster of the smooth but in fact disguise something more troubling? Think of your Instagram account, for example; what it shows, but especially what it doesn’t. Much is glossed over in such a form of life. There is no overarching narrative—just a couple of keywords with explanations–, no diagram to bring it all together, but a mere list of terms or words found in, or relating to, a specific subject—and that subject is you. The only order available, in the glossary, is that of the alphabet.

    And one could even go further than that. The listomania of the present may be transforming our very brains into organs that list rather than narrate, that gloss over rather than think through, that are associated with brief impressions and superficial attractions rather than in-depth engagements. Post-critical organs, if you will, rather than critical ones (and post-criticalism may be a good name for the cultural logic of our time[3]). It’s in this overall context, within these overall transformations, that our glossary needs to be situated. Glossary, then, ought to be read as a further realization of a cultural logic that is already clinically and critically present in a work like Neidich’s Statisticon Neon. But whereas the diagram in Statisticon Neon still provides some narrative of how the terms featured in it cohere—a narrative that Neidich also performs, as a key supplement to the work–, the book form of the glossary moves further in the direction of the mere list, a formal shift that solicits our careful attention.

    In the field of what’s called “theory”, Finance Aesthetics: A Critical Glossary is hardly the only recent publication to take the form of a list. I’ve already mentioned (and commented on) Neidich’s book. Emily Apter’s Unexceptional Politics also reads in this way, as a collection of loosely connected short entries that bring a change to the traditional format of the academic book (Apter 2018). It’s a form that goes back to Apter’s Against World Literature (2013), a book whose entire second part is constituted by entries that present themselves as “Keywords” (this recalls, of course, Raymond Williams’ Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society). That book came out around the time that Apter’s translation and reworking of Barbara Cassin’s Dictionary of Untranslatables was published (Cassin 2004), and it seems that the dictionary format somehow worked its way into Apter’s writing. Consider also Karen Pinkus’ Fuel: A Speculative Dictionary; or the edited collection Veer Ecology: A Companion for Environmental Thinking.

    “Lists” are also a central stylistic trait of one current of contemporary theory, object-oriented ontology, where, according to Ian Bogost for example, they perform serious philosophical work. In his book Alien Phenomenology, Bogost discusses what he calls “ontography” “as a name of a general inscriptive strategy, one that uncovers the repleteness of units and their interobjectivity … Like a medieval bestiary, ontography can take the form of a compendium, a record of things, juxtaposed to demonstrate their overlap and imply interaction through collocation” (Bogost 38). “The simplest approach to such recording,” Bogost observes towards the end of his paragraph, “is the list, a group of items loosely joined together not by logic or power or use but by the gentle knot of the comma” (Bogost 38). He suggests in his chapter that the exploded-view drawing, invented in the Renaissance, is a kind of visualization of an OOO list in which “everything sits suspended” (Bogost 50).

    This isn’t exactly the same as the glossary—but it is formally similar, there is an isomorphy here that deserves to be considered. And of course the question that I am asking is to what extent the list, as a philosophically serious and thus critical (or perhaps better, post-critical?) tool in OOO, is also a clinical symptom of the information era.[4]

    While those examples of theorists working with lists or glossaries are chosen almost at random, the format seems widespread enough—and the attention that the list has received is large enough—to warrant my claim about the glossary as a cultural logic. One can think, for example, of Eva von Contzen’s “listology” project, which is supported by a grant from the European Research Council of 1.38 million euros over a period of five years.[5] It’s enough to make one wonder not so much whether academics can’t write books anymore (though this may be part of the condition we are diagnosing) but whether, in this new form of the glossary and the list that they have chosen, something like a cultural logic might be at work—the cultural logic of the very economic era that, in our glossary, the form of the list seeks to capture.

    The spin on the glossary and the list that I’ve given so far (with the goal of provoking you a little bit, of course) is the pathological one—the glossary or list as the pathological form of the era of late cognitive capitalism. But although pathology is part of the glossary-form and the list-form, it cannot tell the whole story. For when we’re putting together or contributing to a book like Finance Aesthetics: A Critical Glossary, we obviously do not only think of the glossary as a pathological form but also as a kind of tool or even weapon that enables activists to find a new poetry, a new common language to talk about our contemporary situation (or un-situation, as Neidich puts it). It’s also the first step towards a narrative moment that we hope will follow.

    Towards a Glossopharmacology

    By thinking of the glossary as a kind of “arsenal of concepts” (as Bernard Stiegler might allow us to call it; when he uses this phrase in his work, he has in mind concepts for artists in particular, artists who are working “neganthropically” [Stiegler’s coinage] against what he calls the entropic dissipation or fall of spirit in the digital era), I am now trying to draw out the other side of the glossary-form’s politics. I do so in light of the recent revival of a “political formalism”, a thinking about the politics of forms—rather than about the politics of formlessness that is characteristic of much “theory”.[6] (Stiegler’s neganthropy is precisely about that: about thinking form against entropic formlessness.) That means to think across aesthetics and politics to assess the positive/ affirmative politics of forms—in this case, the politics of the glossary-form and, by extension, of the glossary brain. I mention Stiegler because the glossary-form is important for thinking what I would characterize as the pharmacology of the late phase of Stiegler’s work. I am trying to think a pharmacology of the glossary, a glossopharmacology, which is operative in Stiegler’s own work.  

    Consider, for example, how in Stiegler’s book The Neganthropocene there are many indications that the author was perpetually running out of time. “Had there been time” (Stiegler 2018, 102), “but, unfortunately, I’m out of time” (Stiegler 128), “If we had more time” (Stiegler 2018, 129), and again “If we had more time” (Stiegler 2018, 131): these are just some of the phrases that punctuate the talks that are collected in this book. Reading the talks that Daniel Ross edited, translated, and introduced for this collection, one gets the impression that one of the reasons Stiegler was running out of time was the burden, if I can put it that way, of his thought itself and especially of the elaborate terminology in which and through which it developed. The term “neganthropocene” is part of that terminology; but any page in the book by that title will reveal many more such terms, with sentences at times appearing to have been put together with jargon alone:

    The epiphylogenetic supplement thus inscribes a bifurcation in vital différance, where it makes an exosomatic différance, which in the Upper Palaeolithic becomes that which makes a noetic différance—by passing through hypomnesic tertiary retention. (Stiegler 2018, 221)

    Always the poetic inventor of philosophical concepts, Stiegler had by the time of the Neganthropocene lectures arrived at a stage where his reliance on what preceded, the fact that when he was speaking he was developing further a thought that had already started, actually risked to prevent him from getting something new across, especially to those not familiar with his work. A lot of his time was taken up by explaining what he had already accomplished (often with reference to other lectures given elsewhere, and sometimes with reference to unpublished work), and introducing his audience to the vocabulary of his thought. The beginnings of his lectures often involve a summary of what’s preceded (in no less than “12 points” [Stiegler 2018, 93], for example); for the non-initiated, they can come across as a language lesson. To think with Stiegler one has to learn Stieglerese. Anyone who has tried to write about or teach the late Stiegler—consider unpacking the passage I quoted about with a group of students–will know what I mean.

    I remember this very issue—Stiegler’s terminology, the increasingly intricate language of his quickly developing thought (he wrote and published at a rate that made some of his fellow philosophers suspicious about the quality of his work)—being a topic of after-hour garden conversations at Cerisy-la-salle, when both Stiegler and I were guests there for the “Décade” on the work of Gilbert Simondon. This was around the time that Stiegler’s book Pharmacologie du Front National had been published (Stiegler 2013). It came, tellingly, with a “Vocabulaire d’Ars Industrialis” (written by Victor Petit), a glossary of the key terms not just of the political organization he co-founded but also—by extension—of his thought. This was also around the time when he was starting his philosophy school in Épineuil-le-fleuriel, and both the book on France’s National Front (now National Rally) party and the plans for the school revealed a concerted effort to translate his thought to readers not necessarily specialized in academic philosophy.

    The addition of a glossary indicated, however, some sense of concern about accessibility: developing a new thought always requires developing a new language, but Stiegler seems to have realized that his work, as a poetic intervention, had begun to spiral terminologically to such an extent that it may have reached a high step-in threshold that prevented him precisely from getting the general reader on board. One could consider this an example of how the tertiary retention of poetic philosophical writing operates pharmacologically to produce the very opposite of the noesis to which it aspires. And if you didn’t quite get that: that’s precisely my point. We’re arriving at a phase of thought in which the terminology becomes a burden, and a glossary is needed. It’s the thin line between a conceptual arsenal and the potentially pathological aspects of a list of concepts—and this is where I would situate the financial glossary.

    So, as a kind of provisional conclusion, I would say that broadly speaking, and by way of the glossopharmacology that I’ve developed after Stiegler, an analysis of today’s listomania—of the ways in which our lives, and possibly our very brains, are starting to operate in the glossary-form—would need to include two components, one clinical, the other critical.

    • On the one hand, and this is the clinical component, the list is the symptom of an era in which, as per Neidich’s description, the subject becomes “‘unsituated’ and agentless”, a transformation that is closely linked to the information era and the rise of the internet, digital image culture, social media networks, digital devices, and so on and so forth. That transformation has had an effect not just on our lives, but— Neidich argues, and research has shown—on our very brains. Neidich’s conclusion does not miss the mark: as a consequence of that transformation, a “non-thinking zombie” will be produced, “controlled by streams of analyzed and activated data” and “without free choice”. I am suggesting that the glossary, tied to today’s societies of information overload, formalizes the cultural logic of that un-situation of the subject—something that Neidich does not state explicitly, but that lies nevertheless contained in his work, for example in Statisticon Neon and in Glossary. While those works contribute to the critical analysis of late cognitive capitalism and its culture, we need to acknowledge that they are also a product of both—their very form already expresses, in its analysis, the cultural logic of the era. This reveals those works to us as symptomatic, as part and parcel of our era’s listomania. Neidich but also we ourselves by consequence, appear in this un-situation as a listo- or glosso-maniacs, suffering from a kind of “mental illness marked by periods of great excitement or euphoria, delusions, and overactivity” (as an online definition of mania has it)—critics of the culture but, to recall Theodor Adorno’s comments on “cultural criticism”, very much part of the culture we criticize. The shiny, lustrous smoothness of both Statisticon Neon and Glossary can thus be understood in the context of what Byung-Chul Han has characterized as a society of the smooth (Han 2018), where the absence of injury risks to ultimately lead to the absence of poetry, art, thought and existence. It’s the neon society of superficial impressions and brief attractions. Life as we know it on Instagram.

    This is not the life of the book—of the narrative or the thought that demands a longer attention-span. We are in the realm of tweet-fiction, of the short story at best, of the novel reconceived as a collection of loosely connected tales that are written with an eye on their future adaptation into a television series. No need to set aside a few hours to dedicate to reading. The time between two zoom meetings or subway stops or art openings will do. It’s the glossy life, made up of keywords that are good conversational value at the next vernissage or finissage.

    Not all of this is bad. Laments about the effect on our attention-spans of significant transformations in the media are legion; there were the same warnings when the novel itself was becoming established as a genre (see, for example, Carr). In some ways this is just the progress of time, the transformation of the contemporary media-scape, and its concomitant effects on our lives and brains. In some ways it is about the always-in-progress generation of our future brains, which will inevitably be different from our past brains (how could it be otherwise?). Not all of this is uniquely tied to the era of late cognitive capitalism—the short story, for example, obviously exceeds that time period. In many ways, then, all of this is normal, and nothing to worry about; criticisms of the glossy life may just be conservative and cantankerous responses to the inevitable progress of time. Consider me guilty.  

    • One thing ought to be clear, however: that a laissez faire attitude towards the developments that the various glossaries I’ve commented on chart, might underestimate the gravity of our “un-situation”. In other words, there very much is something to worry about, and we need to become activists in response. This is the critical component (the “other hand” of what I announced above) of the glossary. For the interesting thing about glossaries—and this is the other side of today’s listomania—is that they are also the weapons that are mobilized to counter the very developments that produced them: there is a dialectic of the glossary here that allows the glossary to be mobilized against the very forces that produced it. The poison thus becomes the cure in a kind of pharmacology of the list.

    To sum up: in glossaries, editors and authors lay out our time’s terms of analysis, and hint at how they are connected (how they are to be diagrammed, or put together as part of a narration). Part symptom, but also pitched as part of the solution, glossaries seek to provide, then, something like a new, and unknown language, a kind of glossolalia, that would open up an understanding of our contemporary list-like, glossary-like, times, and enable a resistance to them. Glossaries realize such a project both through their content and their form. Importantly, the resistance they propose does not strike from the outside but from within. Rooted in a deep understanding of what it counters, a critical glossary would not be a knee-jerk response that simply rejects what it resists. Rather, it promises to take on that very thing in order to assume agency over it, and make it ours.

    Arne De Boever teaches contemporary comparative fiction, literary theory, and aesthetic and political philosophy in the School of Critical Studies and the MA Aesthetics and Politics program at the California Institute of the Arts. His most recent book is Post-Exceptionalism: Art After Political Theology (Edinburgh University Press, 2025). De Boever is part of the boundary 2 editorial collective and co-edits boundary 2 online.

    References

    Apter, Emily. Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability. New York: Verso, 2013.  

    —. Unexceptional Politics: On Obstruction, Impasse, and the Impolitic. New York: Verso, 2018.

    Boever, Arne De. “Giorgio Agamben’s Political Formalism”. Distinktion 23: 2-3 (2022): 259-273.  

    Bogost, Ian. Alien Phenomenology or What It’s Like to Be a Thing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012.

    Carr, Nicholas. The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains. New York: Norton, 2011.  

    Cassin, Barbara. Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon. Ed. and Trans. Emily Apter, Jacques Lezra, Michael Wood. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

    Cohen, Jeffrey Jerome and Lowell Duckert, eds. Veer Ecology: A Companion for Environmental Thinking. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017.  

    Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 1978.  

    Han, Byung-Chul. Saving Beauty. Trans. Daniel Steuer. Cambridge: Polity, 2018.

    —. The Disappearance of Rituals: A Topology of the Present. Trans. Daniel Steuer. Cambridge: Polity, 2020.

    Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991.

    Kornbluh, Anna. Immediacy or, The Style of Too Late Capitalism. New York: Verso, 2023.  

    Liming, Sheila. “Fighting Words”. Los Angeles Review of Books, 12/14/2020, accessible: https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/fighting-words/.

    Neidich, Warren. Glossary of Cognitive Activism (For a Not So Distant Future). Berlin: Archive Books, 2019.

    Pinkus, Karen. Fuel: A Speculative Dictionary. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016.     

    Stiegler, Bernard. Pharmacologie du Front National. Paris: Flammarion, 2013.

    —. The Neganthropocene. Ed. and Trans. Daniel Ross. London: Open Humanities Press, 2018.

    Tucker-Abramson, Myka. “Make Literary Criticism Great Again”. boundary 2 online, 09/26/2018, accessible: https://www.boundary2.org/2018/09/myka-tucker-abramson-make-literary-criticism-great-again-review-of-david-alworths-site-reading-fiction-art-social-form/.

    Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

     

    [1] Here it is worth noting the importance of the list, a term that will appear in my argument momentarily, in Anna Kornbluh’s work on immediacy as the “style of too late capitalism” (Kornbluh 175ff). Indeed, I have no hesitation in positing the glossary as one indication of immediacy as the style of our time.

    [2] The sculpture has various iterations. For the work from 2016, see: https://www.warrenWarren.com/01-Warren-statisticon-neon-2016/. For the work from 2020, see: https://vimeo.com/496263760.

    [3] I am evoking the rise of post-critique in academic discourse. For two critical takes, see: Tucker-Abramson, 2018; Liming, 2020.

    [4] We shouldn’t forget Bogost’s ties to video-game culture and the centrality of the Cold War as a reference point in his thought–especially in Alien Phenomenology, which begins with a Cold War story from Bogost’s childhood. It would be interesting to place next to each other Neidich’s Statisticon Neon, Bogost’s exploded-view drawing (with its Cold War resonances), and a work by Jackson Pollock, and note the CIA’s interest in Pollock’s so-called automatic painting–because of the patterning that it produced. So there are connections here between Pollock, the Cold War moment, and algorithmic governance in the information era that interests Neidich.

    [5] See: https://www.listlit.uni-freiburg.de/.

    [6] On this, see Boever 2022.

  • Matti Leprêtre–Modernity, Lebensreform, and MAGA’s Grassroots: On Some Economic Contradictions of Trumpism

    Matti Leprêtre–Modernity, Lebensreform, and MAGA’s Grassroots: On Some Economic Contradictions of Trumpism

    This Intervention is published as part of the b2o Review’s “Stop the Right” dossier.

    Modernity, Lebensreform, and MAGA’s Grassroots: On Some Economic Contradictions of Trumpism

    Matti Leprêtre

    The MAGA movement presents a paradox: it rails against globalization and modernity, yet it is led by billionaire capitalists who thrive on both. This contradiction echoes the coalition that brought Hitler to power—a mix of industrial elites and working- to middle-class Germans drawn to the reactionary, anti-modern rhetoric of the Lebensreform. The same fractures that ultimately weakened that coalition could be exploited today to challenge MAGA’s hold on power. But if left unchecked, its path is just as clear: when economic promises fail, all that remains is the persecution of minorities.

    *

    Trump, Hitler, and Weimar: Rethinking the German-American Parallel

    There is something deeply amiss in the way the memory of Nazi Germany is invoked in contemporary debates about American politics. Trump’s bid for a second term has inspired countless comparisons between him and Hitler—comparisons that, aside from their historical dubiousness, merely stimulate MAGA supporters’ libidinous drive to trigger woke liberals. Instead, there is value in fixating not on the Nazi era from 1933 onward, but on the more fluid, transformative period of 1920s Germany.

    In that turbulent decade, a wounded cultural pride lingered after the 1918 defeat, and deep anxieties about losing world-power status permeated society. Gender-based challenges to the patriarchal order, the growing assertion of gay rights, and other emancipation movements met with fierce resistance from traditional authorities and conservative reactionaries. Most importantly, the profound crisis of modernity caused widespread anti-modern sentiments—all of which eventually coalesced into the conditions that allowed the Nazi Party to seize power.

    There is little doubt that dealing with the first element—hurt cultural pride—is the chasse gardée of the Republican Party, while the struggle for emancipation remains the preserve of the Democrats. As an outsider, I have long been struck by how readily the U.S. left has allowed anti-modern sentiments to be co-opted by Republicans, with figures like Steve Bannon at the helm.

    The caution is understandable. Anti-modern sentiments have long been associated with the rise of fascism in Europe and Nazism in particular. Yet before these ideas became the exclusive domain of the Nazis, they circulated freely across the political spectrum for more than half a century. They not only fueled nationalist and anti-Semitic currents but also underpinned a proto-environmentalist critique of modernity as part of a popular movement that came to be known as the Lebensreform.

    Antimodernity before Fascism: The Ambivalent Heritage of the Lebensreform

    Emerging in the latter half of the 19th century in a rapidly industrializing Germany, the Lebensreform (or reform of life) movement chiefly championed the “return to nature,” in a country where factories mushroomed across the landscape. For some, this “return” meant rejecting modern medicine in favor of natural remedies; for others, it meant embracing long hikes in the mountains; and for still others, it meant seeking an alternative to a worldview that treated nature and humanity as mere cogs in the economic machine.

    Though largely driven by the bourgeoisie, the movement mounted a sharp critique of globalization, the dehumanization of factory labor, and the environmental devastation wrought by capitalist accumulation—even giving birth to Germany’s first utopian communities. For all these reasons, the Lebensreform has been described as the matrix not only for Nazism but also for future environmentalist and anti-globalization movements.

    As a historian of Germany, I have always been struck by the parallels between the Lebensreform critique of globalization and the rhetoric of the grassroots of the MAGA movement. The far-right’s critique of “globalists” finds a clear parallel in the Lebensreform’s disdain for the emerging globalized world; and Bannon’s scathing attacks on technological progress, Elon Musk, and the “broligarchs” are reminiscent of earlier Lebensreform-ist critiques of technological advancement. Likewise, the widespread rejection of academic medicine and science—exemplified by the nomination of Robert Kennedy Jr. as Health Secretary—bears an uncanny resemblance to the alternative medical views championed in Germany a century ago. Yet, because of their common historical root in the Lebensreform, these elements also appear in leftist anti-globalization movements.[1]

    Beyond Cultural War: Reclaiming the Critique of Globalization

    I am not equating anti-globalization leftist movements with MAGA, nor suggesting that an alliance between the two is possible or desirable at this point. MAGA’s anti-modernity departs sharply from the traditional leftist critique—with its crude racism, nationalism, Christian fundamentalism, and mysticism. Yet these tensions were already present in 1920s Germany, and largely because the German left failed to harness these popular energies, a significant portion of the movement fell into Nazi hands. This historical precedent suggests that if a new left is to succeed where the old faltered against the far right, it should develop a critique of globalized capitalism able to prevent the growing number of those left behind by globalization from joining MAGA, or even capture the grassroots energies now under the MAGA banner.

    For that, the left has a rich political repertory to draw upon. The critique of globalization and capitalist modernity has never been primarily a far-right one. From the first utopian communities to the “small is beautiful” movement of the 1970s, from Ivan Illich’s critique of biomedicine to the Our Bodies, Ourselves of the Boston Women’s Health Group Collective, from the anti-G8 protests of the 2000s to post- and decolonial propositions for finding an alternative to—or even an exit from—modernity, a range of options exists, more or less appealing, more or less viable today, but all worth considering for the emergence of a New Left. What is certain is that discarding the slightest critique of academic medicine as a conspiracy theory, scorning even the smallest enthusiasm for a life lived closer to nature as reactionary, and claiming to be “progressive” at all costs in a world so deeply embedded in a crisis of modernity will only seem repulsive to the growing number of people who see techno-industrial progress and globalized capitalism as the main cause of their torment.

    It is only a question of time before MAGA’s disparate coalition begins to disappoint its working- and middle-class members. A coalition built around an omnipotent, transhumanist tech billionaire and a cadre of like-minded oligarchs will most likely do very little to address the real impacts of globalization and technological change on millions of American workers. Trump’s wavering stance on tariffs reflects this very contradiction: every time he tries to deliver on the aspirations of his working-class base, he is reined in by the cast of oligarchs he ultimately serves. To conceal this, the oligarchs have to double down on the one fight in which they can seem to stand with “the people” against “the regime”—cultural war. In effect, the only arena in which the Trump administration can thrive is in the persecution of minorities.

    This, too, was the case in 1920s Germany. The coalition that eventually propelled Hitler to power brought together Lebensreform-inspired anti-modern peasants, factory workers, and middle-class employees, alongside wealthy industrialists terrified of the rising tide of communism and emancipatory movements.[2] This uneasy alliance forced the Nazis to adopt a vehement anti-modern rhetoric to placate their grassroots supporters, while simultaneously embracing cutting-edge techno-industrial policies and deepening the logics of global capitalism. Even the Nazis’ de-globalizing measures emerged only when war loomed and autarky became a national security imperative. Their only ideological common ground was the cultural war they waged against emancipatory movements and, most notoriously, against ethnic and religious minorities—a war that would ultimately pave the way for the Shoah.

    So far, Democrats have largely fallen into the trap of fighting Republicans on the terrain of cultural war, the only domain in which MAGA’s coalition remains united. While there is indeed an urgency in responding to the Trump administration’s “flood the zone” strategy and its constant targeting of minority rights, history suggests that a more promising strategy would be to stop fighting solely on the terrain of values and start exposing the internal fractures within MAGA’s vision—particularly its conflicting ideas about globalization, technology, and the meaning of life and work. At the same time, they must put forward viable alternatives; ones that embrace more localized, low-tech ways of living.

    An Uncomfortable Dialogue: Lessons from the Yellow Vests

    Engaging in a dialogue with people currently attracted by MAGA’s anti-modern rhetoric might feel uncomfortable at first. In France, the left faced a similar unease in 2018 when the Yellow Vest movement erupted. Initially a reaction against an oil tax, the movement soon broadened to encompass grievances common to MAGA’s grassroots—demands for a decent life in one’s village, resistance to the concentration of services in big cities, a rejection of unrestrained globalization, and a critique of the ultra-connected, ultra-mobile elite’s way of life. In retrospect, it became clear that the movement had emerged from those left behind by globalization.[3] The French left, initially repulsed by the protests—deeming them the product of politically illiterate people with no clear views on immigration, gender politics, and ecology—gradually joined the movement, imposing leftist slogans and even sidelining its more overtly far-right, violent elements.

    The convergence was by no means easy. A sensible component of the Yellow Vests eventually turned back to the far right as the movement faded—partly due to quasi-military repression and partly because some of its most basic revendications were fulfilled. Yet this turn toward Marine Le Pen also occurred because the institutional left was unable to articulate a critique of modernity compelling enough to keep the Yellow Vests from falling into the open hands of France’s MAGA equivalent. As uncomfortable as this dialogue might feel, it is a necessary one.

    Coda: What’s Left of the Left?

    Debates after the election have focused on whether the Democrats should have leaned further to the left or more toward the center to win the votes they needed to secure victory. This assumes that political positions can be summed up along a single line from far right to far left. Yet, depending on the issues considered, there is sometimes less distance between an anti-globalization leftist activist and a MAGA grassroots supporter than between that same activist and a centrist Democrat. MAGA supporters may soon come to see that the strongest “regime” of all is the one that binds together the guardians of globalized capitalism—a regime spanning large swathes of both the Democratic and Republican parties, with Trump and Musk as its most zealous artisans.

    One can only hope that the American left will have made its aggiornamento by the time this day comes, to welcome the disillusioned adherents of Trumpism. The Democratic Party’s current stance—as the last firewall between Trump’s erratic populism and Wall Street, and as the staunch defender of free trade and the post-1945 global economic order—raises serious doubts about the American left’s ability—or willingness—to reclaim a critique of globalization that should always have remained central to any party still dreaming of itself as the voice of the working class[4].

    Matti Leprêtre is a Teaching and Research Fellow at Sciences Po Paris and a PhD candidate at the EHESS. His dissertation examines the history of medicinal plants in the German Empire from the 1880s to 1945. He trained in postcolonial studies as an undergraduate and earned a dual degree from Sciences Po and Columbia University in 2017. He has been invited to present his research at a wide host of institutions across France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, including Oxford and Harvard. His work has appeared in several edited volumes and journals such as the Journal of the History of Ideas. He is currently co-editing an edited volume and a journal special issue on the relationship between health, nature, and the pharmaceutical industry.

    Works Cited

    Chapoutot, Johann. Les irresponsables. Qui a porté Hitler au pouvoir ? Paris: Gallimard, 2025.

    Gourgouris, Stathis. Nothing Sacred. New York: Columbia University Press, 2024.

    Porcher, Thomas. Les délaissés: Comment transformer un bloc divisé en force majoritaire. Paris: Fayard, 2020.

    Siegfried, Detlef, and David Templin, eds. Lebensreform Um 1900 Und Alternativmilieu Um 1980: Kontinuitäten Und Brüche in Milieus Der Gesellschaftlichen Selbstreflexion Im Frühen Und Späten 20. Jahrhundert. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019. 

    [1] Siegfried, Detlef and David Templin, eds. Lebensreform Um 1900 Und Alternativmilieu Um 1980: Kontinuitäten Und Brüche in Milieus Der Gesellschaftlichen Selbstreflexion Im Frühen Und Späten 20. Jahrhundert. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019.

    [2] Chapoutot, Johann. Les irresponsables. Qui a porté Hitler au pouvoir ? Paris: Gallimard, 2025.

    [3] Porcher, Thomas. Les délaissés : Comment transformer un bloc divisé en force majoritaire. Paris: Fayard, 2020.

    [4] For a recent example of what a leftist criticism of globalization could be, see Gourgouris, Stathis. Nothing Sacred. New York: Columbia University Press, 2024.

  • Shrobona Shafique Dipti, Naveeda Khan and Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury–How to Capture a University: Lessons from Dhaka

    This post is Part Three of “The Bangladesh Chapter” of the b2o review’s “The University in Turmoil: Global Perspectives” dossier.

    How to Capture a University: Lessons from Dhaka

    Shrobona Shafique Dipti, Naveeda Khan and Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury

    Figure 1: Dhaka University. 

    The Cast of Characters

    Sheikh Mujib, Founding father of Bangladesh

    Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Sheikh Mujib, head of AL, and till recently Prime Minister of Bangladesh

    AL, Awami League, the ruling party

    BCL, Bangladesh Chhatra League, AL student wing, also referred as Chhatra Leaguers

    BNP, Bangladesh Nationalist Party, opposition party

    JI, Jamaat-e-Islami, religious party

    Shibir, JI student wing

    Hefazat-e-Islam, coalition of religious parties and groups

    DU, Dhaka University

    BUET, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology 

    Universities in Comparative Perspective: Two Types of Capture

    2024 will surely go down in history as the year that students in U.S-based universities revolted against their government’s stance on Gaza.  Expressions of gratitude emblazoned on the tent roofs of displaced Gazans gave voice to an almost global appreciation of the students in the face of threats by university administrators.  While for a bit it seemed that university campuses were the last bastion of free speech in the U.S., the subsequent attacks by police on students at the behest of administrators made clear that universities in the Global North were already captured spaces and had been for a long time.  Between zealously grown and protected endowments, entrenched boards of trustees, and administrative bloat, faculty, students, research and teaching had long been mere excuses for the existence of corporatized universities.  

    In other parts of the world this pernicious combination of liberalism and capitalism has not quite set in the same way, although there are some indications that it may yet do so, judging by the growing numbers of private, for-profit universities in places where capital is rapidly accumulating, such as China and India.  Consider, for instance, the case of Bangladesh.  Here public universities, such as Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and Dhaka University (DU) – both British, colonial-era institutions – are still hallowed places of education and training, where teachers are respected, and young Bangladeshis strive to get admission to better their life chances.  This has remained the case even as the Bangladesh economy has turned rapaciously capitalist, private universities steal away teaching talent, and university coffers are depleted, with a baleful impact on infrastructure and services.  

    But it is not the case that universities of Bangladesh are free of capture.  The capture is just of a different kind than that by capital.  Historically, university students, most notably at Dhaka University, have been associated with anti-colonial and nationalist politics.  Since Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan in 1971, political parties have evolved student wings that carry out a version of national politics on campus.  Depending on which party is in power, their equivalent wings dominate in universities, extending into higher education the politics of patronage and insinuating themselves into the lives of students.  

    Given this scenario, it was quite shocking to most that the 2024 Student Anti-Quota Movement, very clearly critical of the government headed by the Awami League (AL), started from Dhaka University, which was at that point very much under the thumb of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), the student arm of the ruling party.  Given this unlikely development, it is incumbent upon us to inquire how a space as state dominated as Dhaka University could also be the site of an anti-state revolt.  It requires us to inquire how the BCL’s vice grip upon the campus may have created the conditions of possibilities for its downfall.  The battle within the university grounds on July 15th, 2024, when the Awami League let loose BCL students upon peers involved in the Anti-Quota Movement, an encounter which ended in considerable bloodshed, death, and the chilling images of Chhatra League men in helmets with hockey sticks bearing down on unprotected bodies – often with the support of law enforcement authorities –will probably serve for all time as the moment when Bangladesh civil society realized that the Prime Minister and her party had gone mad.   

    In Part Three of “The Bangladesh Chapter” of the b2o review’s “The University in Turmoil: Global Perspectives” dossier, we explore the spatial experience of the university as a captured space, that is, how the AL-led government and its student wing came to take over the space of the university, before turning in our next contribution to how this space was reinhabited to launch a movement against the state.  We hope that getting a sense of the lay of the land may provide a glimpse into how small incursions into space becomes a full-throated capture of every domains of existence, including the imagination, and what living under active oppression feels like while one is trying to simply go about the business of getting educated.  

    Mapping Dhaka University

    Dhaka University occupies a central location in the capital, on the way from the older residential neighborhoods of west Dhaka to the business district in the east, but which, crossroads though it may be, still feels like a haven, thanks to its wide roads, tree-lined avenues and historic buildings set back from the roads.  In this section, we provide in three maps an overview of the location and layout of the university before homing in on the monuments that dot its landscape and that provide an important vantage on how students have been central to politics in Bangladesh, for better or for worse.  

    Map 1. 

    The first map shows the form of the university area and its placement within the heart of downtown Dhaka.  We see that it is relatively green, indicating trees and parks in its vicinity, such as the Ramna Park, a site of romantic liaisons, sports, and other leisure activities.  Otherwise, very densely occupied neighborhoods and areas throng the campus.

    Map 2. 

    The second is a road map of the University.  When we zoom into it, we see that the campus is overlaid by four roads, although university buildings spread out beyond these thoroughfares:  the New Elephant Road to its north, Kazi Nazrul Islam Avenue/Abdul Gani Road somewhat to its east, Nilkhet Road to its south and Azimpur Road to its west.  All four of these roads are busy commercial thoroughfares and sites of important student mobilization.  

    Map 3. 

    The third map is a creation of the graphic art group Dhakayeah, known for producing images of urban and semi-urban areas of Bangladesh – visual pastiches, suffused with elements of the past, espousing a certain romantic view of Bangladesh as both familiar and lost.  The pale green color palette reinscribes this view.  The image of a woman in a white overcoat and that of a woman in a sari perusing a book alongside the image of a man sitting on the grass looking at something or the man playing football puts forward the university as a co-educational space.  While we are alerted to the distribution of educational buildings through icons indicating laboratories, libraries, science, art, etc., and we are also given the names and images of several historical buildings and cultural sites, such as Curzon Hall, Shahidullah Hall, Bangla Academy, National Museum.  Among the residential buildings, the one for non-Muslims, primarily Hindus, Jaganath Hall, is indicated by the icon of the Hindu Goddess Saraswati, associated with wisdom, with her sitar and white goose. 

    On the Dhakayeah map we are pointed to the presence of notable monuments, such as the Central Shahid Minar (Martyrs Monument), the 1963 national monument to the martyrs of the 1952 Language Movement composed of five forms of white pillars and arches.  There is the 1979 sculpture of three freedom fighters holding guns, including a woman, titled Aparajeyo Bangla (Unvanquished Bengal) to commemorate the 1971 liberation struggle.  The Anti-Terrorism Raju Memorial, composed of men and women looking outwards while forming a circle with interlocked arms and hands, was created in the late 1990s to commemorate the student Moin Hossain Raju, killed while protesting terrorism within the university campus. 

    Figure 2, ©jagonews24. 

    The map represents several others, but inevitably omits many, as the campus is awash in monuments.  One significant to the story of how the campus has come to be the resting place of the memories of violence faced by the country’s young is called the Road Accident Memorial, unveiled in 2014 and representing the car crash that killed the Bangladesh filmmaker Tareque Masud and his companions in 2011.  These memorials, like others, indict the country’s two major political parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), for their reigns of violence and neglect of student safety.  These monuments were once counterpoised by large murals of Sheikh Mujib, the founder of Bangladesh, and Sheikh Hasina, his daughter and Prime Minister of Bangladesh until 2024, on the pillars of the Metrorail.  The murals were defaced during the Anti-Quota Movement (figure 2), but are worth keep in mind, as we note how monumental sculptures and images indicate the diverse political strivings of the university students.

    A Recent History of the University, 1990s-2020s

    To understand our story of the capture of the university by the ruling party, and the seeds of unrest that this planted, it would help to trace the recent history of Dhaka University from 1990 to the present. In the early part of the period, we see students becoming involved in national movements to depose a dictator, but also teachers and administrators getting politicized.  In the later part of this period, we see the student wing of the ruling party consolidating its hold on the university with the aid of senior administrators.  We also see the university expelling all other student parties across the political spectrum.  

    1990 stands out as the year in which a broad swathe of civil society organized to lead a movement against the standing military leader turned dictator, General Ershad.  Students at Dhaka University were part of this movement.  What is particularly noteworthy in the decade following Ershad’s being forced out of power was the entrenchment of teachers within national politics by means of the university.  Until the 1990s, it was students who had played a conspicuous role in national politics through the student wings of various parties, but the 1990s brought party-linked teachers’ organization to the fore: the BNP-backed teachers of Shada Dol (White Party), for instance, or Awami League-backed teachers of Nil Dol (Blue Party).  The students remained markedly more influential than their teachers within this changing dispensation; it was students, for instance, who secured positions for teachers, such as those of the vice chancellor, proctor and hall provosts.  The teachers expressed their gratitude through shielding and protecting students from criticism and the repercussions of their violent acts.  

    The next two decades, the period from 2000 to 2019, saw the steady encroachment of the state into the university, leading to growing political influence over university governance, including the dispensing of justice.  One event that especially colored this period was the 2010 murder of Abu Bakar, widely regarded as a student of great promise, who was killed during clashes between two Chhatra League factions fighting for control over access to a room in a residential hall referred to as a “hall seat.”  Despite overwhelming evidence, the students accused of his murder were acquitted, and the victim’s family was not even informed of the verdict.  Even the President of the country ignored the family’s appeals for justice.  Such incidents were in step with the state growing in power in the country more widely, and starting to perpetrate violence against its own citizens, in the form of enforced disappearances and illegal detentions.

    Figure 3, ©Global Voice. Dhaka, Bangladesh. 18th February 2013 — A woman shouts on a microphone. — A demonstration for the death penalty to be given to war criminals, is continuing at Shahbag crossroads, and has reached its fourteenth day. 

    Figure 4, ©Maciej Dokowicz.         

    Figure 5, ©JagoNews24. Scenes from Shapla.                                         

    Figure 6, ©Syed Zakir Hossain. 

    This period also saw the rise of sizeable movements in which university students, including seminarians, played a leading role.  Two, the Shahbag Protests of 2013 and the Shapla Square Protests of the same year, were defining moments in the country’s recent history, driving home the cultural divides that marked the Hasina era.  Locating themselves at one of the main entry points of Dhaka University, tens of thousands of people participated in the Shahbagh Movement, which were led by pro-liberation activists, aligned with Bangladesh’s bid for self-determination from Pakistan in 1971, and strongly supported by left-leaning Dhaka University students.  These activists expressed their desire for the state to impose stiff sentences, including death, on those they considered war criminals for having sided with the Pakistan army in 1971, for having, that is, assisted in the violence that the army inflicted against East Pakistanis at that time.  When the war criminal Abdul Quader Molla was handed a life sentence by the tribunal overseeing his trial, the movement demanded that he be sentenced to death instead.  The movement thus served the state’s interests by pushing for the rigorous punishment of those seen as traitors to the nation – Molla’s sentence was transmuted, and he was promptly hung; it was also used by the state to suppress the political activities of the student wing of the religious party Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing, and other groups within the university campus.[1] 

    This movement was followed by the Shapla Square Protests, led by Hefazat-e-Islam, an advocacy group consisting of religious leaders and students within the Qawmi Madrasa system, a privately run religious educational system parallel to the state-run one.  They called for the adoption of a blasphemy law, citing perceived offences to religious sentiment caused by Shahbag protesters.  This movement ended in a violent crackdown, with security forces brutally dispersing protesters.  Even though Hefazat as a group backed the war crimes trials, which was used to persecute leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) Bangladesh, JI and its student wing Shibir, contributed heavily to the group, seeking common ground against the Awami League and a shared goal of integrating Islam into Bangladesh’s governance and laws. 

    The two movements, Shahbagh and Shapla, symbolized a deep political and cultural divide: Shahbagh was framed as upholding the spirit of 1971 (muktijuddher chetona), while Shapla was portrayed as anti-liberation (bipokkho shokti).  This binary allowed the government to homogenize and demonize madrasa students and anyone visibly religious, such as those with beards and skullcaps, as enemies of the state.  By constructing this division, the ruling party justified widespread repression under the guise of protecting the nation’s independence, a strategy that they continued for the next decade.[2]

    While the Shahbagh and Shapla movements have provided the frame for political narratives since 2013, Dhaka University students also led the first version of the anti-quota reform movement that same year.  Though overshadowed by the massive Shahbagh movement, anti-quota activism would return in 2018 and again in 2024 to challenge the established polarities of the nation’s politics, its divvying of the field between progressives and reactionaries, that framed the Awami League’s encroachment upon and the Chhatra League’s dominance on the DU campus and elsewhere.

    The Micro-capture of University Space

    Amid this growing capture and repression of the university by the state by means of its student wing, the entire social, cultural, and educational landscape of the university underwent a transformation.  Chhatra League’s dominance extended beyond student politics, infiltrating academic and professional spheres.  Academic opportunities, teaching positions, and even government jobs increasingly required loyalty to them.  Many joined not out of ideological conviction, but as a means of survival: to secure protection from violence, gain access to institutional privileges, or ensure career advancement.  But once they joined, they soon learned of the BCL’s mode of operation: the loyalty that it expected of its members and the incessant jockeying for power within the organization.

    The president and general secretary of the Dhaka University branch of BCL were considered the most powerful positions within the branch, as these served as steppingstones to central leadership within the all-Bangladesh student party.  So important were these two posts that both the national media and the wider student body watched to see who secured them.  Those who aspired to political careers on the national scene often prolonged their studies artificially, declining to complete their degrees to hang onto positions of influence.  Departments were organized to allow students to stay enrolled despite failing their exams multiple times.  In fact, the longer one stayed at the university, the greater were one’s chances of rising to the top. 

    Students within the Chhatra League competed for these positions.  Having control over hall committees, enjoying a monopoly over rackets enabling rent seeking and patronage, known locally as “cartels,” and cultivating close ties with the university administration all contributed to one’s prospects of rising through the ranks.  And the path to leadership began within the residential halls.  Political leaders often referred to their time in the halls as laying the foundation for their careers.   

    At Dhaka University, the number of students admitted often exceeded the available accommodations, leading to overcrowding.  As a result, the university authorities had long ago stopped offering housing to first-year students, leading to tremendous insecurity for those coming from outside Dhaka or from poorer backgrounds, given the exorbitant rental costs in the capital.  Hall leaders, backed by their loyal followers, consolidated power by securing the support of hall provosts and house tutors.  Through such political maneuvering, BCL activists gained control over specific rooms, with Chhatra League leaders and their followers receiving rooms more easily.

    The leaders typically had separate rooms with amenities, while students, depending on their patronage of BCL activists, were assigned spaces within rooms, called Gonorooms (mass dormitories), which housed 20-30 students, far exceeding their normal capacity.  They were overcrowded, unsanitary environments, severely affecting students’ health and well-being.  Nonetheless, the premium on space meant that they were sought after and served as spaces of control and political tutelage.  For instance, students new to Chhatra League were required to attend Guest Room sessions, where they were instructed on so-called political courtesy, including how to show deference to student leaders.  These sessions often lasted several days; refusal to participate often resulted in bullying and even physical abuse.  Fear was pervasive, as the Chhatra League’s power was absolute as they had both impunity and deep resources to draw on to impose their will.  

    The 2016 death of Hafizur Molla, a student from the Marketing Department of Dhaka University, highlighted the harsh living conditions and political control exercised by the Chhatra League over students at the university.  Molla moved into Salimullah Muslim Hall in January under the good graces of a Chhtra League activist, but was forced to sleep in the veranda, which some halls also use as makeshift living spaces.  Less than a month after his admission, he contracted pneumonia and typhoid and died.  His family and classmates claimed that his illness worsened due to the exposure to cold living in the veranda and being forced to attend Chhatra League nightly programs, including AL-led political processions.  

    This power over students and their residential lives extended to the food canteens in the halls.  Canteen owners were required to provide food and stay open late to serve the leaders or else face beatings and assaults.  According to an example provided by the newspaper Daily Jugantor, leaders ate food worth 18 lakhs of takas ($18,000) from the canteens between 2019 and 2024 without paying for it.  In turn, the canteen owners passed on their losses to the students, who had to pay inflated prices for their food, while the canteen ownership saw a fast turnover.  

    Despite widespread awareness of the ongoing situation at Dhaka University and other campuses, one incident deeply shook the public.  This incident occurred not at Dhaka University but at the neighboring Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET), a campus traditionally known for its apolitical stance.  On the night of October 6, 2019, Abrar Fahad, a second-year BUET student, was tortured to death by Chhatra League activists inside Sher-e-Bangla Hall.  The attack was likely brought on by his Facebook post, which was critical of India. Accused of being affiliated with Shibir, the religious student wing – a common justification for violent hazing – he was severely beaten.  CCTV footage later showed his lifeless body being dragged down the stairs, an image that quickly spread across the country through national media.  In response to Abrar Fahad’s murder, BUET students launched a massive protest demanding justice and the banning of political activities on campus.  This movement led to the BUET administration officially prohibiting student politics, marking an unprecedented step by an avowedly apolitical but also relatively passive administration, which now committed to quashing student influence within public universities.

    Figures 7 and 8, Modhur Canteen, 1904 and Present. 

    The BCL’s mode of extending its influence over the campus was to capture sites that had historically been associated with the fight for freedom (of various kinds) and that retained symbolic importance within the history of the university.  One such site, Modhur Canteen, was long associated with student social gatherings and political activism.  Originally a dance hall in the garden house of a zamindar from Srinagar, on whose property Dhaka University was later built (figures 7 and 8), it would host the planning of significant student-led anti-government movements in 1948 and 1952.  During 1971, Madhusudhan Dey otherwise known as Modhu Da, the man who served in the canteen, was shot dead by Pakistani forces.  After independence, the canteen came to bear his name in recognition of his sacrifice.  Its symbolic importance for student politics is indicated by the fact that it became the site of press conferences by various student wings.

    Figure 9, ©Jannatul Mawa. 

       Figure 10, ©amarbarta.                                      

    Figure 11, ©Mehedi Haque. 

    Under the BCL the canteen became a site for the performance of power by their leaders.  After gaining control of the space, its leaders arrived every day on motorcycles, revving their engines to produce an awful din.  Their helmet-covered heads and shielded eyes gave them an ominous look.  This look even acquired a certain iconic character (figures 9, 11 and 13).  Modhur Canteen also served pragmatically as the site of BCL meetings.  Factional infighting took place here in full view of passersby and those living close by (figure 10).  

    Another example of a space captured, and its original symbolism overturned was the Teachers-Students Center (TSC).  The capture of TSC allowed Chhatra League to expand its scope from being a political force to asserting cultural hegemony, becoming the “Cultural Chhatra League.”  TSC housed a cafeteria, beside which stood the Anti-Terrorism Raju Memorial Sculpture, a significant piece expressing the students’ struggle for spaces to learn without the threat of political violence (see section “Mapping Dhaka University”).  TSC’s auditorium and rooms were allocated for various long-standing and popular students – film, IT, debate, etc.  In time these clubs too fell under the control of Chhatra League.  Club leaders had to be affiliated with BCL.  This included the presidents of the film and debate clubs, which had once been the most independent-minded of the student clubs, generating high levels of cultural and political excitement, but which now operated under Chhatra League’s command. 

    TSC was once a stronghold of leftist political organizations.  Even as the clubs fell under BCL control, they maintained some independence by putting on concerts, film screenings, and other cultural events.  However, the rigged Dhaka University Central Students Union (DUCSU) election of 2019 (discussed below) brought about a drastic change, tilting the Center entirely into BCL’s camp.  All funds allocated for cultural activities were appropriated by the BCL, which started organizing large concerts with massive banners and extravagant expenses amounting to lakhs of takas ($100,000s), both as a racket and to draw attention to their presence and power.  Without any school funding, the leftist groups were forced to rely on crowdfunding.  While the much-weakened leftist groups were allowed to stay on campus the student organizations affiliated with the opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) were expelled from campus in 2010.  The party was then allowed to participate in the 2019 DUCSU elections – and thus allowed back on campus in some limited way – because elections, even rigged ones, require opposition groups and BNP was deemed the most acceptable of the lot.  Students affiliated with Jamaat-e-Islami and other religious parties were forced to hide their political identities or else were banned from campus.  In fact, dissimulating one’s political identity became the norm. 

    Women in the BCL

    Although there were women in the Chhatra League, they were often excluded from the image of Chhatra League politics, where leadership was typically associated with men – the kind of men who led motorcycle processions, exerted control through violence, carried out extortion, and exuded dominance by wearing biker helmets as though they were armor.  Women’s spaces were also a site of BCL power politics, though of a muted kind.  And while not free of the BCL’s clientism, they still provided the space for some iota of resistance.  

    As a resident of Ruqayyah Hall, one of us, Shrobona, witnessed firsthand how power operated in women’s halls.  While the violent capture of student halls by Chhatra League members was rampant in men’s dormitories, women’s halls experienced a more subtle form of control.  Rooms in each hall were designated for Chhatra League leaders—at least two to four per building spread across different floors.  These rooms belonged to senior apus (sisters), each of whom had her own group of followers.  Some of these followers joined the BCL willingly, hoping to advance in politics, while others were recruited for reasons of geography or because they were squatting and were vulnerable to intimidation.  Women who were conventionally attractive and deemed obedient were often targeted for recruitment. 

    Every week or month, these women were required to meet with BCL leaders, who then selected a few to be introduced to party officials at the AL headquarters.  Despite never holding major leadership positions, these women were often deployed to suppress protests.  I remember one such incident when we marched to the Vice-Chancellor’s office to protest sexual harassment. There were around 200 students, yet Chhatra League mobilized nearly 2000 men and women to attack us – under the pretext of protecting the university administrator.

    While residents were only allowed to stay out until 10 PM, female Chhatra League leaders could enter halls at any hour of the night.  There were extravagant birthday celebrations of apu leaders.  One such event went viral during the 2024 protests that led to Hasina’s downfall.  In the footage, Atika, a BCL leader from Ruqayyah Hall, was seen celebrating her birthday in grand style, with the TV room lavishly decorated with flowers and followers chanting slogans, a festivity that seemed ill-judged at a time of national crisis.  

    Unlike men’s halls, where religious segregation was enforced (e.g., male students of minority religions had to stay in Jagannath Hall and were not welcome in the other halls), women’s halls accommodated students of all religious backgrounds.  This encouraged a degree of pluralism.   While BCL monopolized university-wide cultural activities – determining, for instance, who could or could not participate in sports, debates or music – Hindu festivals, such as the Saraswati Puja, were celebrated within the women’s halls, providing some spaces for socializing outside of BCL control.

    Women’s halls were also frequently sites of protest, as students came to challenge the treatment of rooms as property and the partisan exploitation – indeed, extortion – of hall resources.  During the fasting month of Ramadan, female students protested the unfair distribution of food, although dissent was soon suppressed by hall authorities threatening to revoke residence permits.  One striking example of resistance to the consolidation of power within the hall emerged following the 2019 DUCSU election.  Professor Zeenat Huda, the provost of Ruqayyah Hall, was accused of colluding with Chhatra League leaders in demanding Tk 21 lakhs in bribes for university jobs in the Class IV category, that is, lower administrative jobs.  Two students posted on social media an audio recording of a conversation in which the demand was made.  In retaliation, the provost canceled their legally allocated residential seats.

    The 2019 DUCSU Elections: A Turning Point?

    Figure 12, ©Maloy Kumar Dutta.                                                           

    Figure 13, ©Reesham Shahab Tirtho 

    The Dhaka University Central Students’ Union had long been a crucial means of political engagement in Bangladesh for students.  Sultan Mohammad Mansur Ahmed, elected as DUCSU Vice President (VP) in 1980 during the Ershad era, underscored the enduring importance of the union in shaping the political trajectory of Bangladesh.  He remarked in 2019 that, “If we consider DUCSU only as the Dhaka University Central Students’ Union, its significance will not be fully understood.  DUCSU has served as the birthplace of Bangladesh’s liberation struggle and all democratic movements.  From the Language Movement to the fight for self-determination and independence, DUCSU has led every major political movement.”  After Bangladesh’s independence, DUCSU continued to serve as a platform for political dissent, notably in the 1990s, when it spearheaded the student uprising that ultimately led to the fall of Hussain Muhammad Ershad’s military dictatorship, mentioned above.

    There is a stark irony in the fact that DUCSU elections were regularly held during both the Pakistan era and General Ershad’s rule.  However, after the 1990 uprising that toppled Ershad, the tenure of those who had been elected in 1990 was allowed to lapse without another election for 28 years.  Between 2016 and 2018, left-wing and non-partisan student activists campaigned for elections to be reinstated, seeing these as a solution to the deteriorating conditions on campus.  Through the DUCSU Chayi (We want DUCSU) movement, they organized protests, gatherings, and graffiti.

    Surprisingly, after decades of inaction, the Awami League government agreed to hold Student Union elections in 2019, just months after the notoriously rigged national elections of December 2018.  This was thought to be a concession, as demands for change had been gaining momentum on campus.  The 2018 Anti-Quota Movement, led by Nurul Haq Nur, had launched a popular panel, Bangladesh Sadharon Chhatra Odhikar Songrokkhon Parishad (Bangladesh General Students’ Rights Protection Council).  Meanwhile, a new student group, Shotontro Jot (Independent Alliance), emerged, consisting mostly of non-resident students from the science departments who claimed to be apolitical and sought a campus free of partisan influence.  Leftist student groups also organized campaigns, addressing critical issues such as the entrenched system of loyalty-based politics (lejurbrittik rajniti), the overcrowded and exploitative conditions in Gonorooms (mass dormitories), and the poor quality of food in campus canteens.  Their manifestos called for greater rights for students and a better quality of campus life.  

    Any hope for change was badly shaken when the Student Union began to resemble the discredited national election.  The AL-government’s apparent concession to student demands appeared to be mere window dressing.  For instance, on the night before voting, ballot papers were discovered hidden in a canteen storeroom.  Students and candidates stood guard to prevent further interference, but BCL activists forcibly entered, clashing with hall tutors and teachers as voting descended into chaos.  When students discovered rigged ballots in another residential hall, they demanded the provost’s resignation on the day of voting.  Despite widespread protests, threats of boycott, and calls to halt the election, officials rushed through with the process and counted the votes.

    To appease the students at large, the BCL strategically conceded the VP position to Nurul Haq Nur, the leader of the 2018 Anti-Quota Movement and a general position to a member of his party, while securing control over the remaining 23 positions.  Upon his election, Nur visited the parliament in session and controversially praised Sheikh Hasina as the “mother of education.” His statement shocked many students who had hoped for continued resistance, reinforcing skepticism about whether any real change was possible within the existing political structure.  But what became clear from the 2019 DUCSU elections was that student participation and protests directly challenged the dominance of the Chhatra League. 

    In Conclusion

    Even in a space as thoroughly captured as Dhaka University, resistance fomented.  As the gains from the previous 2018 Quota Movement were eroded back to nothing, above all through the 2024 High Court ruling that reestablished the hated quotas for the family members of freedom fighters, students in various universities took to protests.  What such spontaneous protests showed more than anything else was that students maintained a belief in the power of collective action above all else.  The monuments we spoke of earlier that dotted the campus of Dhaka University embodied this belief.  And as we saw in the sketch of student politics over the past few decades, despite all efforts at repression by BCL, the space of Dhaka University was riven by unrest always just below its surface, materializing in intermittent protests.  In effect, the July Movement of 2024 that toppled the Awami League government and its mode of student politics could be taken to be just one more protest along a long trajectory of such protests.  We next move to the scene of the movement to explore how it became the means of undoing an authoritarian regime and the possible undoing of the state capture of the university campus.

    Naveeda Khan is professor of anthropology at Johns Hopkins University. She has worked on religious violence and everyday life in urban Pakistan. Her more recent work is on riverine lives in Bangladesh and UN-led global climate negotiations. Her field dispatches from Dhaka in the middle of the July Uprising may be found here.

    Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury is a campaigner working for the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association on climate, policy, renewable energy and human rights. 

    Shrobona Shafique Dipti, a graduate of the University of Dhaka, is an urban anthropologist and lecturer at the University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh with an interest in environmental humanities and multi-species entanglements.

    [1] Through these trials much of the leadership of Jamaat-e-Islami was also executed. There were also torture and repression of students at this and other universities, such as Rajshahi University under the presumption that they were supporters of JI or Shibir.   

    [2] At the same time as the religious right was being suppressed, there was considerable concession to their demands.  The 2018 Digital Security Act allowed in through the side door the surveillance and punishment of utterances deemed blasphemous by criminalizing any insult to Sheikh Mujib, the founding father of Bangladesh, and the Prophet Muhammad. 

  • Ali Rıza Taşkale–Mapping Affective Landscapes within Financialized Capitalism through Speculative Fiction

    Ali Rıza Taşkale–Mapping Affective Landscapes within Financialized Capitalism through Speculative Fiction

    This response to Torsten Andreasen’s article “The Day the Music Died” was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier.

    Mapping Affective Landscapes within Financialized Capitalism through Speculative Fiction

    Ali Rıza Taşkale

     Introduction

    In ‘The Day the Music Died’, Torsten Andreasen explores the link between Robert Brenner’s theory of a ‘long downturn’ in advanced economies and Fredric Jameson’s concept of the ‘waning of affect’. Brenner argues that capitalist economies have faced low profit rates since the 1970s, while Jameson describes postmodernism as the cultural logic of financialization, leading to a shift in affective responses from deep historical engagement to surface-level intensities. Andreasen expands on Jameson’s notion of affect as a historically specific capacity to perceive and act in a given social context, exploring how the genre of finance fiction both depicts affective reactions to finance and itself constitutes such a reaction.

    Andreasen identifies three stages of affective response to financialized capitalism: the euphoric hubris of the 1980s, the schizophrenic horror of the 1990s and early 2000s, and the resignation following the 2007-2008 financial crisis. To Andreasen, these stages mirror broader cultural shifts in responses to financial capitalism, from optimism to crisis-induced alienation and eventual acceptance, as illustrated by films like Wall Street, American Psycho, and Cosmopolis.

    I find Andreasen’s periodization helpful, as it reflects shifts in how speculative finance and capitalism are culturally represented. Moreover, his exploration of the evolution of finance fiction is particularly insightful, as it frames a transition from the optimism of the post-war era to a growing recognition of the breakdown of industrial capitalism, ultimately leading to the post-crisis affect of resignation. Thus, the strength of his argument lies in his critique of finance fiction’s focus on individual crises, highlighting how this emphasis often overlooks the systemic violence embedded in financial capitalism. Ultimately, Andreasen calls for a more critical engagement with the structural forces sustaining financial capitalism, rather than perpetuating the individualization of crises within finance fiction.

    However, Andreasen’s piece is not without its limitations. These become particularly visible in his references to Raymond Williams’ ‘structures of feeling’. Williams’ concept is closely tied to a political economy of affect, which Andreasen hints at but does not explicitly explore. This is important because some of his analyses illuminate affective logics shaped by the values embedded in specific historical and material processes. This raises an important question: what, exactly, are the prevailing affective states within speculative financial capitalism, and how are we to understand them?

    Affective Landscapes through Pattern Recognition

    In his piece, Andreasen alludes to affective states, but he does not capture what I refer to as ‘speculative fatigue’, which I argue is the dominant affective state of contemporary financial capitalism. Speculative fatigue, I argue, is the exhaustion caused by continuous market volatility and high-risk investments, leading to disillusionment with financial systems that appear disconnected from real-world stability. To address this, I suggest turning to speculative fiction to gain a deeper understanding of the affective modes within financial capitalism. Speculative fiction brings distinctive powers, pleasures, and textual and visual richness to the issues discussed by Andreasen (Canavan 2017; Chambers and Garforth 2020; Vint 2021). It not only exposes the inherent contradictions of financial speculation but also unveils the predominant affective dynamics associated with it.

    Several works of speculative fiction effectively make legible the prevailing affective states of financial capitalism. Examples could include Kim Stanley Robinson’s New York 2140 (2017) and Jonas Eika’s After the Sun (2021). I want to focus, however, on one particular novel: William Gibson’s Pattern Recognition (2003, hereafter PR), a work of speculative fiction that explores the intersections of branding, marketing, and finance in a digital age. Although written in 2003, just after the 9/11 attacks and before the 2007–2008 global market crash, the novel’s portrayal of homo-economicus as the affective subjectivity and speculative fatigue as the dominant affect remains strikingly relevant today.

    The novel’s protagonist, Cayce Pollard, is a marketing consultant with an exceptional ability to recognize patterns in cultural trends and advertisements. When tasked with tracing the origins of enigmatic film clips known as ‘footage’ circulating online, Cayce becomes entangled in a global conspiracy. As her investigation deepens, she not only confronts her own inner demons but also navigates a reality increasingly shaped by virtual connections and speculative agendas. This journey mirrors the broader thematic concerns in PR, especially the commercialization and commodification of life within late financial capitalism. Cayce’s search for the origins of the footage can be seen as a metaphor for the way financial capitalism shapes our affective valuation of life, reducing personal and emotional experiences to marketable and commodified elements.

    In the novel, one of the most potent tools of such market commodification is a strategy called ‘cool-hunting’. Cool-hunting, or trendspotting, as defined by Cayce, involves identifying ‘a group behavior pattern around a particular class of objects’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 86). She further explains that this tactic relies heavily on pattern recognition, with cool-hunters aiming to identify ‘a pattern before anyone else does’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 86). Following this, she describes the next process: ‘I point a commodifier at it […], it gets productized. Turned into units. Marketed’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 86).

    Trapped in the Perpetual Present: Homo Economicus in Financial Capitalism

    The commodification of everyday life, where even the most intimate moments can be analyzed and monetized by pattern-recognizing experts and cool hunters employed by profit-driven multinational corporations, poses a significant threat as life is reduced to ‘homo economicus’, driven solely by market and corporate interests. Homo economicus is the ideal figure within the financial market. Just as financial capitalism creates markets, it also shapes homo economicus as a form of subjectification and affect. Within financial capitalism, therefore, ‘we are everywhere homo economicus and only homo economicus’ (Brown, 2015, p. 33). In this framework, the subject is left to fend for itself and is addressed affectively. Its wants, desires, passions, and instincts are duly noted and turned into a financial narrative. It is in this space that financial capitalism aligns with its affective subjectivity – the subject of homo economicus, motivated only by self-interest.

    Thus, what is distinctive about the figure of homo-economicus, and necessary for the functioning of financial capitalism, is that it legitimizes and ultimately (re)produces individuals based on market-defined self-interest(s). This system has become so pervasive that it has transformed everyday human existence into a vast game, or an endless stream of derivatives and speculative instruments. Individuals are increasingly defined by their ‘speculative value’ (Davis, 2018), a phenomenon that extends beyond consumers to include those working within the system, such as the cool-hunters themselves.

    This is further illustrated in PR, which shows how the dominance of techno-financial culture, the surplus of consumer goods, and the illusion of instant gratification collectively transform society’s perception of time. This transformation gives rise to what Fredric Jameson (1991) terms a ‘perpetual present’. This is not just a structural shift but is also deeply affective, reshaping how individuals experience and internalize their place in the world by establishing a regime of ‘indifference’ (Martin, 2007). This affective state of perpetual present manifests in a world where the boundaries between the past, present, and future are increasingly blurred, as technological advancements and financial imperatives accelerate the pace of life. The constant flood of new products, information, and experiences generates a sense of ‘immediacy’ (Kornbluh, 2023), where the future is always deferred, and the past is continually reinterpreted to serve present speculation. In a world dominated by the logic of speculative finance and branding, time becomes a commodity – something to be sold, consumed, and constantly redefined. The notion of inhabiting a perpetual futuristic present also resonates with the statements of the sinister entrepreneur in the novel, Hubertus Bigend:

    We have no idea, now, of who or what the inhabitants of our future might be. In that sense, we have no future. Not in the sense that our grandparents had a future, or thought they did. Fully imagined cultural futures were the luxury of another day, one in which “now” was of some greater duration. For us, of course, things can change so abruptly, so violently, so profoundly, that futures like our grandparents’ have insufficient “now” to stand on. We have no future because our present is too volatile. [. . . ] We have only risk management. The spinning of the given moment’s scenarios. Pattern recognition. (Gibson 2003, p. 57)

    Therefore, for Bigend, history has effectively ended, and resistance is deemed futile. To project meaningfully into the future from a ‘perpetual present’ characterized by constant change, has become an impossible task. The novel also suggests that we, as readers, may be vulnerable under such circumstances to ‘apophenia’, a concept defined within the text as ‘the spontaneous perception of connections and meaningfulness in unrelated things… an illusion of meaningfulness, faulty pattern recognition’ (2003, p. 115). While cool-hunters recognize real patterns to be economized, we merely imagine them in a desperate attempt to give meaning to our lives. They are hunting for cool; we are seeing patterns where there are none.

    In the novel, people become more and more fixated on the footage, attempting to decipher patterns and significance within it. They engage in speculation about the meaning, function, or nature of the footage within Internet forums and across various digital networks, fostering the creation of new channels through which objects can be circulated and marketed (Nilges, 2019, p. 47). This reflects the relationship between interpretation and object, speculation and value, which forms the system through which the footage circulates.

    This obsession with patterns must be understood differently depending on the historical period, allowing us to expand Andreasen’s periodization. In the 1980s, it aligns with Baudrillard’s critique of the simulacrum, where the proliferation of signs detached from reality creates existential uncertainty and a loss of meaning. By 2003, it reflects early Internet culture’s optimism about digital connectivity and the democratization of meaning, generating excitement and a belief in new possibilities, even within an emerging neoliberal landscape. By 2025, the affective response shifts again, shaped by a highly financialized, algorithm-driven digital economy, where engagement with content is driven by monetization and speculation. This fosters anxiety, compulsive interaction, and a sense of precarity, as meaning itself becomes a commodity. This shift does not follow a simple linear progression, nor does one phase completely replace another. Instead, it highlights how the pursuit of meaning moves from existential uncertainty to optimism, and finally to a precarious, commodified engagement with digital networks and financialized attention economies.

    PR captures this historical trajectory while dramatizing humanity’s endless quest for meaning in a world dominated by signs and symbols – a pursuit for authenticity (amidst simulacra), continuity (in a culture celebrating fragmentation), and depth (in a society increasingly shaped by surface-level engagement and algorithmic immediacy). In the novel, this is an obsession that Hubert Bigend seeks to capitalize on financially. The objective is not to uncover patterns that might imbue the footage with meaning but, rather, as he sees it, to exploit and commercialize the footage. At this point, Bigend makes an important statement that aptly describes today’s financial market, which has increasingly become a simulacrum or a speculative construct rather than a tangible entity: ‘Far more creativity, today, goes into the marketing of products than into the products themselves’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 67). Thus, Bigend serves as a living embodiment of financial capitalism, wherein speculative value and profit supersede all other considerations. To him, life is viewed primarily through the prism of marketing and speculation.

    However, the rise of speculative financial instruments does not signal the end of production and labor in today’s economies, nor a decrease in the focus on commodities. Instead, it reflects a shift from traditional consumer- and production-based capitalism to speculative financial practices, which are altering our understanding of value. Under financial capitalism, value increasingly derives from activities like ‘debt trading, financial market activity’ and ‘rentier practices’ (Davis, 2018, p. 5). This reflects a transformation in how economic value is generated: it is no longer grounded in production, but in abstract financial mechanisms that reshape wealth distribution and economic power.

    This transformation is portrayed in PR, where Bigend’s pursuit of the footage is driven purely by financial motives. Cayce’s search, by contrast, is motivated by a desire to uncover something of genuine value, revealing a tension between speculative financial practices and the human need for meaning beyond profit and homo-economization. This contrast demonstrates how speculative capitalism not only redefines value but also influences individual desires and perceptions of worth.

    Jameson (2003, p. 114) offers a reading of Gibson’s PR in which he observes that the clips’ absence of pattern and style provides ‘an ontological relief’ to Cayce, granting her ‘an epoch of rest, an escape from the noisy commodities themselves, which turn out […] to be living entities preying on the humans who have to coexist with them’. Although Cayce’s abilities develop within an overpowering technological market, she manages to avoid being reduced to homo economicus or having her life fully economized. She possesses what is known as a ‘trademark allergy’, which evolves into a phobia or nausea towards certain trademarks like Tommy Hilfiger and Bibendum, the Michelin Man. This reaction can be described as a side-effect of too much exposure to the world of branding and marketing. To cope, she removes trademark logos from her clothing and avoids contact with fashion brand names. As Gibson describes it, this rejection reflects Cayce’s conscious effort to resist being consumed by the hegemonic power of the techno-financial system and avoid becoming merely a commodified entity.

    In her journey to find the creator of the footage, Cayce travels to various cities, including Tokyo. Upon her arrival in that city, she is confronted with what Gibson (2003, p. 125) describes as ‘the manically animated forest of signs’, leading her to seek nature and authenticity in the city. Cayce perceives Tokyo as a place where reality has been exiled, to the extent that even the paved streets seem to conceal no soil beneath them; everything appears artificial. She reflects, ‘she’s never actually seen soil emerge from any incision they might make in the street, here; it’s as though there is nothing beneath the pavement but a clean, uniformly dense substrate of pipes and wiring’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 125).

    Tokyo thrives on signs and simulacra; yet, through her individual re-appropriation, Cayce resists the overwhelming dominance of financial instruments and cultural discourses, managing to prevent her life from being economized and commercialized. In other words, she refuses to be consumed by the simulacrum. In this sense, Cayce’s radicality and authenticity do not lie in overthrowing the oppressive systems of capitalism in which she is immersed, but rather in surviving within that system with some degree of agency.

    Speculative Fatigue

    PR anticipates a technologized future where financialization becomes ingrained in daily life. In this world, the distinction between the actual and the virtual blurs, and speculative finance takes center stage. The result is a subject reduced to a mere number, shaped by the totalizing forces of financial capitalism, where individuality is obscured, and the capacity to engage with or make sense of events is suspended. In this condition, the subject embodies homo economicus – driven by market logic rather than personal agency. Paralyzed by brands, speculative financial instruments, and AI technologies, this subject inhabits the world without truly interacting with it.

    But how is the dominant affective state presented in the novel? While there are many affective responses throughout, PR illustrates an affective state in which speculative financial capitalism creates a life of suspended agency, where individuals are trapped in an endless loop of commodification and abstraction, shaped by the banality of corporate logos, technologies, and financial instruments. I call this affective state speculative fatigue, as it frames the affective and psychological toll of living under the constant pressure of financial speculation. If homo economicus is the product of financial speculation, then speculative fatigue could be seen as the affective residue left from being constantly subjected to its logic. In this sense, speculative fatigue isn’t just about an individual’s weariness with financial markets; it’s about how these markets and the perpetual self-calculation they demand leave people exhausted, emotionally drained, and disconnected from anything other than their economic value. It acknowledges the toll that the pervasive logic of financialization takes on people, whether or not they’re actively participating in it.

    Speculative fatigue diverges from the affective states of euphoria and resignation, as described by Andreassen, through its distinct tone and lived experience. Euphoria, seen in the early stages of financialization, is driven by optimism and belief in the limitless potential of financial markets. In contrast, speculative fatigue arises from the constant pressure of engaging with financial speculation, leaving individuals mentally and affectively drained rather than energized. Resignation, often following a crisis, involves passive acceptance of the financial system’s dominance. While speculative fatigue shares some emotional distance with resignation, it is more about the ongoing toll of living in a financialized world that limits agency and connection, rather than simply giving up. In short, euphoria is driven by hope, resignation by acceptance, and speculative fatigue by the affective weariness of navigating a financially-driven reality.

    Speculative fiction, in this context, provides a lens through which to explore the speculative fatigue produced by financial capitalism, though such explorations are not exclusive to the genre. PR exposes how financial speculation actively shapes cognitive and emotional experiences, leading to an endless state of homo economicus – a condition of perpetual economic calculation and self-optimization. This state is not abstract or universal; it is a direct result of how speculative finance permeates daily life, inducing affective overload and fatigue. Thus, speculative fatigue emerges as the emotional and psychological toll of this constant engagement with the logic of financial speculation, leaving individuals disconnected and mentally drained. The novel not only depicts the speculative fatigue of living in a financialized world, but also critiques the very systems that generate this fatigue. By revealing how homo economicus is both constructed and perpetuated by the very forces it critiques, and how speculative fatigue emerges from this process, PR illustrates how speculative financial capitalism reshapes not only our material world but also our affective landscapes, reducing individuals to economic units within a system that demands constant self-commodification.

    In this sense, PR reveals the inherent contradictions of contemporary speculative financial capitalism, showing how speculation functions not only as an ‘immanent critique’ (Nilges, 2019) but also as a mechanism that cultivates homo economicus – a state where the pursuit of financial success, self-optimization, and market-driven choices supplant deeper values and genuine social connections. This homo economicus is not a passive backdrop but a central feature of the narrative, embodying the instability and uncertainty that come with speculative finance, where future outcomes are unpredictable. The affective experience of homo economicus, which manifests as speculative fatigue, is not incidental to financial speculation; rather, it is an intrinsic consequence of the constant cycle of self-assessment and recalculation of worth. This perpetual recalculation, driven by the fluctuating demands of financial markets and speculative mechanisms, exhausts individuals emotionally and psychologically, leaving them trapped in a state of ongoing fatigue.

    Conclusion: Speculative Fiction as Critique

    Andreasen identifies three stages of affective response to financialized capitalism: the euphoric hubris of the 1980s, the schizophrenic horror of the 1990s and early 2000s, and the resignation following the 2007–2008 financial crisis. In PR, however, speculative fatigue transcends this periodization, presenting a perpetual state of homo economicus, shaped by the pervasive logic of speculative finance.

    Yet this is not the entire story. PR is also illuminating in its depiction of Cayce’s resistance to speculative fatigue generated by commodification and financialization, extending beyond Andreasen’s understanding of the affective stages of financial capitalism. The novel concludes with Cayce peacefully falling asleep after achieving her initial goal: finding the maker and revealing the mystery of the footage. However, just before drifting off, Cayce’s trademark allergy is suddenly cured. She no longer fears the Michelin Man or Tommy Hilfiger products. This cure symbolizes her ability to save herself from the ‘logo-maze’ that threatened to erode her, as she has gained a deeper understanding of the system. Her consciousness reaches a new level. From now on, she continually works to expose, challenge, and resist the coercive system attempting to dominate her. Furthermore, of equal significance in the novel’s final scene is Cayce’s weeping ‘for her century, though whether the one past or the one present she doesn’t know’ (Gibson, 2003, p. 356).

    Resistance, though not an affect in itself, is fueled by a complex blend of emotions – frustration, anger, hope, and determination – that arise in response to the fatigue caused by speculative finance. This dual perspective, combining the affective state of speculative fatigue with the resistance that follows, highlights the transformative potential of speculative fiction. It does not simply capture the affective landscape of life within financialized systems but also weaves in acts of defiance, fueled by these very emotions. In this way, PR illustrates how resistance is both a reaction to the speculative fatigue of financial capitalism and a catalyst for imagining alternative futures.

    Thus, it is crucial to engage with speculative fiction, not merely as a realm of flying cars and futuristic gadgets, but as a toolkit for examining how speculative financial practices shape social and cultural dynamics. Speculative fiction exposes how desires, fears, and imagined futures are engineered by economic systems, while also offering a glimpse of new possibilities and forms of resistance that can disrupt and transform those systems.

    Ali Rıza Taşkale is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Social Sciences and Business at Roskilde University. Prior to joining Roskilde University, he held positions at Near East University, Northern Cyprus, and Hacettepe University, Turkey. His research has been published in journals such as Critical Studies on Security, Urban Studies, Utopian Studies, Distinktion, Thesis Eleven, Rethinking Marxism, Northern Lights, New Political Science, Contemporary Political Theory, Third Text, Theory, Culture & Society, and the Journal for Cultural Research. His book, Post-Politics in Context, was published by Routledge in 2016. He serves on the editorial board of Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, overseeing special issues and the forum exchange section and is actively engaged in a project exploring the logical and structural relationship between speculative fiction and speculative finance.

    References

    Andreasen, T. (2024). The day the music died – the waning of affect in finance fiction of the long downturn. Boundary (forthcoming)

    Brown, W. (2015). Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New York: Zone Books.

    Canavan, G. (2017). Green Planets: Ecology and Science Fiction. Wesleyan University Press.

    Chambers, A. C., & Garforth, L. (2020). Reading Science: SF and the Uses of Literature. In N. Ahuja, et al. (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Twentieth and Twenty-First Century Literature and Science (pp. xx-xx). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48244-2_14.

    Davis, A. (2018). Defining speculative value in the age of financialized capitalism. The Sociological Review, 66(1), 3-19.

    Frantzen, M. K. (2024). Making a Killing: The Birth of the Financial Thriller in the 1970s. Edinburgh: UEP. (forthcoming)

    Gibson, W. (2003). Pattern Recognition. Putnam Adult.

    Jameson, F. (1991). Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke University Press.

    Jameson, F. (2003). Fear and loathing in globalization. New Left Review, 23, 105–114.

    Nilges, M. (2019). The Realism of Speculation. CR: The New Centennial Review, 19(1), 37-59.

    Vint, S. (2021). Science Fiction. MIT Press.

     

  • Torsten Andreasen–The Day the Music Died: Finance Fiction and the Affects of the Long Downturn

    Torsten Andreasen–The Day the Music Died: Finance Fiction and the Affects of the Long Downturn

    This article was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier.

    The Day the Music Died: Finance Fiction and the Affects of the Long Downturn

    Torsten Andreasen

    All About that Base…

    Since the late 20th century, finance fiction has evolved through distinct affective phases – euphoria, schizophrenia, and resignation – both reflecting economic transformations and shaping the cultural logic of financialized capitalism. By bringing Robert Brenner’s theory of the long downturn into dialogue with Fredric Jameson’s waning affect, this article proposes a periodization of finance fiction that traces how affect mediates the contradictions of financial accumulation, not only registering crises in capitalism but also framing the ideological terms in which they are understood.

    Robert Brenner’s theory of a “long downturn” in advanced capitalist economies since 1973 and Fredric Jameson’s description of the same period as a “waning of affect” have each inspired innumerable analyses and diagnoses of late capitalist society and its cultural artefacts[1]. The theory of the long downturn grapples with enduring low industrial profit rates due to persistent overcapacity despite decreased investment in labor and equipment (Brenner 2006). The waning of affect is characteristic of postmodernism as the superstructure correlate to the base of financialized economy’s compensation for waning industrial growth  (Jameson 1991: xx-xxii): the transition from Munch’s Scream to Warhol’s Marilyn Monroe, from depth hermeneutics to simulacral surface, from a psychic experience and cultural language dominated by historical temporality to a fragmented hyper-spatiality transcending the modernist alienation of subjective anxiety and thus surpassing the capacities of the human sensorium and mutating the now ungraspable totality of the world system into impersonal schizophrenic experience.[2]

    Brenner’s long downturn and the financial bubbles and busts obfuscating it, have been analyzed and debated in minute historical detail, while Jameson’s waning of affect has been an important reference for discussion of both other affects and other kinds of waning—for example, the waning of genre. However, it is much less frequent for the two to be considered together.

    In an attempt to think through certain shifts in the historical development of cinematic and literary finance fiction, this article scrutinizes and further periodizes the waning of affect as a historical claim. It does so by considering affect in light of the long downturn, as specific affective reactions to concrete historical operations of financial capital after the post-war boom.

    The concept of affect is often employed in a somewhat vague manner. Jameson considers affect to be the interior feelings or emotional states of a historically specific subject: the bourgeois ego. Since postmodernity entails the fragmentation of the subject, there is no longer any ego to contain the emotions of old, and instead of feelings and emotions, the postmodern subject is left with free-floating and impersonal intensities.

    Holding on to Jameson’s notion of affect, I also consider a further, although more general, tradition of questioning affect: From Plato and Aristotle to Brian Massumi’s reading of Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, the question of affect has been framed as the ability to “affect and be affected”. In Plato and Aristotle, the ability (δύναμις) to affect (ποιεῖν) and be affected (παθεῖν) is a fundamental “property of being” (ἴδιον τοῦ ὄντος) (Aristotle 1960: V, IX) or of that which has “real existence” (πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι) (Plato 1921: 247 d7-23). Focusing on human existence, Spinoza was in search of “that which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many ways (ut pluribus modis possit affici), or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways (ad corpora externa pluribus modis afficiendum)” (Spinoza 2005: IV, prop. 38). Human affect, then, can be considered not so much a question of subjective or even impersonal emotion but as the ability to perceive, comprehend and react to the surrounding world: it is emotion as linked to perception, cognition, and, most importantly, agency.

    Jameson’s periodizing analysis of the waning of affect as characteristic of postmodernity reminds us that although there exists a long and varied philosophical tradition of analyzing as “affect” the ability to affect and be affected, it should not simply be read as a transhistorical subjective category, where each encounter is one of either joy or tristesse. Affect relies on historically specific material conditions, and Jameson’s argument implies that in this stage of late capitalism, the joy or tristesse of Spinoza’s encounter are displaced by euphoria and schizophrenia.

    Jameson himself defined the “ideological task” of the concept of postmodernism by referencing Raymond Williams’s concept of “structures of feeling” which, according to Williams, defines “forms and conventions in art and literature as inalienable elements of a social material process” (1977: 133) and describes how these structures constitute emergent, dominant, or residual social forms. I thus take affect to be a historically specific subjective ability to experience, feel, understand, and act within a given social material process – an ability enabled and mapped by cultural representation.

    My question is, then, whether it would be possible to consider the waning of affect as discontinuous constellations of shifting cultural dominants and their accompanying residual and emergent forms in late capitalism. I tentatively answer this question by looking at the representation of financialized affect in a selection of films and novels ostensibly about finance to distinguish various affective modes in the cultural depiction of the financier subject.[3]

    Jameson claimed that anxiety and alienation had been replaced by schizophrenia and euphoria as the two intensities available to the postmodern subject. I argue that within the cultural representation of the financier, euphoria and schizophrenia are historically separate modes, the second following the first, and both followed by a third. I thus propose to further periodize the conjecture of “waning affect” by sketching out three successive modes of perceiving, understanding, and reacting to one’s surroundings as they appear in finance fiction:

    1. “The Future’s So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades”: euphoric hubris of the 1980s.
    2. “And as Things Fell Apart…”: schizophrenic horror of the 1990s and early aughts.
    3. “The Day the Music Died”: predominant resignation after the financial crisis of 2007-2008.

    Through this periodization, I hope to analyze the cultural logic of financialized late capitalism as manifested in fictional renditions of finance in novels and movies.

    The Future’s So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades

    The financialized economy that superseded the production-based economic expansion of the postwar boom is, in Marxian terms, based on the belief that it is possible to cut out commodity production from the general formula for capital, M – C – M’, so that money is exchanged for more money with no value-adding labor required. The formula for this is M – M’, what Marx called the “most superficial and fetishized form” (Marx 1981: 515) of the capital relation, it is “fictitious capital” (1981: Chapter 25).

    The financiers in 1980s fiction all seem to subscribe to such a fantasy. Historically, this specific version of that recurring fantasy came out of the general slowdown in manufacturing profitability in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The slowdown was combatted by government facilitated debt creation – public, corporate, and private. Because of low profit rates, firms were unable to meet debt-fueled increases in demand by investing in production, and without an increase in supply prices went up (Brenner 2006: 157-159). The subsequent inflation peaked at 14.8% in March 1980, which was combatted by Fed Chair Paul Volcker by increasing the Fed funds rate to its peak of 20% in June 1981. The shift from Keynesian stimulus in the 1970s to Volcker’s monetarism at the end of the decade brought an abrupt end to subsidized demand and recession inevitably ensued.

    Wall Street had suffered during this slowdown in production, and “Between 1968 and 1975 over 150 firms were absorbed or closed” (Bruck 1988: 29). But while Volcker’s decision to fix money supply and let interest rates float inaugurated a recession in the American economy from 1979-1982, it also marked what Michael Lewis called “the beginning of the golden age of the bond man” (Lewis 1989: 43). This period saw the invention of the securitized mortgage loan and its repackaging in the so-called Collateralized Debt Obligations and “between 1977 and 1986, the holdings of mortgage bonds held by American Savings and Loans grew from 12.6 billion dollars to 150 billion dollars” (142), i.e., more than a ten-fold increase over the course of a decade.

    The early eighties also saw an explosion in Junk bonds (bonds rated below investment grade, i.e., BB+ or below) and the related debt-fueled hostile mergers and acquisitions which enabled the emergence of that crucial figure of the age: the corporate raider. This explosion in debt also drove stocks toward new highs before the crash in October 1987. The specific version of the fantasy of M – M’ which constitutes the clear cultural dominant of 1980s finance fiction should no doubt be seen in the light of this bull market run-up to the crash.

    This first stage of my proposed periodization, the stage of euphoric hubris where the future is so bright that shades are strictly necessary, is the age of what has been called the “Masters of the Universe.” The financial masters were famously described in Tom Wolfe’s Bonfire of the Vanities (1987) as the proud moniker which the protagonist, Sherman McCoy, awards himself:

    […] one fine day, in a fit of euphoria, after he had picked up the telephone and taken an order for zero-coupon bonds that had brought him a 50,000$ commission, just like that, this very phrase had bubbled up into his brain. On Wall Street he and a few others – how many? – three hundred, four hundred, five hundred? – had become precisely that… Masters of the Universe. There was… no limit whatsoever! (Wolfe 1987: 11)

    These masters were also known as Big Swinging Dicks, as famously documented in Michael Lewis’s Liar’s Poker: “If he could make millions of dollars come out of those phones, he became that most revered of all species: a Big Swinging Dick” (Lewis 1989: 56). Limitless accumulation of capital through the technologically mediated and thus seemingly immediate exchange of paper: this is the fantasy of the masters of the universe. In terms of affect, Jameson’s euphoria is clear, even explicit. The ability of the financier to immediately affect the world renders the M – M’ relation sensible as the absence of material limits. Money is transformed into more money, just like that!

    However, confronted with the stratified realms of production – the white working class (e.g., the airplane builders in Wall Street (1987) and ship builders in Pretty Woman (1990)) and racialized precarious labor (e.g., Eddie Murphy’s character Billy Ray Valentine in Trading Places (1983) and the depictions of Harlem and the Bronx in Bonfire) – these masters are generally depicted as incorporations of hubris. They are figures of Icarus who, in their euphoria, fly too close to the sun and fall as a result of their moral transgressions.

    The immediate expansion of finance capital via M – M’ as cultural dominant is accompanied by the residual forms of the manufacturing sector, presented as the sound but betrayed foundation of the American economy. The machine maintenance workers of Bluestar Airlines in Oliver Stone’s Wall Street are the salt of the earth betrayed by the soaring immoral greed of Gordon Gekko and his protégé Bud Fox. When Bud’s analyses of publicly available stock data find little demand in his one-shot ideas pitch to Gekko, he proposes the airline in which his father is a machinist and union representative. His insider’s knowledge of the company’s troubled financial situation enables him to argue that there is money to be made if the unions agree to a 20% salary cut to be reversed if the company turns a profit. Gekko pretends to go along but in fact intends to break up the company, sell the parts, and siphon off the surplus in the pension fund.

    As has been pointed out by Leigh Claire La Berge (La Berge 2015: 99), Bud is caught between his two fathers, the two ideals: on the one hand, the corporate raider for whom “Greed is good” and who clearly states “I create nothing; I own” and, on the other, the honest hard-working man who advises his son to “stop trading for the quick buck and go produce something with your life, create, don’t live off the buying and selling of others…”

    The two confronting ideals are narratively deployed to organize a moral showdown between labor and predatory ownership, between “the real economy” and “fictitious capital”, between a post-war production economy and the financial “zero sum game” where “Money itself isn’t lost or made, it’s simply transferred from one perception to another. Like magic. […] The illusion has become real”, as Gekko puts it.

    Wall Street and other finance fiction of the 1980s condemn finance in moral terms: the immorality of finance is to claim the reality of financial illusion, a claim rendered dubious in the film’s staging of the ideological confrontation between Gekko and Fox. During their heated exchange, the camera swivels restlessly around the two interlocutors, almost desperately avoiding a steady shot. But exactly at the transition from Gekko’s “I create nothing” to “I own”, the camera finally rests on Gekko in a satisfied pose, drink in hand, and New York skyscrapers as a backdrop. That brief image of capital’s self-satisfaction is only disturbed by the worker on a lift outside the building, cleaning the windows with long strokes from top to bottom.

    Gekko’s demonstrative pose as master of the universe is only minimally tainted by the slow movement of manual labor. I disagree, here, with La Berge’s description of the window cleaner as an evocation of “cleansing” (110). I would argue, rather, that he is an almost comical stain on the fantasy of frictionless transition of money from illusion to reality. Even in the most glorious image of the dominance of finance capital, the residual head of manual labor pops into the frame and by the strokes of its servicing hands discretely insists on labor as the inescapable material reality behind financial euphoria.

    A similar confrontation between the dominant fantasy of financial profit without cumbersome labor and the residual postwar ethos of a production-driven economic expansion appears in Pretty Woman where the corporate raider Edward Lewis is brought onto a more virtuous path by a sex worker with a heart of gold. The movie presents several forms of labor: the sex work of Vivian and her friend Kit, the corporate raiding of Edward and his icky lawyer Stucky, the service work of the hotel manager Barnard, the Rodeo Drive saleswomen, other service workers, and, finally, the family founders of the shipbuilding Morse Industries.

    Although the movie hints at the troubles of sex work by briefly mentioning the death of Skinny Marie (who Kit repeatedly dismisses as a flake and a crack head who is thus not worthy of Vivian’s “Cinder-fucking-ella”-like social ascent), the material conditions that constitute such work are quickly occluded by the question of inner subjective nobility predetermining social destiny. Because Vivian flosses her teeth and weeps with emotion at the opera, she proves a true princess who should, surely, be rewarded with a true prince protruding from a limousine sunroof, that preferred steed of budding financial royalty.

    Pretty Woman’s particular rendition of several age-old narrative schemata (e.g., Cinderella and Pygmalion) gets historically specific, however, when depicting the two mutually constitutive transformations in Vivian and Edward. In the opening scene, midway upon the journey of his life, Edward finds himself without a straightforward pathway. Lost in a Lotus, descending into the inferno of Hollywood Boulevard, Edward encounters real-world wisdom and grace united in the form of Vivian. The financier in the penthouse suite whose vertigo announces his inability to confront the material conditions of his social status is brought out of the euphoric hubris of his station by the straightforward humanity and nobility of the sex worker. The nobility of physical labor enables him to realize the ignominy of the M – M’ fantasy. As he says to Stucky: “We don’t build anything, Phil. We don’t make anything.”

    Instead of buying Morse Enterprises to break the company apart and sell the pieces in a replica of Gekko’s plan for Bluestar, Edward decides to invest in the company’s production: “Mr. Lewis and I are going to build ships together. Great big ships” as Mr. Morse says, thus providing Edward with a new and more benevolent father of industrial production than the one of inherited wealth who divorced his music teacher mother and thereby drove Edward towards the immoral quest of corporate raiding – a quest initiated by taking over and splitting up his father’s company in a fit of oedipal frenzy.[4]

    While Edward is obviously the knight in suit and shining armor, Stucky is the villain, insisting on maximizing profits through corporate raiding and even venting his frustrations with Edward’s newfound nobility by violating its source, Vivian, who, as a sex worker, is supposedly obliged to obey the proposition of an impromptu stint of wage labor. But the villainy of Stucky is the very condition of possibility of Edward’s nobility, just as Vivian’s nobility rests on the backdrop of a dead Skinny Marie. Only because the raw greed and dirty business tricks have been outsourced to Stucky – “That’s why I hired you, Phil, to do my worrying for me” – can Edward maintain the shine of his armor, and only because of the crackhead flakyness of certain colleagues can Vivian’s nobility stand out enough for her to ascend beyond her station and, from there, engage in the benevolent financing of Kit’s education. Carved of less noble wood than Vivian, Kit needs a philanthropic push from those of natural worth to work her way towards middle class respectability while Vivian takes the express elevator straight to the penthouse.

    The problem with this plot where innate moral nobility redirects the dominant 1980s fantasy of M – M’ back towards the residual M – C – M’ of a supposedly healthy and noble postwar industrial economy, is that such a turn enacts an ideological intervention in the historical causality of capital. Contrary to the movie’s claims, a return to an earlier era of production is not a question of morals. The laws of capital demand profit and you can neither morally nor magically restore the profitability of the manufacturing sector.

    The residual aspect of Pretty Woman does not solely spring from its fairy tale plot, then, but from the persistence of a postwar ethos of production as a valid response to the beginning cracks in the 1980s fantasy of finance, cracks that became exceedingly manifest on October 19, 1987, the day of the so-called Black Monday stock crash. The depiction of finance as moral corruption is a very real “imaginary resolution of […] objective contradictions” (Jameson 1981: 118). Pretty Woman and its contemporaries thus provide a residual affective response to the failing affective dominant of the 1980s. It is not simply a nostalgia for the good old days, but the claim that only the immorality of a few Gekko’s and Stucky’s inhibit the restoration of the supposedly more sustainable and more noble character of production and honest labor. The failure of this residual affect of the post-war boom to actually and not just imaginarily resolve the failing affect of euphoria becomes the main problem in my two subsequent periods.

    And as Things Fell Apart…

    Something emerged in the cultural representations of finance in the beginning of the 1990s. A new threat of a schizophrenic disintegration of signifying surfaces seems to accompany a shift in the cultural perception of the financial sector after the Black Monday stock crash on October 19, 1987. The bull market of 1981-1987 came abruptly to a halt, and what could, in relation to the crash, be considered the euphoric hubris of Wall Street traders bound to fail and fall soon turned out to be a systemic negation of reality.

    Along with the authorities in other countries, e.g., Japan, the US Fed decided to alleviate the collapse in equity prices by cutting interest rates. Volcker’s successor as chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, slashed short term interest rates to zero between 1990 and 1993 to help the market and it was widely believed that, as Robert Brenner’s critical account of this time would have it, “the stock market would never be allowed to drop too severely, and the bull run continued” (Brenner 2000: 16). Nobel Prize-winning economist Rudiger Dornbusch expressed the belief clearly in 1998: “This expansion will run forever” (Dornbusch 1998). Brenner more pertinently described the asset-price run-up in the late 1990s as a stock market “climbing skyward without a ladder” (Brenner 2009: 21).

    Further, the recession of 2000-2002, i.e. the bursting of the dot.com-bubble, was quickly followed by yet another ladder-less climb, this time in bonds. Driven by an initially low interest rate and the explosion of subprime loans, another bubble violently separating the financial sector from its material underpinnings was underway and about to finally burst both the euphoric fantasy of the 1980s and its haunted schizophrenic counterpart in the 1990s and early aughts.

    The year after Pretty Woman attempted to save financial capital from euphoric hubris by insisting on the possibility of profitable investment in manufacturing, Brett Easton Ellis’ American Psycho (1991) introduced a new cultural response to the market’s systemic negation of reality by exhibiting the collapse of fantasy into horror. As a chapter title announces, the novel stages the “End of the 1980s”. With the rambling confessions of the investment banker Patrick Bateman – the next generation financier, who is neither a new Master of the Universe “with a taste for human flesh”, as one commentator would have it[5], nor much of a master at all – we have gone from the dominant hubris of 1980s financial euphoria accompanied by industrial production as its residual moral counterpart to the dominant schizophrenic dissolution of the financier subject: “my depersonalization was so intense … I was simply imitating reality, a rough resemblance of a human being …” (Ellis 1992: 282).

    In American Psycho, euphoric hubris joins the remnants of the industrial expansion as the residual affective forms accompanying dominant schizophrenic horror. The fantasy of a world of financial signs with immense exchange value but very little material reality behind them to limit their instantaneous circulation has begun to crack and fragment its correlated subjective form: “There wasn’t a clear, identifiable emotion within me, except for greed and, possibly, total disgust” (282).

    These schizophrenic intensities of the pleasure principle with no reality in sight are manifested in the main formal characteristic of American Psycho which is repetition standing in for plot: The enumeration of brands, the more or less heated arguments about table reservations, the inability of anyone to recognize anyone else, the renting and returning of video tapes, the frantic and senseless cash withdrawals from ATMs, and, of course, the forced iterations of physical violence desperately exploring new extremes to escape the dullness of the very repetitions to which they contribute.

    The bourgeois ego that reached its limit in the greed of Gekko and Stucky but retained a certain affective capacity for shame or remorse in Bud Fox, Sherman McCoy, and Edward Lewis, has now fallen apart and been reduced to a narrative structure with “… no catharsis. I gain no deeper knowledge about myself, no new understanding can be extracted from my telling. There has been no reason for me to tell you any of this. This confession has meant nothing” (388).

    Nothing is to be learned, nothing to be gained, and the bizarre, automated telling machine convincingly described by La Berge (2014: 133-138) has no point but its own continuation: “I just want to… […] keep the game going” (Ellis 1992: 394). The Automated Telling Machine seems to be a ploy to render the reader just as empty and numb as its narrator: “expecting a heart, but there is nothing there, not even a beat” (116). The listing of brand names and consumables almost challenges the reader to not skim or skip ahead, just as the violence constantly probes whether the reader maintains the ability to be affected. The purpose of this, of course, is the interpellation of any unaffected reader as the hypocritical semblable of the narrator.

    La Berge argues that “American Psycho destroys the very genre that it creates” (La Berge 2014: 113). If genre, as Lauren Berlant would have it, provides “an affective expectation of the experience of watching something unfold” (Berlant 2011: 6), the novel’s destruction of genre consists in the extensive use of repetition in lieu of plot to numb the reader’s sensorium so that, indeed, no hope of unfolding is possible for those who enter. Joshua Clover observes: “Narrative requires motion and change, not simple replenishment; motion and change are exactly what constitute the general formula [of capital]. Implied in M-C-M’ … is not simply change and motion but expansion beyond any limit …” (Clover 2011: 36). For Bateman, there is no possible catharsis, no possible development or systemic expansion, just the eternal continuation of the same game.

    That plot development and economic expansion are both residual expectations haunting the dominant psychosis of a 1990s and early aughts bull markets with extremely distant material underpinnings is not just characteristic of American Psycho but can be read as part of a wider tendency. While the big swinging dicks of the eighties tried and failed to master the universe – they flew too close to the sun and got burnt – Bateman’s generation is frantically trying to navigate the financial imaginary in a world of signs increasingly haunted by their negated material referent.[6] Bateman’s killing spree is an attempt to break out of this postmodern Platonic cave, not to touch the sun but to reach the sunlight of actual reality.

    If American Psycho is the first clear manifestation of this period of schizophrenic affect, Don DeLillo’s Cosmopolis (2003) can be read as its culmination. While American Psycho was an explicit step beyond Bonfire, Cosmopolis is, in many ways, a clear continuation of American Psycho. After having his Rolex stolen at gunpoint as revenge for one of his murders, and he sobbingly expresses his humble desire to “keep the game going”, Bateman is presented with an injunction: “As I stand, frozen in position, an old woman emerges behind a Threepenny Opera poster at a deserted bus stop and she’s homeless and begging, hobbling over, her face covered with sores that look like bugs, holding out a shaking red hand. “Oh will you please go away?” I sigh. She tells me to get a haircut” (Ellis 1991: 394).

    Along with an inexplicably mounting yen, this task provides the central plot device in Cosmopolis.

    The financier Eric Packer rides around in his limousine manifestation of the Big Swinging Dick fantasy of an immaterial connection to the market and the future as such: pure M – M’. The limousine is, however, also the vehicle bringing him to the goal of the day: a haircut – a financial term meaning the reduction in a given asset’s value, as compared to market value, when it is used as collateral for a loan. But in this case, Packer literally wants a haircut from his old family barber, Anthony, who knew his father and gave him his very first haircut. Of course, Packer is unable to go through with this emotional confrontation with his past and leaves in the middle of the haircut.

    Here, the limousine is far from Edward’s princely steed in Pretty Woman. It is now the postmodern Platonic cave on wheels, an immaterial fantasy connected to material reality via screens and data.

    Material and emotional reality is the weak residual expectation or goal haunting the fantasy of high finance. Through the limousine sunroof, Packer contemplates an urban scene, focusing on the bank towers a bit further away: “They were the end of the outside world. They weren’t here, exactly. They were in the future, a time beyond geography and touchable money and the people who stack and count it” (DeLillo 2003: 36). They are so abstract that he must concentrate to see them. The material world becomes the disturbing veil through which to glimpse the abstraction of something purer. But the abstraction of the “pure spectacle, or information made sacred, ritually unreadable” (80) holds its own haunting. Not just the difficulty of focusing on the abstraction of information through the materiality of the bank towers, but also the inability of the abstraction of the market to encompass concrete life and death: “People will not die … People will be absorbed in streams of information” (104). But when confronted with the televised images of a man in flames, reality beyond financial signifiers crack the surface of the spectacle of the market: “The market was not total. It could not claim this man or assimilate his act. Not such starkness and horror. This was a thing outside its reach” (99-100).

    Packer’s asymmetrical prostate is the subjective, physiological counterpart of what cannot be assimilated by data and should therefore, according to his doctor, be allowed to “express itself”. This becomes the ethos of a financier staring at the impossible soaring of the yen on which his fortune depends. This subjective expression of objective contradictions – in this case the soaring yen as well as generalized misery and numerous deaths (real, fake, and threatened) – plays out in a realm of surfaces with no material backing. Like American Psycho, this is formally manifested through repetition: Finance requires a new theory of time to understand the repeated temporal glitches of the limousine security camera and television screens, where the mediated events often precede their actual occurrence; Packer has multiple chance encounters with and misrecognitions of his wife, recalling the misrecognitions in America Psycho; the semiotic construction of reality is explicitly questioned by the repeated claims of the referential obsolescence of words, objects, and subjects.

    This problem of referentiality comes down to what Packer’s Chief of Theory terms “an aesthetics of interaction” (86) charting what Packer describes as a “… common surface, an affinity between market movements and the natural world” (86). This is the affinity that no longer applies. The yen soars skyward without a ladder and things no longer chart. The “new and fluid reality” (83) of cyber-capital is money “talking to itself” (77) and “lines of code that interact in simulated space” (124). And the subject desiring a realm of pure information excluding subjective agency, this self-contradiction, finally expresses itself in a longing for action[7]: “He was alert, eager for action, for resolution. Something had to happen soon, a dispelling of doubt and the emergence of some design, the subject’s plan of action, visible and distinct” (171-172). A subject’s plan of action which in this period leads only to death, but which, soon, will lead nowhere.

    The Day the Music Died

    In the 1980s, dominant euphoric hubris was accompanied by a residual belief in the continued viability of an industrial economic expansion. The resulting moral indictment of financial fantasy – the belief in production as the true driver of economic expansion itself becoming a driver of narrative development – however, soon disintegrated into the formal repetitions of schizophrenic horror during the 1990s and early aughts. Those formal repetitions were haunted by the failure of the residual expectations of plot development and economic expansion, no longer present to restore the balance and bring Icarus to justice. The falls of Icarus – first, from the penthouse to jail and, next, the quest for reality disintegrating into death – were both historically separate versions of “the feeling of M – M’, haunted by the C to come” (Clover 2011: 46). In the 1980s, the fantasy of M – M’ was haunted by the crisis of profitability in manufacturing, i.e. in the sphere of production, while, in the subsequent period, it was haunted by the circulation and consumption of commodities as empty signifiers and immaterial data. In my final period, post-crisis resignation can be described as the affective correlate of the reassertion of the economic law of value: “The law of value asserted itself with savage clarity, fictitious capital was destroyed, jobs were annihilated, exported immiseration refluxing toward the economic cores” (Clover 2012b: 113). As the profits of a hoped-for future production proved absent, the temporal fix collapsed in an instant and the spatial fix returned only misery.

    There is a vast archive of narrative fiction representing the resignation of the post-crisis financier and questioning the narrative structuring of the financial economy through plot: Sebastian Faulks’ A Week in December (2009), Jonathan Dee’s The Privileges (2010), Adam Haslett’s Union Atlantic (2010), Justin Cartwright’s Other People’s Money (2011), John Lanchester’s Capital (2012), Zia Haider Rahman’s In the Light of What We Know (2014), Adam McKay’s movie The Big Short (2015), Paul Murray’s The Mark and the Void (2015), and Gary Shteyngart’s Lake Success (2018) all stage financiers, nostalgically longing for lived reality, and a financial profession no longer understanding what it is doing or why it is doing it.

    Murderous horror in the quest for reality has been replaced by the longing for simple things like childhood memories, romance without consideration for social status, a sense of control of one’s destiny, a sense of nation, a sense of family… It is the hope to be delivered from abstraction while resigning to the acknowledgement that reality is not readily available. The hubris of finance remains as a residual affect but without the euphoria, i.e., only in the form of explicit renunciation of sensible reality and emotional ties in favor of a focus on the numbers and the ensuing profit – without desire, horror, or haunting. The dominant affect is therefore, quite clearly, resignation. 

    In J. C. Chandor’s movie Margin Call (2011), Jeremy Irons’ diabolic CEO, John Tuld – a less than subtle reference to Lehman CEO Dick Fuld – clearly states the dominant affect: “I am here for one reason and one reason alone. I am here to guess what the music might do a week, a month, a year from now. That’s it, nothing more. Standing here tonight, I am afraid that I don’t hear a thing. Just silence.”

    It is the day the music finally died. The movie opens with layoffs at a large investment bank. Leading risk analyst Eric Dale is fired but, just before leaving, he hands a yet to be resolved riddle to junior risk analyst Peter Sullivan. Peter cracks it and communicates the extreme danger of the company’s current overleveraged position to higher management. This opening establishes the “epistemological distance between the players and the rest of the world” (Clover 2012a: 8) where a couple of risk analysists and higher management alone know what the markets would inevitably soon learn in the form of the 2008 crash. This epistemological distance structures both the staged separation of those who know from those who do not and the plot’s development toward dumping toxic assets onto an unknowing market at the price of annihilating all trust between trading partners and thereby ending the trader’s professional futures.

    The epistemological distance clearly operates as an aesthetic instrument. While scrutinizing the numbers, Peter is acoustically cut off from the surrounding office space by his earbuds and, visually, by the illuminated screen against the darkened offices. The city is present merely as indistinct lights beyond soundproof windows. Even when Peter and his fellow analyst Seth go out to retrieve Eric, the fired source of knowledge who is nowhere to be found, the passing urban scenery is perceived as vague and hazy shapes beyond the windows of a chauffeured car. Only after dawn, when they finally find Eric and the epistemological distance is about to vanish, the world becomes distinguishable when perceived from an open convertible.

    In this narrative, as in this final phase of my periodization more generally, the fundamental opposition is not between financial cynicism and the production economy but, as pointed out by Clover, between the greedy cynicism of management and the morally pure calculations of the analysts. The “ideological payload” is “precisely the proposition that quantification is not itself a problem: quantification is on no one’s side; the risk is in its misuse” (8). The hunt for the lost risk analyst is explicitly a matter of information control, but it also obviously implies that the party could have continued were it not for a new kind of hubris: this time, not the renunciation of the “sound” production economy, but of the “sound” and risk-controlled mathematical foundation of the financial system.

    Although pure mathematics is the new position from which to launch the moral indictment of financial greed – a greed incorporated by Tuld who shrugs at the repeated financial crises: “It’s all just the same thing over and over; we can’t help ourselves” – the residual affect of the production economy persists. When they finally locate Eric, he continues the tradition from Edward’s “We don’t build anything, Phil. We don’t make anything” in Pretty Woman and Gekko’s “I create nothing; I own” in Wall Street: “Do you know I built a bridge once? … I was an engineer by trade.” After a lengthy calculation, he concludes: “[t]hat one little bridge has saved the people of those communities a combined 1,531 years of their lives not wasted in a fucking car.” The affect of the production economy persists, though no longer as a salute to honest and noble industrialized labor but as a means to optimize the productivity of human capital. The difference between these two perspectives on “building” – the difference between Pretty Woman’s Edward and Margin Call’s Eric Dale – is the one expressed by the transformation of Dolly Parton’s canonical song “9 to 5” (1980) from a 1980s lament of poorly waged and little-credited office work to a post-crisis advertisement jingle, “5 to 9” (2021), about the realization of human capital as the goal and meaning of life. 

    The dominant cultural affect in Margin Call and, indeed the whole period, however, remains resignation. At the end of the movie, the traders are paid to destroy their future ability to trade ever again by dumping worthless assets, i.e., they cut their relations to the market, their ability to affect and be affected by it. The traders lose their relation to the market, while others keep that relation but lose their personal, emotional ties. Head of Sales and Trading, Sam Rogers, is finally kept on at the company, paid to ignore his moral disgust with his own complicity. In the beginning, while preparing a pep talk for his traders about to be laid off, he is in tears, not in solidarity with his employees, but at the news of his dog’s terminal illness. At the end, after the liquidation of toxic assets, the firing of the remaining employees, and the collapse of the epistemological distance under the general market crash, after accepting management’s money offer to ignore his own inclinations and keep the game going, we find him digging the dog’s grave in his garden – the sounds of the digging continuing into the end credits.

    This is the end…

    By pairing it with Brenner’s long downturn, Jameson’s waning of affect can thus, I argue, be further periodized as a number of emergent and residual forms interacting in finance fiction from the 1980s until today. The emergence of the master of the universe during the run-up to the 1987 crash carried with it a residual faith in the continued viability of the post-war industrial boom and the related moral indictment of fictitious capital’s promise of economic expansion without manufacturing and thus without a certain exploitative societal distribution of wealth through wage labor.

    In the 1990s and early aughts, the residual affective structure of noble industrial labor and its moral condemnation of the dominant euphoric hubris gave way to on a dominant affect of schizophrenic horror, fragmenting the subject and the ability of language to index reality. The residual structure, here, seemed less the nobility of labor and commodity production to sustain M – C – M’ but the circulation and consumption of commodities as empty signs and dubious data, exchange value without use value. The music had seemingly lost its base. Where, in the 1980s, the financier tended to end up in jail, he now surrendered himself to death and destruction, the absence of exit from haunted existence forcing an eternal repetition of violence, both exuberant in its transgressions and desperate for its own end.

    As the haunted system crashed spectacularly during the financial crisis of 2007-2008, resignation emerged as the new dominant affective mode. Whether giving up on the illusion of financial mastery to recover a sense of control by retreating to personal emotional bonds or by giving up on emotional contact altogether to sustain the residual fantasy of self-sufficient financial products, resignation has become unavoidable. ‘Your money or your life’ is, indeed, the fundamental ultimatum of post-crisis finance fiction.

    In a certain way, the masters of the universe subscribed to Marx’s ironic description of money from 1844: “The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. … Do not I, who thanks to money am capable of all that the human heart longs for, possess all human capacities?” (Marx 1970: 324). But the master financier only considered one side of the coin, as it were. Marx continued: “If money is the bond binding me to human life, binding society to me, … [i]s it not, therefore, also the universal agent of separation?” (324).

    The schizophrenic experience springs from the beginning realization in the finance fiction of the 1990s and early aughts that the problem of finance is not reducible to the pursuit of money by immoral means but, rather, that “[m]oney is the alienated ability of mankind”, that money turns ability “into its contrary” and operates as the “distorting power against the individual and against the bonds of society …” which “confounds and confuses all things” (325). The meaningless repetitions and repeated meaningless violence constitute the attempt to either end or transcend a world that has revealed itself as “the fraternization of impossibilities” (325).

    Post-crisis resignation, then, poses the question of the possibility for a financialized “relationship to the world to be a human one” (326). The financier either attempts to abandon the exchange of paper to “exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc.” (326), or he abandons love and material reality in favor of the magical self-sufficient power of money. These two forms of resignation are not the first glimpse of a future after capital, however. What was in the 1990s the schizophrenic ambivalence – the search for the exit and hope for the game to continue – has now been separated as two distinct forms of resignation, two roads – your life or your money – both leading nowhere.

    However, Marx’s analysis of money progressed from a question of the human relationship between subject and world – where the alienating mediation of money is vanquished by love, trust etc. evenly given and received – toward an analysis where money is an expression of value within capitalist social relations. Similarly, the analysis presented here of the varying degrees of universal mastery wielded by the financier subject should progress toward not simply other subjective forms than the financier – those excluded from the narrative or forced into the background on the basis of race, class, or gender as conditions of possibility for the affect of the financial agent – but toward a questioning of the insistence of finance fiction to engage with finance in terms of subjectivity, thus occluding the analysis of the impersonal structural violence operated by financial capitalism. The purpose of the analysis is therefore not just to propose a periodization of financial affect but to lay the groundwork for a further study of the ideological operations of finance fiction, which, by various imaginary resolutions of objective contradictions, tend to limit our critical scope. Immoral hubris, schizophrenic horror, or the resignation of lost illusions all partake in the same ideological claim: that the problem is caused by our errant subjective agencies within the world of capital and not by the capitalist mode of production as such. The different phases of waning affect within finance fiction are active responses to a failing fantasy, a fantasy that survives in residual forms to this day. I have tried to present the phases as historically specific affective relations to developments within capital accumulation, but the goal must be to go beyond the crises of subjective fantasy and seek an active response to the failing self-reproduction of capitalist social relations which, along with its fantasies, deserve to be laid to rest.

    Torsten Andreasen’s work currently focuses on the periodization of the correlation between culture and financial capital since 1980.

    Works cited

    Aristotle. “Topica.” In Posterior Analytics. Topica. Translated by E. S. Forster, and Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.

    Arrighi, Giovanni. The Long Twentieth Century. London & New York: 1994.

    Berlant, Lauren. Cruel Optimism. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011.

    Brenner, Robert. “The Boom and the Bubble”. In New Left Review, no. 6 (Nov Dec 2000): 5-43).

    Brenner, Robert. Economics of Global Turbulence – The Advanced Capitalist Economies from long Boom to long Downturn, 1945-2005. London & New York: Verso, 2006.

    Brenner, Robert. “What Is Good for Goldman Sachs Is Good for America: The Origins of the Current Crisis,” April 2009, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/cstch/papers/BrennerCrisisTodayOctober2009.pdf.

    Bruck, Connie. The Predators’ Ball: the Junk-Bond Raiders and the Man Who Staked Them. New York: The American Lawyer, 1988.

    Cartwright, Justin. Other People’s Money. London: Bloomsbury, 2011.

    Clover, Joshua. “Autumn of the System: Poetry and Financial Capital.” Journal of narrative theory 41, no. 1 (April 1, 2011): 34–52.

    Clover, Joshua. “Playing by the numbers.” Film Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Spring 2012a), pp. 7-9.

    Clover, Joshua. “Value | Theory | Crisis.” PMLA 127, no. 1 (2012b): 107–114.

    Clover, Joshua. “Crisis.” Pendakis, Andrew, Imre Szeman, and Jeff Diamanti (eds). The Bloomsbury Companion to Marx. London: Bloomsbury, 2018.

    De Boever, Arne. Finance Fictions – Realism and Psychosis in a Time of Economic Crisis. New York: Fordham University Press, 2018.

    Dee, Jonathan. The Privileges. New York: Random House, 2010.

    DeLillo, Don. Cosmopolis. New York: Picador, 2003.

    Dornbusch, Rudiger. “Growth Forever,” Wall Street Journal (30 July, 1998).

    Ellis, Bret Easton. American Psycho. London: Picador, 1992.

    Faulks, Sebastian. A Week in December. London: Hutchinson, 2009.

    Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Cambridge, Ma.: Blackwell, 1990.

    Haslett, Adam. Union Atlantic. London: Tuskar Rock Press, 2010.

    Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious – Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981.

    Jameson, Fredric. “Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” New Left Review, no. 146 (July-August, 1984): 59-92.

    Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. London & New York: Verso, 1991.

    Jameson, Fredric. “Culture and Finance Capital.” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 246-265.

    Jameson, Fredric. “The Aesthetics of Singularity.” New Left Review, 92 (March-April, 2015), pp. 101-132.

    La Berge, Leigh Claire. Scandals and Abstraction: Financial Fiction of the Long 1980s. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

    Lanchester, John. Capital. London: Faber and Faber, 2012.

    Lewis, Michael. Liar’s Poker. New York: Norton, 1989.

    Mandel, Ernest. Late Capitalism. London & New York: Verso, 1978.

    Marx, Karl. “The Power of Money” in Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 3, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970.

    Marx, Karl. Capital vol 3. London: Penguin, 1981.

    Murray, Paul. The Mark and the Void. London: Penguin, 2015. Apple Books.

    McClanahan, Annie: Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, and Twenty-First-Century Culture. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 2017.

    Plato. “Sophist.” In Theaetetus. Sophist. Translated by Harold North Fowler. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921.

    Rahman, Zia Haider. In the Light of What We Know. London: Picador, 2014.

    Spinoza, Baruch de. Ethics. Translated by Edwin Curley. New York: Penguin Classics, 2005.

    Shteyngart, Gary. Lake Success. New York: Random House, 2018.

    Williams, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

    Wolfe, Tom. The Bonfire of the Vanities. New York: Picador, 1987.

    [1]  Jameson bases his economic periodization of the waning of affect on Ernest Mandel’s Late Capitalism (1978). However, in later engagements with finance capital (Jameson 1997; 2015), he turns to Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century (1994).

    [2]  See Jameson (1984) and (1991: chapter 1).

    [3] This financier protagonist of finance fiction is predominantly white and male, a dominance only partially challenged in the last of the three phases that I intend to lay out. I hope to present a study of those occluded from the both economic and narrative universe of the financial masters in a later publication.  

    [4] It should be noted here, that both Wall Street and Pretty Woman associate what they consider the morally sound capitalism of industrial production with international transportation: airplanes and ships, the essential foundation for the “spatial fix” of globalization. David Harvey famously argued that the fading postwar boom sought a “spatial fix”, i.e., the inclusion of new and geographically dispersed markets and labor forces in the capitalist system. The spatial fix of globalization, however, required a further temporal fix in the form of financialization, defined as “capital that has a nominal money value and paper existence, but which at a given moment in time has no backing in terms of real productive activity or physical assets as collateral” (Harvey 1990: 182). As formulated by Annie McClanahan: “it allows capital to treat an anticipated realization of value as if it has already happened. … financialization allowed capitalism to supplement the declining profitability of investment in present production with money borrowed from the profits of a hoped-for future production” (McClanahan 2017: 13). By morally contrasting the means of international transportation and trade with the immorality of finance, the two films almost seem to propose that the spatial fix will be sufficient for sustainable economic expansion and that the “temporal fix” of finance is but immoral exuberance. That the spatial fix is necessarily linked to the colonial enterprise and war effort of empire is only hinted at by Morse Industries’ potential contract to build destroyers for the Navy.

    [5]  Quoted in (La Berge 2014: 130).

    [6]  A similar development can be seen in the use of Talking Heads songs in Wall Street and American Psycho, respectively. In Wall Street, the decoration of Bud Fox’s new apartment is accompanied by the Talking Heads song “This must be the place”, whereas American Psycho opens, as mentioned with “and as things fell apart / Nobody paid much attention” from the songs “Flowers” about the inability to live in a new paradise, where consumer society is covered in flowers. The last words of the song: “Don’t leave me stranded here / I can’t get used to this lifestyle.”

    [7]  Arne De Boever argues that “Packer, throughout the novel, seems to be in search of such threats and their potentially fatal consequences in a desperate attempt to encounter something – anything – real” (De Boever 2018: 2). The same applies to Bateman, though both characters also share a desire to perpetuate the game—one within the realm of simulacral surfaces, the other within pure information.

  • Naveeda Khan, Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury, and Shrobona Shafique Dipti–Shomonnoyok or Who Wants to be a Student Leader?

    Naveeda Khan, Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury, and Shrobona Shafique Dipti–Shomonnoyok or Who Wants to be a Student Leader?

    ©Mashruk Ahmed

    This post is Part Two of “The Bangladesh Chapter” of the b2o review’s “The University in Turmoil: Global Perspectives” dossier.

    Shomonnoyok or Who Wants to Be a Student Leader?

    Naveeda Khan, Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury, and Shrobona Shafique Dipti

    On July 26, 2024, the police in Dhaka city picked up three students by the names of Nahid Islam, Abu Baker Majumdar and Asif Mahmud. Over the next two day, three more students were taken into custody: Sarjis Alam, Hasnat Abdullah, and–the only woman in the initial group–Nusrat Tabassum. The 2024 Quota Reform Movement had already turned violent by this time: the Awami League’s student organization had begun beating the protestors; the police had fired on unarmed crowds; and some in the public had retaliated by burning government buildings and infrastructure.

    This instance of the police detaining students had broader consequences. It had broader consequences because by taking in specific students the Sheikh Hasina government was for the first time acknowledging that the movement was not just composed of innocent (read “ignorant”) students being manipulated by anti-state agitators; it was after all an organized effort led by the students themselves. The government could not help but identify several students as leaders of the movement simply by picking them up, supposedly for their own protection. Among these student leaders, Nahid Islam had already been picked up earlier and beaten, no doubt because he was most visible in the media. But this group sweep suggested that the Awami League government felt they had identified and seized the most influential of the student leaders, without whom the protests would surely come to a halt. This action repeated the strategy of the government during the 2018 Quota Movement when several key leaders were taken into custody by the detective branch of the police to break the movement.

    This performance of concern for the student leaders—they weren’t being arrested; they were being taken into protective custody—was also violent in a psychological sense as it forced the six students to partake in televised displays of their cordial relations with the police. They were filmed sharing a meal with their captors. For many, the scene of the students gathered in the main detective branch of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police to take a meal with the notorious chief of the branch, Harun-ur Rashid (also referred to as DB Harun), evoked many earlier scenes. In them DB Harun was shown on television to be breaking bread with those he had picked up without warrant and, one heard, was mistreating, if not torturing, sometimes before these tablemates were permanently “disappeared.” There was a macabre humor to the students being feted in what had come to be referred to as “Harun’s Rice Hotel” (“Haruner Bhater Hotel”).

    ©Shrobona Shafique Dipti, graffiti at Dhaka University of the six students in custody.

    Under ordinary circumstances, the leaders appearing on television, being made to read out a statement calling off the movement, would have marked the end of the student action, cut off at the head, with viewers savoring the forced jollity of condemned prisoners partaking of a last meal. But not this time. Not only did viewers balk at this effort to quell a movement by excising the efforts of the young, but the other students also watching the television performance rejected the statement to call off the movement and openly repudiated the leadership of the six.

    The act of seeking out and gathering student coordinators in the police station marked a moment of failed recognition by the government. It failed to recognize that the category of the student coordinator, the self-named shomonnoyok, well exceeded the six who had been picked up, having evolved into a generic category to include anyone willing to take up the reins of organization as befitting the decentralized nature of the movement. True to form, the extorted call to end the protests was answered by other self-proclaimed shomonnoyoks vowing to continue the protests regardless. Many shomonnoyoks in cities such as Chittagong and Rangpur, previously unknown to the public, came to dominate the TV screens and front pages of the newspapers, marking the proliferating lines of the movement in towns and cities outside of the capital.

    A precursor to such organizing was the 2018 Road Safety Movement, which had followed the first Quota Movement of 2018. This had been initiated by schoolchildren, who had concluded that their erstwhile pleadings with the government to make roads safe for the young would go unheard. The young protestors had unintentionally adopted a decentralized mode of gathering, shouting slogans such as “neta hotey ashi nain” (“We have not come to be leaders”), only to be met with violence. Perhaps, the decentralized nature of organizing by the current shomonnoyoks was informed by that earlier movement. Undoubtedly many of the school children involved in it were now of age to participate in the 2024 Quota Movement. They likely drew upon their past practices and encounters with the state and violent memories of that past to fuel their mobilization in the present. Or perhaps it was just the call of the hour; the 2024 movement had come too far and reached too deeply into the conscience of Bangladeshi society for it to falter on a statement made clearly under duress by the six shomonnoyoks in the police station. “Bhoi kete giyeche,” “Fear has gone.” The fear that had once tempered protests and empowered the regime had given way.

    While a message was shared widely across social media clarifying that students were to offer themselves as mere coordinators and not take on the mantle of leaders, it is not clear by what modality any decision on this question was taken, agreed upon, faithfully transmitted and taken up. The mimetic doubling, redoubling, multiplying of the figure of the shomonnoyoks was so forceful within the movement that the term, previously in general use in Bangladesh to refer to the coordinator of any movement, be it garment factory workers protesting better work conditions and wages or environmentalists protesting pollution, seems likely henceforth to refer only to the countless, effectively nameless leaders of the Quota Reform Movement, a number of whom gave their lives to bring down Hasina.

    The importance of the category of the shomonnoyok is manifest even after the fall of the Hasina government and the winding down of street protests. However, it has now gone from being a labile, even generic category donned by anybody to being a marker of some distinction, of a person backed by a successful uprising. Some, such as Abu Sayeed, deemed the first student to be killed in the movement, have been memorialized as martyred shomonnoyoks. Others, such as Nahid Islam and Asif Mahmud of the original six who were imprisoned, have taken up seats in government and acquired distinction that way. Others, such as Umama Fatema, have gained publicity by complaining of women students being left out of government despite being in the maelstrom from the start. But what is interesting is how the very act of claiming the title of shomonnoyok or being deputed by a shomonnoyok has come to indicate that one is authorized. Since the fall of Hasina, there have been notable incidents of those claiming to be shomonnoyoks or authorized by shomonnoyoks to carry out a range of activities, from enforcing change within institutions to rid them of Awami League loyalists to carrying out extortion rackets.

    As if to remind us that the title of the shomonnoyok carries no particular distinction and may be time-bound to the movement alone, Nahid Islam, one of the original six and now in the interim government as an upadeshta or advisor overseeing post, telecommunication and information technology, recently felt compelled to address a letter to various ministries assuring them that he had nothing to do with anyone claiming to be acting on his behalf: “Recently, some individuals have been using my name or claiming to be my relatives to seek favours in different offices, to fulfil their personal interests and gain illegal benefits, which is entirely unethical. This is tarnishing my reputation.” Newspaper reportage had him saying that if anyone tries to use his name or claim to be his relative in order to get something done or make a request, it should not be considered under any circumstances (The Business Standard, 2 January 2025). In effect, he was disavowing that his name meant anything in particular, as in the original meaning of shomonnoyok.

    At present, students in the government, such as Nahid Islam, are seen to be growing more pragmatic by the day: they have lost their shomonnoyok quality of splitting off and leading in the face of opposition. They are seen to emphasize instead broad-based consensus across political parties. Meanwhile others have gathered to take on the mantle of shomonnoyok, leaning into its demonstrated capacity to proliferate. The umbrella group of the movement, the Boishommo Birodhi Chhatra Andolon (Anti-Discrimination Students Movement) formed in 2024 has been joined by the 55 member-Jatiya Nagorik Committee (National Citizens Committee), also spearheaded by student coordinators during the July Uprising. The first seeks to represent students, while the second seeks to represent citizens more widely.

    These newest versions of shomonnoyoks have vowed to pressure the interim government to deliver on its promise of reforms to the country’s constitution, election process, and civil administration such that fascism may be forever stayed. Yet they were foiled in their most recent effort to get a declaration from the government, dubbed the July Proclamation, attesting to the rightfulness of the student uprising. They had sought such a proclamation so that the uprising may go down in the history books as necessary and legitimate, securing the legacy of the shomonnoyoks. They also sought to protect those who had been involved in the movement from future retaliatory action, as in the form of a general amnesty. The Proclamation was deferred, as the interim government sought consensus across party lines. However, such deferral is seen to be having a deleterious impact on the ability of students to deliver change, compounded by the fast recouped strength of traditional political parties who have been quick to capture political spaces. It is notable that Nurul Haque Nur and Rashed Khan, who had been leaders of the 2018 Quota Movement, became national level leaders in the aftermath of the movement, just as Nahid and others are now on their way to being. They may have wanted to stay shomonnoyoks, as Nahid’s recent words quoted above indicate, but it appears that they may be becoming student “netas” (“leaders”) in the old way.

    The July Uprising was a moment of unity in the face of unprecedented brutality by a regime that ultimately had no recourse for the decentralized and multitudinous movement of shomonnoyoks. But just as the population came together from different ideological fronts to uphold and support the evolving movement, in a post-uprising Bangladesh, they are fracturing once again. Islamists, nationalists and leftists marched together in July but have since recovered their differences. The shomonnoyoks have decided to focus on building a new political front. But that requires originality of thought and pursuit. Can an identity premised on schismatic mimesis to be effective provide such focus and newness?

    Naveeda Khan is professor of anthropology at Johns Hopkins University.  She has worked on religious violence and everyday life in urban Pakistan.  Her more recent work is on riverine lives in Bangladesh and UN-led global climate negotiations.  Her field dispatches from Dhaka in the middle of the July Uprising may be found here.

    Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury is a campaigner working for the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association on climate, policy, renewable energy and human rights. 

    Shrobona Shafique Dipti, a graduate of the University of Dhaka, is an urban anthropologist and lecturer at the University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh with an interest in environmental humanities and multi-species entanglements. 

  • Naveeda Khan, Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury, and Shrobona Shafique Dipti–The July Movement of 2024

    Naveeda Khan, Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury, and Shrobona Shafique Dipti–The July Movement of 2024

    ©Rahul Talukder

    This post is Part One of “The Bangladesh Chapter” of the b2o review’s “The University in Turmoil: Global Perspectives” dossier.

    The July Movement of 2024

    Naveeda Khan, Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury, and Shrobona Shafique Dipti

    Raised on stories of the rebellious 1960s, we are aware of the large role played by students across the world protesting war, racial inequities, and human rights violations, among other issues. We are also well versed in the stories of reaction that set in soon afterwards, as police and armies beat back students, conservative governments came to power, and free-market ideology became dominant nearly everywhere. What, then, would it mean to encounter student protests in the present without this past determining its reception? How should we think about protests in parts of the world other than those which have been endowed with the capacity for historical change? Can we take our learning from emergent events whose trajectory we cannot claim to know in advance?

    In “The Bangladesh Chapter” of “The University in Turmoil”, we explore what the country’s student-led July Movement of 2024 has to teach us in terms of the contours of student demands, the nature of student organizing, the spatial conditions of possibility for protests, and the narrative battle over the past in order to secure a different future. From the outset we do not claim the movement to be a success or even that it has been liberatory; we will, rather, follow its grain to arrive at a dense emplotment of what it is to struggle for meaning and political salience from within universities in our present. We begin with an account of the July Movement to contextualize our contributions to this chapter.

    ©Faysal Zaman

    Starting in June 2024, students at the University of Dhaka, the eminent public university established in 1921, gathered in Shahbag, an area in the capital city well known for hosting protests. They demanded what seemed like an oddly specific thing. They wanted the reform of a quota system for lucrative government jobs that held a large quota (some 30%) for the children and grandchildren of those who had fought in the liberation struggle of 1971, which had secured Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan. This quota for freedom fighters and their families had been reduced once already in the face of strong student protests in 2018, when it was brought down from 56% to 30%. The students’ request in 2024 to get rid of quotas entirely, including those for women, seemed specific and retrograde to boot. Intellectuals and ordinary people alike watched the protests from afar, uncertain as to whether it ought to matter to them or not.

    A series of discursive missteps by then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina soon made clear that the protests turned on more than policy, that she herself was a problem, particularly her personalistic and paranoid mode of running the country. Hasina was the child of an assassinated politician, the very same one generally credited with liberating the nation from Pakistan. Almost her entire family, barring her sister, was assassinated in 1975. Her framing of the protests exposed her Manichean view of the world, divided between those who were with her and those against her. And the students who protested a quota system that favored those who fought in the liberation struggle alongside her father were clearly not with her. Despite putatively accepting their demands, her hostility to the students was made apparent by the escalating attacks on them, first by the student wing of the Awami League, the ruling party, then by law-enforcement personnel, and finally to an extent by the military, alongside a campaign of disinformation and an unprecedented internet and communications blackout. Joined by their peers from other educational institutions, notably both public and private, the students took to the streets with bricks, sticks and rods to engage in street battles with state forces. Those from the working class soon joined the fray.

    Many expected the government to dig in and massacre as many as required to hold onto power, but this was averted when the army chief of staff, who, reading the unrest in the streets and among rank-and-file soldiers, forced Sheikh Hasina to leave the country. It was a testimony to the hold that Hasina had over her party that her resignation couldn’t be salved by placing a more conciliatory member of the party as the interim head of the government. Her removal from the scene meant the collapse and universal discrediting of the Awami League party.

    Even as students most publicly associated with what has come to be called the July Movement or July Uprising negotiated over the composition of the interim government with army officials and members of the opposition parties, long ill-treated by Hasina, they–the students–made clear that this government was not to assume the usual caretaker role of calling elections to usher in a new administration. Rather, the interim government was to reform the existing political system such that fascibad or fascism may never again triumph. Representatives of the students who organized the movement took up seats of government to ensure this, while others took to the streets first to uphold order in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the government, then to keep pressure on the interim government not to cave to reconciliation with the prior ruling party or other parties but to stay the course of reform.

    What is meant by reform, however, and how it is to be brought about are still being deliberated some six months after the fall of the Awami League government. In that time the usual ageist, gerontological reaction to the utpat or mischief of the young has set in, particularly among the intelligentsia of the elite, and even some of the working class who strongly supported the students. And the students, those in government and those on the street, seem uncertain of the way forward. Recently, a large crowd of primarily young men demolished Hasina’s father’s house in Dhaka, once memorialized as a museum, out of a desire to be done with the past. Their past is of tyranny and trauma, and not of the progress recently preached by Hasina in an online address to her followers.

    It is from within this present that we think it important to return to the July Movement, not to memorialize it, but to ask: what were the unique features of this movement that laid the foundations for its efficacy? And just how efficacious has it been? Is that efficacy faltering?  The moment is complex. There are as many answers as there are questions.

    Naveeda Khan is professor of anthropology at Johns Hopkins University. She has worked on religious violence and everyday life in urban Pakistan. Her more recent work is on riverine lives in Bangladesh and UN-led global climate negotiations. Her field dispatches from Dhaka in the middle of the July Uprising may be found here.

    Bareesh Hasan Chowdhury is a campaigner working for the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association on climate, policy, renewable energy and human rights. 

    Shrobona Shafique Dipti, a graduate of the University of Dhaka, is an urban anthropologist and lecturer at the University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh with an interest in environmental humanities and multi-species entanglements.