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  • Ending the World as We Know It: Alexander R. Galloway in Conversation with Andrew Culp

    Ending the World as We Know It: Alexander R. Galloway in Conversation with Andrew Culp

    by Alexander R. Galloway and Andrew Culp
    ~

    Alexander R. Galloway: You have a new book called Dark Deleuze (University of Minnesota Press, 2016). I particularly like the expression “canon of joy” that guides your investigation. Can you explain what canon of joy means and why it makes sense to use it when talking about Deleuze?

    Andrew Culp, Dark Deleuze (University of Minnesota Press, 2016)

    Andrew Culp: My opening is cribbed from a letter Gilles Deleuze wrote to philosopher and literary critic Arnaud Villani in the early 1980s. Deleuze suggests that any worthwhile book must have three things: a polemic against an error, a recovery of something forgotten, and an innovation. Proceeding along those three lines, I first argue against those who worship Deleuze as the patron saint of affirmation, second I rehabilitate the negative that already saturates his work, and third I propose something he himself was not capable of proposing, a “hatred for this world.” So in an odd twist of Marx on history, I begin with those who hold up Deleuze as an eternal optimist, yet not to stand on their shoulders but to topple the church of affirmation.

    The canon portion of “canon of joy” is not unimportant. Perhaps more than any other recent thinker, Deleuze queered philosophy’s line of succession. A large portion of his books were commentaries on outcast thinkers that he brought back from exile. Deleuze was unwilling to discard Nietzsche as a fascist, Bergson as a spiritualist, or Spinoza as a rationalist. Apparently this led to lots of teasing by fellow agrégation students at the Sorbonne in the late ’40s. Further showing his strange journey through the history of philosophy, his only published monograph for nearly a decade was an anti-transcendental reading of Hume at a time in France when phenomenology reigned. Such an itinerant path made it easy to take Deleuze at his word as a self-professed practitioner of “minor philosophy.” Yet look at Deleuze’s outcasts now! His initiation into the pantheon even bought admission for relatively forgotten figures such as sociologist Gabriel Tarde. Deleuze’s popularity thus raises a thorny question for us today: how do we continue the minor Deleuzian line when Deleuze has become a “major thinker”? For me, the first step is to separate Deleuze (and Guattari) from his commentators.

    I see two popular joyous interpretations of Deleuze in the canon: unreconstructed Deleuzians committed to liberating flows, and realists committed to belief in this world. The first position repeats the language of molecular revolution, becoming, schizos, transversality, and the like. Some even use the terms without transforming them! The resulting monotony seals Deleuze and Guattari’s fate as a wooden tongue used by people still living in the ’80s. Such calcification of their concepts is an especially grave injustice because Deleuze quite consciously shifted terminology from book to book to avoid this very outcome. Don’t get me wrong, I am deeply indebted to the early work on Deleuze! I take my insistence on the Marxo-Freudian core of Deleuze and Guattari from one of their earliest Anglophone commentators, Eugene Holland, who I sought out to direct my dissertation. But for me, the Tiqqun line “the revolution was molecular, and so was the counter-revolution” perfectly depicts the problem of advocating molecular politics. Why? Today’s techniques of control are now molecular. The result is that control societies have emptied the molecular thinker’s only bag of tricks (Bifo is a good test case here), which leaves us with a revolution that only goes one direction: backward.

    I am equally dissatisfied by realist Deleuzians who delve deep into the early strata of A Thousand Plateaus and away from the “infinite speed of thought” that motivates What is Philosophy? I’m thinking of the early incorporations of dynamical systems theory, the ’90s astonishment over everything serendipitously looking like a rhizome, the mid-00s emergence of Speculative Realism, and the ongoing “ontological” turn. Anyone who has read Manuel DeLanda will know this exact dilemma of materiality versus thought. He uses examples that slow down Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts to something easily graspable. In his first book, he narrates history as a “robot historian,” and in A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, he literally traces the last thousand years of economics, biology, and language back to clearly identifiable technological inventions. Such accounts are dangerously compelling due to their lucidity, but they come at a steep cost: android realism dispenses with Deleuze and Guattari’s desiring subject, which is necessary for a theory of revolution by way of the psychoanalytic insistence on the human ability to overcome biological instincts (e.g. Freud’s Instincts and their Vicissitudes and Beyond the Pleasure Principle). Realist interpretations of Deleuze conceive of the subject as fully of this world. And with it, thought all but evaporates under the weight of this world. Deleuze’s Hume book is an early version of this criticism, but the realists have not taken heed. Whether emergent, entangled, or actant, strong realists ignore Deleuze and Guattari’s point in What is Philosophy? that thought always comes from the outside at a moment when we are confronted by something so intolerable that the only thing remaining is to think.

    Galloway: The left has always been ambivalent about media and technology, sometimes decrying its corrosive influence (Frankfurt School), sometimes embracing its revolutionary potential (hippy cyberculture). Still, you ditch technical “acceleration” in favor of “escape.” Can you expand your position on media and technology, by way of Deleuze’s notion of the machinic?

    Culp: Foucault says that an episteme can be grasped as we are leaving it. Maybe we can finally catalogue all of the contemporary positions on technology? The romantic (computer will never capture my soul), the paranoiac (there is an unknown force pulling the strings), the fascist-pessimist (computers will control everything)…

    Deleuze and Guattari are certainly not allergic to technology. My favorite quote actually comes from the Foucault book in which Deleuze says that “technology is social before it is technical” (6). The lesson we can draw from this is that every social formation draws out different capacities from any given technology. An easy example is from the nomads Deleuze loved so much. Anarcho-primitivists speculate that humans learn oppression with the domestication of animals and settled agriculture during the Neolithic Revolution. Diverging from the narrative, Deleuze celebrates the horse people of the Eurasian steppe described by Arnold Toynbee. Threatened by forces that would require them to change their habitat, Toynbee says, they instead chose to change their habits. The subsequent domestication of the horse did not sew the seeds of the state, which was actually done by those who migrated from the steppes after the last Ice Age to begin wet rice cultivation in alluvial valleys (for more, see James C Scott’s The Art of Not Being Governed). On the contrary, the new relationship between men and horses allowed nomadism to achieve a higher speed, which was necessary to evade the raiding-and-trading used by padi-states to secure the massive foreign labor needed for rice farming. This is why the nomad is “he who does not move” and not a migrant (A Thousand Plateaus, 381).

    Accelerationism attempts to overcome the capitalist opposition of human and machine through the demand for full automation. As such, it peddles in technological Proudhonism that believes one can select what is good about technology and just delete what is bad. The Marxist retort is that development proceeds by its bad side. So instead of flashy things like self-driving cars, the real dot-communist question is: how will Amazon automate the tedious, low-paying jobs that computers are no good at? What happens to the data entry clerks, abusive-content managers, or help desk technicians? Until it figures out who will empty the recycle bin, accelerationism is only a socialism of the creative class.

    The machinic is more than just machines–it approaches technology as a question of organization. The term is first used by Guattari in a 1968 paper titled “Machine and Structure” that he presented to Lacan’s Freudian School of Paris, a paper that would jumpstart his collaboration with Deleuze. He argues for favoring machine to structure. Structures transform parts of a whole by exchanging or substituting particularities so that every part shares in a general form (in other words, the production of isomorphism). An easy political example is the Leninist Party, which mediates the particularized private interests to form them into the general will of a class. Machines instead treat the relationship between things as a problem of communication. The result is the “control and communication” of Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics, which connects distinct things in a circuit instead of implanting a general logic. The word “machine” never really caught on but the concept has made inroads in the social sciences, where actor-network theory, game theory, behaviorism, systems theory, and other cybernetic approaches have gained acceptance.

    Structure or machine, each engenders a different type of subjectivity, and each realizes a different model of communication. The two are found in A Thousand Plateaus, where Deleuze and Guattari note two different types of state subject formation: social subjection and machinic enslavement (456-460). While it only takes up a few short pages, the distinction is essential to Bernard Stiegler’s work and has been expertly elaborated by Maurizio Lazzarato in the book Signs and Machines. We are all familiar with molar social subjection synonymous with “agency”–it is the power that results from individuals bridging the gap between themselves and broader structures of representation, social roles, and institutional demands. This subjectivity is well outlined by Lacanians and other theorists of the linguistic turn (Virno, Rancière, Butler, Agamben). Missing from their accounts is machinic enslavement, which treats people as simply cogs in the machine. Such subjectivity is largely overlooked because it bypasses existential questions of recognition or self-identity. This is because machinic enslavement operates at the level of the infra-social or pre-individual through the molecular operators of unindividuated affects, sensations, desires not assigned to a subject. Offering a concrete example, Deleuze and Guattari reference Mumford’s megamachines of surplus societies that create huge landworks by treating humans as mere constituent parts. Capitalism revived the megamachine in the sixteenth century, and more recently, we have entered the “third age” of enslavement marked by the development of cybernetic and informational machines. In place of the pyramids are technical machines that use humans at places in technical circuits where computers are incapable or too costly, e.g. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.

    I should also clarify that not all machines are bad. Rather, Dark Deleuze only trusts one kind of machine, the war machine. And war machines follow a single trajectory–a line of flight out of this world. A major task of the war machine conveniently aligns with my politics of techno-anarchism: to blow apart the networks of communication created by the state.

    Galloway: I can’t resist a silly pun, cannon of joy. Part of your project is about resisting a certain masculinist tendency. Is that a fair assessment? How do feminism and queer theory influence your project?

    Culp: Feminism is hardwired into the tagline for Dark Deleuze through a critique of emotional labor and the exhibition of bodies–“A revolutionary Deleuze for today’s digital world of compulsory happiness, decentralized control, and overexposure.” The major thread I pull through the book is a materialist feminist one: something intolerable about this world is that it demands we participate in its accumulation and reproduction. So how about a different play on words: Sara Ahmed’s feminist killjoy, who refuses the sexual contract that requires women to appear outwardly grateful and agreeable? Or better yet, Joy Division? The name would associate the project with post-punk, its conceptual attack on the mainstream, and the band’s nod to the sexual labor depicted in the novella House of Dolls.

    My critique of accumulation is also a media argument about connection. The most popular critics of ‘net culture are worried that we are losing ourselves. So on the one hand, we have Sherry Turkle who is worried that humans are becoming isolated in a state of being “alone-together”; and on the other, there is Bernard Stiegler, who thinks that the network supplants important parts of what it means to be human. I find this kind of critique socially conservative. It also victim-blames those who use social media the most. Recall the countless articles attacking women who take selfies as part of self-care regimen or teens who creatively evade parental authority. I’m more interested in the critique of early ’90s ‘net culture and its enthusiasm for the network. In general, I argue that network-centric approaches are now the dominant form of power. As such, I am much more interested in how the rhizome prefigures the digitally-coordinated networks of exploitation that have made Apple, Amazon, and Google into the world’s most powerful corporations. While not a feminist issue on its face, it’s easy to see feminism’s relevance when we consider the gendered division of labor that usually makes women the employees of choice for low-paying jobs in electronics manufacturing, call centers, and other digital industries.

    Lastly, feminism and queer theory explicitly meet in my critique of reproduction. A key argument of Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus is the auto-production of the real, which is to say, we already live in a “world without us.” My argument is that we need to learn how to hate some of the things it produces. Of course, this is a reworked critique of capitalist alienation and exploitation, which is a system that gives to us (goods and the wage) only because it already stole them behind our back (restriction from the means of subsistence and surplus value). Such ambivalence is the everyday reality of the maquiladora worker who needs her job but may secretly hope that all the factories burn to the ground. Such degrading feelings are the result of the compromises we make to reproduce ourselves. In the book, I give voice to them by fusing together David Halperin and Valerie Traub’s notion of gay shame acting as a solvent to whatever binds us to identity and Deleuze’s shame at not being able to prevent the intolerable. But feeling shame is not enough. To complete the argument, we need to draw out the queer feminist critique of reproduction latent in Marx and Freud. Détourning an old phrase: direct action begins at the point of reproduction. My first impulse is to rely on the punk rock attitude of Lee Edelman and Paul Preciado’s indictment of reproduction. But you are right that they have their masculinist moments, so what we need is something more post-punk–a little less aggressive and a lot more experimental. Hopefully Dark Deleuze is that.

    Galloway: Edelman’s “fuck Annie” is one of the best lines in recent theory. “Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop” (No Future, 29). Your book claims, in essence, that the Fuck Annies are more interesting than the Aleatory Materialists. But how can we escape the long arm of Lucretius?

    Culp: My feeling is that the politics of aleatory materialism remains ambiguous. Beyond the literal meaning of “joy,” there are important feminist takes on the materialist Spinoza of the encounter that deserve our attention. Isabelle Stengers’s work is among the most comprehensive, though the two most famous are probably Donna Haraway’s cyborg feminism and Karen Barad’s agential realism. Curiously, while New Materialism has been quite a boon for the art and design world, its socio-political stakes have never been more uncertain. One would hope that appeals to matter would lend philosophical credence to topical events such as #blacklivesmatter. Yet for many, New Materialism has simply led to a new formalism focused on material forms or realist accounts of physical systems meant to eclipse the “epistemological excesses” of post-structuralism. This divergence was not lost on commentators in the most recent issue of of October, which functioned as a sort of referendum on New Materialism. On the hand, the issue included a generous accounting of the many avenues artists have taken in exploring various “new materialist” directions. Of those, I most appreciated Mel Chen’s reminder that materialism cannot serve as a “get out of jail free card” on the history of racism, sexism, ablism, and speciesism. While on the other, it included the first sustained attack on New Materialism by fellow travelers. Certainly the New Materialist stance of seeing the world from the perspective of “real objects” can be valuable, but only if it does not exclude old materialism’s politics of labor. I draw from Deleuzian New Materialist feminists in my critique of accumulation and reproduction, but only after short-circuiting their world-building. This is a move I learned from Sue Ruddick, whose Theory, Culture & Society article on the affect of the philosopher’s scream is an absolute tour de force. And then there is Graham Burnett’s remark that recent materialisms are like “Etsy kissed by philosophy.” The phrase perfectly crystallizes the controversy, but it might be too hot to touch for at least a decade…

    Galloway: Let’s focus more on the theme of affirmation and negation, since the tide seems to be changing. In recent years, a number of theorists have turned away from affirmation toward a different set of vectors such as negation, eclipse, extinction, or pessimism. Have we reached peak affirmation?

    Culp: We should first nail down what affirmation means in this context. There is the metaphysical version of affirmation, such as Foucault’s proud title as a “happy positivist.” In this declaration in Archaeology of Knowledge and “The Order of Discourse,” he is not claiming to be a logical positivist. Rather, Foucault is distinguishing his approach from Sartrean totality, transcendentalism, and genetic origins (his secondary target being the reading-between-the-lines method of Althusserian symptomatic reading). He goes on to formalize this disagreement in his famous statement on the genealogical method, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” Despite being an admirer of Sartre, Deleuze shares this affirmative metaphysics with Foucault, which commentators usually describe as an alternative to the Hegelian system of identity, contradiction, determinate negation, and sublation. Nothing about this “happily positivist” system forces us to be optimists. In fact, it only raises the stakes for locating how all the non-metaphysical senses of the negative persist.

    Affirmation could be taken to imply a simple “more is better” logic as seen in Assemblage Theory and Latourian Compositionalism. Behind this logic is a principle of accumulation that lacks a theory of exploitation and fails to consider the power of disconnection. The Spinozist definition of joy does little to dispel this myth, but it is not like either project has revolutionary political aspirations. I think we would be better served to follow the currents of radical political developments over the last twenty years, which have been following an increasingly negative path. One part of the story is a history of failure. The February 15, 2003 global demonstration against the Iraq War was the largest protest in history but had no effect on the course of the war. More recently, the election of democratic socialist governments in Europe has done little to stave off austerity, even as economists publicly describe it as a bankrupt model destined to deepen the crisis. I actually find hope in the current circuit of struggle and think that its lack of alter-globalization world-building aspirations might be a plus. My cues come from the anarchist black bloc and those of the post-Occupy generation who would rather not pose any demands. This is why I return to the late Deleuze of the “control societies” essay and his advice to scramble the codes, to seek out spaces where nothing needs to be said, and to establish vacuoles of non-communication. Those actions feed the subterranean source of Dark Deleuze‘s darkness and the well from which comes hatred, cruelty, interruption, un-becoming, escape, cataclysm, and the destruction of worlds.

    Galloway: Does hatred for the world do a similar work for you that judgment or moralism does in other writers? How do we avoid the more violent and corrosive forms of hate?

    Culp: Writer Antonin Artaud’s attempt “to have done with the judgment of God” plays a crucial role in Dark Deleuze. Not just any specific authority but whatever gods are left. The easiest way to summarize this is “the three deaths.” Deleuze already makes note of these deaths in the preface to Difference and Repetition, but it only became clear to me after I read Gregg Flaxman’s Gilles Deleuze and the Fabulation of Philosophy. We all know of Nietzsche’s Death of God. With it, Nietzsche notes that God no longer serves as the central organizing principle for us moderns. Important to Dark Deleuze is Pierre Klossowski’s Nietzsche, who is part of a conspiracy against all of humanity. Why? Because even as God is dead, humanity has replaced him with itself. Next comes the Death of Man, which we can lay at the feet of Foucault. More than any other text, The Order of Things demonstrates how the birth of modern man was an invention doomed to fail. So if that death is already written in sand about to be washed away, then what comes next? Here I turn to the world, worlding, and world-building. It seems obvious when looking at the problems that plague our world: global climate change, integrated world capitalism, and other planet-scale catastrophes. We could try to deal with each problem one by one. But why not pose an even more radical proposition? What if we gave up on trying to save this world? We are already awash in sci-fi that tries to do this, though most of it is incredibly socially conservative. Perhaps now is the time for thinkers like us to catch up. Fragments of Deleuze already lay out the terms of the project. He ends the preface to Different and Repetition by assigning philosophy the task of writing apocalyptic science fiction. Deleuze’s book opens with lightning across the black sky and ends with the world swelling into a single ocean of excess. Dark Deleuze collects those moments and names it the Death of This World.

    Galloway: Speaking of climate change, I’m reminded how ecological thinkers can be very religious, if not in word then in deed. Ecologists like to critique “nature” and tout their anti-essentialist credentials, while at the same time promulgating tellurian “change” as necessary, even beneficial. Have they simply replaced one irresistible force with another? But your “hatred of the world” follows a different logic…

    Culp: Irresistible indeed! Yet it is very dangerous to let the earth have the final say. Not only does psychoanalysis teach us that it is necessary to buck the judgment of nature, the is/ought distinction at the philosophical core of most ethical thought refuses to let natural fact define the good. I introduce hatred to develop a critical distance from what is, and, as such, hatred is also a reclamation of the future in that it is a refusal to allow what-is to prevail over what-could-be. Such an orientation to the future is already in Deleuze and Guattari. What else is de-territorialization? I just give it a name. They have another name for what I call hatred: utopia.

    Speaking of utopia, Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of utopia in What is Philosophy? as simultaneously now-here and no-where is often used by commentators to justify odd compromise positions with the present state of affairs. The immediate reference is Samuel Butler’s 1872 book Erewhon, a backward spelling of nowhere, which Deleuze also references across his other work. I would imagine most people would assume it is a utopian novel in the vein of Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward. And Erewhon does borrow from the conventions of utopian literature, but only to skewer them with satire. A closer examination reveals that the book is really a jab at religion, Victorian values, and the British colonization of New Zealand! So if there is anything that the now-here of Erewhon has to contribute to utopia, it is that the present deserves our ruthless criticism. So instead of being a simultaneous now-here and no-where, hatred follows from Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestion in A Thousand Plateaus to “overthrow ontology” (25). Therefore, utopia is only found in Erewhon by taking leave of the now-here to get to no-where.

    Galloway: In Dark Deleuze you talk about avoiding “the liberal trap of tolerance, compassion, and respect.” And you conclude by saying that the “greatest crime of joyousness is tolerance.” Can you explain what you mean, particularly for those who might value tolerance as a virtue?

    Culp: Among the many followers of Deleuze today, there are a number of liberal Deleuzians. Perhaps the biggest stronghold is in political science, where there is a committed group of self-professed radical liberals. Another strain bridges Deleuze with the liberalism of John Rawls. I was a bit shocked to discover both of these approaches, but I suppose it was inevitable given liberalism’s ability to assimilate nearly any form of thought.

    Herbert Marcuse recognized “repressive tolerance” as the incredible power of liberalism to justify the violence of positions clothed as neutral. The examples Marcuse cites are governments who say they respect democratic liberties because they allow political protest although they ignore protesters by labeling them a special interest group. For those of us who have seen university administrations calmly collect student demands, set up dead-end committees, and slap pictures of protestors on promotional materials as a badge of diversity, it should be no surprise that Marcuse dedicated the essay to his students. An important elaboration on repressive tolerance is Wendy Brown’s Regulating Aversion. She argues that imperialist US foreign policy drapes itself in tolerance discourse. This helps diagnose why liberal feminist groups lined up behind the US invasion of Afghanistan (the Taliban is patriarchal) and explains how a mere utterance of ISIS inspires even the most progressive liberals to support outrageous war budgets.

    Because of their commitment to democracy, Brown and Marcuse can only qualify liberalism’s universal procedures for an ethical subject. Each criticizes certain uses of tolerance but does not want to dispense with it completely. Deleuze’s hatred of democracy makes it much easier for me. Instead, I embrace the perspective of a communist partisan because communists fight from a different structural position than that of the capitalist.

    Galloway: Speaking of structure and position, you have a section in the book on asymmetry. Most authors avoid asymmetry, instead favoring concepts like exchange or reciprocity. I’m thinking of texts on “the encounter” or “the gift,” not to mention dialectics itself as a system of exchange. Still you want to embrace irreversibility, incommensurability, and formal inoperability–why?

    Culp: There are a lot of reasons to prefer asymmetry, but for me, it comes down to a question of political strategy.

    First, a little background. Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of exchange is important to Anti-Oedipus, which was staged through a challenge to Claude Lévi-Strauss. This is why they shift from the traditional Marxist analysis of mode of production to an anthropological study of anti-production, for which they use the work of Pierre Clastres and Georges Bataille to outline non-economic forms of power that prevented the emergence of capitalism. Contemporary anthropologists have renewed this line of inquiry, for instance, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, who argues in Cannibal Metaphysics that cosmologies differ radically enough between peoples that they essentially live in different worlds. The cannibal, he shows, is not the subject of a mode of production but a mode of predation.

    Those are not the stakes that interest me the most. Consider instead the consequence of ethical systems built on the gift and political systems of incommensurability. The ethical approach is exemplified by Derrida, whose responsibility to the other draws from the liberal theological tradition of accepting the stranger. While there is distance between self and other, it is a difference that is bridged through the democratic project of radical inclusion, even if such incorporation can only be aporetically described as a necessary-impossibility. In contrast, the politics of asymmetry uses incommensurability to widen the chasm opened by difference. It offers a strategy for generating antagonism without the formal equivalence of dialectics and provides an image of revolution based on fundamental transformation. The former can be seen in the inherent difference between the perspective of labor and the perspective of capital, whereas the latter is a way out of what Guy Debord calls “a perpetual present.”

    Galloway: You are exploring a “dark” Deleuze, and I’m reminded how the concepts of darkness and blackness have expanded and interwoven in recent years in everything from afro-pessimism to black metal theory (which we know is frighteningly white). How do you differentiate between darkness and blackness? Or perhaps that’s not the point?

    Culp: The writing on Deleuze and race is uneven. A lot of it can be blamed on the imprecise definition of becoming. The most vulgar version of becoming is embodied by neoliberal subjects who undergo an always-incomplete process of coming more into being (finding themselves, identifying their capacities, commanding their abilities). The molecular version is a bit better in that it theorizes subjectivity as developing outside of or in tension with identity. Yet the prominent uses of becoming and race rarely escaped the postmodern orbit of hybridity, difference, and inclusive disjunction–the White Man’s face as master signifier, miscegenation as anti-racist practice, “I am all the names of history.” You are right to mention afro-pessimism, as it cuts a new way through the problem. As I’ve written elsewhere, Frantz Fanon describes being caught between “infinity and nothingness” in his famous chapter on the fact of blackness in Black Skin White Masks. The position of infinity is best championed by Fred Moten, whose black fugitive is the effect of an excessive vitality that has survived five hundred years of captivity. He catches fleeting moments of it in performances of jazz, art, and poetry. This position fits well with the familiar figures of Deleuzo-Guattarian politics: the itinerant nomad, the foreigner speaking in a minor tongue, the virtuoso trapped in-between lands. In short: the bastard combination of two or more distinct worlds. In contrast, afro-pessimism is not the opposite of the black radical tradition but its outside. According to afro-pessimism, the definition of blackness is nothing but the social death of captivity. Remember the scene of subjection mentioned by Fanon? During that nauseating moment he is assailed by a whole series of cultural associations attached to him by strangers on the street. “I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all else, above all: ‘Sho’ good eatin”” (112). The lesson that afro-pessimism draws from this scene is that cultural representations of blackness only reflect back the interior of white civil society. The conclusion is that combining social death with a culture of resistance, such as the one embodied by Fanon’s mentor Aimé Césaire, is a trap that leads only back to whiteness. Afro-pessimism thus follows the alternate route of darkness. It casts a line to the outside through an un-becoming that dissolves the identity we are give as a token for the shame of being a survivor.

    Galloway: In a recent interview the filmmaker Haile Gerima spoke about whiteness as “realization.” By this he meant both realization as such–self-realization, the realization of the self, the ability to realize the self–but also the more nefarious version as “realization through the other.” What’s astounding is that one can replace “through” with almost any other preposition–for, against, with, without, etc.–and the dynamic still holds. Whiteness is the thing that turns everything else, including black bodies, into fodder for its own realization. Is this why you turn away from realization toward something like profanation? And is darkness just another kind of whiteness?

    Culp: Perhaps blackness is to the profane as darkness is to the outside. What is black metal if not a project of political-aesthetic profanation? But as other commentators have pointed out, the politics of black metal is ultimately telluric (e.g. Benjamin Noys’s “‘Remain True to the Earth!’: Remarks on the Politics of Black Metal”). The left wing of black metal is anarchist anti-civ and the right is fascist-nativist. Both trace authority back to the earth that they treat as an ultimate judge usurped by false idols.

    The process follows what Badiou calls “the passion for the real,” his diagnosis of the Twentieth Century’s obsession with true identity, false copies, and inauthentic fakes. His critique equally applies to Deleuzian realists. This is why I think it is essential to return to Deleuze’s work on cinema and the powers of the false. One key example is Orson Welles’s F for Fake. Yet my favorite is the noir novel, which he praises in “The Philosophy of Crime Novels.” The noir protagonist never follows in the footsteps of Sherlock Holmes or other classical detectives’s search for the real, which happens by sniffing out the truth through a scientific attunement of the senses. Rather, the dirty streets lead the detective down enough dead ends that he proceeds by way of a series of errors. What noir reveals is that crime and the police have “nothing to do with a metaphysical or scientific search for truth” (82). The truth is rarely decisive in noir because breakthroughs only come by way of “the great trinity of falsehood”: informant-corruption-torture. The ultimate gift of noir is a new vision of the world whereby honest people are just dupes of the police because society is fueled by falsehood all the way down.

    To specify the descent to darkness, I use darkness to signify the outside. The outside has many names: the contingent, the void, the unexpected, the accidental, the crack-up, the catastrophe. The dominant affects associated with it are anticipation, foreboding, and terror. To give a few examples, H. P. Lovecraft’s scariest monsters are those so alien that characters cannot describe them with any clarity, Maurice Blanchot’s disaster is the Holocaust as well as any other event so terrible that it interrupts thinking, and Don DeLillo’s “airborne toxic event” is an incident so foreign that it can only be described in the most banal terms. Of Deleuze and Guattari’s many different bodies without organs, one of the conservative varieties comes from a Freudian model of the psyche as a shell meant to protect the ego from outside perturbations. We all have these protective barriers made up of habits that help us navigate an uncertain world–that is the purpose of Guattari’s ritornello, that little ditty we whistle to remind us of the familiar even when we travel to strange lands. There are two parts that work together, the refrain and the strange land. The refrains have only grown yet the journeys seem to have ended.

    I’ll end with an example close to my own heart. Deleuze and Guattari are being used to support new anarchist “pre-figurative politics,” which is defined as seeking to build a new society within the constraints of the now. The consequence is that the political horizon of the future gets collapsed into the present. This is frustrating for someone like me, who holds out hope for a revolutionary future that ceases the million tiny humiliations that make up everyday life. I like J. K. Gibson-Graham’s feminist critique of political economy, but community currencies, labor time banks, and worker’s coops are not my image of communism. This is why I have drawn on the gothic for inspiration. A revolution that emerges from the darkness holds the apocalyptic potential of ending the world as we know it.

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    _____

    Alexander R. Galloway is a writer and computer programer working on issues in philosophy, technology, and theories of mediation. Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, he is author of several books and dozens of articles on digital media and critical theory, including Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization (MIT, 2006), Gaming: Essays in Algorithmic Culture (University of Minnesota, 2006); The Interface Effect (Polity, 2012), and most recently Laruelle: Against the Digital (University of Minnesota, 2014), reviewed here in 2014. He is a frequent contributor to The b2 Review “Digital Studies.”

    Andrew Culp is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Rhetoric Studies at Whitman College. He specializes in cultural-communicative theories of power, the politics of emerging media, and gendered responses to urbanization. His work has appeared in Radical Philosophy, Angelaki, Affinities, and other venues. He previously pre-reviewed Galloway’s Laruelle: Against the Digital for The b2 Review “Digital Studies.”

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  • Jorge Amar and Scott Ferguson — Podemos and the Limits of the Neoliberal Order

    Jorge Amar and Scott Ferguson — Podemos and the Limits of the Neoliberal Order


    Photo courtesy of ATTAC TV

    by Jorge Amar and Scott Ferguson

    No private character, however pure, no personal popularity, however great, can protect from the avenging wrath of an indignant people the man who will either declare that he is in favor of fastening the gold standard upon this people, or who is willing to surrender the right of self-government and place legislative control in the hands of foreign potentates and powers.

    William Jennings Bryan, “Cross of Gold,” 1896

    In the wake of Syriza’s disappointing challenge to the Troika’s punishing austerity politics in the Eurozone, leftists around the globe are now turning their eyes, and hopes, to Podemos in Spain. Podemos grew out of the 15-M, or Los Indignados, anti-austerity protests back in 2011. The organization took myriad local government seats after forming an official political party in 2014. And as of the national parliamentary elections held in December 2015, Podemos has emerged as a viable third-party counterforce to Spain’s historically two-party neoliberal government. During the recent elections, the ruling, conservative People’s Party (PP) lost sixty-four seats, while the opposing Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) hemorrhaged twenty seats. Podemos, by contrast, earned sixty-nine seats, coming in just 300,000 votes behind PSOE and securing roughly 20% of the votes within the Spanish parliament. And in fourth place was Ciudadanos, the smaller, center-right “Party of the Citizenry.” Ciudadanos won a sizeable forty seats in parliament, but this was far less than early polling predicted.

    Commentators have dubbed Podemos’ and Ciudadanos’ upset of Spain’s two-party system a political earthquake, while the international left is characterizing the battle ahead as source of great hope and an opportunity to bring real change to Europe. Here, however, we dampen the leftist enthusiasm surrounding the Spanish election, and regarding Podemos in particular, putting pressure on what we argue to be the party’s under-theorized and rather conservative program for economic change. Specifically, we offer a critique of Podemos’ commitment to so-called “sound finance,” as well as the tax-and-spend liberalism upon which its proposed solution to Eurozone austerity is supposed to hinge. But we also suggest a more promising way forward: that Podemos join forces with the fifth-ranking Unidad Popular party. Unidad Popular’s primary economist has turned to the heterodox school of political economy known as Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), coming to see what Podemos takes to be economic truths regarding the Eurozone as neoliberal myths that should be overtly politicized and rejected as such. By collaborating with Unidad Popular, we conclude, Podemos stands to not only pose a serious threat to Eurozone austerity, but also supplant the neoliberal order with an alternative and more just political-economic regime.

    Political Crossroads

    The general elections results that some people are characterizing as the end of the Spain’s hegemonic ’78 Regime are not quite as promising as such pronouncements let on. Podemos still lacks the necessary votes to command real power in the government, and the neoliberal bipartisanism comprised of the false choice between PP conservatives and PSOE socialists will continue to rule Spanish politics for some time. What Podemos’ electoral gains do represent is a crucial political challenge. Now it is time for Podemos to decide whether to openly collaborate with others, thereby creating a relatively stable government that can reverse austerity, or to refuse cooperation, likely forcing a new election cycle.

    Though constrained in its own right, this is essentially Podemos’ decision to make. The dominant PP has no chance to win a working parliamentary majority without the endorsement of the PSOE. With an electoral base that is, demographically speaking, doomed, PP received more than 7,215,000 votes in the election, but lost more than 3,500,0000 votes from 2011. PSOE, meanwhile, saw its worst outcome since 1977: 5,530,779 votes, losing more than 1,500,000 since 2011. This leaves Podemos to negotiate between three future scenarios. None are certain. And each comes with its own rewards and pitfalls.

    In the first scenario, the PP could form a government through more or less open cooperation with the PSOE and Ciudadanos. This arrangement would look something like the political makeup of the current German government. However, open collaboration may prove dangerous for the PSOE. As some regional leaders of that party are explicitly warning (if not threatening), the PSOE’s Pedro Sanchez should not rush too quickly to show support for the PP, since such an action may incite a mass defection of voters from the PSOE towards Podemos. Podemos’ recent gains have gone far to unmoor the decades-old truism that the PSOE is the Spanish left’s only feasible tool for combating PP conservatives, and the PSOE are now visibly worried.

    Under a second scenario, the PSOE can attempt to constitute a new government by aligning itself with the third party, Podemos, and the fifth party, Unidad Popular. But this is also unlikely, considering the fact that Podemos rose to power by rejecting Spain’s bipartisan regime and calling for a new constitutional process. Podemos won its power from voters who resist the PP and PSOE duopoly, seeing both parties as more or less equally guilty of alienating the citizenry and exploiting the revolving doors between government, industry, and finance. Podemos disparages this class as the casta (caste) and vows to overturn it. To renege on this promise could prove politically deadly. One way to for Podemos to skirt this problem would be to demand the PSOE accept certain far-left measures, such as the referendum about Catalonia’s (and other regions’) “right to decide.” Podemos’ allies in these regions are unwavering on this issue, and persuading the PSOE to sign on to such a measure would go far to secure Podemos’ political base. Unfortunately, however, the PSOE has historically refused this policy and in all likelihood will not adopt it.

    Finally, in a third scenario no coalitions are built between the reigning parties and we see a repetition of the same general elections in few months. This scenario is most likely, given the obstacles suggested above. In this case, the bipartisan regime will continue its decline and Podemos will use the PSOE’s rejection of its own faux leftism to erode more of the PSOE’s electoral base. Such a process may result in Podemos overtaking the PSOE and eventually taking command of parliament. But there are clearly many moving parts at work here, rendering the future of the Spanish left at once promising and uncertain.

    Podemos’ Economic Program

    Such are the political crossroads that Podemos and the Spanish left in general will face in the months ahead. But there is still another and, we would claim, more important matter to consider, and one that fundamentally shifts the ground beneath this unfolding story. This is the issue of political economy and specifically, the economic program Podemos aims to install, if and when it manages to take hold of parliament.

    Surprisingly, Podemos’ economic platform has received inadequate critical attention by the leftist commentariat. This is especially true of English-language media. Much has been written about Podemos in the US, UK, and elsewhere. But such writing tends to focus on Podemos’ leader, Pablo Iglesias, and devote most of its energy to weighing the relevance of Podemos’ status as a popular political movement in relation to similar efforts around the globe. As a consequence, English speakers are offered little concrete discussion about the specific economic policies Podemos is proposing. Iglesias himself has published articles in English-language publications such as New Left Review, Jacobin, and The Guardian. These pieces explore political struggles, communication strategies, and grassroots organizing. Yet Iglesias devotes very few words to outlining Podemos’ economic program in such texts, leaving most English-language readers in the dark.

    In truth, Podemos’ economic program has evolved quite a bit since the party’s initial formation. But this economic program seems to become more and more conservative as time progresses. At first, for instance, Podemos proposed a Basic Income Guarantee and debt relief for citizens, in addition to making more general promises about ending austerity. Yet month by month, Podemos has dropped both the Basic Income Guarantee and the debt relief program, as well as myriad other proposals. To be sure, the party remains committed to its central promise, which is to repair and expand Spain’s welfare state. But Podemos has conspicuously pared down its economic platform in compliance with the reigning economic orthodoxy in an effort to secure political legitimacy both within Spain and abroad.

    The Trouble with Podemos

    Although Podemos’s grassroots-driven rise to power should be seen as meaningful and genuinely exciting, the party’s economic strategy is simply inadequate to win the political struggle it aims to conduct against the neoliberal order. The real problem with Podemos’ political economy lies less in the specific proposals the party is offering, but rather in the unreflected neoliberal assumptions that underlie the party’s shifting economic platform. First among these assumptions is Podemos’ apparently blind commitment to the doctrine of sound finance: the mythic principle that a healthy national economy requires government to balance its budget, whether in the short run or over the course of the business cycle. As Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) has shown, this principle is not only inimical to economic productivity, but also debilitating for equality and justice. Meanwhile, this principle rests upon another noxious maxim Podemos holds dear: the false notion that states are revenue constrained and that a government must tax before it can spend toward the public good.

    The only scenarios under which a sovereign government might be constrained in this way, contend MMT economists, is when international gold standards or currency-peg agreements force states to accept debt obligations in a currency over which they assert little control. Such arrangements not only limit public spending to the tax revenues the state is capable of collecting, but also force governments to bend to the dictates of international creditors. Put another way, metal standards and currency pegs transform sovereign nations into de facto colonies of other political bodies.

    This is why MMT economists such as Bill Mitchell have long spoken out against the bankrupt neoliberal logics that undergird the Maastricht Treaty. Signed in February 1992 by the members of the European Community in Maastricht, Netherlands, this treaty robbed European member states of their fiscal sovereignty and established the Eurozone as a monetary union without the strong fiscal union that would be required to support it. This has resulted in an abstract and especially cruel version of an old-time gold standard, which paradoxically forgoes any basis in gold bullion. Against the warnings of a dissenting minority, the Eurozone’s quasi-gold standard has crippled European nations by restricting public spending to a finite pool of value and in turn forcing governments into brutal debt agreements.

    The dominant narrative sees the resulting sovereign debt crises as the crux of the Eurozone disaster, thought to be the consequence of profligate governments being unable to live within their means. However, these crises are mere symptoms of the Eurozone’s faulty structure. The true cause of this disaster is the Eurozone’s shackling of government spending to a false finitude and treating this subjugation as a natural state of affairs. Though written in somewhat technical language, Mitchell’s account of the Eurozone’s structural failings is instructive:

    It is a basic characteristic of any monetary system that government can only create risk free liabilities if they are denominated in its own currency. … [However], the current design of the Eurozone determines that the Member State governments are not sovereign in the sense that they are forced to use a foreign currency and must issue debt to private bond markets in that foreign currency to fund any fiscal deficits. … The member state governments thus can run out of money and become insolvent if the bond markets decline to purchase their debt. … Their fiscal positions must then take the full brunt of any economic downturn because there is no federal counter stabilization function. Among other things, this means the elected governments cannot guarantee the solvency of the banks that operate within their borders.i

    Governments require the political capacity to create money, or “risk-free liabilities,” on demand, Mitchell explains. Such powers are needed to maintain the solvency of banks, as well as to use fiscal policy to counter recessions and depressions. The Eurozone, however, strips member states of this spending capacity and requires them to borrow on international bond markets. The result transforms sovereign governments into cash-strapped debtors, makes economic recovery for individual nation-states impossible, and dooms the entire Eurozone system to failure.

    Fellow MMTers L. Randall Wray and Dimitri B. Papadimitriou describe the historical consequences of the Eurozone’s lethal design as follows:

    From the very start, the European Monetary Union (EMU) was set up to fail. The host of problems we are now witnessing, from the solvency crises on the periphery to the bank runs in Spain, Greece, and Italy, were built into the very structure of the EMU and its banking system. Policymakers have admittedly responded to these various emergencies with an uninspiring mix of delaying tactics and self-destructive policy blunders, but the most fundamental mistake of all occurred well before the buildup to the current crisis. What we are witnessing are the results of a design flaw. When individual nations like Greece or Italy joined the EMU, they essentially adopted a foreign currency—the euro—but retained responsibility for their nation’s fiscal policy. This attempted separation of fiscal policy from a sovereign currency is the fatal defect that is tearing the Eurozone apart.ii

    As Wray and Papadimitriou have it, the Eurozone crisis is not the direct outcome of pro-business policymaking and anti-social austerity programs, as vile as these measures are. It is, rather, an effect of the calamitous finitude baked into the EMU project. The Troika can say, “Pay up!” and “Tighten your belts!” until they are blue in the face. But European governments will be structurally incapable of settling such debts as long as their monetary sovereignty remains fettered. To make matters worse, Germany’s tendency to hold money surpluses as the Eurozone’s net exporter further exacerbates the debtor positions of other member states. If the money supply is finite in the Eurozone and the German economy hoards its export profits, this means that there is simply not enough money to go around and that import-dependent economies such as Greece, Spain, and Italy will continue to suffer deficits no matter how successfully they manage to tax their distressed populations.

    Europe’s phantom gold standard has not only immiserated populations, but also quashed Syriza’s resistance to the ongoing devastation in Greece. This is not merely because the Troika rejected what Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis consistently referred to as Syriza’s “modest proposal.” It is because, unlike during previous eras when metal standards were both popularly contested and philosophically denounced, neoliberal ideology has come to wholly naturalize the Eurozone’s shrouded cross of gold. This has made real transformation unimaginable, as Varoufakis and his team sadly discovered in July 2015.

    For this reason, Podemos will have to directly thematize and politicize the Eurozone’s taken-for-granted finitude if it wishes to make meaningful and lasting transformations. First and foremost, this means reclaiming the state’s monetary sovereignty and boundless fiscal capacities. But it shall also require a major propaganda campaign, aimed at persuading ordinary people that the state is limited only by real resources and productive infrastructures and simply cannot run out of an abstract unit of account. It must be made clear that only by seizing government’s power to spend as needed can Podemos hope to end austerity and create the conditions for full employment and widespread prosperity. However, for all its leftist rhetoric and broad grassroots support, Podemos remains ill-equipped to end austerity since it does not dare imagine liberating Spain’s public purse from the Troika’s asphyxiating grip.

    Podemos’ economic program is thoroughly consistent with the gold standard metaphysics of sound finance. Party leaders imagine they can simultaneously adopt this ideology and succeed in accomplishing what Syriza could not: acting against austerity while playing along with Eurozone budgetary rules. Upon these faulty premises, Podemos then treats what is in reality a very conservative tax-and-spend liberalism as the crux of its economic strategy. A Podemos-led government would seek to reverse social spending cuts by increasing some taxes, creating a slate of new taxes, and reinforcing the mandate of the AEAT (the Spanish equivalent of the IRS) of fighting tax evasion. Believing that public programs should be funded by this revenue, Podemos thus plans to tether the recovery and expansion of the Spanish welfare state to the futile task of fighting tax avoidance within a zone that permits free trade and capital movement. In such a zone, every private person and corporation can shuffle money easily between countries without notice. Barring a common tax authority and total multinational cooperation, even the most vigilant efforts to collect taxes are bound to fail.

    Podemos’ chief economist, Nacho Alvárez Peralta, is quite explicit about the party’s devotion to sound finance and tax-and-spend economics. Alvarez expressly supports government budget-balancing. He breaks with the European Central Bank only on the timeline he asserts is required to achieve the criteria outlined by the Eurozone’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Alvarez is also the architect behind Podemos’ tax-based strategy to fix the welfare state, which he presumes to be the only way out of the current mess.

    Podemos thinks it can somehow accomplish what Syriza did not. However, it must learn the true lesson of the Greek fiasco: As long as a nation-state remains inside the Eurozone and subject to its SGP budget requirements, there shall be no alternative to austerity or the neoliberal order. And with the EU Commission’s latest demand that the next Spanish government cut another 9 billion euros to meet stringent deficit targets, the stakes of learning this lesson could not be higher.

    Another Future

    With MMT’s critique of political economy in focus, a more promising way forward presents itself for the Spanish left, one that refuses the neoliberal premises that have come to frame Eurozone politics. As we suggested at the outset, this will require Podemos to join forces with Unidad Popular, an avowedly socialist and feminist party of the left now headed by economist and MMT advocate Alberto Garzón. As opposed to Podemos’ Iglesias and Alvarez, both Garzón and Unidad Popular’s chief economist, Eduardo Garzón (Alberto’s brother), hold a view of political economy that is very close to MMT’s understanding of monetary sovereignty, fiscal spending, and taxation. Garzón is well aware that Eurozone rules have perniciously, and needlessly, choked off the Spanish government’s spending powers, severely contracting what MMTers such as Stephanie Kelton refer to as the “fiscal space” that is necessary to sustain and enlarge a national economy.

    In addition to restoring and developing the Spanish welfare state, Unidad Popular’s key economic proposal takes its cue from MMT’s idea for a federal Job Guarantee program. Garzón’s proposal is a modestly scaled version of MMT’s Job Guarantee. It is designed to provide community-focused, living-wage employment to Spain’s chronically under- and unemployed, which would not only provide immediate relief to destitute Spaniards, but also reverse the nation’s deflationary economy. Going beyond Keynesian pump priming, this Job Guarantee is meant to be a permanent public institution that expands countercyclically in lockstep with market downturns. If permitted to become a truly universal program, Spain’s Job Guarantee would serve a powerful new mediator of social production and value. In addition to setting just minimum standards for wages, working hours, and benefits, the Job Guarantee would carve out a larger space for public works that are free from market imperatives, place the program’s means of production in workers’ hands, socialize and compensate much unremunerated care work, and give everyday people a say in the shaping of their world.

    What is more, Unidad Popular’s Job Guarantee scheme makes no mention of needing to meet the arbitrary budget goals of the SGP in order to fund such a program. This is because Unidad Popular roundly rejects the neoliberal premises of such goals. Indeed, if challenged by the Troika, the party is wholly prepared to set the crucial question before the body politic: Should we continue to obey the Troika’s crippling mandate in order to remain within the Eurozone? Or, shall we refuse the Troika’s dictates and risk ejection from the Eurozone? This is the question Syriza could not, or would not, ask. Yet what the Syriza tragedy has proven is that this is the key question upon which the fate of Europe shall depend.

    Before the recent Spanish election, Podemos and Unidad Popular were in conversations to form a coalition. At the last minute, however, Podemos’ leaders broke off these talks for what we considered to be tactical reasons. Our hope is that there will be another chance to forge a coalition when the new elections are convoked. Of course, nothing will ensure the success of the Spanish left. All we have is our solidarity and commitment to struggle. But to fight against the neoliberal order while uncritically adopting neoliberal assumptions is to forfeit the contest from the start. Unless Podemos or any other leftist party is prepared to proffer a substantive alternative to the rules of the neoliberal game, we will no doubt suffer a disaster that is far greater than the one we are currently witnessing in Greece.

    Such is the promise of MMT for the contemporary left: While MMT’s understanding of money as a limitless public instrument can free us from debt and austerity, its community-focused Job Guarantee provides means to build a new political economy, which transfigures social and ecological relations from the bottom up. Yet this is what other critical-theoretical appeals to MMT do not seem to comprehend. Reticent to appropriate and reshape the state apparatus, critics such as Nigel Dodd and David Graeber have called upon MMT’s understanding of money as a public balance sheet to challenge the inevitability of neoliberal power. In our estimation, however, MMT is more than a weapon for negating neoliberal domination. It is also a powerful tool for cultivating a positive and enduring alternative to the neoliberal catastrophe—first in Spain, then beyond.

     

    Jorge Amar is a Spanish economist, president of the APEEP (Asociación por el Pleno Empleo y la Estabilidad de Precios, or Full Employment and Price Stability Association), and a doctoral candidate in Applied Economics at the Universidad Valencia. Recently, Amar served as economic advisor for Spain’s Unidad Popular party within the Grupo de elaboración política (Policy Elaboration Group), a provisional task force coordinated by economist Eduardo Garzón.

    Scott Ferguson holds a Ph.D. in Rhetoric and Film Studies from the University of California, Berkeley and is currently an assistant professor of Humanities & Cultural Studies at the University of South Florida. He is also a Research Scholar at the Binzagr Institute for Sustainable Prosperity. His essays have appeared in CounterPunch, Screen, Arcade, the Critical Inquiry blog, Naked Capitalism, Qui Parle, and Liminalities.

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    Tortosa, María Dolores. 2015. “Susana Díaz se opone tanto a un pacto con el PP como con Podemos.” Ideal, December 22. http://www.ideal.es/andalucia/201512/22/susana-diaz-opone-tanto-20151222005459-v.html.

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    ii. Randall L. Wray and Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, “Euroland’s Original Sin,” Policy Note 8, July 2012, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/pn_12_08.pdf.

  • Richard Hill — The Root Causes of Internet Fragmentation

    Richard Hill — The Root Causes of Internet Fragmentation


    a review of Scott Malcomson, Splinternet: How Geopolitics and Commerce Are Fragmenting the World Wide Web
      (OR Books, 2016)
    by Richard Hill
    ~

    The implicit premise of this valuable book is that “we study the past to understand the present; we understand the present to guide the future.” In that light, the book makes a valuable contribution by offering a sound and detailed historical survey of aspects of the Internet which are not well-known nor easily accessible outside the realms of dedicated internet research. However, as explained below, the author has not covered some important aspects of the past and thus the work is incomplete as a guide to the future. This should not be taken as criticism, but as a call for the author, or other scholars, to complete the work.

    The book starts by describing how modern computers and computer networks evolved from the industrialization of war and in particular due to the advantages that could be gained by automating the complex mathematical calculations required for ballistics on the one hand (computers) and by speeding up communications between elements of armed forces on the other hand (networks). Given the effectiveness of ICTs for war, belligerents before, during, and after World War II heavily funded research and development of those technologies in the military context, even if much of the research was outsourced to the private sector.

    Malcomson documents how the early founders of what we now call computer science were based in the USA and were closely associated with US military efforts: “the development of digital computing was principally an unintended byproduct of efforts to improve the accuracy of gunfire against moving targets” (49).

    Chapter 1 ends with an account of how Cold War military concerns (especially so-called mutual assured destruction by nuclear weapons) led to the development of packet switched networks in order to interconnect powerful computers: ARPANET, which evolved to become the Internet.

    Chapter 2 explores a different, but equally important, facet of Internet history: the influence of the anti-authoritarian hacker culture, which started with early computer enthusiasts, and fully developed in the 1970s and 1980s, in particular in the West Coast (most famously documented in Steven Levy’s 1984 book Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution). The book explains the origins of the venture capitalism that largely drove the development of ICTs (including the Internet) as private risk capital replaced state funding for research and development in ICTs.

    The book documents the development of the geek culture’s view that computers and networks should be “an instrument of personal liberation and create a frictionless, alternative world free from the oppressing state” (101). Malcomson explains how this led to the belief that the Internet should not be subject to normal laws, culminating in Barlow’s well known utopian “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” and explains how such ideas could not, and did not survive. The chapter concludes: “The subculture had lost the battle. Governments and large corporations would now shape the Internet” (137). But, as the book notes later (171), it was in fact primarily one government, the US government, that shaped the Internet. And, as Shawn Powers and Michael Jablonski explain in The Real Cyberwar, the US used its influence to further its own geopolitical and global economic goals.

    Chapter 3 explores the effects of globalization, the weakening of American power, the rise of competing powers, and the resulting tensions regarding US dominance of ICTs in general and the Internet in particular. It also covers the rise of policing of the Internet induced by fear of “terrorists, pedophiles, drug dealers, and money launderers” (153).

    We have come full circle: a technology initially designed for war is now once again used by the military to achieve its aims, the so-called “war on terror.” So there is a tension between three different forces, all of which were fundamental to the development of ICTs (including the Internet): the government, military, and security apparatus; more-or-less anarchic technologists; and dominant for-profit companies (which may have started small, but can quickly become very large and dominant – at least for a few years until they are displaced by newcomers).

    As the subtitle indicates, the book is mostly about the World Wide Web, so some of the other aspects of the history of the Internet are not covered. For example, there is no mention of the very significant commercial and political battles that took place between proponents of the Internet and proponents of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) suite of standards; this is a pity, because the residual effects of those battles are still being felt today. Nor does the book explore the reasons for and effects of the transition of the management of the Internet from the US Department of Defense to the US Department of Commerce (even if it correctly notes that the chief interest of the Clinton administration “was in a thriving Internet that would lead to new industries and economic growth” [133]).

    Malcomson explains well how there were four groups competing for influence in the late 1990s: technologists, the private sector, the US government, and other governments, and notes how the US government was in an impossible situation, since it could not credibly argue simultaneously that other governments (or intergovernmental organizations such as the ITU) should not influence the Internet while it itself formally supervised the management and administration of the domain name system (DNS). However, he does not explain how the origins of the DNS, its subsequent development, or how its management and administration were unilaterally hijacked by the US, leading to much of the international tension that has bedeviled discussions on Internet governance since 1998.

    Regarding the World Wide Web, the book does not discuss how the end-to-end principle and its premise of secure end devices resulted in unforeseen consequences (such as spam, cybercrime, and cyberattacks) when unsecure personal computers became the dominant device connected via the Internet. Nor does it discuss how the lack of billing mechanisms in the Internet protocol suite has led to the rise of advertising as the sole revenue generation mechanism and the consequences of that development.

    The book analyses the splintering (elsewhere called fragmentation) brought about by the widespread adoption of proprietary systems operating system and their associated “apps”, and by mass surveillance. As Malcomson puts the matter, mass surveillance “was fatal to the universality of the web, because major web companies were and are global but cannot be both global and subject to the intricate agendas of US intelligence and defense institutions, whose purpose is to defend national interests, not universal interests” (160).

    However, the book does not discuss in any depth other sources of splintering, such as calls by some governments for national control over some portions of the Internet, or violations of network neutrality, or zero rating. Yet the book notes that the topic of network neutrality had been raised by Vice President Gore as early as 1993: “Without provisions for open access, the companies that own the networks could use their control of the networks to ensure that their customers only have access to their programming. We have already seen cases where cable company owners have used their monopoly control of their networks to exclude programming that competes with their own. Our legislation will contain strong safeguards against such behavior” (124). As we know, the laws called for in the last sentence were never implemented, and it was only in 2015 that the Federal Communication Commission imposed network neutrality. Malcomson could have used his deep knowledge of the history of the Internet to explain why Gore’s vision was not realized, no doubt because of the tensions mentioned above between the groups competing for influence.

    The book concludes that the Internet will increasingly cease to be “an entirely cross border enterprise”(190), but that the benefits of interoperability will result in a global infrastructure being preserved, so that “a fragmented Internet will retain aspects of universality” (197).

    As mentioned above, the book provides an excellent account of much of the historical origins of the World Wide Web and the disparate forces involved in its creation. The book would be even more valuable if it built on that account to analyze more deeply and put into context trends (which it does mention) other than splintering, such as the growing conflict between Apple, Google et al. who want no restrictions on data collection and encryption (so that they can continue to collect and monetize data), governments who want no encryption so they can censor and/or surveil, and governments who recognize that privacy is a human right, that privacy rules should be strengthened, and that end-users should have full ownership and control of their data.

    Readers keen to understand the negative economic impacts of the Internet should read Dan Schiller’s Digital Depression, and readers keen to understand the negative impacts of the Internet on democracy should read Robert McChesney’s Digital Disconnect. This might lead some to believe that we have would up exactly where we didn’t want to be: “government-driven, corporate-interest driven, profit-driven, monopoly-driven.” The citation (from Lyman Chapin, one of the founders of the Internet Society), found on p. 132 of Malcomson’s book, dates back to 1991, and it reflects what the technologists of the time wanted to avoid.

    To conclude, it is worth noting the quotation on page 57 from Norbert Wiener: “Just as the skilled carpenter, the skilled mechanic, the skilled dressmaker have in some degree survived the first industrial revolution, so the skilled scientist and the skilled administrator might survive the second [the cybernetic revolution]. However, taking the second revolution as accomplished, the average human of mediocre attainments has nothing to sell that is worth anyone’s money to buy. The answer, of course, is to have a society based on human values other than buying and selling.”

    Wiener thus foresaw the current fundamental trends and dilemmas that have been well documented and analyzed by Robert McChesney and John Nichols in their new book People Get Ready: The Fight Against a Jobless Economy and a Citizenless Democracy (Nation Books, 2016).

    There can be no doubt that the current trends are largely conditioned by the early history of ICTs (and in particular of the Internet) and its roots in military applications. Thus Splinternet is a valuable source of material that should be carefully considered by all who are involved in Internet policy matters.
    _____

    Richard Hill is President of the Association for Proper internet Governance, and was formerly a senior official at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). He has been involved in internet governance issues since the inception of the internet and is now an activist in that area, speaking, publishing, and contributing to discussions in various forums. Among other works he is the author of The New International Telecommunication Regulations and the Internet: A Commentary and Legislative History (Springer, 2014). He writes frequently about internet governance issues for The b2 Review Digital Studies magazine.

    Back to the essay

  • Michelle Moravec — The Never-ending Night of Wikipedia’s Notable Woman Problem

    Michelle Moravec — The Never-ending Night of Wikipedia’s Notable Woman Problem

    By Michelle Moravec
    ~

    Author’s note: this is the written portion of a talk given at St. Joseph University’s Art + Feminism Wikipedia editathon, February 27, 2016. Thanks to Rachael Sullivan for the invite and  Rosalba Ugliuzza for Wikipedia data culling!

    Millions of the sex whose names were never known beyond the circles of their own home influences have been as worthy of commendation as those here commemorated. Stars are never seen either through the dense cloud or bright sunshine; but when daylight is withdrawn from a clear sky they tremble forth
    — Sarah Josepha Hale, Woman’s Record (1853)

    and others was a womanAs this poetic quote by Sarah Josepha Hale, nineteenth-century author and influential editor reminds us, context is everything.   The challenge, if we wish to write women back into history via Wikipedia, is to figure out how to shift the frame of references so that our stars can shine, since the problem of who precisely is “worthy of commemoration” or in Wikipedia language, who is deemed notable, so often seems to exclude women.

    As as Shannon Mattern asked at last year’s Art + Feminism Wikipedia edit-a-thon, “Could Wikipedia embody some alternative to the ‘Great Man Theory’ of how the world works?” Literary scholar Alison Booth, in How To Make It as a Woman, notes that the first book in praise of women by a woman appeared in 1404 (Christine de Pizan’s Book of the City of Ladies), launching a lengthy tradition of “exemplary biographical collections of women.” Booth identified more than 900 voluanonymous was toomes of prosopography published during what might be termed the heyday of the genre, 1830-1940, when the rise of the middle class and increased literacy combined with relatively cheap production of books to make such volumes both practicable and popular. Booth also points out, that lest we consign the genre to the realm of mere curiosity, predating the invention of “women’s history” the compilers, editrixes or authors of these volumes considered them a contribution to “national history” and indeed Booth concludes that the volumes were “indispensable aids in the formation of nationhood.”

    Booth compiled a list of the most frequently mentioned women in a subset of these books and tracked their frequency over time.  In an exemplary project, she made this data available on the web, allowing for the creation of the visualization below of American figures on that chart.

    booth data by date

    This chart makes clear what historians already know, notability is historically specific and contingent, something Wikipedia does not take into account in formulating guidelines that take this to be a stable concept.

    Only Pocahontas deviates from the great white woman school of history and she too becomes less salient over time.  Furthermore, by the standards of this era, at least as represented by these books, black women were largely considered un-notable. This perhaps explains why, in 1894, Gertrude Mossell published The Work of the Afro-American Woman, a compilation of achievements that she described as “historical in character.” Mossell’s volume itself is a rich source of information of women worthy of commemoration and commendation.

    Looking further into the twentieth-century, the successor to this sort of volume is aptly titled, Notable American Women, a three-volume set that while published in 1971 had its roots in the 1950s when Arthur Schlesinger, as head of Radcliffe’s College council, suggested that a biographical dictionary of women might be a useful thing. Perhaps predictably, a publisher could not be secured, so Radcliffe funded the project itself. The question then becomes does inclusion in a volume declaring women as “notable” mean that these women would meet Wikipedia’s “notability” standards?

    Studies have found varying degrees of bias in coverage of female figures compared to male figures. The latest numbers I found, as of January 2015, concluded that women constituted only 15.5 percent of the biographical entries on the English Wikipedia, and that prior to the 20th century, the problem was wildly exacerbated by “sourcing and notability issues.” Using the “missing” biographies concept borrowed from a 2010 study of Wikipedia’s “completeness,” I compared selected “classified” areas for biographies of Notable American Women (analysis was conducted by hand with tremendous assistance from Rosalba Ugliuzza).

    Working with the digitized copy of Notable American Women in Women and Social Movements, I began compiling a “missing” biographies quotient,  the percentage of entries missing for individuals by the “classified list of biographies” that appeared at the end of the third volume of Notable American Women. Mirroring the well-known category issues of Wikipedia, the editors finessed the difficulties of limiting individuals to one area by including them in multiple, including a section called “Negro Women” and another called “Indian Women”:

    missing for blog

    Initially I had suspected that larger classifications might have a greater percentage of missing entries, but that is not true. Social workers, the classification with the highest percentage of missing entries, is a relatively small classification with only nine individuals. The six classifications with no missing entries ranged in size from five to eleven.  I then created my own meta-categories to summarize what larger classifications might exacerbate this “missing” biographies problem.

    legend missing blog

    Inclusion in Notable American Women does not translate into inclusion in Wikipedia.   Influential individuals associated with female-dominated professions, social work and nursing, are less likely to be considered notable, as are those “leaders” in settlement houses or welfare work or “reformers” like peace advocates.   Perhaps due to edit-a-thons or Wikipedians-in-residence, female artists and female scientists have fared quite well.  Both Indian Women and Negro Women have the same percentage of missing women.

    Looking at the network of “Negro Women” by their Notable American Women classified entries, I noted their centrality. Frances Harper and Ida B. Wells are the most networked women in the volumes, which is representative of their position as bridge leaders (I also noted the centrality of Frances Gage, who does not have a Wikipedia entry yet, a fate she shares with the white abolitionists Sallie Holley and Caroline Putnam).

    negro network colors

    Visualizing further, I located two women who don’t have Wikipedia entries and are not included in Notable American Women:

    missing negro women

    Eva del Vakia Bowles was a long time YWCA worker who spent her life trying to improve interracial relations. She was the first black woman hired by the YWCA to head a branch. During WWI, Bowles had charge of Y’s established near war work factories to provide R & R for workers. Throughout her tenure at the Y, Bowles pressed the organization to promote black women to positions within the organization. In 1932 she resigned from her beloved Y in protest over policies she believed excluded black women from the decision making processes of the National Board.

    Addie D. Waites Hunton, also a Y worker and founding member of the NAACP, was an amazing woman who along with her friend Kathryn Magnolia Johnson authored Two Colored Women with the American Expeditionary Forces (1920), which details their time as Y workers in WWI where they were among the very first black women sent. Later, she became a field worker for the NAACP, a member of the WILPF, and was an observer in Haiti in 1926 as part of that group

    Finally, using a methodology I developed when working on the racially-biased History of Woman Suffrage, I scraped names from Mossell’s The Work of the Afro-American Woman to find women that should have appeared in Notable American Women and in Wikipedia. Although this is rough result of named extractions, it gave me a place to start.

    overlaps negro women

    Alice Dugged Cary does not appear in Notable American Women or Wikipedia.  She was born free in 1859 became president of the State Federation of Colored Women of Georgia, librarian of first branch for African Americans in Atlanta, established first free kindergartens for African American children in Georgia, nominated as honorary member in Zeta Phi Beta and was involved in its spread.

    Similarly, Lucy Ella Moten, born free in 1851, became principal of Miner Normal School, earned an M.D., and taught in the South during summer “vacations, appears in neither Notable American Women nor Wikipedia (or at least she didn’t until Mike Lyons started her page yesterday at the editathon!).

    _____

    Michelle Moravec (@ProfessMoravec) is Associate Professor of History at Rosemont College. She is a prominent digital historian and the digital history editor for Women and Social Movements. Her current project, The Politics of Women’s Culture, uses a combination of digital and traditional approaches to produce an intellectual history of the concept of women’s culture. She writes a monthly column for the Mid-Atlantic Regional Center for the Humanities, and maintains her own blog History in the City, at which an earlier version of this post first appeared.

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  • Jürgen Geuter — Liberty, an iPhone, and the Refusal to Think Politically

    Jürgen Geuter — Liberty, an iPhone, and the Refusal to Think Politically

    By Jürgen Geuter
    ~

    The relationship of government and governed has always been complicated. Questions of power, legitimacy, structural and institutional violence, of rights and rules and restrictions keep evading any ultimate solution, chaining societies to constant struggles about shifting balances between different positions and extremes or defining completely new aspects or perspectives on them to shake off the often perceived stalemate. Politics.

    Politics is a simple word but one with a lot of history. Coming from the ancient Greek term for “city” (as in city-state) the word pretty much shows what it is about: Establishing the structures that a community can thrive on. Policy is infrastructure. Not made of wire or asphalt but of ideas and ways of connecting them while giving the structure ways of enforcing the integrity of itself.

    But while the processes of negotiation and discourse that define politics will never stop while intelligent beings exist recent years have seen the emergence of technology as a replacement of politics. From Lawrence Lessig’s “Code is Law” to Marc Andreessen’s “Software Is Eating the World”: A small elite of people building the tools and technologies that we use to run our lives have in a way started emancipating from politics as an idea. Because where politics – especially in democratic societies – involves potentially more people than just a small elite, technologism and its high priests pull off a fascinating trick: defining policy and politics while claiming not to be political.

    This is useful for a bunch of reasons. It allows to effectively sidestep certain existing institutions and structures avoiding friction and loss of forward momentum. “Move fast and break things” was Facebook’s internal motto until only very recently. It also makes it easy to shed certain responsibilities that we expect political entities of power to fulfill. Claiming “not to be political” allows you to have mobs of people hunting others on your service without really having to do anything about it until it becomes a PR problem. Finally, evading the label of politics grants a lot more freedoms when it comes to wielding powers that the political structures have given you: It’s no coincidence that many Internet platform declare “free speech” a fundamental and absolute right, a necessary truth of the universe, unless it’s about showing a woman breastfeeding or talking about the abuse free speech extremists have thrown at feminists.

    Yesterday news about a very interesting case directly at the contact point of politics and technologism hit mainstream media: Apple refused – in a big and well-written open letter to its customers – to fulfill an order by the District Court of California to help the FBI unlock an iPhone 5c that belonged to one of the shooters in last year’s San Bernadino shooting, in which 14 people were killed and 22 more were injured.

    Apple’s argument is simple and ticks all the boxes of established technical truths about cryptography: Apple’s CEO Tim Cook points out that adding a back door to its iPhones would endanger all of Apple’s customers because nobody can make sure that such a back door would only be used by law enforcement. Some hacker could find that hole and use it to steal information such as pictures, credit card details or personal data from people’s iPhones or make these little pocket computers do illegal things. The dangers Apple correctly outlines are immense. The beautifully crafted letter ends with the following statements:

    Opposing this order is not something we take lightly. We feel we must speak up in the face of what we see as an overreach by the U.S. government.

    We are challenging the FBI’s demands with the deepest respect for American democracy and a love of our country. We believe it would be in the best interest of everyone to step back and consider the implications.

    While we believe the FBI’s intentions are good, it would be wrong for the government to force us to build a backdoor into our products. And ultimately, we fear that this demand would undermine the very freedoms and liberty our government is meant to protect.

    Nothing in that defense is new: The debate about government backdoors has been going on for decades with companies, software makers and government officials basically exchanging the same bullets points every few years. Government: “We need access. For security.” Software people: “Yeah but then nobody’s system is secure anymore.” Rinse and repeat. That whole debate hasn’t even changed through Edward Snowden’s leaks: While the positions were presented in an increasingly shriller and shriller tone the positions themselves stayed monolithic and unmoved. Two unmovable objects yelling at each other to get out of the way.

    Apple’s open letter was received with high praise all through the tech-savvy elites, from the cypherpunks to journalists and technologists. One tweet really stood out for me because it illustrates a lot of what we have so far talked about:

    Read that again. Tim Cook/Apple are clearly separated from politics and politicians when it comes to – and here’s the kicker – the political concept of individual liberty. A deeply political debate, the one about where the limits of individual liberty might be is ripped out of the realm of politicians (and us, but we’ll come to that later). Sing the praises of the new Guardian of the Digital Universe.

    But is the court order really exactly the fundamental danger for everybody’s individual liberty that Apple presents? The actual text paints a different picture. The court orders Apple to help the FBI access one specific, identified iPhone. The court order lists the actual serial number of the device. What “help” means in this context is also specified in great detail:

    1. Apple is supposed to disable features of the iPhone automatically deleting all user data stored on the device which are usually in place to prevent device thieves from accessing the data the owners of the device stored on it.
    2. Apple will also give the FBI some way to send passcodes (guesses of the PIN that was used to lock the phone) to the device. This sounds strange but will make sense later.
    3. Apple will disable all software features that introduce delays for entering more passcodes. You know the drill: You type the wrong passcode and the device just waits for a few seconds before you can try a new one.

    Apple is compelled to write a little piece of software that runs only on the specified iPhone (the text is very clear on that) and that disables the 2 security features explained in 1 and 3. Because the court actually recognizes the dangers of having that kind of software in the wild it explicitly allows Apple to do all of this within its own facilities: the Phone would be sent to an Apple facility, the software loaded to the RAM of the device. This is where 2 comes in: When the device has been modified by loading the Apple-signed software into its RAM the FBI needs a way to send PIN code guesses to the device. The court order even explicitly states that Apple’s new software package is only supposed to go to RAM and not change the device in other ways. Potentially dangerous software would never leave Apple’s premises, Apple also doesn’t have to introduce or weaken the security of all its devices and if Apple can fulfill the tasks described in some other way the court is totally fine with it. The government, any government doesn’t get a generic backdoor to all iPhones or all Apple products. In a more technical article than this on Dan Guido outlines that what the court order asks for would work on the iPhone in question but not on most newer ones.

    So while Apple’s PR evokes the threat of big government’s boots marching on to step on everybody’s individual freedoms, the text of the court order and the technical facts make the case ultra specific: Apple isn’t supposed to build a back door for iPhones but help law enforcement to open up one specific phone within their possession connected not to a theoretical crime in the future but the actual murder of 14 people.

    We could just attribute it all to Apple effectively taking a PR opportunity to strengthen the image it has been developing after realizing that they just couldn’t really do data and services, the image of the protector of privacy and liberty. An image that they kicked into overdrive post-Snowden. But that would be too simple because the questions here are a lot more fundamental.

    How do we – as globally networked individuals living in digitally connected and mutually overlaying societies – define the relationship of transnational corporations and the rules and laws we created?

    Cause here’s the fact: Apple was ordered by a democratically legitimate court to help in the investigation of a horrible, capital crime leading to the murder of 14 people by giving it a way to potentially access one specific phone of the more than 700 million phones Apple has made. And Apple refuses.

    Which – don’t get me wrong – is their right as an entity in the political system of the US: They can fight the court order using the law. They can also just refuse and see what the government, what law enforcement will do to make them comply. Sometimes the cost of breaking that kind of resistance overshadow the potential value so the request gets dropped. But where do we as individuals stand whose liberty is supposedly at stake? Where is our voice?

    One of the main functions of political systems is generating legitimacy for power. While some less-than-desirable systems might generate legitimacy by being the strongest, in modern times less physical legitimizations of power were established: a king for example often is supposed to rule because one or more god(s) say so. Which generates legitimacy especially if you share the same belief. In democracies legitimacy is generated by elections or votes: by giving people the right to speak their mind, elect representatives and be elected the power (and structural violence) that a government exerts is supposedly legitimized.

    Some people dispute the legitimacy of even democratically distributed power, and it’s not like they have no point, but let’s not dive into the teachings of Anarchism here. The more mainstream position is that there is a rule of law and that the institutions of the United States as a democracy are legitimized as the representation of US citizens. They represent every US citizen, they each are supposed to keep the political structure, the laws and rules and rights that come with being a US citizen (or living there) intact. And when that system speaks to a company it’s supposed to govern and the company just gives it the finger (but in a really nice letter) how does the public react? They celebrate.

    But what’s to celebrate? This is not some clandestine spy network gathering everybody’s every waking move to calculate who might commit a crime in 10 years and assassinate them. This is a concrete case, a request confirmed by a court in complete accordance with the existing practices in many other domains. If somebody runs around and kills people, the police can look into their mail, enter their home. That doesn’t abolish the protections of the integrity of your mail or home but it’s an attempt to balance the rights and liberties of the individual as well as the rights and needs of all others and the social system they form.

    Rights hardly ever are absolute, some might even argue that no right whatsoever is absolute: you have the right to move around freely. But I can still lock you out of my home and given certain crimes you might be locked up in prison. You have the right to express yourself but when you start threatening others, limits kick in. This balancing act that I also started this essay with has been going on publicly for ages and it will go on for a lot longer. Because the world changes. New needs might emerge, technology might create whole new domains of life that force us to rethink how we interact and which restrictions we apply. But that’s nothing that one company just decides.

    In unconditionally celebrating Cook’s letter a dangerous “apolitical” understanding of politics shows its ugly face: An ideology so obsessed with individual liberty that it happily embraces its new unelected overlords. Code is Law? More like “Cook is Law”.

    This isn’t saying that Apple (or any other company in that situation) just has to automatically do everything a government tells them to. It’s quite obvious that many of the big tech companies are not happy about the idea of establishing precedent in helping government authorities. Today it’s the FBI but what if some agency from some dictatorship wants the data from some dissident’s phone? Is a company just supposed to pick and choose?

    The world might not grow closer together but it gets connected a lot more and that leads to inconsistent laws, regulations, political ideologies etc colliding. And so far we as mankind have no idea how to deal with it. Facebook gets criticized in Europe for applying very puritanic standards when it comes to nudity but it does follow as a US company established US traditions. Should they apply German traditions which are a lot more open when it comes to depictions of nudity as well? What about rules of other countries? Does Facebook need to follow all? Some? If so which ones?

    While this creates tough problems for international law makers, governments and us more mortal people, it does concern companies very little as they can – when push comes to shove – just move their base of operation somewhere else. Which they already do to “optimize” avoid taxes, about which Cook also recently expressed indignant refusal to comply with US government requirements as “total political crap” – is this also a cause for all of us across the political spectrum to celebrate Apple’s protection of individual liberty? I wonder how the open letter would have looked if Ireland, which is a tax haven many technology companies love to use, would have asked for the same thing California did?

    This is not specifically about Apple. Or Facebook. Or Google. Or Volkswagen. Or Nestle. This is about all of them and all of us. If we uncritically accept that transnational corporations decide when and how to follow the rules we as societies established just because right now their (PR) interests and ours might superficially align how can we later criticize when the same companies don’t pay taxes or decide to not follow data protection laws? Especially as a kind of global digital society (albeit of a very small elite) we have between cat GIFs and shaking the fist at all the evil that governments do (and there’s lots of it) dropped the ball on forming reasonable and consistent models for how to integrate all our different inconsistent rules and laws. How we gain any sort of politically legitimized control over corporations, governments and other entities of power.

    Tim Cook’s letter starts with the following words:

    This moment calls for public discussion, and we want our customers and people around the country to understand what is at stake.

    On that he and I completely agree.


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    Jürgen Geuter (@tante) is a political computer scientist living in Germany. For about 10 years he has been speaking and writing about technology, digitalization, digital culture and the way these influence mainstream society. His writing has been featured in Der Spiegel, Wired Germany and other publications as well as his own blog Nodes in a Social Network, on which an earlier version of this post first appeared.

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  • Micah Robbins — Misanthropic Humanism & the Politics of Comic Futility: Robert T. Tally Jr.’s Kurt Vonnegut and the American Novel

    Micah Robbins — Misanthropic Humanism & the Politics of Comic Futility: Robert T. Tally Jr.’s Kurt Vonnegut and the American Novel

    by Micah Robbins

    Kurt Vonnegut owes a good measure of his popularity, both as novelist and public intellectual, to his gift for treating the most depressing aspects of postmodern American life with cheerful contempt. His steadfast good humor renders dissident fictions palatable for mainstream audiences, while also appealing to those more politically active readers who are convinced the core values animating contemporary American life must be revised if, as the most idealistic generation in recent memory warned, we are not to be “the last generation in the experiment with living.”¹ He is, in this regard, one of postwar America’s most politically savvy literary voices, a novelist perhaps uniquely suited to posit radical ideas within mainstream discourse. It is important to note, however, that while Vonnegut lends his voice to a number of “isms” well outside the bounds of popular American politics (socialism, pacifism, and atheism come immediately to mind), he does so while remaining conspicuously skeptical of political activism as a force for positive and lasting social change. He thus performs the paradoxical task of inculcating a progressive moralism that condemns the most troubling aspects of postmodern American life—most notably the twin forces of consumer capitalism and militarization—while at the same time insisting on the inability of progressive politics to set straight what he sees as having gone so obviously awry. At the core of his critique is a “Do-Nothing ethos,” a sort of hip resignation that suggests an inevitable descent into evermore cruel and calloused ways of being.² This ethos finds its most memorable expression in his famously fatalistic phrase, “So it goes,” which he utters like a mantra throughout Slaughterhouse-Five (1969); or, to put it differently, as he does in his less popular novel Bluebeard (1987), humankind is “doomed to repeat the past no matter what. That’s what it is to be alive” (Slaughterhouse-Five 2; Bluebeard 91). It is around this fatalism that his oeuvre’s core contradiction develops. While Vonnegut’s novels may speak passionately against manifold forms of violence and oppression, they ultimately succumb to a playful nihilism that, though rich in irony and black humor, offers little by way of imagining a future beyond the sequence of traumas and disasters that characterizes our historical moment.

    Irony and black humor are, to be sure, means of making the intolerable seem tolerable, as gallows humor surely attests, and in the hands of more radical satirists such as William S. Burroughs, Ishmael Reed, Thomas Pynchon, and Kathy Acker, to name just a few of Vonnegut’s contemporaries, they become discursive weapons against the violent, exploitative mentalities that continue to structure our world into the twenty-first century. But with Vonnegut, the gallows carry the day. This is not to deny that Vonnegut’s satire does much to shame prevailing sociopolitical mores. It does. It also raises a powerful alarm that something has gone horribly wrong in the world. But in the end, Vonnegut’s fiction eschews imagining acts of meaningful resistance—symbolic or actual. His work is, in this regard a surrender, for even his most politically effective novels advance an image of humanity as powerless to enact positive social change in the face of overwhelming biological and historical forces. In his well-known 1973 interview with Playboy magazine, Vonnegut goes so far as to explicitly position the political novelist as part of a biological process that functions independently of the writer’s strategic intentions, an explanation that illustrates the fatalistic paradox at the core of his politics. In response to a question regarding his motives for writing, he says, “My motives are political. I agree with Stalin and Hitler and Mussolini that the writer should serve his society. I differ with the dictators as to how writers should serve. Mainly I think they should be—and biologically have to be—agents of change” [my emphasis]. Vonnegut imagines writers as “evolutionary cells” in the “social organism,” biologically determined agents that simultaneously introduce new ideas into society and function as a central “means of responding symbolically to life.” Yet immediately after articulating his progressive political commitments, Vonnegut turns notably pessimistic, stating, “I don’t think we’re in control of what we do,” before proceeding (in characteristically self-depreciatory fashion) to dismiss his theory of the writer as a force for evolutionary social change as “horseshit.”³ He thus undermines, in a moment of what I read as impromptu candor, one of the foundational premises of political activism: that people can join in solidarity and organize around conscious acts of will to fashion a better future.

    Robert T. Tally, Jr. takes up Vonnegut’s paradoxical politics in his ambitious study, Kurt Vonnegut and the American Novel: A Postmodern Iconography (2011). Ranging over Vonnegut’s nearly fifty-year career, and offering commentary on all fourteen of his novels, Tally develops a theory of Vonnegut as a leading iconographer of postmodern American society. This is not to say that Vonnegut is a leading postmodernist per se —Tally suggests the label “postmodern” doesn’t quite fit—but rather that he is a writer with deep-seated modernist sensibilities whose work attempts to capture a comprehensive vision of America at the height of its power. In ranging over Vonnegut’s novels, Tally touches on some crucial theoretical and generic concerns, both of which I’ll discuss in due course, but what stands out most impressively when considering Vonnegut’s effort to construct a thoroughgoing postmodern iconography is the way in which his modernist political sensibility—rooted in utopian ideals of social wholeness and moral intelligibility—gives way to the overwhelming uncertainty and fragmentation of the postmodern age. His iconography may aim for the “comprehensiveness and unity assayed by the most wide-eyed utopians of the early modernist period,” as Tally argues early in his study, “yet Vonnegut’s world remains more fragmentary and unfixed than the elegiac modernists imagined. Hence, Vonnegut makes a botch of things” (Kurt Vonnegut and the American Novel xxi). By tracking Vonnegut’s career-long attempt to negotiate the tensions between modernity and postmodernity, Tally offers a compelling literary-critical portrait of a significant (though largely neglected) American novelist grappling with the contradictions and crises of postwar American life, a portrait that helps clarify the paradoxical core of Vonnegut’s fatalistic political ethos.

    Tally argues that Vonnegut’s postmodern iconography is a fundamentally modernist project in that it seeks through symbolic means to contain a cultural moment come unhinged through rapid technological development and the values associated with mass consumerism and unchecked militarization. In response to the pervasive fragmentation of American society, Vonnegut constructs an iconography intended to identify the roots of postmodern social disintegration and thus, by extension, illuminate traces of a prelapsarian integrated whole or idealized unity. We see in this effort what Tally regards as Vonnegut’s “thoroughgoing, elegiac modernism,” a perspective that leads him to revisit key modernist concerns, including “the effects of industrialization and technology, the breakup of traditional (so-called organic) communities, the relations between historical and psychological structures, between social totality and personal experience” (6 – 7). Yet because he does so within a postmodern framework, his efforts at identifying clearly defined social problems that fit within stable narrative structures are ultimately stymied by the very slippages and lack of coherence that his fiction attempts to contain. The result of this tension is a body of work that fails to effectively imagine utopian solutions precisely because it runs repeatedly into the limitations of a cultural-historical moment that denies utopian thinking as such. As Tally rightly notes, “the politics of postmodernism—by denying both an Edenic past to return to and a utopian future just over the horizon—often appears doomed to fall back into an apolitical position.” As a result of this denial, and surrounded everywhere by a breakdown in signification and its attendant political frustrations, Vonnegut’s “political forces have been driven deeply into an unconscious. A writer who desperately wants to support causes championed by a populist left, Vonnegut cannot help his general despondence over the impossibility of a genuinely political movement achieving success” (10). So while Vonnegut’s modernist sensibility may lead him to desire stable political solutions, he ultimately succumbs to a postmodern framework that all but forecloses on the utopian, redemptive promise that energizes the various “isms” I mentioned above. He thus becomes what Tally calls “a reluctant postmodernist” (7).

    Although Tally makes the political dimensions of Vonnegut’s postmodern iconography clear, he tends away from situating Vonnegut within the rich and varied political discourses that shaped Cold War American society and its aftermath. He opts instead to engage literary-critical debates to argue for the significance of Vonnegut’s contribution to the development of American literature, even going so far as to suggest that Vonnegut is as good a candidate as any for having achieved some proximity to the ever-elusive “great American novel.” Indeed, Tally makes an extended claim that Vonnegut’s postmodern iconography is a noble yet failed attempt—a near miss, really—at achieving precisely such a deed. This is both a strength and a weakness. On the one hand, the book struggles to bear out Tally’s claim that Vonnegut’s iconography attempts the comprehensiveness associated with a project such as “the great American novel” precisely because it avoids a substantive engagement with specific sociopolitical developments in the decades following the end of the Second World War. Kurt Vonnegut and the American Novel is not a work of American studies, nor does it take advantage of sociohistorical methodologies that may, in the hands of some future scholar, help place Vonnegut’s work in relation to actual politics of world-historical significance—the Civil Rights and Anti-War movements, Nixon’s ouster and the rise of Reagan, the fall of Communism, etc. On the other hand, Tally’s emphasis on literary-critical debates allows him to construct an impressive survey of Vonnegut’s work, and he makes important strides toward understanding the extent of Vonnegut’s engagement with theoretical concerns developed by some of the twentieth century’s most important continental philosophers. Figures such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Theodore Adorno, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari loom large in his study, and while their presence at times softens what could be a sharper focus on the particularities of Cold War American society, they allow Tally to make a case for Vonnegut as something more than a popular novelist. The truth is that Vonnegut is not taken very seriously within the academy, and by showing how his novels are shaped by and/or fit in relation to key theoretical insights, Tally makes a strong argument for Vonnegut’s place within a lineage of great American novelists running from Herman Melville to Thomas Pynchon.

    Yet even when Tally focuses on continental philosophy to make literary-critical claims about Vonnegut’s work, and particularly when he does so in relation to how Vonnegut negotiates the tension between modernist and postmodernist narrative techniques, he still manages to present important insights vis-à-vis Vonnegut’s paradoxical politics. For example, in his chapter on Vonnegut’s most famous novel, Slaughterhouse-Five, Tally draws extensively on Nietzsche’s theory of the “eternal return”—the idea that a finite universe exists in infinite time and space and thus must recur ad infinitum—as a key to understanding the novel’s “Tralfamadorian style.” Named after the bizarre alien life forms that abduct the book’s protagonist, Billy Pilgrim, and display him in a sort of zoo/natural history museum on their home planet Tralfamador, Vonnegut’s Tralfamadorian style is rooted in a cosmological concept that, much like Nietzsche’s eternal return, asserts “all moments, past, present, and future, always have existed, always will exist” (Vonnegut 1969, 34). Tralfamadorians experience such simultaneity literally, seeing all time arrayed before them as if it were a mountain chain over which their consciousnesses may range at will. Billy also experiences something approaching this simultaneity after coming “unstuck in time,” and his subsequent and varied shifts between the past, present, and future allow Vonnegut to dispose of linear storytelling and engage in altogether more experimental narrative techniques (29). Armed with Nietzsche’s theory of the eternal return, Tally argues that these techniques, though relying on apparent narrative instability and its associated fragmentation of experience, are actually evidence of Vonnegut’s attempt to achieve a more rigorous realism than that which more conventional narrative forms allow. If reality is determined by an eternal recurrence, as Nietzsche asserts, and all moments in time exist simultaneously, than it only makes sense that Slaughterhouse-Five’s narrative structure move beyond representing the world as if “one moment follows another one, like beads on a string, and that once a moment is gone it is gone forever” (Vonnegut 1969, 34). The novel’s fragmented narrative form thus becomes an exercise in constructing a cosmological unity, with past, present, and future held simultaneously in view and nothing left to slip away beyond our reach. For Tally, this is wholly “characteristic of Vonnegut’s modernism: the need for experimental narrative techniques (such as stream-of-consciousness, collage, time-warps) to do justice to what is really real, something that the older modes of realism were seemingly unable to accomplish. This marks Vonnegut’s wholly modernist view of reality” (78).

    Though questions regarding Vonnegut’s narrative techniques may seem to be of limited literary-critical interest, Tally shows how they prove reflective of Vonnegut’s “Tralfamadorian ethics,” an ethics infused with Nietzschean amor fati, or “love of fate,” and one that Tally argues is peculiarly “suited to Vonnegut’s modernist approach to the postmodern condition” (71). Billy’s disillusionment with time as linear phenomenon not only affects the novel’s narrative structure, but it also leads him to accept that which he has no power to change, namely the pervasive reality of death. Billy articulates this acceptance in a letter he writes to the editors of his local newspaper, an example Tally highlights as evidence of his peculiar ethics: “When a Tralfamadorian sees a corpse, all he thinks is that the dead person is in a bad condition in that particular moment, but that the same person is just fine in plenty of other moments. Now, when I myself hear that somebody is dead, I simply shrug and say what the Tralfamadorians say about dead people, which is ‘So it goes’” (34). The specific context of Billy’s struggle with death is the trauma he experiences after witnessing the American firebombing of Dresden, an event that Vonnegut also witnessed during his military service in World War Two. Hundreds of thousands of German civilians perished during the attack, and Billy’s postwar experiences—including the experience of seeing his son deploy to fight in Vietnam, a detail that provides the immediate political context of this self-professed anti-war novel—are haunted by his memories of the Dresden dead. Slaughterhouse-Five is, to a significant degree, an attempt to grapple with a world in which even those forces that seem most committed to liberty and justice engage in indiscriminate acts of mass murder. Nietzsche’s eternal return, a theory meant to liberate human psychology from the anxiety and resentment bound up in the wish to both alter the past and change an inevitable future, provides Tally with the theoretical means to figure the fatalism expressed in the phrase “So it goes” as the “appropriate response to death, as well as an affirmation of life” (75). It also allows him to synthesize Vonnegut’s style and ethics in such a way as to illuminate the paradox at the core of Vonnegut’s seemingly progressive politics, namely the belief that the world is as it is because it cannot be otherwise.

    In what is his most significant contribution to our understanding of Vonnegut’s work, Tally proposes the term “misanthropic humanism” to describe Vonnegut’s cheerful fatalism. Misanthropic humanism is a useful term because it explains how a body of work can seem committed to a radical project for progressive sociopolitical change, while simultaneously holding forth a constant reminder that cruelty, injustice, stupidity, and death are inevitabilities that strike at all in the end. There can be no question that Vonnegut cares deeply about the fate of humanity; his best novels expose the sometimes subtle pathologies that produce unparalleled suffering in the contemporary world, and they do so in such a way as to stir lasting sympathies in his audience. But the humanity Vonnegut cares so deeply about is, in his view, a species with self-destructive tendencies written into its very biology. The notion that human beings function as cells in a social organism, and biologically have to be a certain way, as Vonnegut insists they must in his Playboy interview, underwrites his misanthropic humanism and infuses his fiction with the humor of those destined for the gallows without hope of escape. Indeed, there is no hope for escape precisely because we are human. Tally argues that Vonnegut’s work “shows how human beings themselves are the greatest, indeed perhaps the only, impediment to human freedom and happiness,” and that this circumstance cannot be otherwise because our most debilitating qualities emerge from the inevitable inner-failing of human nature itself (23). Tally has a keen eye for how Vonnegut’s misanthropic humanism manifests itself through nearly every one of his novels, and though his study cannot ultimately resolve the contradiction of a progressive politics that denies the possibility of progress (this is Vonnegut’s failure, not Tally’s), it goes a long way toward clarifying some of the more paradoxical aspects of Vonnegut’s politics.

    Vonnegut stresses a pointed view of humanity as innately self-destructive throughout his oeuvre, beginning with his 1952 debut novel Player Piano, and extending into the late stages of his long career (his 1985 novel Galápagos is a good example). Indeed, in ranging over each of Vonnegut’s fourteen novels, Tally reveals the far-reaching ways in which Vonnegut’s work not only highlights humanity’s self-destructive tendencies, but also suggests that human beings lack basic free will. For example, he draws on Vonnegut’s first novel, Player Piano, to illustrate how his fiction “blurs the lines between man and machine, showing not just how humans are being replaced by machines or how machines have dehumanized American society (the ostensible themes of Player Piano), but that humans are themselves machines” (21; my emphasis). Set in a dystopian America in which an automated economy has deprived most people of meaningful work, Player Piano expresses the pervasive sense of corporate, middle-class angst captured most famously by Sloan Wilson’s novel The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit (1955). However, Vonnegut’s debut differs from most other 1950s novels of its sort by imagining a revolutionary movement that acts to restore power and dignity to a people dispossessed by a technocratic economic-political system. In this regard, Vonnegut’s fiction anticipates sociologist Theodore Roszak’s important study of the New Left’s opposition to technocratic values in his book The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition (1969). Yet unlike those New Left activists motivated by the belief that a better world is possible, Vonnegut has his revolution fail at the very moment of its success. Immediately after Vonnegut’s dissident neo-Luddite zealots smash all the machines, they begin testing their technical know-how by first explaining and then repairing the technology they have just destroyed, thus taking the first step toward reestablishing the technocratic regime that had dispossessed them in the first place. It’s as if they can’t help but undermine their own liberation. In other words, the revolution fails not because it runs up against an implacable, dehumanizing system, but rather because such failure is written into human nature itself.

    Vonnegut’s work suggests that such failures are more than political; they are an innate part of human biology, which is hardwired for self-destructive behavior. This belief is what allows Vonnegut to care so deeply about humanity while simultaneously holding it squarely responsible for all of the world’s troubles. Tally makes this point clear when he writes, “Vonnegut sees most people as fundamentally flawed, petty, avaricious, and prone to acts of almost incredible cruelty. Yet, for all that, Vonnegut also cannot abandon humanity; he marvels at man’s folly, noting sadly or just curiously man’s absurd perseverance, as in the bittersweet image of the triumphant Luddites who, at the end of Player Piano, proudly put back together the very machines they had broken. In Galápagos, Vonnegut takes further pity on people, arguing that it was never their fault that they were silly, arrogant, and cruel. It was all due to their grotesquely oversized brains” (131). Absurd as this may sound, Vonnegut’s late novel Galápagos does indeed blame the evolutionary accident that led to our current brain size for everything from predatory economics and war to suicidal thoughts. In fact, the narrative fantasizes a world in which humans, through a dangerous mix of nuclear radiation and natural selection, evolve out of their debilitating brain size and into simpler brains incapable of advanced logical and/or moral reasoning. Only after humanity evolves into a species of seal-like creatures does the world achieve a sense of equilibrium. The joke is more-or-less transparent: we humans, with our advanced cognitive processes and opposable thumbs, our integrated economies and technologized wars, are a far baser lot than the simple-minded creatures splashing along the shores of the Galápagos islands. Better to be an animal than a human being when humans have done so much to degrade the world. But behind Vonnegut’s joke is a pathetic fatalism that holds forth biological evolution as the only feasible solution to the very real problems facing our world. According to this view, humanity will only be relieved of the destruction it visits upon itself and its environment when it ceases to be comprised of humans. A posthuman condition—or as Tally would have it, “a new humanism without the human”—thus becomes the only way to overcome the compelling, though ultimately frustrating misanthropy that infuses Vonnegut’s important body of work (132).

    Kurt Vonnegut and the American Novel does much to reposition Vonnegut as a major American writer. By approaching Vonnegut’s oeuvre as an integrated postmodern iconography, a strategic project bridging the gap between modernism and postmodernism, Tally reveals Vonnegut to be a serious, deeply imaginative writer whose fictions intervene in major intellectual debates—political and theoretical—that continue to impact contemporary social developments. Tally thus begins to correct the general paucity of scholarship on Vonnegut’s work, and he does so with a critical agility that not only allows him to touch on all of Vonnegut’s major fictions, but also to situate those fictions in relation to American literary history, continental philosophy, modernist and postmodernist aesthetics, and progressive politics. But what stands out most remarkably in this study is Tally’s theory of Vonnegut as misanthropic humanist. In bringing together these two seemingly oppositional terms, Tally lays bare the raison d’être of Vonnegut’s black humor, which is to find a way to embrace a self-degrading humanity that—through inevitable historical forces and biological determinism—cannot do otherwise but construct the mechanisms of its own destruction. Vonnegut’s black humor thus reveals the contours of what I now think of as a politics of comic futility. It’s important to note, however, that despite the fatalism that underwrites Vonnegut’s misanthropic humanism, his novels do struggle against seemingly insurmountable forms of violence and injustice, and they do so while maintaining a cheerful spirit that encourages political engagement even as they dismiss political activism as a quixotic pursuit of the impossible. As Tally notes at the conclusion of his illuminating study, Vonnegut “recognizes the demeanor and comportment best suited for engaging in a project such as he faces, and we face at the end of the American Century, and moving into another, as yet unknown, era. As Nietzsche put it, ‘Maintaining cheerfulness in the midst of a gloomy affair, fraught with immeasurable responsibility, is no small feat; and yet what is needed more than cheerfulness? Nothing succeeds without high spirits having a part in it’” (159).

    Micah Robbins is Assistant Professor of English at the American University in Dubai. His work focuses on the intersections between contemporary literature, radical politics, and small press publishing/alternative media, especially as these relate to the cultures of dissent that developed during the Cold War. He is currently revising his book manuscript, Total Assault on the Culture! Radical Satire and the Rhetoric of Liberation. You can learn more about his work at micahrobbins.com.

    Notes

    1. Tom Hayden et al., “Port Huron Statement,” H-Net, accessed August 19, 2015, http://www.h-net.org/~hst306/documents/huron.html.
    2. For more on this ethos and how it diminishes the force of Vonnegut’s satire, see Steven Weisenburger, Fables of Subversion: Satire and the American Novel, 1930-1980 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 176.
    3. Kurt Vonnegut, interviewed by David Standish, “Playboy Interview,” in Conversations with Kurt Vonnegut, ed. William Rodney Allen (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1988), 76-77.

  • John Champagne — Making and Unmaking Primo Levi

    John Champagne — Making and Unmaking Primo Levi

     

    By John Champagne

    First of all, I believe that we should argue for a withdrawal from Lebanon. Then it is just as urgent to stop further construction of settlements in the occupied territories. After that, as I was saying, I would cautiously but firmly move on a withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza.

    Primo Levi, “If This is a State,” 1984

    Introduction

    The monthly magazine of the Comunità Ebraica di Roma (Jewish Congregation of Rome), Shalom, publicizes events of local interest; the June 2013 issue thus included “Primo Levi among us,” announcing the exhibition “Survivor: Primo Levi in the portraits of Larry Rivers” (De Canino 2013, 41). Housed in the Museo Ebraico di Roma, in the room titled “From Emancipation to Today,” the exhibition ran from May 9 to October 15, 2013. It was organized around three multimedia works: Survivor (cm. 186 x 152.5 x 15), Periodic Table (named after one of Levi’s most famous collections of personal essays; cm. 186 h x 146 x 15), and Witness (cm. 191 H X 162.5 X 15), each a half-length portrait of the Turinese writer (Melasecchi 2013).1 Previously housed in a conference room at the Turin offices of La Stampa (to which, between 1959 and 1968, Levi contributed regularly), these portraits had never before been available to the public.2

    That same issue of Shalom also included the article “Zionism, a Word not Everyone Understands” (Volli 2013). 3 An examination of “an infinite campaign of delegitimation and demonization throughout the world” against Israel, the article identifies recent critiques of that nation-state from both the left and right. Linking such critiques to the “degeneration of anti-Israelian sentiment in terrorism,” the article particularly laments that even the “official press of Italian Judaism” has recently published attacks on Israel. One example cited is an essay by Simon Levis Sullam (2013) that “takes as its starting point the attack on the synagogue of Rome of 1982 for a profound delegitimation of Israel, ‘of its leadership and its disastrous politics’” (Volli 2013; the words in quotation marks are Sullam’s). Interestingly, the Shalom writer has left off, deliberately or otherwise, some of Sullam’s words, as the quotation actually ends with “of the last few years.”

    The co-locating, in Shalom, of these two articles adventitiously summons up the ongoing struggle among those affiliated with Italian Jewry to determine the meaning of Primo Levi.4 On the one hand, certain employments of Levi seek to restrict his meaning largely to “Italian Jewish writer” and “Shoah survivor”; on the other, there are efforts to make of the writer an “empty signifier” whose performative function is to condense “a diversity of issues into a relatively stable political project” (Dean 2010, 43-44) and thus “bring into existence political agendas that only tenuously existed before” (44).5 These diverse issues could potentially include not only Levi’s pacifism and critique of anti-Semitism but also a critique of the Israeli occupation and even a critique of humanism (Ross 2010). Perhaps it is apt that Levi once described himself as a centaur – an identity summarized by Marco Belpoliti as embodying not only “the presence of opposites, but also the union of man and beast, of impulse and ratiocination, an unstable union destined to break down. The man-horse is an emblem of the radical internal opposition that every survivor lived through”(2001, xx).

    This semiotic struggle to signify Levi has a long history (Cheyette 2007), one that reached a kind of denouement in 1982 and its traumatic events, including the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the massacres at Sabra and Shatila, and the bombing of Rome’s Tempio Maggiore or Great Synagogue (Marzano and Schwarz 2013; Molinari 1995). Levi’s death in 1987 has attenuated this struggle, for it marked a point wherein what the author said or did not say about Israel, as well as his relationship to his Italian Jewish identity, became a matter not only of scholarship and speculation but sometimes heated polemic. (While the circumstances of Levi’s death are ambiguous, [see Gambetta 1999], a comment on a New Yorker blog in 2013 posted that both Levi’s critique of Israel and his suicide were the product of “his pitiable depressive mental illness”; Eeman 2013.)6

    In Politics out of History, Wendy O. Brown (2001) explores some of the “new political and epistemological possibilities” emerging from the ruins of modernity (2001, 5). Working through post-structuralism’s critique of metaphysics, metanarratives, and foundationalism, Brown seeks “to craft a fruitful form of historical-political consciousness” (16), one that “does not resort to discredited narratives of systematicity, periodicity, laws of development, or a bounded, coherent past and present” (143). Brown’s project is in sympathy with a number of other interventions in the wake of the critique of foundationalism, from what is called the aesthetic turn in political theory, to the queer unhistoricism debates in Renaissance studies, to post-colonial historiography as pursued by the Subaltern Studies group.7 All of these interventions hope to conjure a method of historical thinking that avoids a crude historicism. All circle around a series of relationships perhaps most characteristically articulated by Walter Benjamin: between aesthetics and politics, the past and the present, historicism and historicity (1968, 2014).

    Reading both Brown and Jacques Derrida, queer Renaissance scholar Carla Freccero uses the tropes of haunting and spectrality to describe an affective relationship to the past and the obligations it brings. “Thinking historicity through haunting thus combines both the seeming objectivity of events and the subjectivity of their affective afterlife,” Freccero suggests (2006, 76). Following Derrida, she employs the term “spectrality” to refer to “the way the past or the future presses upon us with a kind of insistence or demand, a demand to which we must somehow respond” (70). Freccero glosses Derrida’s term as an attempt “to describe a mode of historical attentiveness that the living might have to what is not present but somehow appears as a figure or a voice” (69-70). Clearly, we – those of us with an investment in Italian Jewry – are haunted by the figure of Levi. Rivers’s portraits, their recent exhibition by the Museo Ebraico di Roma, the photographs, poems, and objects included in the exhibition, all constitute a form of spectrality; “something ghostly is being conjured to address a way of calling and being called to historical and ethical accountability” (69).

    In what follows, I read Larry Rivers’s portraits of Levi against the backdrop of some of the discursive contexts in which they were – and are – embedded and exhibited. For the Rivers exhibition exposes the contradictory meanings assigned to Levi. This is not deliberate on the museum’s part; rather, it is the result of a series of complex circumstances, including the history of the museum, its relationship to the Comunità, its contradictory museological agendas, and the history of Italian Jewry and Italian Jewish identities. An analysis of Rivers’s portraits in the context of the exhibition illustrates some of the competing contemporary meanings of Primo Levi.

    For, as the very title of the exhibit (“Primo Levi Among Us”) reveals, “Primo Levi” has come to signify this question: “What, today, is an Italian Jew?” It is a question so fractious that the single, sustained scholarly attempt in Italian to answer it – Shaul Bassi’s booklength study, Essere qualcun altro (To be someone else) – has gone virtually unremarked by the Italian Jewish press. Bassi writes, “The majority of Italian Jews are for all practical purposes reformed in their mentality and religious practice, but are viscerally hostile to institutionalizing this condition,” sentimentalizing religious orthodoxy but unwilling or uninterested in fully observing halakhà (2011, 252-3). The historical, economic, and political conditions that have made this possible are outlined in Bassi’s book and will only be alluded to here, but, according to one Italian Jewish journalist writing not in Italian but rather English, “In Italy, a Traditional Jewish Lifestyle is Disappearing” (Momigliano 2013).

    I argue that “Primo Levi” has become a metonymy for that lifestyle, with both Orthodox and reform-minded Italian Jews (which, as Bassi suggests, might in some cases be one and the same) claiming to be its representatives and feeling equally embattled. Both Orthodox and reform-oriented Jews recognize that the community risks, in Momigliano’s term, disappearing. The Orthodox response, however, is to shore up the boundaries of Italian Jewish identity and in the process make them less permeable – a condition that both Bassi and Momigliano argue is anathema to the history of Italian Judaism. As the subtitle of Bassi’s book suggests, reform-oriented Jews propose a postmodern, postcolonial Judaism that would deconstruct the categories by which Judaism historically has been defined, by both its “inside” and “outside,” philo- and anti-semitism. (Bassi’s position is informed by what is called in English “New Jewish Cultural Studies”; see Bassi 2011, 51-73. On the New Jewish Cultural Studies, see, for example, Cheyette and Marcus 1998; 2002; Boyarin and Boyarin 1997; Eilberg-Schwartz 1992; Gilman 2003; Gruber 2002; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998.)

    As for my formal analysis of the portraits, I see it as a necessary step that brings together aesthetics and politics – the latter conceived here not as “mere policing” but rather as “an event of dissensus” (Shapiro 2013, 140; on this definition of politics, see also Rancière 1999). Attentive to the sensuous specificity of the art work and the way that the art object potentially binds together affects and thoughts so as to propose alternative modes of being, my analysis seeks to foster a critical attitude that “presents a challenge to identity politics in general” and encourage “self-reflection rather than capitulation to the already-institutionalized identity spaces available within prevailing power arrangements – even those on which some challenging social movements are predicated” (shapiro 2013, 8). The formal inventiveness of Rivers’s portraits is in keeping with Levi’s own attempts to express the Shoah, a trauma that defied expression through language (2005, 23), and Rivers’s portraits are themselves an effort to re-figure Levi. In short, for both Rivers and perhaps even Levi himself, “Primo Levi” functions as what Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 177) have called an “aesthetic figure”: “sensations, percepts and affects, landscapes and faces, visions and becoming” – terms that, uncannily, seem to refer specifically to Rivers’s portraits.

    My hope is that, simultaneously, my formal analysis of the portraits is an answer to a prescient question for anyone writing about art who seeks to circumvent both a “necrological model” of historiography (Freccero 2006, 70) that would “entomb within writing the lost other of the past” and a related model, historiography as “outright mastery or appropriation” (71):

    Is it possible to escape the descriptive illusion in any way other than by denouncing the representationalist hypothesis from which it proceeds, while retaining the rights to an analysis that’s not about painting but rather proceeds with it, but that doesn’t necessitate our allowing ourselves to be spoken by it, like that “experiment with the past” which, according to Walter Benjamin, is history? (Damisch 1994, 263)8

    By “the representationalist hypothesis,” Damisch is referring to “the view that representation is the primary function of both language and art” (238). This hypothesis emphasizes the “constitutive transparency” of the sign and “the impossibility of its reflecting on itself in the process of representation” (269). In other words, the representationalist hypothesis is underwritten by a realist epistemology that, as my formal analysis of the portraits will demonstrate, Rivers rejects.

    Given its explicit critique of identity politics, my reading thus challenges or at least re-contextualizes some of the ways in which those responsible for the Levi exhibit deploy his figure. Here, for example, is the Museo Ebraico’s sense of what is at stake in the meaning of Levi as evidenced in the words of its current director, Alessandra Di Castro. Note in particular the emphasis on identity:

    Survivor. Primo Levi in the portraits Larry Rivers” is the first interdisciplinary show that sets its sights on the contemporary: the struggle is to render the Museo Ebraico di Roma “narrator” of our identity today, both as Jews and Italians. Primo Levi is the emblem, the cornerstone of this new discourse. Across the three portraits, Rivers recounts Levi in all his aspects: the writer, the scientist, the man who was subject to the racial laws and deportation, and the testimony of his experience in the extermination camps.

    “In memoria,” 2013.

    How does the Comunità’s museum take on the challenge of narrating, via the figure of Levi, an identity (and accompanying politics) that is both Italian and Jewish? Of what does this “new discourse” consist, and how does it interact with traces of previous readings of Levi, at least one of which the museum itself highlights?

    For “Survivor: Primo Levi” shared space with several items from its “Emancipation” room left in situ, including a wall panel describing the negative response of (what in the museum text are) unnamed Italian Jewish intellectuals to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and the events of Sabra and Shatila.9 That is, within meters of a narrative of what the museum calls (arguably, misleadingly) “the first, painful division of the community over the subject of Israel” were three large portraits of the man who embodied that division (Di Castro 2010, 61). As Marcella Simoni and Arturo Marzano (2010, 33) have argued, “In terms of the mobilization of intellectuals, the most definitive” condemnation of the government of then Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s invasion, euphemistically titled “Peace in Galilee,” came from Levi, who accused Begin of “exploiting the Shoah with the goal of a national mobilization in Israel”(Simoni and Marzano’s words). Yet neither the museum wall text nor the exhibition mentioned this coincidence.

    Of course, this was not simply a coincidence in that the room chosen for the Levi exhibition is one that normally houses material from the 1900s, including the Shoah. In an effort to create space for the show, some items were relocated temporarily to other rooms, while others were left in place. As a result of the way the museum imagines Roman Jewry from antiquity up until today, the 1900 room has deliberately constructed relationships between Emancipation, Italian Zionism, Italian Jewish Resistance to Fascism, the Shoah in Italy, the “birth” of the state of Israel, and the events that post-date the 1967 war, including the invasion of Lebanon, Italian response to that invasion, and, on October 9 of that year, the attack on the Tempio Maggiore by members of the Abu Nidal terrorist organization that resulted in the death of two-year-old Stefano Gay Taché and the wounding of thirty-seven others (Champagne and Clasby, forthcoming).10 Via the recent exhibition, Levi has been (re)inserted into this context.11

    The museum began as a temporary space for the Community’s liturgical objects, many dating as far back as the Counter-Reformation; expanded first into a museum directed primarily toward Jews visiting Rome from North America; and then adopted, in 2005, a program of renovation and reorganization from a chronological to a thematic itinerary.(See Di Castro 2010,13-18 for a history of the museum).12 This reorganization was predicated on a nineteenth-century museum aesthetic of pedagogy (Crane 1997) seeking to educate an audience of Jews and non-Jews, Italians and non-Italians, alike.13 So, for example, while the museum’s explanation of religious Judaism is Orthodox, and thus includes unequivocal statements such as that Jewish law requires that men must cover their heads “at all times, and not only in the synagogue” ((Di Castro 2010, 103), its commitment to the reality of Italian Jewish historical experience necessarily exposes other versions of Italian Judaism. Caught between at least three competing agendas – the preservation of the Community’s history and artifacts, the education of non-Jews in the religious practices of Orthodox Judaism, and a specifically twenty-first-century museological agenda of inviting commentary and controversy, to which, as Alessandra Di Castro’s remarks suggest, the Levi exhibition in part responds – the museum is necessarily marked by contradictions that constitute its very conditions of possibility.14 This contemporary museological agenda is itself a response to Benjamin’s work and the critique of the museum that followed in its wake. (See, for example, Crimp 1999).

    Pre-Text: Primo Levi, Italian Judaism, and Israel

    There has been a Jewish presence in Italy since antiquity, and, unlike many other regions in Europe, Italy never expelled its Jews (Mendel, 2005).15 Italy was also, however, responsible for the invention of the ghetto, the first of which dates from sixteenth-century Venice. In 1555, as part of the Catholic response to the Protestant Reformation, Pope Paul the IV issued Cum nimis absurdum, the Papal bull that revoked Jewish rights in the Papal states, forced Jews to live in ghettos and wear visible signs so that “they may be recognized everywhere,” and limited Jews in terms of their occupations.16

    It is extremely difficult to generalize about the long and rich history of Italian Jewry prior to Italian Unification, given the very different circumstances Jews faced throughout the territory of present day Italy. For example, while both Venetian and Roman Jews were confined to ghettos, the former, owing to a variety of factors including the Republic’s desire to maintain autonomy from the papacy and its recognition of the economic and trade benefits of a Jewish presence, flourished despite their oppression, developing a rich artistic and intellectual culture whose influence spread far beyond the ghetto walls; Roman Jews, under the thumb of the papacy, instead lived in poverty.17 At various times in European history, Jews fled from other lands to Italy; as a result of the Spanish expulsion of 1492, for example, many Italian Jewish communities saw the arrival of new members, who, because of the ghetto laws, were by the late sixteenth century typically required to worship in a single synagogue, despite the varying rituals that had developed as a result of the Diasporas. Like their Venetian co-religionists, Jews in Livorno flourished – under the Medici, who were interested in attracting Sephardic merchants expelled from Spain (Trivellato 2009). The Habsburgs similarly saw the advantage of the Jews of Trieste: “All Jews who could increase the commerce of the free port were welcome” (Dubin 1996, 61)

    Italy’s Jews were first emancipated by the Napoleonic conquest, but anti-Jewish laws were reinstated via the Restoration. The Jews of Turin were emancipated in 1848 by Carlo Alberto Savoy, at that time King of Sardinia (which included Piedmont). Italian Jews largely participated in and supported the Risorgimento and the unification of Italy; it was not until Rome was added to a unified Italy that Roman Jews were emancipated, and various congregations in Italy – among them, Rome and Florence – built monumental synagogues in the wake of unification. As one writer suggests, among Jews, the emancipation brought “the explosion of political passion for liberal and socialist ideas” (Molinari 1995,7; on the role Jews played in Italian Unification, see also Molinari 1991).

    During this same period, the papacy was resolutely opposed to Italian Unification (Webster 1960, 5-9), and, even after the founding of the state, discouraged Catholic participation in the political, social, and economic life of Italy – a situation that remained until Mussolini signed, on behalf of King Victor Emanuel III, the 1929 Lateran Pacts. As a result of this history, it is misleading to speak chiefly of Jewish Italian “assimilation,” as the national identity of Italian Jews was formed contemporaneously with the process of Italian Unification (Molinari 1991, 26). Italian Jewish identity must be understood historically as “in continual precarious balance between integration and assimilation” (26).

    Prior to the 1938 racial laws, some Jews belonged to the Fascist party, while others opposed Fascism. Levi’s natal city of Turin was a center of resistance activity (Nezri-Dufour 2002, 20-21), and many of its intellectuals were members of the underground anti-Fascist organization Giustizia e libertà (Ward 2007, 11). Founded in 1929, the organization had members both within Italy and abroad (Shain 2005, 99). It had a significant Jewish membership, and, in March of 1934, several of its members from Turin were arrested for anti-Fascist activity (Sarfatti 2006, 69-79; Zuccotti 1996, 28-29; Nezri-Dufour 2002, 21-22; Felice 2001, 134-37). Despite the fact that the members of the organization were not Zionists, the incident set off a debate in the Fascist press concerning whether or not Italian Jews’ loyalty was divided between Israel and the country of their citizenship.

    The question of Levi’s relationship to his Jewishness is a complex one. Levi wrote that it was only as an effect of the 1938 anti-Jewish laws and his deportation to Auschwitz that he came to see himself as Jewish (Levi 1984b, 376, Parussa 2005).18 In one of his memoirs he describes being “amazed” that the end of the war did not bring an end to anti-Semitism (1987, 41).19 Levi’s family was not religious but did celebrate certain holidays like Rosh Hashanah, Passover, and Purim (Levi 1984, 377). His parents had been married in the synagogue (Thomson 2002, 16); Levi was circumcised according to Jewish custom (Thomson 2002, 18) and had a Bar Mitzvah and the necessary religious training preceding that ceremony.20 While Levi was far enough along in his own studies that anti-Jewish laws did not interrupt his university education, his younger sister was, like all Jewish children, expelled from her state school in 1938 (83-84).

    On the complexity of Levi’s identity, Nancy Harrowitz has argued that “Levi’s family and Levi himself had a distinct Jewish identity, which was in part religious, and could not straightforwardly be labeled ‘assimilated’” (Harrowitz 2007,18). Indeed, Levi’s family was typical of many other Italian Jewish families of the time in that they embraced “a so-called ‘secular’ or ‘cultural’ Judaism” (2007, 17; on such families and their identities as Jews, including Levi’s, see also Nezri-Dufour 2002, 13-19). Paola Valabrega (1997, 264) describes Levi’s as “a typical Jewish family, depository of an atavistic code of values.” She also emphasizes the way Levi’s Jewish identity was deeply tied to his family history and memories and identifies this fondness for the family (and the symbol of the family as haven) as a typically Jewish trope (268). Another important aspect of Levi’s Jewish identity was an association of Judaism with a passion for learning, subtle debate, and “the world of books” (Levi, cited in Nezri-Dufour 2002, 15).

    According to Levi and many other “cultural” Jews, this lack of orthodox religiosity was due to the fact that Jewish emancipation was the fruit of the secular character of the Italian Risorgimento (Levi 1984b, 76; Nezri-Dufour 2002, 17). In a 1984 interview, Levi stated, “I am in favor of the integration of Jews in Italy, but not of their assimilation, their disappearance, the dissolution of their culture. Right here in Turin, there is an example of a Jewish community that is fully integrated into the life and culture of the city, but not assimilated”(1984a).

    As we will see, however, Levi’s understanding of Italian Judaism, at least as summarized by Harrowitz, is not in keeping with the Comunità Ebraica di Roma’s Orthodoxy. As Harrowitz writes, Levi’s family was “perhaps closer to what contemporary British or American Jews would call, respectively, Reform or Conservative Judaism” (Harrowitz 2007, 17). Levi also resisted being categorized, in the United States in particular, as a “Jewish writer” (Cheyette 2007, 67). He is reputed to have said once, “I don’t like labels. Germans do” (Angier 200 2, 645). On the other hand, according to one critic, “Levi rarely missed an opportunity to identify himself as Jewish throughout his writings” (Sungolowsky 2005, 75).

    This tension between Orthodoxy and Levi’s Judaism is perhaps most rigorously emblematized in the fact that the Jewish Museum of Rome both claims and does not claim Levi as one of the Comunità’s own. In mounting the Rivers’s exhibit and framing that exhibit via the above-cited comments by the Museum’s director, the Museum itself clearly construes Levi as not only Jewish but as a model of contemporary Italian Jewish identity.21 Yet as I have mentioned, he is not named in the museum’s in situ wall commentary concerning the Comunità’s response to both the invasion of Lebanon and the events of Sabra and Shatila.

    As for Zionism, at least one biographer has argued that Levi was ambivalent, suggesting that, prior to the Shoah, while he “admired the ideals of left-wing Zionism,” he was not a Zionist himself (Angier 2002, 628). This same biography suggests this changed after the war, as Levi felt the Jews needed a home where they might be safe from persecution.22 “But immediately he had had doubts and reservations: about the Palestinian expulsions, about the nascent militarism of this homeland born of war” (638). Levi visited Israel for the first and only time in 1968 and was disturbed by its militarism and the fact that securing a home for those Jews who had been dispersed by the Shoah occurred without regard to the Arabs living in the region (Thomson 200 2, 340-42). By the 1980s, Levi was “one of the promoters of an appeal for withdrawal of the troops and for a peace process to guarantee a homeland to those who did not have one” (Belpoliti 2001, xxv). Late in his career, he gave an interview in which he suggested that in the “center of gravity” of Jewish life was in the Diaspora and that he valued the “dispersed, polycentric” quality of Jewish culture (1984a 290-91).

    Since Emancipation, some Italian Jews were at best ambivalent about Zionism.23 A phenomenon linked to Tarquini’s analysis was raised often in post-emancipation defenses of Zionism, particularly when Mussolini made a point of questioning Italian Jews’ commitment to their nation. 24 As Rabbi Sonnino’s comments suggest, Italians had a long history of sending monetary contributions to poor Jews living in the Middle East. Michele Sarfatti refers to this as “philanthropic Zionism,” which also sought to free Jews from anti-Semitic persecution (Sarfatti 2006, 11-12). For at least some Italian Jews, however, this did not translate into support for a nascent Jewish state. An Italian historian of science has suggested that Italian Jewish support for Zionism “was of only marginal significance until the pressure of the [Fascist] regime convinced the Jews to turn in that direction” (Israel 2004).

    On the other hand, it has also been suggested that, by the beginning of the twentieth century, Italian rabbis “supported Zionism almost without exception” (Laquer 2003, 161). Bringing these two comments together, a noted Italian Jewish scholar argues that “Italian Zionism before the racial laws was essentially the result of the actions of a group of rabbis” (Segre 2000, 190). In any case, both prior to and following the war, Italian Jews did not immigrate in significant numbers to Israel.

    Historians have argued, however, that, following the war, changes in the leadership of the Comunità, on both the national and local levels – specifically, the active part played in Jewish intellectual and cultural life by surviving anti-fascist, pro-Zionist Italian Jews – led to “a general acceptance of Zionism as a key reference point in Italian-Jewish identity”(Schwarz 2009, 370). However, “new instability arose when (beginning from 1956 but growing more obvious since 1967) a clearer anti-Zionist position emerged in these [Communist and Socialist Italian political] parties, unsettling the position of many individual Jews, as well as many Jewish youth organisations” (Schwarz 2009, 371). Furthermore, “in the post-war period, anti-Zionist feelings were still present within Italian Judaism, but they remained for the most part in the private sphere.” (Schwarz 2011, 51).

    In order to understand Levi’s later response to Israeli military policies, we might place that response in the larger context of Italian politics and Italy’s relationship to Israel. On the occasion of the Six Day War, the majority of Italian political forces, the Italian press, and public opinion all sided with Israel, filtering the conflict “through the prism of the common struggle against fascism and the memory of the racial persecution” (Marzano and Schwarz 2013, 48; on this period, see also Molinari 1995, 28-45; Di Figlia 2012, 77). That war also exposed, however, divisions within the Italian government, but a compromise was arrived at thanks to Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who “reaffirmed the right of every State to political independence, territorial integrity, and protection from threats and the use of force, but also considered it necessary to confront the question of the Israeli retreat from the occupied territories in view of a shared stable territorial arrangement of the various parties” (Marzano and Schwarz 2013, 51). In 1969, Levi himself joined a protest against Israeli military policy, a protest headed by a group of “left-wing Jewish intellectuals in Turin” (Angier 2002, 628). Along with thirty others, he signed a document arguing that Palestinian guerrilla activity was “not terrorism, but ‘resistance’” (Molinari 1995, 56). and defining Israel’s actions as destined to augment “extremist and expansionist positions” within Israeli society (57).

    By the time of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the political climate began to change; while the majority of Italian public opinion still favored Israel, there were increasing calls, by the leftist parties and press in particular, for the restitution of the territories occupied in 1967 and for the rights of the Palestinians to a “national and autonomous entity” (Achilli 1989, 187; Di Figlia 2012, 79-80). In 1975, in Levi’s home of Turin, a new journal, Ha-Keilà (The Community), was launched by a group of “progressive” (their own term) leftist Jews who supported the birth of an independent Palestinian states alongside Israel (Molinari 1995, 87; Di Figlia 2012, 104-09). By the end of the 1970s, in Italy and elsewhere, the Palestinians had become a symbol of a global, revolutionary struggle against imperialism (Marzano and Schwarz 2013, 73).

    While Levi never equated the Palestinians with the Jewish victims of Fascist violence, according to one writer, he “wished to situate the Holocaust in the context of global injustice” (Cheyette 2007, 69). This situating included a critique of France in Algeria and the United States in Vietnam. US support for Israel contributed to the perception of the Palestinians as engaged in a struggle for national liberation. As early as 1967, some members of the Italian left were in fact comparing the Israelis to the French and the Americans (Molinari 1995, 33). In Italy, anti-Imperialist struggles took on the particular symbolic contours of the memory of the Resistance and antifascism, which in turn led in some quarters to an equating of the policies of the Israeli government with Nazism (Marzano and Schwarz 2013, 29).25 By 1981, the situation was further complicated by a rise in right-wing anti-Semitism in Italy as well as anti-Semitic violence in Italy and abroad (100-104).

    By the time of the 1982 war in Lebanon, Italian public opinion was generally oriented toward a condemnation of Israel (Marzano and Schwarz 2013, 56). Levi has been described as “a key figure for understanding the spirit of the time” and someone who throughout the war in Lebanon received a great deal of media attention (157). Some of this attention was due to the recent release of his novel Se non ora, qunado? Harrowitz characterizes these years as ones in which Levi “tried to make the clear the distinctions between Jews and Zionists” (Harrowitz 2007, 20).

    As a result of the 1982 war in Lebanon, termed “Operation Peace in Galilee” by the Israelis, many Jews living in the Diaspora questioned the relationship between their communities and the state of Israel (Sullam 2013). Opinion was divided on whether Israeli actions constituted a defensive or offensive war. Several Italian Jewish intellectuals, including Primo Levi, signed “Perché Israele si ritiri,” or “Why Israel must withdraw,” a condemnation, published June 16, 1982, of the invasion.26 This document called for opposition to Begin and what the document characterized as the threat he represented, both to a democratic Israel and to the prospect of its peaceful coexistence with the Palestinian people (Scarpa and Soave 2012). It argued that “to combat Begin means to combat the germs of a new anti-Semitism” and called for the recognition of a “Palestinian Resistance” (cited in Molinari 1995, 106).

    On June 24, after calling Israel a country that “feels like my second home,” Levi stated his fear that the war in Lebanon, “frightfully costly in terms of blood, inflicts on Judaism a degradation that can be curable only with difficulty and a tarnished image” (1997, 1172). Three days later, in an interview in La Repubblica, Levi (1982b), while resisting the positing of an analogy between Hitler’s “Final Solution” and “the quite violent and quite terrible things the Israelis are doing today,” nevertheless argued, “a recent Palestinian diaspora exists that has something in common with the diaspora of two million years ago” (cited in Scarpa and Soave, 2012).27

    On July 6, 1982, in part in response to Levi’s condemnation, Jewish journalist Rosellina Balbi published, also in La Repubblica, “Davide, discolpati!”or “David, defend yourself!” an article justifying Israel’s actions as defensive and arguing that any critique of the state of Israel has punctually provoked across Europe “tremors of anti-Semitism” (quoted in Baroz, 2013). “Why Israel Must Withdraw” was also critiqued by other Italian Jews, including rabbi Scialom Bahbout, described as “one of the most charismatic of Rome” (Molinari 1995, 106), and head rabbi Elio Toaff.

    The issue of the war in Lebanon was brought to a head with the revelation of the September 16-18 massacre of several thousand Palestinian men, women, and children at the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. The massacre was perpetrated by Lebanese Christian Phalangists whom the Israeli army had invited into the camps (Mieli 2012; Shahid 2002, 38).28 and to whom they had provided logistical and operational support (Shahid 2002, 42).Following the massacre, in an interview in La Repubblica, Levi called for the resignation of Begin (1982a, 295-303). Levi stated that “for Begin, ‘fascist” is a definition I accept” (1982a, 298).”29 About the failure of the Israeli army to intervene in the atrocities, Levi said, “The massacre in these camps reminds me of what the Russians at Warsaw did in August of 1945; they stood by on Vistula while the Nazis exterminated Polish partisans. Certainly like all historical analogies, even mine is inexact. But Israel, like the Soviets then, could have intervened” (1982, 301). The next day, he and other Italian Jews demonstrated outside the Israeli embassy (Cicioni 1995, 129). This demonstration revealed “the rift between the two spirits” of the Italian Comunità, for “the traditional and popular base” of Roman Judaism was absent from the demonstration (Molinari 1995, 107). In 1983, an International Commission on the deaths at Sabra and Shatila concluded that Israel had violated international law, “systematically refused to settle its disputes peacefully” (MacBride et al 1983, 128) and “played a facilitative role in the actual killings” (130).

    The publication in 2012 of Matteo Di Figlia’s excellent Israele e la Sinistra, exploring the period from 1945 to today, reinvigorated the debates around Levi’s politics, prompting commentary from all sides of the political spectrum.30 Figlia’s book takes as its project a rereading of the participation of Jews and the Italian Left in the debates on Israel, seeking to complicate the treating of both Jews and the Left as monolithic and tracing out the specific trajectory of the thinking of individual Italian Jewish intellectuals. For example, he offers a more nuanced argument than the claim that those on the Italian left who pursued a pro-Palestinian line were simply following the lead of Cold War Moscow.

    Until the end of his life, Levi continued to speak out against Israeli military policy when it went beyond what he perceived as defensive. Following his death, and in a kind of summa of Levi’s sensibility, Stefano Levi Della Torre (1997) – a painter, scholar, professor of architecture, and cousin of Levi’s – wrote that Primo was considered by some “an irritating character”:

    the more embarrassing a critic, the more morally and intellectually authoritative, and representative of the most terrible of Jewish experiences. But for those Jews who envisaged “Hahavat Israel,” love for Israel, love for justice as well, and for that tolerance that is founded on memory (“Do not oppress a stranger, because you yourselves already know how it feels to be a stranger, because you were strangers in Egypt”, Exodus 23:9), Primo Levi was instead a teacher [maestro], despite that, as often is the case with teachers, he had neither the intention nor the presumption to be one. (261-262)

    The exhibition

    In 1987, shortly after Levi’s death, Gianni Agnelli commissioned Larry Rivers to create a portrait that would commemorate both the writer and at the same time the Jews exterminated by the Nazis. Agnelli – Fiat heir and tabloid and political figure – had studied in the same Turin liceo as Levi.31 [31] Rivers’s portraits thus constitute a kind of historiography as well as a premonition of what will be the aesthetic turn in political science. Yet it is one that, via its formal properties, is arguably not a history that would seek “to identify, and thus stabilize, the meaning of an event or a person” (Freccero 2006, 74).

    Reflecting Rivers’s aesthetic – a mingling of influences from abstract expressionism, cubist collage, and pop art – the portraits are assemblages: photographic images of Levi silk-screened, à la Andy Warhol, on canvas that has then been mounted on molded polyurethane foam, attached to a background and “supplemented” with additional images: painted and drawn directly on the canvas or modeled in polyurethane, abstract and representational. The effect is that of a reassembled three-dimensional puzzle hung vertically, Levi having been “pieced together” by Rivers from the traces left behind after his death.32

    Rivers’s developed some of these techniques, and their use in the depiction of Holocaust images, in his 1981 Four Seasons at Birkenau. A photograph of Jewish civilian prisoners in a forest is reproduced on foam core. Rivers then alters the image by drawing “over” it with colored pencils, cutting out various figures (people and trees) and pasting them on top of another piece of form core onto which the artist has drawn additional figures and trees. As in the case of the Levi portraits, an image has been both appropriated by the artist and altered.

    Being images of images, the portraits, like Four Seasons, seek to circumvent what Walter Benjamin so famously called the art work’s aura, as “the presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity” (2014). Rivers’s deconstruction of authenticity is of a piece with the “spectrality” of the portraits, suggesting that “we inherit not ‘what really happened’ to the dead but what lives on from that happening, what is conjured from it, how past generations and events occupy the force fields of the present, how they claim us, and how they haunt, plague, and inspirit our imaginations and visions for the future” (Brown 2001, 150). It suggests the way that art in the age of mechanical reproduction might contain certain conditions of possibility whereby we might “seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger” – whether that moment be the one in which the portraits were commissioned or the one we inhabit today (Benjamin 1968, 255).

    Four Season at Birkenau has a particularly complex relationship to linear perspective, as Rivers has “disassembled” a photograph (which relies for its illusion of three dimensions on the technology of the camera lens) and then “reassembled” it in a way that adopts from other representational systems “alternative” methods for creating the illusion of depth, such as layering images on top of one another and using the lower half of the canvas space to represent foreground and the upper half to represent distance. Employed in the painting of religious icons, for example, these precursors to linear perspective are rescued from the trash dump of history and cited by Rivers. Of course, Renaissance painting made use of a whole series of techniques, including the layering of images on top of one another, to create the illusion of depth. When juxtaposed with the rendering of perspective via a photograph, however, the “inferiority” of these other techniques (in terms of the degree to which they convey the illusion of depth) is foregrounded.

    These “non-Renaissance” means of imagining canvas space also refer in complex ways to forms of illustration like comics and advertising. On the one hand, comics often also reject perspective for other means of creating depth, and the Levi portraits in fact have a cartoon like quality that emphasizes drawing (and draftsmanship) over painting. On the other, Rivers’s use of photographs suggests advertising’s exploitation of cheap methods of color photography to create the illusion of an image that the consumer might possess. Rivers’s techniques of disassembly and over-drawing work against this particular aspect of advertising, perhaps constituting a version of Benjamin’s envisioned dialectical response to the invention of cheap forms of mechanical reproduction, the withering of the art work’s aura, and “the phony spell of a commodity” (1936).

    In contradistinction to Warhol, rather than musing primarily on the status of publicity, public relations, advertising, and news in commodity culture, Rivers focuses on historical and cultural icons and then alters them via drawing, painting, and sculpting.33 Rivers’s appropriations are characterized by a more obvious intervention of the artist’s hand than Warhol’s, in the form of both painting and drawing over the silk-screened photographs, in this case indicating a “working over” rather than a monumentalizing (in the Nietzschian sense) or even an advertising of a fixed image of Levi. Rivers’s works are thus a visual analogy for the post-war debates in cultural theory concerning the role of human agency in what is increasingly experienced as our collective subjection and subjugation to cultural, economic, and historical forces beyond the control of the individual. Additionally, the “playfulness” of Rivers’s pop aesthetic mitigates what Cheyette terms a tendency to “appropriate” Levi – as symbol of Christian redemption via suffering, for example (2007, 69). The title of one of the portraits, “Witness,” is a word Levi used to refer to himself, opposing it to both victim and one who seeks revenge (cited in Cheyette 2007, 70).

    Rivers’s re-imaging of canvas space and combining of media result in what Leo Steinberg so famously categorized as works that “no longer simulate vertical fields, but opaque flatbed horizontals” (Steinberg 1972, 44). The Levi portraits make “symbolic allusion to hard surfaces such as tabletops, studio floors, charts, bulletin boards – any receptor surface on which objects are scattered, on which data is entered, on which information may be received, printed, impressed – whether coherently or in confusion” (44). For while the portraits hang so that they are oriented to the standing human being, the works do not depend on this head- to-toe orientation any more than newspapers – or the photographs on which the portraits were based – do. They exemplify Steinberg’s “flatbed picture plane,” referring not to “the analogue of visual experience of nature but of operational processes” (1972, 84). Such an aesthetic suggests that the meaning of Levi is not transparent or self-evident but must be arrived at via labor – another way in which Rivers’s portraits are not simple appropriations but rather reinventions of Levi.

    Like the “work” of survival and mourning, Rivers’ techniques are a working over and through historical trauma. Rivers has taken on aesthetically the problem of representing what in static images is unrepresentable: the temporal and spatial simultaneity of past and present that occurs in the act of remembering, memory’s layering of the past over and under the present; the spatio-temporal discontinuity between the past and present; the almost unfathomable cruelty of the Shoah; Levi’s representation of that cruelty in prose, in Se Questo è un uomo specifically, that refuses to turn away from or even sentimentalize its horrors. That is, refusing the “critical orthodoxy” of the logic that dictates that only a documentary aesthetic is adequate to the representing of the Holocaust, Rivers has attempted to create a plastic equivalent of what it means to be a survivor of a historical trauma (on this orthodoxy, see Cheyette 2007, 68).

    Rivers’s layering of images on images “doubles” Levi so that his torso – and face, when shown in profile – appear to cast a shadow, but that shadow is itself constructed of foam core. In Survivor, for example, Levi’s right hand (which touches his chin), his nose, his lips, his shirt pocket and sleeves, and the nose of an internee are all modeled of polyurethane and layered on top of Levi’s “original” image, such that Rivers is building images upon images. Depending on how an exhibition space is lit, these raised areas will themselves cast shadows on the canvas, the irregularity of the layering ensuring that almost any lighting whatsoever will produce shadow somewhere on the portraits. As a survivor, Levi is always somewhere marked by shadow – but also by light.

    But not content simply to “add” to the canvas, Rivers also subtracts, cutting out sections. In Periodic Table, the doors of the crematory oven have been layered atop the canvas, as if the ovens had been constructed and then hollowed out to create their depth. Layered over the hollowed-out space are burning objects, and names of some of the elements are written in cursive script on the ovens – emphasizing the canvas’s flatness, as if it were a chalkboard. In Survivor, part of Levi’s forehead has been removed and an internee’s head inserted into it. (For an image of the photograph from which the internee is drawn, see Hunter 1989,52). These techniques foreground the constructedness of the image, re-introducing the artist’s hand into the work not in a gesture of self-expression but as a reminder of the iconicity of Levi and the construction of Levi as icon. Rivers’s work, then, is “figurative without being realist” (Jodidio 1990, 77) as well as a negative intervention in what Benjamin (1968) called “the long-since-counterfeit wealth of creative personality” (232).

    Another interesting technique of layering is the use of paint itself to connect the present with the past, sometimes represented on different spatial planes. For example, in Survivor, the past, represented by the stripes of a concentration camp internee’s uniform, “bleed” onto the portrait of Levi layered on top of the canvas. In Periodic Table, four black stripes, like the shadows of prison bars, connect a crematory oven with Levi’s portrait, which is layered on top of the oven. In Witness, Levi’s hair blends into the smoke from a crematorium, both painted in thick impasto.

    But this relationship in both portraits between past as background and present as foreground is simultaneously reversed: in Periodic Table, the left side of the crematory oven has been painted over Levi as survivor, but in such a way as to leave the writer visible. That is, the crematory oven is neither behind nor in front of Levi, but both at the same time (and vice versa), as if Levi’s head were partially translucent. Similarly, in Survivor, the internee is behind and on top of Levi at the same time, for while Levi is layered on top of the prisoner’s torso, the stripes from his uniform are painted on Levi’s face, and while Levi’s face is on the plane closest to the spectator, a space has been carved into Levi’s forehead, and the internee’s head inserted into it. Perhaps most startlingly and with much virtuosity, in Witness, a portrait of Levi has been placed onto the canvas-covered foam core surface, but then another picture has been literally “carved” into the writer. In an ironic use of trompe l’oeil, a barbed wire fence and a set of train tracks seem to be receding into Levi’s body. In the foreground are images of children of the Shoah, layered on top of the canvas and painted with varying degrees of abstraction. Levi himself is then placed in a room that resembles a bunker, but one apparently filled with the smoke of the crematory ovens, his hands, themselves on different planes, struggling to grasp the young victims.

    In all of these instances, though to varying degrees, Levi has been rendered translucent, his bodily identity and boundaries “interrupted” by memories and reminders of the Shoah. For the photographs from which all of the portraits have been constructed are from his years after having been an internee. The sum of these techniques is a brilliant paradox. In all three cases, the boundaries between Levi and the past have been both erased and reasserted. Present and past interrupt one another, not only temporally but spatially. Levi as survivor is behind, in front of, and traversed by images of the Shoah.

    The black lines that in two of the portraits traverse Levi’s face, while literally connecting the contemporary image of Levi to an image of the past, also reference both carbon and ash; as the brochure for the exhibition reminds us, “il carbone ha la stessa valenza della cenere,” “carbon has the same valence as ash.” Carbon is the main element in all organic matter; ash signifies both the horrors of the Shoah ovens and refers to God’s punishment of Adam and Eve in Genesis 3:19. In a related vein, the brochure mentions Rivers’s technique of “cancellation,” wherein the artist drew and then partially erased images. A technique Rivers developed via a series of drawings of Holocaust victims, this erasing is similar to the painting techniques employed by Rivers in the Levi portraits in at least two respects. On the one hand, it is another version of rendering the Holocaust victim “translucent,” there and not there at the same time, for, in the “canceled” drawings, parts of the figures have been erased. On the other, the erasing techniques lighten the hues of the colors and blur the drawings’ lines, creating diffuse patches and swaths of color. The ashy stripes and washes in the Levi portraits are thus painterly versions of cancellation, the washes re-presenting both color and its subtraction, the presence of the artist and his subtraction; “the lifework is preserved in this work and at the same time canceled” (Benjamin 1968, 263).34

    Additionally, Rivers’s washes of color and stripes also refer to American abstract expressionism, and in complex, ironic ways. For here and elsewhere, Rivers seems to be exploiting and commenting upon, in a mannerist fashion, the conceit of painting as gesture, as his contemporary Jasper Johns also did (On Rivers’s influence on Johns, see Hunter 1989, 25). On the one hand, the lines, as well as the loose, abstract shapes and washes of color that appear in all three canvases, reassert the flatness of those canvases. Spread across the canvas surfaces, the patches of color obstruct attempts to read the image perspectivally. Countering River’s building up of raised areas as well as those areas where he has resorted to the use of linear perspective – the crematory ovens of Perodic Table, the receding train tracks and barbed wire fence of Witness – the lines and washes of color create an interesting visual tension between the two and three dimensional that adds to the paintings’ deconstruction of a series of binary opposites: not simply flatness/depth but also foreground/background, past/present, inside/outside, present/absent. Complicating this tension even further is Rivers’s use of these washes of color in a more traditional manner – to shade Levi’s face and body. Once again, Rivers combines different representational systems simultaneously.

    Rivers’s critically reflexive appropriation of painting as gesture suggests that, in a post-Shoah world – the very world in which the American expressionists “stole the idea of modern art” (Guilbaut 1985) – the conceit of art as a vehicle for either self-expression or transcendence of material reality is obscene. In a related vein, in all three portraits, the abstract patches also read as so much dust – taking us back to the tropes of carbon and erasure. This is particularly true of Periodic Table, where the white painted areas dirtying Levi’s black suit resemble ashes from the crematory ovens. Similarly, in Witness, the smoke and ash from the ovens threatens to overtake the bunker and, as in the previous painting, Levi’s jacket is “stained” by abstract washes of color. The palette of all three canvases call up images of fire (via Levi’s skin tones in particular, but also, in Witness, the wash of color that connects Levi’s body with both the bunker in which he has been placed and the train tracks, barbed wire, and children) and ash.

    The Exhibition Context of the Portraits35

    In addition to the portraits, other elements of the exhibition included three photographic portraits of Levi; three glass cases; and commentary on the exhibition in the form of wall text (much of it reproduced, though in a different order, in the Italian language exhibition brochure); as well as the words, painted on the wall in Levi’s own hand-writing, of the poem with which Se questo è un uomo opens, “Shemà,” itself the “name of the central prayer in Judaism” (Harrowitz 2007, 28).Read scrupulously, this context is highly contradictory, a site in which competing models of a relation to the past are juxtaposed, sometimes even in the same artifact. For example, the preservation of Levi’s handwriting on the wall serves, in the space of a museum, an auratic function; like expressionist painting, it preserves traces of the dead author’s human presence. But the colored script also calls up the image of so much graffiti. Perhaps not surprisingly, although the exhibit has since closed, Levi’s poem remains on the museum’s walls.

    The first glass case contained the manuscript of “La Bambina di Pompeii”, a poem published first in La Stamp, December, 23, 1978, and successively in the collection Ad ora incerta of 1984. Rivers’s drawing technique of “cancellation” and its painterly phantom double have the paradoxical effect of making present an absence, much the way ash is an index of what no longer exists. “La Bambina is similarly about the presence of absence, for it recounts the traces in the present of murdered children. The plaster cast of one of Pompeii’s victims, the writings of Anne Frank, a Japanese schoolgirl transformed by Hiroshima into “ombra confitta nel muro dalla luce di mille soli,” (shadow driven into the wall by the light of a thousand suns): each is the visible reminder of a child erased from existence. As we will see, these images in turn potentially resonate with the wall text left in situ and its reminder of the children murdered in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.

    However, the enclosing of the manuscript in a glass case repeats the monumentalizing gesture of the other glass cases. They seek to reinvest the mechanically produced objects they contain with aura by conferring on them a “unique existence” in the space and time of the exhibit. If “the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition,” the enclosure of that object in a glass case re-endows the object with “cult value” (Benjamin 1936). Thus a first (1947) edition of Se questo, open to the first page of the chapter “Il Viaggio,” occupied the second glass case. The page describes the February 21, 1944 announcement that all Jews currently interned at Fossoli were to be deported: “Per ognuno che fosse mancato all’appello, dieci sarebbero stati fucilati/for each one missing at the roll call, ten will be executed.” The third case contained a leaflet advertising this same novel, on the back of which (and thus unable to be seen) was a print of the manuscript of “Shemà.” The leaflet copy does not mention Levi’s Jewishness, but perhaps this is simply because his name would be recognized as of Jewish origin.

    Three oversize black and white photographic portraits hung on one wall of the room. They include a portrait of a smiling young Levi seated on a bench in a garden at the home of his maternal grandparents; an image of the post-Shoah Levi in profile posed in front of a photograph of an internee lying in his bunk, the wideness of the latter’s gaze paradoxically suggesting both life and death simultaneously; a photo of Levi surrounded by students from the Scuola Media Rosselli. The overall effect of these photographs is haunting, as they remind us of Levi’s past (Levi portrayed as an adolescent, at an age where his arms and legs have grown so fast that they seem too long for his body); his survivor present, as depicted in the two portraits from the post-Shoah years; and his future death under ambiguous circumstances. But the photographs themselves are of little value, inexpensive reproductions of casual snapshots.

    The Portraits in the Context of the Emancipation Room

    In terms of what was left in situ in the room, these included a camp uniform and other objects from the post-emancipation period, including an 1860 Chair of the Prophet Elijah used for circumcisions, sketches and a model from the competition for the building of the Tempio Maggiore, two contemporary art works, and a portrait of Samuele Alatri, Jewish Italian patriot and politician.

    On the wall of this room is a text in Italian, English, and Hebrew, labeled “Rome and Israel.” This text narrates the history of Roman Zionism from the turn of the twentieth century to the present. It asserts that “the entire community has always stood side by side with the Jewish state” ((Di Castro 2010, 61), “organizing aid and assistance during all of Israel’s wars” (wall text). But, seemingly contradicting itself, the text then references some of the aforementioned events of 1982. In that year,

    When the Israeli army was forced to defend the country’s northern border with Lebanon from Palestinian [sic], a group strongly critical of Israeli policy arose within the Jewish community of Rome. An appeal published in the Rome daily La Repubblica after the widely discussed massacres of Sabra and Shatila, signed by numerous Jewish intellectuals, was the first, painful division of the community over the subject of Israel (61).36

    Note how, though unnamed, Jews (like Levi) who protested Israeli military policy are also construed as belonging to the Roman Comunità. According to Ward, Levi was not living in Rome at this time (Ward 2007, 3). Levi is thus, however inadvertently, construed as simultaneously belonging and not belonging to the Comunità. The museum is not alone in this regard, as at least one other historian refers to these events as having revealed cleavages within “le Comunità ebraiche” (Molinari 1995, 106).

    As the previous discussion of Italian Zionism suggests, these comments are perhaps a bit misleading, in part the result of the ambiguity around just what constitutes the Jewish “community” versus those inscribed in the register of the Comunità. “Rome and Israel” specifically cites Dante Lattes as one of the figures responsible for the “spread” to Rome of what it terms political Zionism ((Di Castro 2010, 58). Lattes’ “Ed il libro?” however, had expressed concerns over the way some aspects of post-emancipation Italian national identity seemed to undercut Jewish cultural and religious identity – a point the guidebook does not mention.

    Although, in a discussion of Enzo Sereni, the guidebook mentions the “pioneering, Socialist wing of Zionism,” the birth of the state of Israel is constructed as a narrative that leads directly from Socialist to Political Zionism; the comments that the Comunità has always stood by Israel are prefaced by a comment that it was led in this direction first by Rabbi David Prato, “an ardent Zionist” ((Di Castro 2010, 61). Sereni occupies a crucial role in the museum’s constructing of the link between Zionism and Roman Jewish anti-fascism, as when the museum text describes him and his wife as “two people destined to make an enormous contribution to the history of the future state of Israel, Enzo to the ultimate sacrifice, in 1944, parachuting beyond German lines in his attempt to save the Jews of Rome from the Nazis.”

    Fascism was an ultra-nationalist ethos whose adherents in Italy forced Jews to side with the Italian state by denying Zionism and a universal Jewish identity. After the Holocaust, the effect of this refusal of temporal continuity in Italy was a collapsing of the past with the present. At the museum, the Roman Jewish community is presented as “always” Zionist, as in commentary such as “It is no accident that one of the first, most active sections of the Italian Zionist Federation was founded in Rome, where the group Avoda was formed” ((Di Castro 2010, 61). Clearly, one of the things at stake in the museum’s claim is, intentional or not, an attempt to draw boundaries separating the Italian Jewish Comunità as represented by its leadership in particular from the Italian Jewish community – and, in the process, produce a particular version of Roman Jewish history. The museum’s phrase “side by side with Jewish state” may refer, then, to the period following the actual foundation of the state of Israel.

    More pertinently to the present argument, however, the letter signed by Roman Jewish intellectuals, including Levi, was published before the massacres, not in response to them. In other words, opposition among some Italian Jews to Israeli military policy predates the infamous events of Sabra and Shatila. The text also admits, however, that within the community, diverse views with respect to the state of Israel’s government and defense policies coexist.

    Nonetheless, there seems to be no space in the museum whatsoever for a discussion of a two-state solution, Israel having risen, like a mythical phoenix, “out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire” (Di Castro 2010, 34); the Arabs living in the region are typically cast as perpetrators of violence (34), and the Israeli army’s actions as defensive (61). In the section of the museum on Libyan Jews, times in the past when Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived together in peace in the Middle East are trivialized by the suggestion that it was only by paying taxes to the Muslims that Jews were granted a modicum of tolerance. (Interestingly, Julius Caesar, who also taxed the Jews, is instead referred to as their protector [(Di Castro 2010, 36]). While the museum laments that expelled Libyan Jews were never compensated for their lost property, no such suggestion of the need for recompense is made concerning displaced Palestinians. In a film that now plays in the “Emancipation” room, the expulsion of Jews from Libya is referred to as a diaspora and compared to the Spanish expulsion of 1492; no mention is made in the film of the Italian colonization of Libya. In this same film, the “problem” of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon is framed as one of public relations, Israel not having adequately explained to the rest of the world its actions.

    As I have already noted in my discussion of its statement on the obligation that men cover their heads, the museum explicitly defines Roman Jews as Orthodox, as this quotation, from the room “From Judaei to Jews” reiterates: “Along with the Orthodox tradition (the point of reference of Italian and Roman Jewry, even if not everyone in private observes every single commandment), modern Judaism comprises other movements. Especially in the English-speaking countries, these movements aim to modernize some exterior aspects of Judaism (Conservative Judaism) or otherwise do not consider themselves strictly bound by tradition (Reform or Liberal Judaism)” (Di Castro 2010, 31). According to Bassi, Italian Judaism today is characterized by “an approximate and selective observance of halakhà” (2011, 252) on the order of what is sometimes called, according to its detractors, “cafeteria Catholicism” (254). Apparently, the museum does not feel authorized to make this claim, and so it fudges the question (and attempts to head off controversy) via the phrase “every single commandment.”

    This explanation of a “lived” Orthodoxy that includes a certain flexibility in one’s private practice of Judaism, however, is complicated by the fact that what counts as “every single commandment” cannot be broached by the museum without risk of alienating either Orthodox or reform-minded Italian Jews — though, in characteristic Orthodox fashion, the museum does argue that the Jewish woman plays a particularly marked role in maintaining the 613 mitzvot. (Bassi 2011, 267-68 offers a pointed critique of this type of pseudo-feminism). Orthodoxy is also not in keeping with Levi’s concept of integration; as the museum stresses, Orthodoxy can only be maintained via a closed community that can ensure the maintenance of tradition, particularly in the Diaspora. Additionally: clearly, wearing a yarmulke at all times is not a “private” act, and the exhibitions multiple images of Primo Levi minus a yarmulke provoke a compelling dissonance concerning Italian Jewish identity, regardless of the museum’s stated intentions.

    What the museum’s comments on Orthodoxy elide is that, associated with the World Union for Progressive Judaism, reform congregations currently exist in Florence and Milan (where there are two), and, most recently, Rome.37 These congregations are not recognized, however, by the Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane, or UCEI, the official legal representative of Italian Judaism.38 To quote one blog writer, “To be a Reform Jew in Italy is to struggle with invisibility” (Reliable Narrator, 2010). (Virtually every single time I have taken the museum’s tour of the Synagogue, visitors have been told that all Italian Jews are Orthodox.)

    Finally, apparently, in Italy, religious orthodoxy and a critique of the military policies of the state of Israel are incompatible, the UCEI “recognizing the centrality of the State of Israel for contemporary Jewish identity.” Such a centering of Jewish life on the State of Israel is not in keeping with the Levi who valued the hybridity and polyvocality of the Diaspora and the vital role it plays in maintaining a vibrant contemporary Judaism. It also simplifies the complex historical relationship between Italian Jewish identity, Israel, and religious orthodoxy – a relationship explored in the popular Jewish press perhaps most frequently by Anna Momigliano (2015), who most recently has suggested that with the recent death of Rome’s Rabbi Toaff will come “a bowing to Israeli orthodoxy” by young Italian rabbis. As Bassi similarly suggests, “If historically Italian Jewish culture was distinguished by its elasticity and permeability, today it seems increasingly to appear provincial and conformist” (2011 , 20). Finally, this centering of Jewish life on the state of Israel feeds into a general denial of “non-Zionist Jewish experience” perpetrated by the state in pursuit of its highly partisan ends.39

    Conclusion

    The Levi/Rivers exhibition invites controversy and commentary, but only if one already knows something of the history of Italian (and Roman) Jewry. What it does not do is offer “experiments with exhibition design” in such a way as to “offer multiple perspectives or to reveal the tendentiousness of the approach taken” (Lavine and Karp 1995, 6). On the one hand, the juxtaposition of the Levi exhibition with the other objects in the Novecento (1900s) room seems perfectly appropriate and non-controversial; the Shoah is part of twentieth-century Italian Jewish history, and Levi was not only a survivor of it but an important writer and intellectual figure. On the other hand, while a matter of public record, Levi’s critique of Israeli military policy of the 1980s is likely unknown to non-Italian visitors to the museum, and the myriad, hybrid, and complex ways in which Italian Jews live their identities is not likely to be foregrounded by a museum that both links the past, present, and future of Italian Jews to Zionism and privileges Orthodox Judaism. This, despite the fact that the turn of the last century saw according to one writer a “paradox” characterized by a Jewish community (the writer specifically uses here the lowercase comunità) “completely assimilated yet proud of its particularism” and eager to discuss publicly and with much passion “problems of national-religious identity, of orthodoxy, of a specifically Jewish morality” (Dan Segre 1995, xi). This portrait clearly contrasts with calls to police more rigorously, for signs of leftist and allegedly anti-Semitic critiques of Israel, the Italian Jewish press (Volli, 2013).

    Johnathan Flatley (2008) locates in modernist aesthetics “the desire to find a way to map out and get a grasp on the new affective terrain of modernity” (4). For Flatley, that terrain is melancholy. Reading Benjamin, Flatley suggests that “a range of historical processes, such as urbanization, the commodity, new forms of technologized war, and factory work required people to shield themselves from the material world around them, to stop being emotionally open to that world and the people in it” (69). That “shielding” or loss of experience results in a collective and historically specific affect, melancholy. World War II and the Shoah represent one of the most horrific events of the modern era, and, as Levi’s work so clearly illustrates, one of the ways of surviving the lager was precisely to cease feeling empathy for one’s fellow sufferers. Levi provides, among other examples, that of “old Kuhn,” who sat in his bunk saying loud prayers of thanks to God that he had not been chosen for “selection,” while, in the bunk across from him, twenty-year-old Beppo the Greek, who knew that he would die in the gas chamber within a few days, stared fixedly at the light bulb (Levi 2005, 116). As Levi puts it, “Kuhn è un insensato.”

    Clearly, like Levi’s work, Rivers’s portraits are a testament to a peculiarly modern form of melancholy – one whose trauma hopefully will never be forgotten and whose loss is experienced consciously. Such an account of irreparable, conscious loss is also at odds with Freud’s (pre-Shoah) understanding of the work of mourning and its eventual “giving up” of the cathexis to the lost object, whereby “deference for reality gains the day” (1917, 166). Freud’s account of the difference between mourning and melancholia, wherein, in the case of the latter, the mourner experiences unconscious loss (166) and displays something “which is lacking in grief – an extraordinary fall in his self-esteem, an impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale” (167) – is likewise flawed. For, in the case of collective devastations like the Holocaust or HIV, melancholy seems not a pathology but rather an appropriate psychic response involving both conscious and unconscious processes (Crimp, 2002). As Flatley (2008) suggests, for Benjamin, “Melancholia is not a problem to be cured; loss is not something to get over and leave behind” (64) or as Derrida (1994) writes, “in fact and by right interminable, without possible normality, without reliable limit” (97).

    In his work on spectrality, Derrida argues that certain types of mourning respond “to the injunction of a justice which, beyond right or law, rises up in the very respect owed to whoever is not, no longer or not yet, living, presently living” (97). Similarly, Flatley argues for the importance of “an antidepressive, political, and politicizing melancholia” (27), one whose purpose is to allow for the historicization of affect and presumably a collective recognition of and response to its causes. Flatley specifically privileges aesthetic experiences that produce in the spectator a sense of “self-estrangement,” a de-familiarization of one’s own (melancholic) emotional life that makes possible “a new kind of recognition, interest, and analysis” (80). Following Adorno, he suggests that, in its non coincidence with the historical present, the art work makes possible an alternative to what currently exists (81). It is a form of knowledge that resists instrumentalization. At the same time, from the point of view of its reception in particular, art works “bring affects into existence in forms and in relation to objects that otherwise might not exist” (81), or as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) suggest, “Art undoes the triple organization of perceptions, affections, and opinions in order to substitute a monument composed of percepts, affects, and blocks of sensation that take the place of language” (176).

    Rivers’s portraits of Primo Levi are examples of the politicized modernist melancholy charted by Flatley. They are overt attempts to “defamiliarize” Levi by appropriating and altering photographs of the writer and processing them through an aesthetic vocabulary that rewrites both the romantic isolationism of abstract expressionism and what John Berger (1972) has called the “eventlessness” of contemporary advertising, wherein “all real events are exceptional and happen only to strangers” (153). Specifically, in place of publicity’s fascination with surface and, by extension, “a future continually deferred” (153) – one in which the consumer/spectator’s life has been made better via the acquisition of the advertised commodity – Rivers’s portraits of Levi interrupt the hermetic time and space of Renaissance painting. Their refusal to respect what, owing to his status as survivor and the circumstances of his death is, in Levi’s case in particular, the integrity (and sanctity) of the photographic portrait; their playful commentary on perspective; their refusal to let the images speak for themselves – all are precisely an attack on the aura of the work of art, a notion that, in a post-Shoah world, can no longer be tolerated. But in place of Warhol’s postmodern abandonment of critique, Rivers uses the techniques of the mass media, its determination to turn the present into yesterday’s news, in the service of a monumental act of remembrance and mourning (the size of these canvases also being pertinent here.)40

    In the chapter of Se Questo è un uomo titled “Sul Fondo,” Levi describes his arrival at the concentration camp. After having been separated from the women and children, the ninety-six exhausted, hungry, and thirsty internees who had managed to survive the initial “selection” were then transported by truck to the camp, la Buna, made to strip naked, and then herded into a shower where they were shaved, sheared of their hair, “disinfected,” handed shoes and a striped uniform, and then forced to run through the snow to a barracks, where they were allowed to dress. Levi writes, “Now for the first time we realized that our language lacked words to express this offense, the destruction of a man” (2005, 23. Out of the more than five hundred Italian Jews in Levi’s convoy, only these ninety some men and twenty-nine women survived this initial selection; 2005,17).

    Rivers’s aesthetic of layering and painting over photographs of Levi is a visual analogy for the attempt to “rebuild” the survivor, to restore to him something of his humanness and to harness an antidepressive melancholy for the almost impossible task of historicizing the Shoah and its aftermath. That Rivers received the commission for the portraits of Levi shortly after the writer’s death suggests the ways Levi as icon continues to be inhabited, perhaps haunted, by meaning. Particularly pertinent in this context are Rivers’s formal innovations and the way they re-produce Levi as ghost via “traces” in the form of erasing, photographs of photographs, paintings of photographs, and so forth. Given Israel’s continued military actions in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas’ response, and the way that, in public debate, certain figures and tropes from the past have recently returned to haunt the present – from an anti-Semitism that holds all Jews responsible for the violence perpetrated by the current Israeli government against the Palestinians, to the equating of all Palestinians with terrorists, to the insistence that any critique whatsoever of Zionism is anti-Semitic, to the continued “morbid attraction for the formula of the ‘victims turned torturers’” (Marzano and Schwarz 2013, 161), – Rivers’s portraits allow Levi to continue to call us to address a wrong. Their exhibition is political in the precise sense of making possible a space from which we might challenge one version of the social world – the claim that the Palestinians as a people don’t exist, or already have a state (Jordan), or the remainder of the litany of excuses provided by the defenders of the violence of various Israeli governments and their United States supporters – with an act of dissensus.

     

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    Levi, Primo. 1982b. “Sì, Israele ha passato il segno ma non è giusto parlare di nazismo.” Interview with Alberto Stabile, La Repubblica 27 June.

    Levi, Primo. 1984a. “If This is a State.” Interview with Gad Lerner, in The Voice of Memory, eds. Belpoliti and Gordon. 287-92.

    Levi, Primo. 1984b. “Itinerario d’uno scrittore ebreo,” La Rassegna Mensile di Israel, terza serie, 50, no. 5/8:376-90.

    Levi, Primo. 1987. The Reawakening. Translated by Stuart Woolf. New York: Collier.

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    Levi, Primo. (1947) 2005. Se questo è un uomo. Turin: Einaudi.Levi Della Torre, Stefano. 1997. “L’eredità di Primo Levi,” in Primo Levi, Un’Antologia della critica, ed. Ernesto Ferrero. Turin: Einaudi. 261-62.

    MacBride, Sean, et al. 1983. “Special Document: Israel in Lebanon, Report of the International Commission to Enquire into Reported Violations of International Law by Israel during its Invasion of Lebanon.” Excerpted in Journal of Palestinian Studies 12.3 (spring): 117-33.

    Magid, Shaul 2014. “Butler Trouble: Zionism, Excommunication, and the Reception of Judith Butler’s Work on Israel/Palestine.” Studies in American Jewish Literature 33(2): 237-59.

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    Meotti, Giulio. 2013. “Pogrom Italiano.” Archivio-La Giornata, Il Foglio.it. 20 maggio. http://www.ilfoglio.it/soloqui/18284, Accessed August 31, 2013.

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    1. Witness is based on a 1988 pencil and pastel drawing on the same subject. Back to essay

    2. On the importance of Levi’s natal city of Turin to his life and work, see Ward 2007. Back to essay

    3. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own. Back to essay

    4. I employ this admittedly awkward phrase “affiliated with” to indicate anyone – regardless of his or her cultural or religious identity – who is invested, affectively and intellectually, in the question of Palestinian-Israeli relations and how the traces of Primo Levi in the present might help us to answer that question. On affiliation as a critical concept, see Said 1984. Back to essay

    5. Dean here is paraphrasing Laclau 1996. Back to essay

    6. On June 29, 1982, Filippo Gentiloni published an article that first quoted a line from Levi’s novel Se non ora, quando? (If Not Now, When?), published in April of that year: “Everyone is the Jew of Someone”(Levi 1997, 427). Gentiloni then added, in his own words, “E oggi i palestinesi sono gli ebrei degli israeliani” (“And today the Palestinians are the Jews of the Israelis.” Scarpa and Soave 2102). Sometime subsequently, the two phrases mutated into a single syllogism attributed to Levi. Thirty years later, Domenico Scarpa and Irene Soave published an essay that “revealed” that the “insidious syllogism” – mis-attributed to Levi and widely disseminated via the internet – was in fact written by Gentiloni. The two phrases were both attributed to Levi by Carole Angier (2002, 628), and when Joan Acocella reviewed Angier’s book in the New Yorker, she simply cited what she had read. Scarpa and Soave blame Acocella for the false aphorism. For an alternative reading of the syllogism and its conditions of possibility, see Perugini, Nicola and Francesco Zucconi 2012. One of the many people who, in the years between 1982 and 2012, had repeated this syllogism was Jewish scholar Judith Butler (2004). Butler’s comments were originally delivered at the Second International Conference on an End to the Occupation, A Just Peace in Israel-Palestine: Towards an Active International Network in East Jerusalem, January 4th-5th, 2004. In the talk, Butler identifies herself as a diasporic Jew of Ashkenazi origin. On responses to Butler’s work on Israel/Palestine, see Magid 2014. I thank Guri Schwartz for bringing these works to my attention. Magid specifically argues that Butler’s critics conflate “a critique of Zionism with anti-Semitism” (237). In an epigraph to the article, Magid repeats the oft-cited syllogism. Unfortunately, like Butler, he mis-attributes it to Levi. Scarpa and Soave’s essay was also widely discussed on the internet; one response, for example, was titled “chronicle of how the pro-Palestinian propaganda has mystified” the thoughts of Levi (Baroz 2012). Back to essay

    7. On the aesthetic turn, see, for example, Shapiro 2103. On queer unhistoricism, see Freccero 2006. On the Subaltern Studies collective, see Spivak 1988. Back to essay

    [8]8. Damish is citing here what he calls Benjamin’s “Joseph Fuchs, collectionneur et historien.” The actual title of Benjamin’s 1937 essay is “Edward Fuchs: Collector and Historian.” Back to essay

    9. The Levi exhibit was located in this room for reasons museum personnel describe as practical considerations. Olga Melasecchi and Claudio Procaccia, interview by the author, Rome, Italy, July 22, 2013. Back to essay

    10. Clasby and I argue that this is part of the larger project of the museum, which is to distinguish Jewish Resistance to the Nazis from other Resistance narratives by inserting Jewish Resistance into the larger narrative of the history of the state of Israel. Also, while they named considerations of space as the primary impetus to locating the Levi exhibition in this room, members of the Comunità are aware of the problems of the 1900 room, as it tries to house too many items from too great a period of time. They are also well aware of the tensions that necessarily arise between the museum as a secular institution and the religious life and exigences of the Communità. Back to essay

    11. It is worth noting that not all Italian Jewish museums focus on Zionism to the extent that Rome’s does, Florence’s museum being one example. Back to essay

    12. From what I have been able to determine, the renovation seems to have been primarily designed by the museum’s former (and now deceased) director, Di Castro, who also wrote the wall copy. Back to essay

    13. Crane argues that there has been a historical shift in the function of the institution. Specifically, in the nineteenth century, museums became, first and foremost, “providers of instruction” (47). She writes, “What had begun as an elite undertaking to save, record, and produce the cultural heritage of the past and the present in the Romantic era . . . had exploded into a popular public project” (46-47). That is, there occurred a shift in the role and aesthetics of the museum, from a nineteenth-century aesthetic of instruction to a twentieth-century aesthetic of dialogue – a dialogue that sometimes produces, if not exactly solicits, public controversy. Back to essay

    14. When I spoke to the museum personnel about its competing goals and the difficulty of presenting their complexity to an audience of museum goers, they reminded me that most people who visit the museum take part in a guided tour, as, for security reasons, the Tempio Maggiore can only be visited in this way. Unfortunately, having taken this guided tour numerous times, I recognize that the guide’s talk seems to be primarily scripted and seldom deviates from what is clearly a religiously inflected understanding of Italian Jewish history. Back to essay

    15. Mendel’s work (2005) unfortunately contains several errors in its account of Jewish history, such as his claim that Turin has the oldest ghetto in Italy (63). He also dates an Italian Jewish community in Rome to the Emperor Nero (62); most other sources, including the Jewish Museum of Rome, date it from the mid second century BCE. Back to essay

    16. For an English translation of the bull, see “Bull Cum Nimis Absurdum.” Back to essay

    17. The standard history of Italian Jewry in English is Roth 1969. On Venice, see Calimani 1987. Back to essay

    18. See Parussa 2005 for more on Levi’s “return” to Judaism. Back to essay

    19. This is the English translation of Levi’s (1965) La tregua, about his return from Auschwitz to Turin. The Italian version contains an account by Levi of his own Judaism. See “Presentazione,” in La Tregua (1963), 5-6 in particular. Back to essay

    20. Harrowitz provides a detailed analysis of what she terms various phases of Levi’s Jewish identity. Back to essay

    21. Symptomatically, an earlier version of this essay was rejected by a reader who chastised me for considering Levi “really” Jewish. The writer also called into question Natalia Ginzburg’s Jewish credentials. For a more sympathetic reading of the latter’s relationship to Judaism, see Castronuovo 2010. Back to essay

    22. On Zionism as a response to the Shoah, see Mankowitz 2002. Back to essay

    23. On pre-war Italian Zionism, see Bettin 2010. One of the first middlebrow biographies in English on Vladimir Jabotinsky (with a foreword by Menachem Begin) suggests that, from Jabotinsky’s point of view, “there were, of course, no Zionist leanings whatsoever in Italian Jewry at the turn of the century” (Schechtman 1956, 56). Rabbi Giuseppe Sonnino of Naples, Italian representative to the 1898 Second Zionist Congress, “declared devotion to philanthropy for persecuted brethren to be the official platform of Italian Zionists” (Hametz 2007, 111). There were in fact debates within the Roman Jewish community over Zionism, perhaps most vividly embodied by Felice Momigliano, who, according to Maurizio Molinari “can be remembered as the most Zionist among the adversaries of Zionism and the most ‘assimilated’ of the Zionists” (Molinari 1991, 63). A socialist and ultimately denouncer of Fascism for its authoritarianism and violence, Momigliano lived in Rome from 1912 until 1924, when he committed suicide. (Tarquini 2011). Additionally, according to Alessandra Tarquini (2011), an interpretation of Zionism widely diffused among Socialists at the turn of the century considered it “a movement born in the ambit of the Second International for the emancipation of the Jewish proletariat persecuted by antisemitism and exploitation.” Back to essay

    24. Two additional sources on Italian Jews and the Fascist regime are De Felice 2001 and Stille 1991. Sarfatti and De Felice disagree in particular on the level of Italian anti-Semitism prior to Fascism, with Sarfatti noting its presence across Italian history and De Felice suggesting it was a recent phenomenon, linked to Mussolini’s desire to emulate Hitler’s policies. Recent critical work seems to have come to a consensus that Italian anti-Semitism must be understood in light of Italian Colonial racism, which predates Fascism – though the debates continue. For example, Gillette (2002) argues a position close to De Felice’s, while Bosworth (2006) sees Fascist anti-Semitism as linked to colonialism. Back to essay

    25.  Marzano and Schwarz cite several examples of political cartoons that cross the line between critique of Israeli military policy and anti-Semitism. However, the writers do not acknowledge that the star of David is both a symbol of Judaism and the state of Israel; this means that any critical deployment of the symbol whatsoever can be construed as anti-Semitic. See, for example, Marzano and Schwarz 2013: 89, 93, and 140. Back to essay

    26. Other signatories included Franco Belgrado, Edith Bruck, Ugo Caffaz, Miriam Cohen, Natalia Ginzburg, David Meghnagi, and Luca Zevi. (Meotti 2013). The letter eventually included 150 signatories. The war had begun ten days earlier, on June 6 of that year. Back to essay

    27. Scarpa and Soave, however, misdate the interview as June 28. Back to essay

    28. On the coverage in the Italian press of the events of 1982, see Scherini 2010. Back to essay

    29. On Revisionist Zionism and its relationship to fascism, see Kaplan 2005. Back to essay

    30. See, for example, Brogi 2012; Tagliacozzo 2012. Back to essay

    31. For a recent (non-scholarly) biography of Agnelli in English, see Clark 2012. Back to essay

    32. For an image of the photograph of Levi on which Periodic Table is based, see Hunter 1989, 44. Throughout his career, Rivers was drawn to Jewish subjects, from his 1952 oil painting Burial, based on his own grandmother’s funeral (15), to Four Seasons. Back to essay

    33. Admittedly, the line between the kinds of images the two artists appropriate is not hard and fast, as both have, for example, altered, in different ways, “iconic” images culled from so-called high art: in the case of Warhol, da Vinci’s fresco of the Last Supper, for example; in the case of Rivers, perhaps most famously, Emanuel Leutze’s Washington Crossing the Delaware. As for advertising, there is clearly a relationship between Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup cans and Brillo boxes and Rivers’s images of Camel cigarette packages and cigar boxes. Back to essay

    34. For images of some of Rivers’s “canceled” works, see “Larry Rivers” 2013. Rivers’s technique of cancellation suggests a parallel to Robert Rauschenberg – in particular, Rauschenberg Erased de Kooning Drawing of 1953. Back to essay

    35. For images of both the portraits and other objects displayed, see Garoffolo 2013. Back to essay

    36. For some reason, there are slight differences between the text I reproduce here, which comes from the museum catalog, and the actual wall text. In terms of this particular passage, the major difference is that Sabra and Shatila are identified in the wall text as Palestinian refugee camps. This same passage identifies the holiday during which the terrorist attack occurred as Sukkoth (or Sukkot), which it was, as Shemini Azeret is sometimes considered the eighth day of Sukkoth. Other times, it is considered a separate holiday. The Italian wall text is different still, the most significant difference being more details about Sabra and Shatila, including the dates over which the killings occurred, the fact that the killers were Christian Lebanese militiamen, that the area was under the direct control of the Israeli army, and an estimate of the deaths as “between hundreds and 3,500.” As is the case with the English translation, however, “Operation Peace in Galilee” is not referred to as a war but rather a defensive move on Israel’s part to defend its border with Lebanon from Palestinian attacks. Back to essay

    37. Lev Chadash, the first reform congregation, dates from 2001. The others include Beth Shalom and Shir Hadash. Lev Chadash and Beth Shalom are in Milan; Shir Hadash, Florence. Given my earlier comments about the museum tours, it is worth mentioning that I first learned of the Roman Reform congregation from a tour guide at the Museo Ebraico who responded to my inquiry about Reform Judaism in Italy by stating first that she was very interested in reaching out to this group, which meets in the vicinity of the synagogue (the guide did not know the exact address, but referenced the famous fountain of the turtles), and second that her rabbi had discouraged her from doing so. The presence of this new community was confirmed by Guri Schwarz. In a text message of March 13, 2015, Schwarz wrote, “at this time there is also a reform synagogue in rome (not a comunità in the strict sense of the word because it does not have official recognition), but it is precisely an unafflitiated [liberal] association not recognized by either the state or the italian jewish institutions (as is also the case in milan and elsewhere” [sic]). Original in Italian. Back to essay

    38. For an account of tensions in Italy’s Jewish community around Orthodoxy, see Gruber 2010. In Italy, the Ministero dell”Interno is responsible for relations between the Italian state and the various religious denominations, which are required to have official representatives. See n37. Back to essay

    39. This phrase “partisan ends” is used by Moses (2011, 557) in a discussion of Zertal 2005. Back to essay

    40. Admittedly, this reading of Warhol is a partial one. For an alternative and admittedly convincing reading of the artist as offering, in at least some of his works, a critique of commodity culture, see Berger, Maurice 1985. Back to essay

  • Data and Desire in Academic Life

    Data and Desire in Academic Life

    a review of Erez Aiden and Jean-Baptiste Michel, Uncharted: Big Data as a Lens on Human Culture (Riverhead Books, reprint edition, 2014)
    by Benjamin Haber
    ~

    On a recent visit to San Francisco, I found myself trying to purchase groceries when my credit card was declined. As the cashier is telling me this news, and before I really had time to feel any particular way about it, my leg vibrates. I’ve received a text: “Chase Fraud-Did you use card ending in 1234 for $100.40 at a grocery store on 07/01/2015? If YES reply 1, NO reply 2.” After replying “yes” (which was recognized even though I failed to follow instructions), I swiped my card again and was out the door with my food. Many have probably had a similar experience: most if not all credit card companies automatically track purchases for a variety of reasons, including fraud prevention, the tracking of illegal activity, and to offer tailored financial products and services. As I walked out of the store, for a moment, I felt the power of “big data,” how real-time consumer information can be read as be a predictor of a stolen card in less time than I had to consider why my card had been declined. It was a too rare moment of reflection on those networks of activity that modulate our life chances and capacities, mostly below and above our conscious awareness.

    And then I remembered: didn’t I buy my plane ticket with the points from that very credit card? And in fact, hadn’t I used that card on multiple occasions in San Francisco for purchases not much less than the amount my groceries cost. While the near-instantaneous text provided reassurance before I could consciously recognize my anxiety, the automatic card decline was likely not a sophisticated real-time data-enabled prescience, but a rather blunt instrument, flagging the transaction on the basis of two data points: distance from home and amount of purchase. In fact, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the gap between data collection and processing, between metadata and content and between current reality of data and its speculative future is still quite large. While Target’s pregnancy predicting algorithm was a journalistic sensation, the more mundane computational confusion that has Gmail constantly serving me advertisements for trade and business schools shows the striking gap between the possibilities of what is collected and the current landscape of computationally prodded behavior. The text from Chase, your Klout score, the vibration of your FitBit, or the probabilistic genetic information from 23 and me are all primarily affective investments in mobilizing a desire for data’s future promise. These companies and others are opening of new ground for discourse via affect, creating networked infrastructures for modulating the body and social life.

    I was thinking about this while reading Uncharted: Big Data as a Lens on Human Culture, a love letter to the power and utility of algorithmic processing of the words in books. Though ostensibly about the Google Ngram Viewer, a neat if one-dimensional tool to visualize the word frequency of a portion of the books scanned by Google, Uncharted is also unquestionably involved in the mobilization of desire for quantification. Though about the academy rather than financialization, medicine, sports or any other field being “revolutionized” by big data, its breathless boosterism and obligatory cautions are emblematic of the emergent datafied spirit of capitalism, a celebratory “coming out” of the quantifying systems that constitute the emergent infrastructures of sociality.

    While published fairly recently, in 2013, Uncharted already feels dated in its strangely muted engagement with the variety of serious objections to sprawling corporate and state run data systems in the post-Snowden, post-Target, post-Ashley Madison era (a list that will always be in need of update). There is still the dazzlement about the sheer magnificent size of this potential new suitor—“If you wrote out all five zettabytes that humans produce every year by hand, you would reach the core of the Milky Way” (11)—all the more impressive when explicitly compared to the dusty old technologies of ink and paper. Authors Erez Aiden and Jean-Baptiste Michel are floating in a world of “simple and beautiful” formulas (45), “strange, fascinating and addictive” methods (22), producing “intriguing, perplexing and even fun” conclusions (119) in their drive to colonize the “uncharted continent” (76) that is the English language. The almost erotic desire for this bounty is made more explicit in their tongue-in-cheek characterization of their meetings with Google employees as an “irresistible… mating dance” (22):

    Scholars and scientists approach engineers, product managers, and even high-level executives about getting access to their companies’ data. Sometimes the initial conversation goes well. They go out for coffee. One thing leads to another, and a year later, a brand-new person enters the picture. Unfortunately this person is usually a lawyer. (22)

    There is a lot to unpack in these metaphors, the recasting of academic dependence on data systems designed and controlled by corporate entities as a sexy new opportunity for scholars and scientists. There are important conversations to be had about these circulations of quantified desire; about who gets access to this kind of data, the ethics of working with companies who have an existential interest in profit and shareholder return and the cultural significance of wrapping business transactions in the language of heterosexual coupling. Here however I am mostly interested in the real allure that this passage and others speaks to, and the attendant fear that mostly whispers, at least in a book written by Harvard PhDs with Ted talks to give.

    For most academics in the social sciences and the humanities “big data” is a term more likely to get caught in the throat than inspire butterflies in the stomach. While Aiden and Michel certainly acknowledge that old-fashion textual analysis (50) and theory (20) will have a place in this brave new world of charts and numbers, they provide a number of contrasts to suggest the relative poverty of even the most brilliant scholar in the face of big data. One hypothetical in particular, that is not directly answered but is strongly implied, spoke to my discipline specifically:

    Consider the following question: Which would help you more if your quest was to learn about contemporary human society—unfettered access to a leading university’s department of sociology, packed with experts on how societies function, or unfettered access to Facebook, a company whose goal is to help mediate human social relationships online? (12)

    The existential threat at the heart of this question was catalyzed for many people in Roger Burrows and Mike Savage’s 2007 “The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology,” an early canary singing the worry of what Nigel Thrift has called “knowing capitalism” (2005). Knowing capitalism speaks to the ways that capitalism has begun to take seriously the task of “thinking the everyday” (1) by embedding information technologies within “circuits of practice” (5). For Burrows and Savage these practices can and should be seen as a largely unrecognized world of sophisticated and profit-minded sociology that makes the quantitative tools of academics look like “a very poor instrument” in comparison (2007: 891).

    Indeed, as Burrows and Savage note, the now ubiquitous social survey is a technology invented by social scientists, folks who were once seen as strikingly innovative methodologists (888). Despite ever more sophisticated statistical treatments however, the now over 40 year old social survey remains the heart of social scientific quantitative methodology in a radically changed context. And while declining response rates, a constraining nation-based framing and competition from privately-funded surveys have all decreased the efficacy of academic survey research (890), nothing has threatened the discipline like the embedded and “passive” collecting technologies that fuel big data. And with these methodological changes come profound epistemological ones: questions of how, when, why and what we know of the world. These methods are inspiring changing ideas of generalizability and new expectations around the temporality of research. Does it matter, for example, that studies have questioned the accuracy of the FitBit? The growing popularity of these devices suggests at the very least that sociologists should not count on empirical rigor to save them from irrelevance.

    As academia reorganizes around the speculative potential of digital technologies, there is an increasing pile of capital available to those academics able to translate between the discourses of data capitalism and a variety of disciplinary traditions. And the lure of this capital is perhaps strongest in the humanities, whose scholars have been disproportionately affected by state economic retrenchment on education spending that has increasingly prioritized quantitative, instrumental, and skill-based majors. The increasing urgency in the humanities to use bigger and faster tools is reflected in the surprisingly minimal hand wringing over the politics of working with companies like Facebook, Twitter and Google. If there is trepidation in the N-grams project recounted in Uncharted, it is mostly coming from Google, whose lawyers and engineers have little incentive to bother themselves with the politically fraught, theory-driven, Institutional Review Board slow lane of academic production. The power imbalance of this courtship leaves those academics who decide to partner with these companies at the mercy of their epistemological priorities and, as Uncharted demonstrates, the cultural aesthetics of corporate tech.

    This is a vision of the public humanities refracted through the language of public relations and the “measurable outcomes” culture of the American technology industry. Uncharted has taken to heart the power of (re)branding to change the valence of your work: Aiden and Michel would like you to call their big data inflected historical research “culturomics” (22). In addition to a hopeful attempt to coin a buzzy new work about the digital, culturomics linguistically brings the humanities closer to the supposed precision, determination and quantifiability of economics. And lest you think this multivalent bringing of culture to capital—or rather the renegotiation of “the relationship between commerce and the ivory tower” (8)—is unseemly, Aiden and Michel provide an origin story to show how futile this separation has been.

    But the desire for written records has always accompanied economic activity, since transactions are meaningless unless you can clearly keep track of who owns what. As such, early human writing is dominated by wheeling and dealing: a menagerie of bets, chits, and contracts. Long before we had the writings of prophets, we had the writing of profits. (9)

    And no doubt this is true: culture is always already bound up with economy. But the full-throated embrace of culturomics is not a vision of interrogating and reimagining the relationship between economic systems, culture and everyday life; [1] rather it signals the acceptance of the idea of culture as transactional business model. While Google has long imagined itself as a company with a social mission, they are a publicly held company who will be punished by investors if they neglect their bottom line of increasing the engagement of eyeballs on advertisements. The N-gram Viewer does not make Google money, but it perhaps increases public support for their larger book-scanning initiative, which Google clearly sees as a valuable enough project to invest many years of labor and millions of dollars to defend in court.

    This vision of the humanities is transactionary in another way as well. While much of Uncharted is an attempt to demonstrate the profound, game-changing implications of the N-gram viewer, there is a distinctly small-questions, cocktail-party-conversation feel to this type of inquiry that seems ironically most useful in preparing ABD humanities and social science PhDs for jobs in the service industry than in training them for the future of academia. It might be more precise to say that the N-gram viewer is architecturally designed for small answers rather than small questions. All is resolved through linear projection, a winner and a loser or stasis. This is a vision of research where the precise nature of the mediation (what books have been excluded? what is the effect of treating all books as equally revealing of human culture? what about those humans whose voices have been systematically excluded from the written record?) is ignored, and where the actual analysis of books, and indeed the books themselves, are black-boxed from the researcher.

    Uncharted speaks to perils of doing research under the cloud of existential erasure and to the failure of academics to lead with a different vision of the possibilities of quantification. Collaborating with the wealthy corporate titans of data collection requires an acceptance of these companies own existential mandate: make tons of money by monetizing a dizzying array of human activities while speculatively reimagining the future to attempt to maintain that cash flow. For Google, this is a vision where all activities, not just “googling” are collected and analyzed in a seamlessly updating centralized system. Cars, thermostats, video games, photos, businesses are integrated not for the public benefit but because of the power of scale to sell or rent or advertise products. Data is promised as a deterministic balm for the unknowability of life and Google’s participation in academic research gives them the credibility to be your corporate (sen.se) mother. What, might we imagine, are the speculative possibilities of networked data not beholden to shareholder value?
    _____

    Benjamin Haber is a PhD candidate in Sociology at CUNY Graduate Center and a Digital Fellow at The Center for the Humanities. His current research is a cultural and material exploration of emergent infrastructures of corporeal data through a queer theoretical framework. He is organizing a conference called “Queer Circuits in Archival Times: Experimentation and Critique of Networked Data” to be held in New York City in May 2016.

    Back to the essay

    _____

    Notes

    [1] A project desperately needed in academia, where terms like “neoliberalism,” “biopolitics” and “late capitalism” more often than not are used briefly at end of a short section on implications rather than being given the critical attention and nuanced intentionality that they deserve.

    Works Cited

    Savage, Mike, and Roger Burrows. 2007. “The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology.” Sociology 41 (5): 885–99.

    Thrift, Nigel. 2005. Knowing Capitalism. London: SAGE.

  • The Human Condition and The Black Box Society

    The Human Condition and The Black Box Society

    Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society (Harvard University Press, 2015)a review of Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Harvard University Press, 2015)
    by Nicole Dewandre
    ~

    1. Introduction

    This review is informed by its author’s specific standpoint: first, a lifelong experience in a policy-making environment, i.e. the European Commission; and, second, a passion for the work of Hannah Arendt and the conviction that she has a great deal to offer to politics and policy-making in this emerging hyperconnected era. As advisor for societal issues at DG Connect, the department of the European Commission in charge of ICT policy at EU level, I have had the privilege of convening the Onlife Initiative, which explored the consequences of the changes brought about by the deployment of ICTs on the public space and on the expectations toward policy-making. This collective thought exercise, which took place in 2012-2013, was strongly inspired by Hannah Arendt’s 1958 book The Human Condition.

    This is the background against which I read the The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms Behind Money and Information by Frank Pasquale (references to which are indicated here parenthetically by page number). Two of the meanings of “black box“—a device that keeps track of everything during a flight, on the one hand, and the node of a system that prevents an observer from identifying the link(s) between input and output, on the other hand—serve as apt metaphors for today’s emerging Big Data environment.

    Pasquale digs deep into three sectors that are at the root of what he calls the black box society: reputation (how we are rated and ranked), search (how we use ratings and rankings to organize the world), and finance (money and its derivatives, whose flows depend crucially on forms of reputation and search). Algorithms and Big Data have permeated these three activities to a point where disconnection with human judgment or control can transmogrify them into blind zombies, opening new risks, affordances and opportunities. We are far from the ideal representation of algorithms as support for decision-making. In these three areas, decision-making has been taken over by algorithms, and there is no “invisible hand” ensuring that profit-driven corporate strategies will deliver fairness or improve the quality of life.

    The EU and the US contexts are both distinct and similar. In this review, I shall not comment on Pasquale’s specific policy recommendations in detail, even if as European, I appreciate the numerous references to European law and policy that Pasquale commends as good practices (ranging from digital competition law, to welfare state provision, to privacy policies). I shall instead comment from a meta-perspective, that of challenging the worldview that implicitly undergirds policy-making on both sides of the Atlantic.

    2. A Meta-perspective on The Black Box Society

    The meta-perspective as I see it is itself twofold: (i) we are stuck with Modern referential frameworks, which hinder our ability to attend to changing human needs, desires and expectations in this emerging hyperconnected era, and (ii) the personification of corporations in policymaking reveals shortcomings in the current representation of agents as interest-led beings.

    a) Game over for Modernity!

    As stated by the Onlife Initiative in its “Onlife Manifesto,” through its expression “Game over for Modernity?“, it is time for politics and policy-making to leave Modernity behind. That does not mean going back to the Middle Ages, as feared by some, but instead stepping firmly into this new era that is coming to us. I believe with Genevieve Bell and Paul Dourish that it is more effective to consider that we are now entering into the ubiquitous computing era instead of looking at it as if it was approaching fast.[1] With the miniaturisation of devices and sensors, with mobile access to broadband internet and with the generalized connectivity of objects as well as of people, not only do we witness an increase of the online world, but, more fundamentally, a collapse of the distinction between the online and the offline worlds, and therefore a radically new socio-technico-natural compound. We live in an environment which is increasingly reactive and talkative as a result of the intricate mix between off-line and online universes. Human interactions are also deeply affected by this new socio-technico-natural compound, as they are or will soon be “sticky”, i.e. leave a material trace by default and this for the first time in history. These new affordances and constraints destabilize profoundly our Modern conceptual frameworks, which rely on distinctions that are blurring, such as the one between the real and the virtual or the ones between humans, artefacts and nature, understood with mental categories dating back from the Enlightenment and before. The very expression “post-Modern” is not accurate anymore or is too shy, as it continues to position Modernity as its reference point. It is time to give a proper name to this new era we are stepping into, and hyperconnectivity may be such a name.

    Policy-making however continues to rely heavily on Modern conceptual frameworks, and this not only from the policy-makers’ point of view but more widely from all those engaging in the public debate. There are many structuring features of the Modern conceptual frameworks and it goes certainly beyond this review to address them thoroughly. However, when it comes to addressing the challenges described by The Black Box Society, it is important to mention the epistemological stance that has been spelled out brilliantly by Susan H. Williams in her Truth, Autonomy, and Speech: Feminist Theory and the First Amendment: “the connection forged in Cartesianism between knowledge and power”[2]. Before encountering Susan Williams’s work, I came to refer to this stance less elegantly with the expression “omniscience-omnipotence utopia”[3]. Williams writes that “this epistemological stance has come to be so widely accepted and so much a part of many of our social institutions that it is almost invisible to us” and that “as a result, lawyers and judges operate largely unself-consciously with this epistemology”[4]. To Williams’s “lawyers and judges”, we should add policy-makers and stakeholders.  This Cartesian epistemological stance grounds the conviction that the world can be elucidated in causal terms, that knowledge is about prediction and control, and that there is no limit to what men can achieve provided they have the will and the knowledge. In this Modern worldview, men are considered as rational subjects and their freedom is synonymous with control and autonomy. The fact that we have a limited lifetime and attention span is out of the picture as is the human’s inherent relationality. Issues are framed as if transparency and control is all that men need to make their own way.

    1) One-Way Mirror or Social Hypergravity?

    Frank Pasquale is well aware of and has contributed to the emerging critique of transparency and he states clearly that “transparency is not just an end in itself” (8). However, there are traces of the Modern reliance on transparency as regulative ideal in the Black Box Society. One of them is when he mobilizes the one-way mirror metaphor. He writes:

    We do not live in a peaceable kingdom of private walled gardens; the contemporary world more closely resembles a one-way mirror. Important corporate actors have unprecedented knowledge of the minutiae of our daily lives, while we know little to nothing about how they use this knowledge to influence the important decisions that we—and they—make. (9)

    I refrain from considering the Big Data environment as an environment that “makes sense” on its own, provided someone has access to as much data as possible. In other words, the algorithms crawling the data can hardly be compared to a “super-spy” providing the data controller with an absolute knowledge.

    Another shortcoming of the one-way mirror metaphor is that the implicit corrective is a transparent pane of glass, so the watched can watch the watchers. This reliance on transparency is misleading. I prefer another metaphor that fits better, in my view: to characterise the Big Data environment in a hyperconnected conceptual framework. As alluded to earlier, in contradistinction to the previous centuries and even millennia, human interactions will, by default, be “sticky”, i.e. leave a trace. Evanescence of interactions, which used to be the default for millennia, will instead require active measures to be ensured. So, my metaphor for capturing the radicality and the scope of this change is a change of “social atmosphere” or “social gravity”, as it were. For centuries, we have slowly developed social skills, behaviors and regulations, i.e. a whole ecosystem, to strike a balance between accountability and freedom, in a world where “verba volant and scripta manent[5], i.e. where human interactions took place in an “atmosphere” with a 1g “social gravity”, where they were evanescent by default and where action had to be taken to register them. Now, with all interactions leaving a trace by default, and each of us going around with his, her or its digital shadow, we are drifting fast towards an era where the “social atmosphere” will be of heavier gravity, say “10g”. The challenge is huge and will require a lot of collective learning and adaptation to develop the literacy and regulatory frameworks that will recreate and sustain the balance between accountability and freedom for all agents, human and corporations.

    The heaviness of this new data density stands in-between or is orthogonal to the two phantasms of bright emancipatory promises of Big Data, on the one hand, or frightening fears of Big Brother, on the other hand. Because of this social hypergravity, we, individually and collectively, have indeed to be cautious about the use of Big Data, as we have to be cautious when handling dangerous or unknown substances. This heavier atmosphere, as it were, opens to increased possibilities of hurting others, notably through harassment, bullying and false rumors. The advent of Big Data does not, by itself, provide a “license to fool” nor does it free agents from the need to behave and avoid harming others. Exploiting asymmetries and new affordances to fool or to hurt others is no more acceptable behavior as it was before the advent of Big Data. Hence, although from a different metaphorical standpoint, I support Pasquale’s recommendations to pay increased attention to the new ways the current and emergent practices relying on algorithms in reputation, search and finance may be harmful or misleading and deceptive.

    2) The Politics of Transparency or the Exhaustive Labor of Watchdogging?

    Another “leftover” of the Modern conceptual framework that surfaces in The Black Box Society is the reliance on watchdogging for ensuring proper behavior by corporate agents. Relying on watchdogging for ensuring proper behavior nurtures the idea that it is all right to behave badly, as long as one is not seen doing do. This reinforces the idea that the qualification of an act depends from it being unveiled or not, as if as long as it goes unnoticed, it is all right. This puts the entire burden on the watchers and no burden whatsoever on the doers. It positions a sort of symbolic face-to-face between supposed mindless firms, who are enabled to pursue their careless strategies as long as they are not put under the light and people who are expected to spend all their time, attention and energy raising indignation against wrong behaviors. Far from empowering the watchers, this framing enslaves them to waste time monitoring actors who should be acting in much better ways already. Indeed, if unacceptable behavior is unveiled, it raises outrage, but outrage is far from bringing a solution per se. If, instead, proper behaviors are witnessed, then the watchers are bound to praise the doers. In both cases, watchers are stuck in a passive, reactive and specular posture, while all the glory or the shame is on the side of the doers. I don’t deny the need to have watchers, but I warn against the temptation of relying excessively on the divide between doers and watchers to police behaviors, without engaging collectively in the formulation of what proper and inappropriate behaviors are. And there is no ready-made consensus about this, so that it requires informed exchange of views and hard collective work. As Pasquale explains in an interview where he defends interpretative approaches to social sciences against quantitative ones:

    Interpretive social scientists try to explain events as a text to be clarified, debated, argued about. They do not aspire to model our understanding of people on our understanding of atoms or molecules. The human sciences are not natural sciences. Critical moral questions can’t be settled via quantification, however refined “cost benefit analysis” and other political calculi become. Sometimes the best interpretive social science leads not to consensus, but to ever sharper disagreement about the nature of the phenomena it describes and evaluates. That’s a feature, not a bug, of the method: rather than trying to bury normative differences in jargon, it surfaces them.

    The excessive reliance on watchdogging enslaves the citizenry to serve as mere “watchdogs” of corporations and government, and prevents any constructive cooperation with corporations and governments. It drains citizens’ energy for pursuing their own goals and making their own positive contributions to the world, notably by engaging in the collective work required to outline, nurture and maintain the shaping of what accounts for appropriate behaviours.

    As a matter of fact, watchdogging would be nothing more than an exhausting laboring activity.

    b) The Personification of Corporations

    One of the red threads unifying The Black Box Society’s treatment of numerous technical subjects is unveiling the oddness of the comparative postures and status of corporations, on the one hand, and people, on the other hand. As nicely put by Pasquale, “corporate secrecy expands as the privacy of human beings contracts” (26), and, in the meantime, the divide between government and business is narrowing (206). Pasquale points also to the fact that at least since 2001, people have been routinely scrutinized by public agencies to deter the threatening ones from hurting others, while the threats caused by corporate wrongdoings in 2008 gave rise to much less attention and effort to hold corporations to account. He also notes that “at present, corporations and government have united to focus on the citizenry. But why not set government (and its contractors) to work on corporate wrongdoings?” (183) It is my view that these oddnesses go along with what I would call a “sensitive inversion”. Corporations, which are functional beings, are granted sensitivity as if they were human beings, in policy-making imaginaries and narratives, while men and women, who are sensitive beings, are approached in policy-making as if they were functional beings, i.e. consumers, job-holders, investors, bearer of fundamental rights, but never personae per se. The granting of sensitivity to corporations goes beyond the legal aspect of their personhood. It entails that corporations are the one whose so-called needs are taken care of by policy makers, and those who are really addressed to, qua persona. Policies are designed with business needs in mind, to foster their competitiveness or their “fitness”. People are only indirect or secondary beneficiaries of these policies.

    The inversion of sensitivity might not be a problem per se, if it opened pragmatically to an effective way to design and implement policies which bear indeed positive effects for men and women in the end. But Pasquale provides ample evidence showing that this is not the case, at least in the three sectors he has looked at more closely, and certainly not in finance.

    Pasquale’s critique of the hypostatization of corporations and reduction of humans has many theoretical antecedents. Looking at it from the perspective of Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition illuminates the shortcomings and risks associated with considering corporations as agents in the public space and understanding the consequences of granting them sensitivity, or as it were, human rights. Action is the activity that flows from the fact that men and women are plural and interact with each other: “the human condition of action is plurality”.[6] Plurality is itself a ternary concept made of equality, uniqueness and relationality. First, equality as what we grant to each other when entering into a political relationship. Second, uniqueness refers to the fact that what makes each human a human qua human is precisely that who s/he is is unique. If we treat other humans as interchangeable entities or as characterised by their attributes or qualities, i.e., as a what, we do not treat them as human qua human, but as objects. Last and by no means least, the third component of plurality is the relational and dynamic nature of identity. For Arendt, the disclosure of the who “can almost never be achieved as a wilful purpose, as though one possessed and could dispose of this ‘who’ in the same manner he has and can dispose of his qualities”[7]. The who appears unmistakably to others, but remains somewhat hidden from the self. It is this relational and revelatory character of identity that confers to speech and action such a critical role and that articulates action with identity and freedom. Indeed, for entities for which the who is partly out of reach and matters, appearance in front of others, notably with speech and action, is a necessary condition of revealing that identity:

    Action and speech are so closely related because the primordial and specifically human act must at the same time contain the answer to the question asked of every newcomer: who are you? In acting and speaking, men show who they are, they appear. Revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others and neither for, nor against them, that is in sheer togetherness.[8]

    So, in this sense, the public space is the arena where whos appear to other whos, personae to other personae.

    For Arendt, the essence of politics is freedom and is grounded in action, not in labour and work. The public space is where agents coexist and experience their plurality, i.e. the fact that they are equal, unique and relational. So, it is much more than the usual American pluralist (i.e., early Dahl-ian) conception of a space where agents worry for exclusively for their own needs by bargaining aggressively. In Arendt’s perspective, the public space is where agents, self-aware of their plural characteristic, interact with each other once their basic needs have been taken care of in the private sphere. As highlighted by Seyla Benhabib in The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, “we not only owe to Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy the recovery of the public as a central category for all democratic-liberal politics; we are also indebted to her for the insight that the public and the private are interdependent”.[9] One could not appear in public if s/he or it did not have also a private place, notably to attend to his, her or its basic needs for existence. In Arendtian terms, interactions in the public space take place between agents who are beyond their satiety threshold. Acknowledging satiety is a precondition for engaging with others in a way that is not driven by one’s own interest, but rather by their desire to act together with others—”in sheer togetherness”—and be acknowledged as who they are. If an agent perceives him-, her- or itself and behave only as a profit-maximiser or as an interest-led being, i.e. if s/he or it has no sense of satiety and no self-awareness of the relational and revelatory character of his, her or its identity, then s/he or it cannot be a “who” or an agent in political terms, and therefore, respond of him-, her- or itself. It does simply not deserve -and therefore should not be granted- the status of a persona in the public space.

    It is easy to imagine that there can indeed be no freedom below satiety, and that “sheer togetherness” would just be impossible among agents below their satiety level or deprived from having one. This is however the situation we are in, symbolically, when we grant corporations the status of persona while considering efficient and appropriate that they care only for profit-maximisation. For a business, making profit is a condition to stay alive, as for humans, eating is a condition to stay alive. However, in the name of the need to compete on global markets, to foster growth and to provide jobs, policy-makers embrace and legitimize an approach to businesses as profit-maximisers, despite the fact this is a reductionist caricature of what is allowed by the legal framework on company law[10]. So, the condition for businesses to deserve the status of persona in the public space is, no less than for men and women, to attend their whoness and honour their identity, by staying away from behaving according to their narrowly defined interests. It means also to care for the world as much, if not more, as for themselves.

    This resonates meaningfully with the quotation from Heraclitus that serves as the epigraph for The Black Box Society: “There is one world in common for those who are awake, but when men are asleep each turns away into a world of his own”. Reading Arendt with Heraclitus’s categories of sleep and wakefulness, one might consider that totalitarianism arises—or is not far away—when human beings are awake in private, but asleep in public, in the sense that they silence their humanness or that their humanness is silenced by others when appearing in public. In this perspective, the merging of markets and politics—as highlighted by Pasquale—could be seen as a generalized sleep in the public space of human beings and corporations, qua personae, while all awakened activities are taking place in the private, exclusively driven by their needs and interests.

    In other words—some might find a book like The Black Box Society, which offers a bold reform agenda for numerous agencies, to be too idealistic. But in my view, it falls short of being idealistic enough: there is a missing normative core to the proposals in the book, which can be corrected by democratic, political, and particularly Arendtian theory. If a populace has no acceptance of a certain level of goods and services prevailing as satiating its needs, and if it distorts the revelatory character of identity into an endless pursuit of a limitless growth, it cannot have the proper lens and approach to formulate what it takes to enable the fairness and fair play described in The Black Box Society.

    3. Stepping into Hyperconnectivity

    1) Agents as Relational Selves

    A central feature of the Modern conceptual framework underlying policymaking is the figure of the rational subject as political proxy of humanness. I claim that this is not effective anymore in ensuring a fair and flourishing life for men and women in this emerging hyperconnected era and that we should adopt instead the figure of a “relational self” as it emerges from the Arendtian concept of plurality.

    The concept of the rational subject was forged to erect Man over nature. Nowadays, the problem is not so much to distinguish men from nature, but rather to distinguish men—and women—from artefacts. Robots come close to humans and even outperform them, if we continue to define humans as rational subjects. The figure of the rational subject is torn apart between “truncated gods”—when Reason is considered as what brings eventually an overall lucidity—on the one hand, and “smart artefacts”—when reason is nothing more than logical steps or algorithms—on the other hand. Men and women are neither “Deep Blue” nor mere automatons. In between these two phantasms, the humanness of men and women is smashed. This is indeed what happens in the Kafkaesque and ridiculous situations where a thoughtless and mindless approach to Big Data is implemented, and this from both stance, as workers and as consumers. As far as the working environment is concerned, “call centers are the ultimate embodiment of the panoptic workspace. There, workers are monitored all the time” (35). Indeed, this type of overtly monitored working environment is nothing else that a materialisation of the panopticon. As consumers, we all see what Pasquale means when he writes that “far more [of us] don’t even try to engage, given the demoralizing experience of interacting with cyborgish amalgams of drop- down menus, phone trees, and call center staff”. In fact, this mindless use of automation is only the last version of the way we have been thinking for the last decades, i.e. that progress means rationalisation and de-humanisation across the board. The real culprit is not algorithms themselves, but the careless and automaton-like human implementers and managers who act along a conceptual framework according to which rationalisation and control is all that matters. More than the technologies, it is the belief that management is about control and monitoring that makes these environments properly in-human. So, staying stuck with the rational subject as a proxy for humanness, either ends up in smashing our humanness as workers and consumers and, at best, leads to absurd situations where to be free would mean spending all our time controlling we are not controlled.

    As a result, keeping the rational subject as the central representation of humanness will increasingly be misleading politically speaking. It fails to provide a compass for treating each other fairly and making appropriate decisions and judgments, in order to impacting positively and meaningfully on human lives.

    With her concept of plurality, Arendt offers an alternative to the rational subject for defining humanness: that of the relational self. The relational self, as it emerges from the Arendtian’s concept of plurality[11], is the man, woman or agent self-aware of his, her or its plurality, i.e. the facts that (i) he, she or it is equal to his, her or its fellows; (ii) she, he or it is unique as all other fellows are unique; and (iii) his, her or its identity as a revelatory character requiring to appear among others in order to reveal itself through speech and action. This figure of the relational self accounts for what is essential to protect politically in our humanness in a hyperconnected era, i.e. that we are truly interdependent from the mutual recognition that we grant to each other and that our humanity is precisely grounded in that mutual recognition, much more than in any “objective” difference or criteria that would allow an expert system to sort out human from non-human entities.

    The relational self, as arising from Arendt’s plurality, combines relationality and freedom. It resonates deeply with the vision proposed by Susan H. Williams, i.e. the relational model of truth and the narrative model to autonomy, in order to overcome the shortcomings of the Cartesian and liberal approaches to truth and autonomy without throwing the baby, i.e. the notion of agency and responsibility, out with the bathwater, as the social constructionist and feminist critique of the conceptions of truth and autonomy may be understood of doing.[12]

    Adopting the relational self as the canonical figure of humanness instead of the rational subject‘s one puts under the light the direct relationship between the quality of interactions, on the one hand, and the quality of life, on the other hand. In contradistinction with transparency and control, which are meant to empower non-relational individuals, relational selves are self-aware that they are in need of respect and fair treatment from others, instead. It also makes room for vulnerability, notably the vulnerability of our attentional spheres, and saturation, i.e. the fact that we have a limited attention span, and are far from making a “free choice” when clicking on “I have read and accept the Terms & Conditions”. Instead of transparency and control as policy ends in themselves, the quality of life of relational selves and the robustness of the world they construct together and that lies between them depend critically on being treated fairly and not being fooled.

    It is interesting to note that the word “trust” blooms in policy documents, showing that the consciousness of the fact that we rely from each other is building up. Referring to trust as if it needed to be built is however a signature of the fact that we are in transition from Modernity to hyperconnectivity, and not yet fully arrived. By approaching trust as something that can be materialized we look at it with Modern eyes. As “consent is the universal solvent” (35) of control, transparency-and-control is the universal solvent of trust. Indeed, we know that transparency and control nurture suspicion and distrust. And that is precisely why they have been adopted as Modern regulatory ideals. Arendt writes: “After this deception [that we were fooled by our senses], suspicions began to haunt Modern man from all sides”[13]. So, indeed, Modern conceptual frameworks rely heavily on suspicion, as a sort of transposition in the realm of human affairs of the systematic doubt approach to scientific enquiries. Frank Pasquale quotes moral philosopher Iris Murdoch for having said: “Man is a creature who makes pictures of himself and then comes to resemble the picture” (89). If she is right—and I am afraid she is—it is of utmost importance to shift away from picturing ourselves as rational subjects and embrace instead the figure of relational selves, if only to save the fact that trust can remain a general baseline in human affairs. Indeed, if it came true that trust can only be the outcome of a generalized suspicion, then indeed we would be lost.

    Besides grounding the notion of relational self, the Arendtian concept of plurality allows accounting for interactions among humans and among other plural agents, which are beyond fulfilling their basic needs (necessity) or achieving goals (instrumentality), and leads to the revelation of their identities while giving rise to unpredictable outcomes. As such, plurality enriches the basket of representations for interactions in policy making. It brings, as it were, a post-Modern –or should I dare saying a hyperconnected- view to interactions. The Modern conceptual basket for representations of interactions includes, as its central piece, causality. In Modern terms, the notion of equilibrium is approached through a mutual neutralization of forces, either with the invisible hand metaphor, or with Montesquieu’s division of powers. The Modern approach to interactions is either anchored into the representation of one pole being active or dominating (the subject) and the other pole being inert or dominated (nature, object, servant) or, else, anchored in the notion of conflicting interests or dilemmas. In this framework, the notion of equality is straightjacketed and cannot be embodied. As we have seen, this Modern straitjacket leads to approaching freedom with control and autonomy, constrained by the fact that Man is, unfortunately, not alone. Hence, in the Modern approach to humanness and freedom, plurality is a constraint, not a condition, while for relational selves, freedom is grounded in plurality.

    2) From Watchdogging to Accountability and Intelligibility

    If the quest for transparency and control is as illusory and worthless for relational selves, as it was instrumental for rational subjects, this does not mean that anything goes. Interactions among plural agents can only take place satisfactorily if basic and important conditions are met.  Relational selves are in high need of fairness towards themselves and accountability of others. Deception and humiliation[14] should certainly be avoided as basic conditions enabling decency in the public space.

    Once equipped with this concept of the relational self as the canonical figure of what can account for political agents, be they men, women, corporations and even States. In a hyperconnected era, one can indeed see clearly why the recommendations Pasquale offers in his final two chapters “Watching (and Improving) the Watchers” and “Towards an Intelligible Society,” are so important. Indeed, if watchdogging the watchers has been criticized earlier in this review as an exhausting laboring activity that does not deliver on accountability, improving the watchers goes beyond watchdogging and strives for a greater accountability. With regard to intelligibility, I think that it is indeed much more meaningful and relevant than transparency.

    Pasquale invites us to think carefully about regimes of disclosure, along three dimensions:  depth, scope and timing. He calls for fair data practices that could be enhanced by establishing forms of supervision, of the kind that have been established for checking on research practices involving human subjects. Pasquale suggests that each person is entitled to an explanation of the rationale for the decision concerning them and that they should have the ability to challenge that decision. He recommends immutable audit logs for holding spying activities to account. He calls also for regulatory measures compensating for the market failures arising from the fact that dominant platforms are natural monopolies. Given the importance of reputation and ranking and the dominance of Google, he argues that the First Amendment cannot be mobilized as a wild card absolving internet giants from accountability. He calls for a “CIA for finance” and a “Corporate NSA,” believing governments should devote more effort to chasing wrongdoings from corporate actors. He argues that the approach taken in the area of Health Fraud Enforcement could bear fruit in finance, search and reputation.

    What I appreciate in Pasquale’s call for intelligibility is that it does indeed calibrate the needs of relational selves to interact with each other, to make sound decisions and to orient themselves in the world. Intelligibility is different from omniscience-omnipotence. It is about making sense of the world, while keeping in mind that there are different ways to do so. Intelligibility connects relational selves to the world surrounding them and allows them to act with other and move around. In the last chapter, Pasquale mentions the importance of restoring trust and the need to nurture a public space in the hyperconnected era. He calls for an end game to the Black Box. I agree with him that conscious deception inherently dissolves plurality and the common world, and needs to be strongly combatted, but I think that a lot of what takes place today goes beyond that and is really new and unchartered territories and horizons for humankind. With plurality, we can also embrace contingency in a less dramatic way that we used to in the Modern era. Contingency is a positive approach to un-certainty. It accounts for the openness of the future. The very word un-certainty is built in such a manner that certainty is considered the ideal outcome.

    4. WWW, or Welcome to the World of Women or a World Welcoming Women[15]

    To some extent, the fears of men in a hyperconnected era reflect all-too-familiar experiences of women. Being objects of surveillance and control, exhausting laboring without rewards and being lost through the holes of the meritocracy net, being constrained in a specular posture of other’s deeds: all these stances have been the fate of women’s lives for centuries, if not millennia. What men fear from the State or from “Big (br)Other”, they have experienced with men. So, welcome to world of women….

    But this situation may be looked at more optimistically as an opportunity for women’s voices and thoughts to go mainstream and be listened to. Now that equality between women and men is enshrined in the political and legal systems of the EU and the US, concretely, women have been admitted to the status of “rational subject”, but that does not dissolve its masculine origin, and the oddness or uneasiness for women to embrace this figure. Indeed, it was forged by men with men in mind, women, for those men, being indexed on nature. Mainstreaming the figure of the relational self, born in the mind of Arendt, will be much more inspiring and empowering for women, than was the rational subject. In fact, this enhances their agency and the performativity of their thoughts and theories. So, are we heading towards a world welcoming women?

    In conclusion, the advent of Big Data can be looked at in two ways. The first one is to look at it as the endpoint of the materialisation of all the promises and fears of Modern times. The second one is to look at it as a wake-up call for a new beginning; indeed, by making obvious the absurdity or the price of going all the way down to the consequences of the Modern conceptual frameworks, it calls on thinking on new grounds about how to make sense of the human condition and make it thrive. The former makes humans redundant, is self-fulfilling and does not deserve human attention and energy. Without any hesitation, I opt for the latter, i.e. the wake-up call and the new beginning.

    Let’s engage in this hyperconnected era bearing in mind Virginia Woolf’s “Think we must”[16] and, thereby, shape and honour the human condition in the 21st century.
    _____

    Nicole Dewandre has academic degrees in engineering, economics and philosophy. She is a civil servant in the European Commission, since 1983. She was advisor to the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, between 1986 and 1993. She then worked in the EU research policy, promoting gender equality, partnership with civil society and sustainability issues. Since 2011, she has worked on the societal issues related to the deployment of ICT technologies. She has published widely on organizational and political issues relating to ICTs.

    The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and in no way represent the view of the European Commission and its services.

    Back to the essay
    _____

    Acknowledgments: This review has been made possible by the Faculty of Law of the University of Maryland in Baltimore, who hosted me as a visiting fellow for the month of September 2015. I am most grateful to Frank Pasquale, first for having written this book, but also for engaging with me so patiently over the month of September and paying so much attention to my arguments, even suggesting in some instances the best way for making my points, when I was diverging from his views. I would also like to thank Jérôme Kohn, director of the Hannah Arendt Center at the New School for Social Research, for his encouragements in pursuing the mobilisation of Hannah Arendt’s legacy in my professional environment. I am also indebted, and notably for the conclusion, to the inspiring conversations I have had with Shauna Dillavou, excecutive director of CommunityRED, and Soraya Chemaly, Washington-based feminist writer, critic and activist. Last, and surely not least, I would like to thank David Golumbia for welcoming this piece in his journal and for the care he has put in editing this text written by a non-English native speaker.

    [1] This change of perspective, in itself, has the interesting side effect to take the carpet under the feet of those “addicted to speed”, as Pasquale is right when he points to this addiction (195) as being one of the reasons “why so little is being done” to address the challenges arising from the hyperconnected era.

    [2] Williams, Truth, Autonomy, and Speech, New York: New York University Press, 2004 (35).

    [3] See, e.g., Nicole Dewandre, ‘Rethinking the Human Condition in a Hyperconnected Era: Why Freedom Is Not About Sovereignty But About Beginnings’, in The Onlife Manifesto, ed. Luciano Floridi, Springer International Publishing, 2015 (195–215).

    [4]Williams, Truth, Autonomy, and Speech (32).

    [5] Literally: “spoken words fly; written ones remain”

    [6] Apart from action, Arendt distinguishes two other fundamental human activities that together with action account for the vita activa. These two other activities are labour and work. Labour is the activity that men and women engage in to stay alive, as organic beings: “the human condition of labour is life itself”. Labour is totally pervaded by necessity and processes. Work is the type of activity men and women engage with to produce objects and inhabit the world: “the human condition of work is worldliness”. Work is pervaded by a means-to-end logic or an instrumental rationale.

    [7] Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958; reissued, University of Chicago Press, 1998 (159).

    [8] Arendt, The Human Condition (160).

    [9] Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, Revised edition, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, (211).

    [10] See notably the work of Lynn Stout and the Frank Bold Foundation’s project on the purpose of corporations.

    [11] This expression has been introduced in the Onlife Initiative by Charles Ess, but in a different perspective. The Ess’ relational self is grounded in pre-Modern and Eastern/oriental societies. He writes: “In “Western” societies, the affordances of what McLuhan and others call “electric media,” including contemporary ICTs, appear to foster a shift from the Modern Western emphases on the self as primarily rational, individual, and thereby an ethically autonomous moral agent towards greater (and classically “Eastern” and pre-Modern) emphases on the self as primarily emotive, and relational—i.e., as constituted exclusively in terms of one’s multiple relationships, beginning with the family and extending through the larger society and (super)natural orders”. Ess, in Floridi, ed.,  The Onlife Manifesto (98).

    [12] Williams, Truth, Autonomy, and Speech.

    [13] Hannah Arendt and Jerome Kohn, Between Past and Future, Revised edition, New York: Penguin Classics, 2006 (55).

    [14] See Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

    [15] I thank Shauna Dillavou for suggesting these alternate meanings for “WWW.”

    [16] Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas, New York: Harvest, 1966.

  • Coding Bootcamps and the New For-Profit Higher Ed

    Coding Bootcamps and the New For-Profit Higher Ed

    By Audrey Watters
    ~
    After decades of explosive growth, the future of for-profit higher education might not be so bright. Or, depending on where you look, it just might be…

    In recent years, there have been a number of investigations – in the media, by the government – into the for-profit college sector and questions about these schools’ ability to effectively and affordably educate their students. Sure, advertising for for-profits is still plastered all over the Web, the airwaves, and public transportation, but as a result of journalistic and legal pressures, the lure of these schools may well be a lot less powerful. If nothing else, enrollment and profits at many for-profit institutions are down.

    Despite the massive amounts of money spent by the industry to prop it up – not just on ads but on lobbying and legal efforts, the Obama Administration has made cracking down on for-profits a centerpiece of its higher education policy efforts, accusing these schools of luring students with misleading and overblown promises, often leaving them with low-status degrees sneered at by employers and with loans students can’t afford to pay back.

    But the Obama Administration has also just launched an initiative that will make federal financial aid available to newcomers in the for-profit education sector: ed-tech experiments like “coding bootcamps” and MOOCs. Why are these particular for-profit experiments deemed acceptable? What do they do differently from the much-maligned for-profit universities?

    School as “Skills Training”

    In many ways, coding bootcamps do share the justification for their existence with for-profit universities. That is, they were founded in order to help to meet the (purported) demands of the job market: training people with certain technical skills, particularly those skills that meet the short-term needs of employers. Whether they meet students’ long-term goals remains to be seen.

    I write “purported” here even though it’s quite common to hear claims that the economy is facing a “STEM crisis” – that too few people have studied science, technology, engineering, or math and employers cannot find enough skilled workers to fill jobs in those fields. But claims about a shortage of technical workers are debatable, and lots of data would indicate otherwise: wages in STEM fields have remained flat, for example, and many who graduate with STEM degrees cannot find work in their field. In other words, the crisis may be “a myth.”

    But it’s a powerful myth, and one that isn’t terribly new, dating back at least to the launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 and subsequent hand-wringing over the Soviets’ technological capabilities and technical education as compared to the US system.

    There are actually a number of narratives – some of them competing narratives – at play here in the recent push for coding bootcamps, MOOCs, and other ed-tech initiatives: that everyone should go to college; that college is too expensive – “a bubble” in the Silicon Valley lexicon; that alternate forms of credentialing will be developed (by the technology sector, naturally); that the tech sector is itself a meritocracy, and college degrees do not really matter; that earning a degree in the humanities will leave you unemployed and burdened by student loan debt; that everyone should learn to code. Much like that supposed STEM crisis and skill shortage, these narratives might be powerful, but they too are hardly provable.

    Nor is the promotion of a more business-focused education that new either.

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    Career Colleges: A History

    Foster’s Commercial School of Boston, founded in 1832 by Benjamin Franklin Foster, is often recognized as the first school established in the United States for the specific purpose of teaching “commerce.” Many other commercial schools opened on its heels, most located in the Atlantic region in major trading centers like Philadelphia, Boston, New York, and Charleston. As the country expanded westward, so did these schools. Bryant & Stratton College was founded in Cleveland in 1854, for example, and it established a chain of schools, promising to open a branch in every American city with a population of more than 10,000. By 1864, it had opened more than 50, and the chain is still in operation today with 18 campuses in New York, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

    The curriculum of these commercial colleges was largely based around the demands of local employers alongside an economy that was changing due to the Industrial Revolution. Schools offered courses in bookkeeping, accounting, penmanship, surveying, and stenography. This was in marketed contrast to those universities built on a European model, which tended to teach topics like theology, philosophy, and classical language and literature. If these universities were “elitist,” the commercial colleges were “popular” – there were over 70,000 students enrolled in them in 1897, compared to just 5800 in colleges and universities – something that highlights what’s a familiar refrain still today: that traditional higher ed institutions do not meet everyone’s needs.

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    The existence of the commercial colleges became intertwined in many success stories of the nineteenth century: Andrew Carnegie attended night school in Pittsburgh to learn bookkeeping, and John D. Rockefeller studied banking and accounting at Folsom’s Commercial College in Cleveland. The type of education offered at these schools was promoted as a path to become a “self-made man.”

    That’s the story that still gets told: these sorts of classes open up opportunities for anyone to gain the skills (and perhaps the certification) that will enable upward mobility.

    It’s a story echoed in the ones told about (and by) John Sperling as well. Born into a working class family, Sperling worked as a merchant marine, then attended community college during the day and worked as a gas station attendant at night. He later transferred to Reed College, went on to UC Berkeley, and completed his doctorate at Cambridge University. But Sperling felt as though these prestigious colleges catered to privileged students; he wanted a better way for working adults to be able to complete their degrees. In 1976, he founded the University of Phoenix, one of the largest for-profit colleges in the US which at its peak in 2010 enrolled almost 600,000 students.

    Other well-known names in the business of for-profit higher education: Walden University (founded in 1970), Capella University (founded in 1993), Laureate Education (founded in 1999), Devry University (founded in 1931), Education Management Corporation (founded in 1962), Strayer University (founded in 1892), Kaplan University (founded in 1937 as The American Institute of Commerce), and Corinthian Colleges (founded in 1995 and defunct in 2015).

    It’s important to recognize the connection of these for-profit universities to older career colleges, and it would be a mistake to see these organizations as distinct from the more recent development of MOOCs and coding bootcamps. Kaplan, for example, acquired the code school Dev Bootcamp in 2014. Laureate Education is an investor in the MOOC provider Coursera. The Apollo Education Group, the University of Phoenix’s parent company, is an investor in the coding bootcamp The Iron Yard.

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    Promises, Promises

    Much like the worries about today’s for-profit universities, even the earliest commercial colleges were frequently accused of being “purely business speculations” – “diploma mills” – mishandled by administrators who put the bottom line over the needs of students. There were concerns about the quality of instruction and about the value of the education students were receiving.

    That’s part of the apprehension about for-profit universities’ (almost most) recent manifestations too: that these schools are charging a lot of money for a certification that, at the end of the day, means little. But at least the nineteenth century commercial colleges were affordable, UC Berkley history professor Caitlin Rosenthal argues in a 2012 op-ed in Bloomberg,

    The most common form of tuition at these early schools was the “life scholarship.” Students paid a lump sum in exchange for unlimited instruction at any of the college’s branches – $40 for men and $30 for women in 1864. This was a considerable fee, but much less than tuition at most universities. And it was within reach of most workers – common laborers earned about $1 per day and clerks’ wages averaged $50 per month.

    Many of these “life scholarships” promised that students who enrolled would land a job – and if they didn’t, they could always continue their studies. That’s quite different than the tuition at today’s colleges – for-profit or not-for-profit – which comes with no such guarantee.

    Interestingly, several coding bootcamps do make this promise. A 48-week online program at Bloc will run you $24,000, for example. But if you don’t find a job that pays $60,000 after four months, your tuition will be refunded, the startup has pledged.

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    According to a recent survey of coding bootcamp alumni, 66% of graduates do say they’ve found employment (63% of them full-time) in a job that requires the skills they learned in the program. 89% of respondents say they found a job within 120 days of completing the bootcamp. Yet 21% say they’re unemployed – a number that seems quite high, particularly in light of that supposed shortage of programming talent.

    For-Profit Higher Ed: Who’s Being Served?

    The gulf between for-profit higher ed’s promise of improved job prospects and the realities of graduates’ employment, along with the price tag on its tuition rates, is one of the reasons that the Obama Administration has advocated for “gainful employment” rules. These would measure and monitor the debt-to-earnings ratio of graduates from career colleges and in turn penalize those schools whose graduates had annual loan payments more than 8% of their wages or 20% of their discretionary earnings. (The gainful employment rules only apply to those schools that are eligible for Title IV federal financial aid.)

    The data is still murky about how much debt attendees at coding bootcamps accrue and how “worth it” these programs really might be. According to the aforementioned survey, the average tuition at these programs is $11,852. This figure might be a bit deceiving as the price tag and the length of bootcamps vary greatly. Moreover, many programs, such as App Academy, offer their program for free (well, plus a $5000 deposit) but then require that graduates repay up to 20% of their first year’s salary back to the school. So while the tuition might appear to be low in some cases, the indebtedness might actually be quite high.

    According to Course Report’s survey, 49% of graduates say that they paid tuition out of their own pockets, 21% say they received help from family, and just 1.7% say that their employer paid (or helped with) the tuition bill. Almost 25% took out a loan.

    That percentage – those going into debt for a coding bootcamp program – has increased quite dramatically over the last few years. (Less than 4% of graduates in the 2013 survey said that they had taken out a loan). In part, that’s due to the rapid expansion of the private loan industry geared towards serving this particular student population. (Incidentally, the two ed-tech companies which have raised the most money in 2015 are both loan providers: SoFi and Earnest. The former has raised $1.2 billion in venture capital this year; the latter $245 million.)

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    The Obama Administration’s newly proposed “EQUIP” experiment will open up federal financial aid to some coding bootcamps and other ed-tech providers (like MOOC platforms), but it’s important to underscore some of the key differences here between federal loans and private-sector loans: federal student loans don’t have to be repaid until you graduate or leave school; federal student loans offer forbearance and deferment if you’re struggling to make payments; federal student loans have a fixed interest rate, often lower than private loans; federal student loans can be forgiven if you work in public service; federal student loans (with the exception of PLUS loans) do not require a credit check. The latter in particular might help to explain the demographics of those who are currently attending coding bootcamps: if they’re having to pay out-of-pocket or take loans, students are much less likely to be low-income. Indeed, according to Course Report’s survey, the cost of the bootcamps and whether or not they offered a scholarship was one of the least important factors when students chose a program.

    Here’s a look at some coding bootcamp graduates’ demographic data (as self-reported):

    Age
    Mean Age 30.95
    Gender
    Female 36.3%
    Male 63.1%
    Ethnicity
    American Indian 1.0%
    Asian American 14.0%
    Black 5.0%
    Other 17.2%
    White 62.8%
    Hispanic Origin
    Yes 20.3%
    No 79.7%
    Citizenship
    Yes, born in the US 78.2%
    Yes, naturalized 9.7%
    No 12.2%
    Education
    High school dropout 0.2%
    High school graduate 2.6%
    Some college 14.2%
    Associate’s degree 4.1%
    Bachelor’s degree 62.1%
    Master’s degree 14.2%
    Professional degree 1.5%
    Doctorate degree 1.1%

    (According to several surveys of MOOC enrollees, these students also tend to be overwhelmingly male from more affluent neighborhoods, and MOOC students also tend to already possess Bachelor’s degrees. The median age of MITx registrants is 27.)

    It’s worth considering how the demographics of students in MOOCs and coding bootcamps may (or may not) be similar to those enrolled at other for-profit post-secondary institutions, particularly since all of these programs tend to invoke the rhetoric about “democratizing education” and “expanding access.” Access for whom?

    Some two million students were enrolled in for-profit colleges in 2010, up from 400,000 a decade earlier. These students are disproportionately older, African American, and female when compared to the entire higher ed student population. While one in 20 of all students are enrolled in a for-profit college, 1 in 10 African American students, 1 in 14 Latino students, and 1 in 14 first-generation college students are enrolled at a for-profit. Students at for-profits are more likely to be single parents. They’re less likely to enter with a high school diploma. Dependent students in for-profits have about half as much family income as students in not-for-profit schools. (This demographic data is drawn from the NCES and from Harvard University researchers David Deming, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence Katz in their 2013 study on for-profit colleges.)

    Deming, Goldin, and Katz argue that

    The snippets of available evidence suggest that the economic returns to students who attend for-profit colleges are lower than those for public and nonprofit colleges. Moreover, default rates on student loans for proprietary schools far exceed those of other higher-education institutions.

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    According to one 2010 report, just 22% of first- and full-time students pursuing Bachelor’s degrees at for-profit colleges in 2008 graduated, compared to 55% and 65% of students at public and private non-profit universities respectively. Of the more than 5000 career programs that the Department of Education tracks, 72% of those offered by for-profit institutions produce graduates who earn less than high school dropouts.

    For their part, today’s MOOCs and coding bootcamps also boast that their students will find great success on the job market. Coursera, for example, recently surveyed its students who’d completed one of its online courses and 72% who responded said they had experienced “career benefits.” But without the mandated reporting that comes with federal financial aid, a lot of what we know about their student population and student outcomes remains pretty speculative.

    What kind of students benefit from coding bootcamps and MOOC programs, the new for-profit education? We don’t really know… although based on the history of higher education and employment, we can guess.

    EQUIP and the New For-Profit Higher Ed

    On October 14, the Obama Administration announced a new initiative, the Educational Quality through Innovative Partnerships (EQUIP) program, which will provide a pathway for unaccredited education programs like coding bootcamps and MOOCs to become eligible for federal financial aid. According to the Department of Education, EQUIP is meant to open up “new models of education and training” to low income students. In a press release, it argues that “Some of these new models may provide more flexible and more affordable credentials and educational options than those offered by traditional higher institutions, and are showing promise in preparing students with the training and education needed for better, in-demand jobs.”

    The EQUIP initiative will partner accredited institutions with third-party providers, loosening the “50% rule” that prohibits accredited schools from outsourcing more than 50% of an accredited program. Since bootcamps and MOOC providers “are not within the purview of traditional accrediting agencies,” the Department of Education says, “we have no generally accepted means of gauging their quality.” So those organizations that apply for the experiment will have to provide an outside “quality assurance entity,” which will help assess “student outcomes” like learning and employment.

    By making financial aid available for bootcamps and MOOCs, one does have to wonder if the Obama Administration is not simply opening the doors for more of precisely the sort of practices that the for-profit education industry has long been accused of: expanding rapidly, lowering the quality of instruction, focusing on marketing to certain populations (such as veterans), and profiting off of taxpayer dollars.

    Who benefits from the availability of aid? And who benefits from its absence? (“Who” here refers to students and to schools.)

    Shawna Scott argues in “The Code School-Industrial Complex” that without oversight, coding bootcamps re-inscribe the dominant beliefs and practices of the tech industry. Despite all the talk of “democratization,” this is a new form of gatekeeping.

    Before students are even accepted, school admission officers often select for easily marketable students, which often translates to students with the most privileged characteristics. Whether through intentionally targeting those traits because it’s easier to ensure graduates will be hired, or because of unconscious bias, is difficult to discern. Because schools’ graduation and employment rates are their main marketing tool, they have a financial stake in only admitting students who are at low risk of long-term unemployment. In addition, many schools take cues from their professional developer founders and run admissions like they hire for their startups. Students may be subjected to long and intensive questionnaires, phone or in-person interviews, or be required to submit a ‘creative’ application, such as a video. These requirements are often onerous for anyone working at a paid job or as a caretaker for others. Rarely do schools proactively provide information on alternative application processes for people of disparate ability. The stereotypical programmer is once again the assumed default.

    And so, despite the recent moves to sanction certain ed-tech experiments, some in the tech sector have been quite vocal in their opposition to more regulations governing coding schools. It’s not just EQUIP either; there was much outcry last year after several states, including California, “cracked down” on bootcamps. Many others have framed the entire accreditation system as a “cabal” that stifles innovation. “Innovation” in this case implies alternate certificate programs – not simply Associate’s or Bachelor’s degrees – in timely, technical topics demanded by local/industry employers.

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    The Forgotten Tech Ed: Community Colleges

    Of course, there is an institution that’s long offered alternate certificate programs in timely, technical topics demanded by local/industry employers, and that’s the community college system.

    Vox’s Libby Nelson observed that “The NYT wrote more about Harvard last year than all community colleges combined,” and certainly the conversations in the media (and elsewhere) often ignore that community colleges exist at all, even though these schools educate almost half of all undergraduates in the US.

    Like much of public higher education, community colleges have seen their funding shrink in recent decades and have been tasked to do more with less. For community colleges, it’s a lot more with a lot less. Open enrollment, for example, means that these schools educate students who require more remediation. Yet despite many community colleges students being “high need,” community colleges spend far less per pupil than do four-year institutions. Deep budget cuts have also meant that even with their open enrollment policies, community colleges are having to restrict admissions. In 2012, some 470,000 students in California were on waiting lists, unable to get into the courses they need.

    This is what we know from history: as the funding for public higher ed decreased – for two- and four-year schools alike, for-profit higher ed expanded, promising precisely what today’s MOOCs and coding bootcamps now insist they’re the first and the only schools to do: to offer innovative programs, training students in the kinds of skills that will lead to good jobs. History tells us otherwise…
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    Audrey Watters is a writer who focuses on education technology – the relationship between politics, pedagogy, business, culture, and ed-tech. She has worked in the education field for over 15 years: teaching, researching, organizing, and project-managing. Although she was two chapters into her dissertation (on a topic completely unrelated to ed-tech), she decided to abandon academia, and she now happily fulfills the one job recommended to her by a junior high aptitude test: freelance writer. Her stories have appeared on NPR/KQED’s education technology blog MindShift, in the data section of O’Reilly Radar, on Inside Higher Ed, in The School Library Journal, in The Atlantic, on ReadWriteWeb, and Edutopia. She is the author of the recent book The Monsters of Education Technology (Smashwords, 2014) and working on a book called Teaching Machines. She maintains the widely-read Hack Education blog, on which an earlier version of this essay first appeared, and writes frequently for The b2 Review Digital Studies magazine on digital technology and education.

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