• Alex Gourevitch—Become the Gods: A Response to Jensen Suther

    Alex Gourevitch—Become the Gods: A Response to Jensen Suther

    This article is a response to a text by Jensen Suther that was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier

    As is too often the case, when I agree with ninety percent of an argument, I spend all my time on the ten percent with which I disagree. I think learning to love the rich, even those as loathsome as the Roys, is a way to understanding the dynamic of love and domination in Succession. But there is a question of how to think about the personal and the impersonal in the show. We can get there indirectly, by way of comparison. I just read Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks and was talking to a friend about the comparison between Buddenbrooks and Succession. Two great works about dynastic succession, but with very different narrative trajectories. The connection between Buddenbrooks and Succession is in the portrayal of patriarchal domination. The institutional fact of succession – who will inherit the family business? – allows that domination to have objective content. Domination is not just an accidental fact of personal psychology, of a father’s ability to morally terrorize or manipulate, but a continual and institutionally stabilized relation. Someone must succeed to the office once occupied by another. The child must succeed the father, not just as father, but also as leader of the enterprise. The power the father has over the child is to confer the title, by which the child becomes something more than mere biological continuity.

    In both Buddenbrooks and Succession, the domination appears at the personal level in the fact that the children fail to measure up to the paterfamilias. In Buddenbrooks, however, the children fail because of the spectral presence of the patriarch’s high moral virtue and its apparent connection to his economic success. The elder Buddenbrook, Johann, was a natural bourgeois. He lived a life of virtue without finding it mere subordination to duty. There is little sense that he had to stifle his basic impulses and inner vitality to the Protestant ethic. Instead he found it spiritually fulfilling, even nourishing. The second-generation Buddenbrooks, however, are inferior in their different ways. None can live as they naturally are. They each find themselves mentally and spiritually stifled, even physically crippled, by their duty to sustain the family in the image of their father’s sober, bourgeois propriety. The naturally impudent and daring daughter, Tony, slowly has the life crushed out of her by the failed attempts to be a good wife and good daughter. The more she tries to carry out her duties the more her life bends and shrinks, like an empty soda can slowly imploding under pressure. Christian, the middle-child, is decadent in mind and body, physically ailing away and economically dissolute: inconsistently employed and endlessly in debt. The eldest and natural successor, Thomas, has neither the will to adapt to the new business conditions nor the spiritual intensity to commit to being a lesser, but proper, businessman. Keeping the business alive means expanding it, but expanding it requires an enterprising spirit at odds with the decency and moderation that he mimics but does not feel. As the unsatisfied and bitter leader of the family enterprise, he is an unworthy successor who fails to sustain the life of his family: the business stagnates and declines while his son and sole heir dies. Buddenbrooks is, therefore, a novel about dynastic decay under a particular kind of social domination. The next generation’s lives are constrained by the unreachable moral example of the previous generation, in the context of a capitalist society that has turned more intensely competitive and, therefore, incompatible with bourgeois moral virtue. Were they to adapt to new conditions, they would violate the example of their father, but to hew to the family morality they must destroy their vitality.

    Succession, however, is not about the same kind of decay because there is no real evolution. Buddenbrooks stretches over three generations, while Succession is almost relentlessly temporally constipated. There is no slow decline from the moral glories of the founding and growth of the enterprise. We start at the peak and are held there for three and a half seasons during which nothing happens. Nothing happens because Logan won’t let “It” happen. Some complain that this temporal stagnation is all in the service of glamorizing the billionaire lifestyle in the guise of prestige TV. All we’re left with is endless shots of private jets, family helicopters, and exclusive residences. But the sclerosis is part of the show’s aesthetic integrity. Logan does not loom over his children by the force of his moral example, like Johann Buddenbrook. Instead – as Jensen observes – Logan sees and despises each of them. He refuses to let them love him.

    But it’s more than that. Logan uses the prospect of succession to ever further crush his children, playing each off the other to keep them all subordinate to him. The children are weak and grasping, not just because they cannot live up to his virtue, but because Logan himself has lost his way. His is a purposeless rule: winning for the sake of winning. “I fucking win!” he screams in the season 3 finale, when he has outmaneuvered his children. When his children ask him why he’s doing this, Logan can only say “because it fucking works.” The dynastic economic project is revealed for what it always was, an exercise in domination. But left with the evidence that his children don’t have the strength and guile to destroy him, he is left only with his will to power now turned inwards, on his own family.

    The reason that the show moves in place, as it were, is because there is still a dynamic tension at the core of Logan’s conflict with his children: the dynasty he created cannot be maintained. He cannot allow a succession to take place because it would mean there is someone worthy of the office. But Logan’s domination of his own family is so complete that there are only children grasping at an inheritance, not worthy of succession. This is not succession as decay, à la Buddenbrooks, but succession as self-annihilation. It is fitting that the only way for a succession to take place, for some kind of historical movement to take place, is Logan dying. It was that or Logan destroying the company by selling it, whichever came first. As it happens, Logan’s will outlives his body. The GoJo deal goes through, Matsson takes over, and the Roy children find themselves outmaneuvered by each other. Roman, ever the truth-teller of the show, explains the result to Kendall: “We are bullshit…You are bullshit, I am bullshit, she is bullshit. It’s all fucking bullshit.” They are bullshit because, though willing to sacrifice each other for their ambition, they are never willing to go all the way, never even quite sure whether they want to succeed their father or want his approval. Shiv’s betrayal, which seals the sale to GoJo, is just the final proof. Matsson was the worthy successor because he was a killer. Even the Roy children know it. They repeatedly accuse Matsson of having killed their father by forcing Logan onto the plane in which he died his ignominious death. It is never clear whether they are more upset at their father’s death or at the dominance Matsson establishes by being responsible for Logan’s end.

    Now I agree that one way to understand Succession is that it is not just a timeless tale of dynastic succession, but one in which that succession is disciplined by its social form: a special kind of social domination. This makes many of the popular comparisons inapt. Some have likened Succession to King Lear. It seems obvious. An increasingly unhinged, aging father tests the love of his three children by rules that make expression of that love impossible. Goneril and Regan’s praise for their father is insincere, not because we know their inner motives, but because of the structure imposed on their speech by Lear. By making their words a test of their worthiness to inherit part of the kingdom, he makes their voice his. Regardless of whether they mean what they say, they cannot mean it. The more they speak, the less they can say. Again, this is not about their true motives but about the conditions under which they speak, conditions determined by their father, who has bound expressions of love to inheritance. In Succession, Roman is the ultimate Goneril-Regan. When Roman pleads with his father, “don’t do this,” in the season 3 finale, Logan asks Roman what he has left. Roman’s pathetic “I don’t know…love?” is so hopeless that it is almost sincere, but also absurd. Love has as little place in a boardroom battle as when inheriting the kingdom. But there is no other conversation Logan understands, no other relation Logan can accept than the struggle to over-power others. The Cordelia option is the one the children left behind at the beginning of season 4: leave the business so that they can be a family. But Cordelia’s silence is not purer. It is just the other side of the domination relationship: she can only express her love for her father by not expressing it. Only further proof that it is the dominator who makes love inexpressible.

    But the Lear comparison withers on further inspection. Lear’s madness is political. He divides the indivisible: a sovereign realm. He compounds the problem by then imagining he can choose his successors. The normal logic of succession, to which he refuses to submit, is that one child – the eldest – inherits it all, because that preserves the integrity of rule. Lear should have as little say as anyone else, yet he wants it all to depend on his will – one kingdom or many, that love should decide, and so on. He is subject to that impersonal political logic, yet wants it all to be personal. Logan Roy, however, is the patriarch of an altogether different enterprise: not the territorially-bound state but the globe-bestriding, multinational corporation. Not Leviathan but Behemoth.

    The universal drama of Succession is mediated by the drama of that social logic – not just of billionaires, but billionaire capitalists, constrained by board-members and shareholders, debt payments and stock prices, conglomerates and subsidiaries. That is why I think Jensen is right to point to capitalist forms of domination in particular. But is this a story about mute compulsion? Where even the very wealthy are as much slaves as everyone else? And where, therefore, we have to root for their love – love them – because it is the only human and emancipatory response to the crushing logic of accumulation?

    It’s true, there is a sense in which the characters are subject to a dynamic they cannot master and that they can only liberate themselves by escaping the social relations they are disciplined by. But I don’t think it’s primarily the silent logic of accumulation that constrains them.

    Now I can imagine a counterargument something like the following. If mute compulsion isn’t the fundamental constraint, then what is? Succession is not itself a timeless logic because it takes different forms. Isn’t that the point of distinguishing between Lear, Buddenbrooks and Succession? Logan’s purposeless rule, of winning for the sake of winning, is as Jensen put it “a late capitalist twist on Lear’s madness.” So Logan has not lost his way in some ethical sense. His is no mere intellectual error. His purposeless rule is an internalization of production for the sake of production, or what Marx called “nothing more than the rationalized motive and aim of the hoarder.”

    I don’t disagree, but there are limits to the mute compulsion reading of Succession. Mute compulsion is the impersonal form of social domination by capital. It is achieved through the discipline the market imposes externally on each of the actors. The clearest account of that domination we have is from volume 1 of Capital. The presentation of that domination as comprehensively impersonal requires assuming, as volume 1 does, that the paradigmatic form of ownership is one in which capital is dispersed across many capitalists. None are in any position to shape the market conditions that discipline them. They are price-takers, in modern parlance, because they are roughly equally situated. (While Marx does later show how capital naturally centralizes and concentrates, that is a natural development of the logic of accumulation that also modifies the nature of those constraints.) When capitalists are in that position vis-à-vis each other Marx does say they are just as much slaves as workers. They are slaves to capital because they are wholly subordinate to the logic of surplus-value extraction. Each particular intersubjective relation is subsumed by this wider social process: exchange-value rules use-value, value accumulation over love and friendship.

    If Succession is an expression of that, we would want it to show us those moments of external discipline, in which characters are forced to adopt the standpoint of capital. And we do sometimes see it. The debt situation in season 1, Stuy Hosseini, proxy battles, desperate attempts to go private, cratering stock prices, hostile takeover threats, the deal with Matsson. Whether the characters want to or not, there are moments when characters must consciously adopt the standpoint of the value-maximizing capitalist, or find themselves and their lives dissolved. This reaches its peak in the first episode of the final season, in the question of whether they will all just cash out. Why not take the billions and be free? Not only do they decide to stay, but never is Kendall prouder than the moment when he gives the successful speech to shareholders on the new value proposition ‘Living Plus.’ He doesn’t want money, he wants to increase value. Cashing out is something close to spiritual death for each of them. But notice one weakness here with the mute compulsion story – they really can cash out. They aren’t petty capitalists, who will go under, and return to the ranks of the working class or whatever. There is nothing really forcing them away from the route Connor takes – spend vast amounts of money on their own vanity projects.

    We might think there is a further form of domination, not external in the sense of market discipline, but social, in the sense of the form that all relations take. This is I think part of what Jensen is getting at. It is not a question of what they are forced to do, but how it is available for them to conceive themselves. Their psychology is already social. For instance, their conception of a family is as an empire not of property but of endlessly accumulating wealth. They can’t imagine the family bond without all being part of the company, making decisions together in the boardroom. They have no experience and no sense of love as its own, independent bond, because who they are as a family and who they are as a business, is inseparable. And that, itself, is product of the social form they are tied up in.

    Now I’m not rejecting that completely. But I don’t quite see the social form of the ‘succession’ as so impersonally capitalist. It is dynastic. The dynastic succession of a commercial empire, not just an ordinary capitalist business. Waystar is a corporate behemoth able to use its economic power to shape and alter markets and to use its political power to anoint or destroy presidents. The Logan family is not subject to the routine discipline of those markets the way, say, a local dry-cleaner or restauranteur or barber is. Succession is also an expression of human power and freedom from within the logic of capitalism. It is an all-too-human form of domination, in which the particular whims of a particular agent – primarily but not only the patriarchal figure – has its own independent existence. And this shapes the dynamic of familial succession. Logan is only willing to hand off to someone like him. The only worthy successor is someone who is equally or even more dominant. And his children routinely wonder what to do with their power. They even seem to celebrate impulsiveness and capriciousness, because they imagine themselves to be exercising Machiavellian virtú just like their father. There is in some sense too much slack, not enough mute compulsion and discipline, which is why they are constantly trying to will themselves into their father’s position. They can never make up their mind and the structure won’t make it up for them.

    So we might say that, while this is a very capitalist form of succession, it is not just a story about impersonal domination, but simultaneously about a highly personal form of domination because it takes place in our particular (Late? Postmodern? Financial?) capitalist society. There is so much wealth and so much market power that it appears like everything depends on the whim and caprice of the patriarch. And personal domination, in the sense of creating the world in one’s own, not just capital’s, image seems like an end in itself.

    That also explains why the trap, the structural logic of the show, is that succession is impossible. Logan has related to his family as to everyone else, as subjects to be manipulated, controlled, dominated – not just used. But those who submit are unsuited to replacing him. Since his children love him, they try to be what he admires – power-seeking, dominant, risk-takers. But they are not really in it to dominate, they are in it for love, so they continuously fail. And Logan, meanwhile, is in it to win. Again, I am not sure we can really get what’s going on with this, without appreciating that the social form of succession is an expression not just of the standard mute compulsion of capital, but of the dynastic form of neoliberal, multinational corporate capitalism. That kind of capitalism creates zones of discretion that add a very personal element to the domination the children experience. It makes the prize they struggle for that much more dramatic, makes Logan seem that much more god-like, and the self-aggrandizement of each not purely delusional or psychologically stunted.

    Which brings me to the politics of the show. Critics complained that we see almost no real people or any of the people doing the work. But that is the genius of the show. It happens in remote and inaccessible areas – private jets and helicopters, Caribbean villas and New York penthouses, Mediterranean yachts and Hampton estates. Even Connor’s private wedding boat has its own private room set aside for the siblings. Over time, the show’s hyper-attention to these exclusive forms of travel, leisure and business, is to make the drama into an Olympian power struggle among pagan gods. Those gods have all the familiar human weaknesses – they are vain and capricious, reckless and indifferent – but coupled to powers no ordinary human beings could have. They choose presidents and they get away with murder. A business (Vaulter) is gutted, whole floors of people unemployed, all because of a petty squabble between two brothers vying for their father’s approval in a boardroom. Or, perhaps the greatest superpower of all, they can just fly over hours-long snarls of plebeian traffic. The emptiness and sterility of most of the settings, the absence not just of anything dirty or even cluttering, but often of any ordinary people, is part of what enhances the sense that these are more than ordinary mortals. When the siblings show up in Sweden to negotiate with Matsson they do so on a literal mountaintop, like lesser Greek divinities locking horns with a Norse deity. Logan’s death was like the death of a Titan, the old gods giving way to the new.

    Some commentators claim that this hyper-stylization glorified the rich, but that is too shallow a reading. The unreachability of the characters, intensified by the remoteness of the settings, was a proper representation of social power in our society. Our capitalist economy is immensely productive and has generated fabulous capacities for social cooperation. But it has done so in a way that makes it seem like, were it not for some foreign power like an employer or financier, we would not cooperate in this social enterprise at all. These immense capacities to shape our material world and determine the rules of cooperation are concentrated in a small number of hands, over whom we exercise little control. We cannot even recognize their social power as our own. It is alien to us. And so it is best represented as the distant powers of a few people who, for that reason, seem more than human. The majority work or don’t work, rest or don’t rest, at their pleasure.

    If that world-shaping power is really a collective one, ours in the broadest national and international sense, then perhaps the real succession story is the one the show doesn’t tell. We are the disinherited. There is a brutal realism to Succession. Only the gods can hurt other gods. There is no Promethean moment. Nobody steals the Roy family’s fire, seizes their property, and brings their power down to earth. And that too is a truth, since nothing seems more remote these days than social transformation. In Greek mythology, the gods begin to die when the people stop worshipping them. In our time, the problem is not one of belief and worship but politics and action. So long as the vast majority does nothing to claim the power that is theirs, then it is not just Gregs all the way down, it is Matssons always on top. Yes, we should love the rich, but we should also want to become the gods. That would be the true succession.

    Alex Gourevitch is an associate professor of political science at Brown University. He is the author of From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century, and is currently working on a book about strikes.

  • Jensen Suther—Learning to Love the Rich in Succession

    Jensen Suther—Learning to Love the Rich in Succession

    This article was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier. The dossier includes a response to this article by Alex Gourevitch.

    Immediately following the finale of the third season of HBO’s Succession—the recent prestige drama about a Murdoch-like media mogul and the struggle among his children over who will succeed him as CEO—screengrabs of a now-famous scene began circulating on social media. The still depicts Jeremy Strong’s emotionally battered Kendall Roy sitting on the ground outside the Italian wedding venue where his mother has just been remarried, his brother Roman (played by a very game Kieran Culkin) bending at the waist to grip his shoulders and his sister Siobhan (or “Shiv,” a role owned by Sarah Snook) lightly touching his head while looking on with evident feeling and concern. To highlight the artistry and painterly composition of the scene, someone had superimposed on the shot of the three Roy siblings a geometric representation of the golden ratio, a spiral within a rectangle. Employed most famously by Italian artist and inventor Leonardo da Vinci, the golden ratio can often be found in paintings from the Renaissance period and was integral to the development of the humanist idea of the harmony, balance, and innate value of the human form. While the Italian setting of the season and portrait-like character of the shot would seem to suggest that this is more than mere coincidence, it is hard to understand what sort of role such an anachronistic gesture could be playing in a series as cruel and as brutally anti-humanist as this one, in which profitability, efficiency and power are “the measure of all things”—rather than humanity, to cite the Renaissance favorite Protagoras. At best, it appears to be a smug, ironic nod to the inhumanity of the Roys; at worst, a case of prestige television freely appropriating from an illustrious phase of art history in order to increase said prestige.

    Yet Succession has consistently centered the human figure—especially, with its snap zooms, the human face—and such cinematographic devices serve to remind us of what very little else in the series’ dialogue or its characters’ acts is able to: their own diminished humanity and value. Understood in this way, the series isn’t engaged in the passé postmodern project of exposing the fraudulence of humanism; its subversiveness rather lies in the way it teaches us to see the humanity in—and thus to love—the rich.

    The series begins with Kendall, the eldest of the three full siblings, preparing to replace his elderly father Logan Roy (Brian Cox) as the CEO of their family company, Waystar Royco, a media and entertainment conglomerate that passingly resembles the Murdoch empire. Yet as the heir apparent is initiated into his role, is widely discussed in the media, and makes the cover of Forbes, Logan begins to suspect that Kendall lacks the “killer instinct,” as Shiv puts it later, that the job requires. A recovering addict with a depressive streak who craves his domineering father’s respect and approval, Kendall fails several implicit tests, like a trick invitation to Logan’s eightieth birthday in the middle of tense acquisition negotiations. Logan’s fateful—yet perhaps prudent—decision to cancel his retirement plans and not step aside is the series’ equivalent to the Big Bang: it births the twisted, post-Shakespearian universe of Succession, in which Kendall, Shiv, and Roman compete against one another for the chief role and thus for their father’s affections.

    By the midpoint of the third season, some of the series’ former champions began to question the point of the endless machinations and to voice concerns about the kinds of sympathies Succession seems made to elicit from its viewers. Why, such commentators wondered, should we feel sorry that the Roys might lose their private jets? Why are their lives given such sumptuous, wide-screen treatment, and not the lives of those their actions destroy? In season one, Roman dangles a million-dollar check before the son of two immigrant staff members, a sum they are promised if the child can hit a homerun in the family’s annual softball game. He of course is outed, his family made to sign an NDA, and they make a brief final appearance just before the credits roll, when it is intimated that, in exchange for their silence, they were given the Patek Philippe watch Logan indifferently received from Shiv’s husband Tom (Matthew Macfadyen) for his birthday. If the actual victims are bit players, silenced and marginalized, then our empathy for Kendall or Roman would appear to reflect our ensnarement in a classical ideological trap: the sentimental identification with a character’s “universal” plight, such as a son’s failure to live up to his father’s expectations.

    In his influential critique of Western theater, Brecht famously decries works that elicit this kind of empathic projection as bourgeois instruments for blocking reflection and anesthetizing thought.[i] Yet the problem is not just that the true victims are elided or relegated to the sidelines; refocusing the narrative on a different struggle would simply reproduce the same difficulty. Rather, what goes missing is “the idea of a man as a function of the environment and the environment as a function of man” (1992: 97). What is elided, in other words, is a sense of the historical specificity of the dramatic action, the social situation that prompts those acts or that struggle at this time. To cite Richard Wright, the point is not to create art “which even bankers’ daughters could read [or watch] and weep over and feel good about”[ii]; the point for Brecht is to create opportunities for understanding the broader systemic reasons that things are as they are. But doesn’t this precisely tell against the mission of Succession, to teach us to “love the rich”?

    At least at first glance, the view of Succession as a show for “bankers’ daughters” is reinforced by the most prominent “critical theory” of the social function of television and by the way that the series is shaped in accordance with the constraints specific to the medium. In the early fifties, Theodor Adorno produced a series of articles on the status of television “as ideology,” based on studies he undertook as the research director of the Hacker Foundation in California.[iii] There is a certain ham-fistedness and predictability to Adorno’s analyses, which largely consist of readings of individual “plays” (“shows,” in our contemporary idiom) as stereotypical representations of everyday life meant to foster conformity. Yet Adorno does begin to sketch a critical theory specific to the medium in elaborating the notion of “pseudo-realism,” which pinpoints the way television substitutes a “pedantically maintained realism in all matters of direct sense perception” for representation of the objective, institutional tendencies responsible for producing our shared reality (1991: 170). This endows television with a unique capacity for smuggling in an ideology of “the normal” advantageous to the capitalist status quo. Adorno cites as a key example the way the medium “personalizes” irreducibly historical and political phenomena. For instance, in a series about a fascist dictator, totalitarianism is represented as the result of the “character defects of ambitious politicians,” the dictator’s fall as a product of the warm personalities of courageous resisters (2005a: 63). This reinforces our sense of society as an aggregate of egos, atoms swirling in a history-less void.

    In the case of Succession, however, this procedure is inverted: the character defects of the rich are like wounds that pique the interest of the morbidly curious and compel them to ask: “how did it happen?” It is precisely by foregoing the prestige sociology of a show like The Wire and by exactingly observing the inner lives and family dynamics of so “undeserving” a subject that the lineaments of distinct historical types (the mogul, the operative, the CEO) are thrown into relief. As a brief, pivotal scene in season one’s emotionally harrowing “Austerlitz” shows, Logan himself is a product of abuse. Shortly after Kendall questions an allusion his father makes to the beatings he endured as a child in Quebec, the camera lingers on Logan’s scarred back during his morning swim in an infinity pool. Yet it would be a mistake to read this scene as aiming to simply elicit the kind of “empathic projection” targeted by Brecht. A hallmark of Succession is its use of handheld cameras to achieve a verité effect, which creator Jesse Armstrong first deployed in his dark comedic masterpiece Peep Show. The series’ verité style is a way of exploiting the “pseudo-realism” of television to bring what is fantastical, sky-scraper high, back down to earth and to shock us with the disclosure that, to cite Marx, “The capitalist is just as enslaved by the relationships of capitalism as is his opposite pole, the worker” (1976: 990). Logan may not live among us, but he does live as one of us, as deformed by the demands of a market society as anyone else. And as we will see, Succession teaches us to love the rich precisely by illuminating the late capitalist web in which we all are caught.

    For Marx, the purpose of capitalist production is the accumulation of value, which is measured in labor time. The drive to accumulation is a matter not of individual greed or miserliness but of a social system that necessitates that one sell one’s labor or buy and employ the labor of others to survive. Succession thus rightly depicts our world as a world of masters and slaves: Shiv is to Logan what Tom is to Shiv; what Tom is to Shiv Greg (Nicholas Braun) is to Tom. And to incentivize his own “slave” to aid him in betraying his master, Shiv, Tom promises Greg “your own Greg.” What Greg’s presence is meant to reveal is that it is in fact Gregs all the way down. Yet it is also Gregs all the way up. It might seem that that degree of wealth (tens of billions) would free anyone so lucky from the “drive to accumulation.”  Logan’s scars help dispel the illusion that, in a family tree splintered into various master-slave relations, he is the “master of the house” standing unfettered at the top. In a reflection on the way marriage under capitalism serves less as a partnership founded on romantic love than as “a community of interests,” Adorno notes that one might think that “marriage without ignominy” is still possible for the rich, those who are “spared the pursuit of interests.” But the privileged, he writes, “are precisely those in whom the pursuit of interests has become second nature—they would not otherwise uphold privilege” (2005b: 31). This is not only apparent from the several weddings (and divorces) depicted in Succession but also from Logan’s neurotic obsession with dynasty, which is less a matter of perpetuating his own line than a matter of perpetuating the line of monopoly capital itself, of which Logan is a mere “character-mask” or representative.

    What Succession dramatizes is the way inter-capitalist competition engenders an intra-capitalist struggle: the struggle within the monopoly itself to ensure its own continuity and the maintenance of its dominance, both within and without. In “Authority and the Family,” Max Horkheimer argues that, “in the golden age of the bourgeois order,” the family functioned as a refuge from the growing antagonisms of a market society and as the lone space in which individuals could still be recognized as autonomous ends. Yet as Horkheimer explains, the family also functioned as an incubator for compliant subjects, obedient to the state and passive in the face of the market just as they were trained to be before the patriarch (1972: 114). In Logan, the distinction between the authority of the patriarch and that of the market collapses. Just as he is subject to market forces beyond his control, which compel him in the end to sell Waystar to the Swedish interloper Lukas Matsson (Alexander Skarsgård), so does he subject his wife and children to the principle of exchange, paying for the loyalty of his wives with Waystar shares and forcing the three siblings to compete against each other not just for his affections but for the position of CEO. Yet because Logan is himself the monopolist, his children become his own competitors. He exploits his own paternal authority to exert his dominance while still expecting one of them to succeed him. Not only is the family enclave irredeemably contaminated by market rationality; it can no longer fulfill its own mission of instilling the (limited) sense of autonomy Kendall and his siblings would require to effectively lead.

    Every master is thus also a slave, and every slave is a would-be master. The “lean-in” feminist ideology that Shiv would mock and disdain and yet that she also lives and breathes renders her a slave to her own drive to maximal empowerment and “independence.” In her (successful) attempt to gaslight Tom into agreeing to a non-monogamous marriage, Shiv reasons that “we’ve torn everything else down […] Love is the last fridge magnet left.” Her wish is fulfilled when, in the season-three finale, her husband finally does as she asks and betrays their marriage to further his own career. Inversely, when Roman “accidentally” sends the dick pic he intended for Gerri (J. Cameron Smith) to Logan’s phone, it could be argued that Roman’s aim has never been truer: on the cusp of success and relative independence, he brings about the ideal scenario for expressing his masochistic tendencies, re-infantilizing himself in Logan’s eyes to ensure his own continued obedience to his true dom, “daddy.” It is the ultimate instance of topping from the bottom. Yet the series itself preempts facile psychoanalytic readings by way of Shiv and Roman’s meta-commentary on the Roy family “family romance.” In a bizarre, truly inspired stretch of dialogue in “Too Much Birthday” in season three, Roman makes so absurdly explicit his psychosexual motivations for competing with Shiv as to render them entirely worthless from the standpoint of the critic: “Turns out he loves it when I do the daddy dance […] He loves fucking me, and he just doesn’t want to fuck you anymore.” In the case of Succession, Oedipal and Electra complexes are not the keys to understanding but the very phenomena to be understood.

    When Succession first premiered, it received a somewhat lukewarm reception because it seemed uncertain about its own generic identity and suffered from tonal problems. But this is by design. In the comedic Succession, our laughter registers our surprise at the ignobility of the nobles. That subversion of expectation is what makes us laugh, but it is also the source of the series’ tragedy—namely that the “good life” after which we all are striving is in actuality the bad one. It is a tragicomedy because the most refined and elite among us are deeply, pathologically, unrefined and broken. According to Henri Bergson, comedy consists in the incursion of the mechanical and autonomic into the realm of the living[iv]; hence the displacement of pseudo-realism in Succession by a Courbet-like realism of decay. In the opening episode of season two, a foul odor pervades the family’s summer home in the Hamptons, spoiling a lavish lunch spread; a later shot establishes a raccoon carcass as the culprit, which a rankled contractor stuffed in the chimney in retaliation for lack of payment. Later, in season three, Tom and Shiv try wine from their private vineyard, only to discover that it tastes of literal shit (Tom, euphemizing, notes its “earthy,” “agricultural,” bouquet). And finally, in accord with Kantorowitz’ famous notion of the “king’s two bodies” (2016), the public, invulnerable one (the monarch) and the private, material one (the man), Logan’s public persona lives parasitically on his ailing body, which suffers a stroke, succumbs to “piss madness” from a UTI, and is jeopardized by a near-heart attack following a walk with his estranged son Kendall and a concerned investor (2016). The clean, corporate spaces are regularly befouled by the Roys, as when Logan urinates on Kendall’s carpet and Roman ejaculates on the office window, suggesting that the “good life” is itself rotten, “bad,” with decadence often coinciding with literal decay.

    Yet as the scene with which we began intimates, it is because the Roys themselves are capital’s slaves that they are worthy of our attention—worthy of our love. When Kendall confesses to his siblings that he was responsible for the death of the waiter at the end of the first season, it is, surprisingly, the darkly impish Roman who listens most attentively. Kendall is motivated to confess because he wants to be confirmed in his understanding of himself as a murderer, a reckless elite, but Roman contests this self-conception and tries to highlight the good intentions evident in Kendall’s acts—that he tried to save the waiter, that he acted as a hero. Kendall’s struggle to be known results in a shift in his own self-knowledge. In treating Kendall as a moral agent, Roman enables him, for the first time in the series, to actually be one rather than just play one. The scene inverts a moment from the season’s second episode, when Kendall had sought to sway his siblings to join his moral crusade against Logan’s stewardship of the company. Whereas Kendall’s self-deceived, self-aggrandizing proposal then proved less than palatable, here his vulnerable disclosure of his role in the death of the waiter at the end of season one amounts to an authentic appeal for community that only Shiv and Roman could satisfy. It is because Kendall has finally and truly given up on being Logan’s son that he is able to become a brother. A further result of Roman’s struggle in the prior scene to know his brother is that, in acknowledging what Roman knows, Kendall enables Roman to learn something about himself, namely that he can be trusted and is capable of love. Roman’s masochistic kink may be an attempt to master his feelings of inadequacy behind closed doors, but his severe allergy to any form of intimacy—especially with his romantic partners—reflects both his fear of being known and his fear of being the knower, one who must trust and one who must be trusted. In recognizing Roman’s capacity as a recognizer, Kendall thus enables his brother to be the sort of person who loves, as we will shortly see.

    But the Utopian dream of their mutual coordination of the company, the flushing out of the fascists at the Fox News-like ATN, and the democracy-minded righting of the corporate ship, is short-lived. As we discover, Tom has betrayed Shiv to Logan on account of her multi-layered betrayal of Tom, enabling Logan to call the bluff of the Roy children and to block their veto of the Waystar sale. When an enraged Logan exclaims that their guns have “turned into sausages” and asks what leverage they have left, Roman repeats Kendall’s confessional gesture and, inelegantly but effectively, asks: “I don’t know—fucking love?” But this appeal for community falls on deaf ears; the struggle for recognition and mutual understanding in which Roman is now trying to engage is misread by Logan as “the Game” the family has been playing since the very first episode. Logan cannot bear the demand that is being made of him, the demand that he act out of love for his children, and so does not just refuse to reciprocate Roman’s gesture but casts doubt on the authenticity of what he has just expressed. This ultimate skeptical act, Logan’s insinuation that Roman is speaking in bad faith, is what undermines the recognitive edifice the siblings had begun to build, by undermining Roman’s new and fragile sense of self. The tragedy of the scene lies in the way that Roman loses his father by finally attempting to genuinely be his son and in the way Logan’s attempt to outmaneuver doom is what—it seems—will ultimately doom him. Logan is constitutionally unable to make the one non-strategic choice that might well destroy the company (and thus himself) but help make his children (and thus himself) a different, non-pecuniary kind of “whole.” As the episode and season draw to a close, the shot with which we began is inverted: Kendall and Shiv now stand over a devastated Roman. It is difficult to watch—all the more so because there is no sense of schadenfreude, no sense of a “rich asshole” getting what he deserves. What the use of such a “humanistic” frame is meant to teach us in such anxiety-provoking scenes, what we are meant to learn from this acknowledgement of us, the viewers, is precisely “how to love the rich.”

    But surely, one might object, we also do have good reasons for hating the rich. While they may be dominated by the law of value, they are, after all, the beneficiaries of that law. Yet just as Adorno observes that “one must have tradition in oneself to hate it properly” (2005b: 52), so must one first learn to love the rich. It is only in recognizing the source of our shared domination that we come to understand the structural necessity of the domination of one class by another—and thus the “badness” of the rich. Over the course of Succession’s four seasons, it becomes increasingly clear that Logan’s children precisely aren’t “killers,” are too mutilated to do what needs to be done: to “succeed” Logan by moving on from Waystar and building something of their own or by toppling their father and running the business themselves. At the same time, it is also exactly what they are formed to do. In the final scene between the siblings in the fourth season, when Shiv chooses not to back Kendall as CEO but to back her estranged husband Tom, Kendall pleads with his sister not to betray him and delivers perhaps the most haunting line of the entire series: “I am like a cog built to fit only one machine. It’s the one thing I know how to do.” The metaphor captures the subsumption of acculturation, Bildung, growing up, under the drive to accumulation. Hence Kendall’s virtuosic—if morally repugnant—attempt to sell what in effect is a glorified retirement facility as a life-extending utopia (“Living+”), just to boost the Waystar valuation. Or Roman’s installation of the fascism-adjacent Mencken as president, just to insure his continued control of the family business. But the tragedy is that, while Kendall is built for this machine only, he is just thereby misshapen, deformed, unable to competently do the job. Time and again his desire to succeed his father as CEO has led him to jeopardize the very company he is supposed to lead. Meanwhile, Shiv blocks Kendall not only because she has negotiated a better deal for herself and because she’ll have a modicum of influence with Tom as CEO. Rather, Shiv cannot but block Kendall, because of the principle of competition Logan has instilled in his children. Shiv may be reasoning strategically, choosing self-interest over fraternal love, but the principle of self-interest has itself become an end in its own right or “highest good”—what Kant once identified as “radical evil” itself.

    The ethical culpability and “badness” of the Roys—the principle of their unlovability—are what lend several of the most moving scenes in the series finale their pathos. When, for example, Shiv and Roman finally relent to Kendall’s desire to be CEO and crown him as “king” in their mother’s kitchen, the scene reads as a kind of “pre-oedipal fantasy.” There is a nostalgia in the scene for a reciprocity, fraternity, and satisfaction the siblings actually never knew—as the cold hearth (or empty refrigerator) of their mother’s home intimates. It isn’t a depiction of the “real” siblings, of their real feelings of love outside the corporate drama; it is the fantasy of a world without or prior to Logan—a world in which Kendall, Roman, and Shiv would not be who they are. This is also why, as the siblings watch a home movie of Logan having dinner with their half-brother Connor (Alan Ruck), the television acts as a “window” onto a reality they can never inhabit. Logan, for them, can only play “father” on TV, or as in Kendall’s “Living+” presentation, as a digitized ghost that finally gives Kendall the approval he has craved—but only because Kendall has paid a technician to manipulate his father’s words. We love the Roys, in a sense, because we are gripped by the tragedy of their inability to love one another. By the same token, it is only by learning to love the Roys that we “can hate them properly,” through a critique of the monopoly form of capital that necessitates the dynastic succession (and thus the existence of the Roys). Nowhere is the iniquity of the rich (and of their indomitable master) more on display than in the series’ final moments. As Lacan famously observed, the true father is the dead one because it is only as dead that the father is “internalized” and thereby able to fully realize his psychological function.[v] The end of Succession bears this out: Shiv has never been more her father’s daughter than when—in an act as loathsome as it is necessary—she destroys Logan’s son.

    In its earlier seasons, in addition to objecting to the series’ overly sympathetic treatment of the rich, critics of Succession often complained that the show had run out of ideas and had nowhere left to go. While this proved untrue in the end, the series’ critics also weren’t exactly wrong. By way of conclusion, it’s worth noting the meta-televisual dimension of the series as reflected in its title, which designates the medium’s principle of motion: seriality or successiveness. In a lesser-known companion essay (“The Fact of Television”) to his justly famous, discipline-founding work on film, The World Viewed, Stanley Cavell attempts the deduction of this defining principle of the medium, alongside the principle that television is meant for “monitoring” rather than “viewing” (as in film). According to Cavell,

    Serial procedure can be thought of as the establishing of a stable condition punctuated by repeated crises or events that are not developments of the situation requiring a single resolution, but intrusions or emergencies—or humor, or adventure, or talent, or misery—each of which runs a natural course and thereupon rejoins the realm of the uneventful; which is perhaps to say, serial procedure is undialectical. (1982: 89)

    In watching television, we “monitor” the normal and the uneventful, the “way of the world,” which the serial format itself embodies. This is why, Cavell remarks, people often leave their TVs on in the background, not unlike the monitors utilized by security companies. What Cavell calls the “fear of television”—still encapsulated today in the common refrain that “I don’t even own a TV”—lies in the way it makes “intuitive the failure of [the world’s] survival of me,” in the way it seems to monitor the “growing uninhabitability of the world, the irreversible pollution of the earth” (1982: 95). If television captures the way the world stands outside me and is in some sense independent of me, what we fear is that the world it is monitoring is a world that will not survive us: the medium has itself become the fearful suggestion of the end of the company we keep. In the age of new media, Cavell’s analysis might seem quaint. But what is “doom scrolling” if not a fearful anticipation of “the failure of [the world’s] survival of me”?

    Succession may have once appeared to be merely spinning its wheels, going nowhere, but it was arguably in just this respect that it fulfilled its medium’s mandate. What the series so grippingly “monitored” was the treadmill of capital itself, the way it spins its wheels, is going nowhere. Succession thereby relayed the submerged tragedy of this uneventful repetition. Yet it is also because it asked of us that we learn to love the Roys that we might begin to see that—despite what they themselves would have us believe—the realm of freedom is not a private enclave in the Hamptons, reachable only by helicopter.

    References

    Adorno, Theodor. 2005a. Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. Translated by Henry Pickford. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Adorno, Theodor. 1991. The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture. Edited by J.M. Bernstein. New York: Routledge.

    Adorno, Theodor. 2005b. Minima Moralia: Reflections on Damaged Life. Translated by E.F.N. Jephcott. New York: Verso.

    Armstrong, Jesse, et al. 2018-2023. Succession. HBO Entertainment, Gary Sanchez Productions, Hyperobject Industries, Project Zeus.

    Brecht, Bertolt. 1992. Brecht on Theater: The Development of an Aesthetic. Edited and translated by John Willet. New York: Hill and Wang.

    Cavell, Stanley. 1979. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Cavell, Stanley. 1982. The Fact of Television. Daedelus 111, no. 4: 75-96.

    Horkheimer, Max. 1972. Critical Theory: Selected Essays. Translated by Matthew J. O’Connell et al. New York: Continuum.

    Kantorowicz, Ernst. 2016. The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Lacan, Jacques. 1992. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960. Translated by Dennis Porter. New York: W.W. Norton.

    Marx, Karl. 1976. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Vol. I). Translated by Ben Fowkes. New York: Penguin Books.

    Warren, Kenneth. 2016. “Rankine’s Elite Status.” Los Angeles Review of Books, January.    https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/reconsidering-claudia-rankines-citizen-an-american-  lyric-a-symposium-part-ii/

    Jensen Suther is a former Fulbright Scholar and received his PhD from Yale University. He is currently a Junior Fellow in the Harvard Society of Fellows. His writing has appeared or is forthcoming in a range of academic and public-facing venues, including Modernism/modernity, Representations, the Los Angeles Review of Books, and the New Statesman. He is currently working on two books—Spirit Disfigured and Hegel’s Bio-Aesthetics—which explore Hegel’s legacy for Marxism in aesthetic, political, and philosophical contexts.

    [i] See the well-known “Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting” in Brecht (1992).

    [ii] Quoted in Warren (2016).

    [iii] See “Prologue to Television” and “Television as Ideology” in Adorno (2005a).

    [iv] As noted in Cavell 1979, 415.

    [v] See, for instance, Lacan 1992, 309.

  • R.A. Judy receives Truman Capote Award for Literary Criticism

    R.A. Judy receives Truman Capote Award for Literary Criticism

    b2o: the online community of boundary 2 would like to congratulate our fellow bounder, R.A. Judy, on receiving the Truman Capote Award for Literary Criticism for his book Sentient Flesh: Thinking in Disorder, Poièsis in Black (Duke University Press, 2020).

    Noting Judy’s outstanding work for decades prior to this landmark book, the selection committee emphasized that Judy’s “work as a philosopher, a literary and cultural critic, a teacher, an editor, and a colleague is a unique and emphatic announcement of what a certain fundamental strain of and in black studies has long been—namely the irruptive, disruptive turning and overturning of the ontological, metaphysical and epistemological foundations of modernity”.

    Previous winners of the award include Fred Moten, who recently interviewed Judy for boundary 2 and b2o.

    Judy is currently leading the team of 5 that edits boundary 2.

  • In Memoriam: David Golumbia

    In Memoriam: David Golumbia

    b2o: the online community of boundary 2 is mourning our friend and co-editor David Alan Golumbia. David had recently been elected as part of a six-person team to edit boundary 2 after the journal’s longtime editor Paul Bové stepped down. Apart from having been a founding and driving force behind b2o, where so much of his work remains visible through the reviews he solicited and special issues he edited or co-edited, David was also a passionate teacher at Virginia Commonwealth University, where he was Professor of English. At b2o and in the editorial collective of b2, we knew David as a generously critical scholar whose expertise in computation studies and media studies (and far beyond) we appreciated and learned from.

    As a scholar, David will be remembered for his landmark book The Cultural Logic of Computation (Harvard University Press, 2009) and its critique of what he called “computationalism”. David worked closely together on this project with his editor at Harvard, our fellow bounder Lindsay Waters. David’s short polemic The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-Wing Extremism (University of Minnesota Press, 2016), a book from which I date my own conversations with David, began to sketch what would become his highly anticipated second book, Cyberlibertarianism (to be published by the University of Minnesota Press).

    David presented materials from Cyberlibertarianism the last time I saw him, at the boundary 2 conference at Dartmouth in April 2022. Perhaps because I had initially encountered his voice on Twitter (now known as X) where David (in spite of his dislike of the medium) was often engaged in important and at times heated debates, his real-life presence always struck me as soft-spoken, kind, and caring in its delivery of his sharp insights. Many of us still saw David at the most recent boundary 2 event in April 2023 and we are deeply shocked by his sudden passing. Our community has lost, in the words of Paul Bové (who brought David into the boundary 2 collective), “an outstanding bounder: a good friend, a fine correspondent, a generous person, and a rigorous intellectual” whose work and spirit we intend to memorialize in future projects.

    –Arne De Boever, on behalf of boundary 2 online: the online community of boundary 2

  • Olga V. Solovieva—Ales Bialiatski, Together: On the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize and East Slavic Solidarity

    Olga V. Solovieva—Ales Bialiatski, Together: On the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize and East Slavic Solidarity

    by Olga V. Solovieva

    The Peace Prize laureates represent civil society in their home countries. They have for many years promoted the right to criticize power and protect the fundamental rights of citizens. They have made an outstanding effort to document war crimes, human right abuses and the abuse of power. Together they demonstrate the significance of civil society for peace and democracy.”

    (The Nobel Peace Prize 2022 Announcement, October 7, 2022)

    In January 2020, boundary2 ran an interview with Ales Bialiatski, the Belarusian human rights activist. The interview was recorded during the 2019 University of Chicago’s Neubauer Collegium workshop “Cultures of Protest in Contemporary Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia.” Back then, the goal was to raise awareness of the democratic aspirations among Belarusian activists and their long history of grassroots organizing for human and civil rights, a struggle largely unknown beyond the country’s borders. At the Neubauer, with help from the Pozen Family Center for Human Rights, we strove to show that these aspirations were shared by citizens of the three East Slavic countries; were connected to the recovery and rethinking of the past; and pointed toward the future. Building upon these commonalities, we also wanted to highlight the differences in the trajectories and forms this struggle has taken throughout the region. We sought to forge collaborative relations among Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian pro-democratic intellectuals in expectation that all three groups would cooperate and learn from each other. Not a shared identity but a common history, filtered through divergent interpretations and experiences, framed the project’s comparative perspective.

    Much changed in the following two years: In the spring and summer of 2020, Belarus saw unprecedented organizing and turnout in the presidential elections, expressing the will of the people to transition to a democratic form of government by peaceful means. The results, manipulated, reasserted the power of the generally despised dictator Alexander Lukashenko for the sixth time since 1994. And in February 2022, the war in Ukraine which Russia had led since March 2014, escalated and expanded to a full-scale invasion. Oppression within Russia and Belarus rose to unimaginable proportions. Ales is now once again a prisoner of conscience. After receiving the 2020 Right Livelihood Award from the Swedish government and the Sakharov Prize from the European Parliament, he is finally also the laureate of the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize, together…

    ***

    The solemn protocol of the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony on December 10, 2022 was emotionally wracking for those who keep close watch on Eastern Europe. The prize came at too high a price, and this price hasn’t even been paid in full. Ales Bialiatski has been in prison since July 14, 2021 because his human rights organization Viasna provided legal aid to victims of police violence during the peaceful democratic protests that followed the fraudulent presidential elections on August 9, 2020. In his absence he was represented by his wife Natalia Pinchuk. She combined some quotations from his previous speeches and conveyed some thoughts he shared with her while in prison in an acceptance speech that struck an uncanny und uncharacteristically metaphysical tone: The references to “the duel of Good and Evil” and to his “soul,” hovering freely over his dungeon and the land of Belarus, exuded an eerily funerary aura. (The Nobel Lecture, Bialiatski, 5-6) For anyone aware of unendurable conditions and torture in Belarusian prisons, it was difficult to ward off a sinister sense of desperation where liberation can be imagined only via a metaphysical escape. But Bialiatski’s fragmented, mediated voice resounded in the speeches of his co-laureates.

    Jan Rachinsky accepted the prize on behalf of the organization, Memorial. This organization documented Soviet and post-Soviet crimes against humanity for over thirty years. It was ordered to shut down by the Russian government as a “foreign agent” in December 2021, and liquidated the following April. Rachinsky was pressured to reject the prize. In a direct affront to the Russian government, he accepted it. The Russian ambassador to Norway was not present at the ceremony. Rachinsky’s speech was overwhelming in its honesty, intellectual integrity, and courage. His condemnation of the war and of its ideological underpinnings in the history of Soviet state-worship will be long remembered. Rachinsky voiced the conscience of Russian intellectuals at a time when they lack any other voice. In the City Hall of Oslo, this voice got an international hearing for the first time since February 2022. This was chilling and almost unbearable to observe, as Putin is known not to forgive those who criticize his wars. Rachinsky spoke as one for whom truth—historical truth in this case—is more valuable than life. The world was watching a man in an utterly unsentimental, matter-of-fact fashion offering his life for his country’s chance at moral survival. Ales’s career had begun in the same endeavor, organizing commemoration of the victims of Stalinist repression at the execution site in Kurapaty. It is from Kurapaty that Ales’ journey toward advocacy for human rights began.

    The Center for Civil Rights, the third recipient of the prize, was represented by Oleksandra Matviichuk. This Center was born out of the new democratic sensibility of the Maidan demonstrations in winter 2013-14. Ever since, the Center has been recording human rights violations in Ukraine in order to safeguard the legal basis of Ukraine’s democratic aspirations. Today, the Center documents the crimes against humanity committed by the Russian and Russia-affiliated troops in Ukraine. Like other recipients of the prize, its members are mortally endangered, but by external threat: it operates right now under conditions of a devastating war, under bombs and gunfire, surrounded by destroyed infrastructure and lack of resources basic to survival. It continues its work demanding justice and accountability in international venues, seeking to prevent the erasure of Ukraine from the surface of the Earth. Matviichuk called the international community to account for its complicity with the invasion of Ukraine, for its failure to intervene in the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of the Donbass region. The international community’s insouciance—and its interest in Russian gas—enabled Putin’s invasion in February, an escalation of a war that has gone on for over nine years without attracting significant attention from the West. Matviichuk’s call for help to Ukraine echoed the bravery and perseverance of the other two speeches pitted against the grim reality of existential doom. “It’s time to assume responsibility. We don’t know how much time we still have.” (The Nobel Prize Lecture, The Center for Civil Rights, 6) A determination born of despair is shared by all of the laureates in their refusal to give up.

    What is a peace prize in time of war? A wishful projection? An unshakable belief in a common peaceful future against all odds? A lifebuoy thrown to a drowning world of East Slavic democracy couldn’t but be a requiem for a dream. In fact, the solemn, austere, restrained musical intermissions in the ceremony tactfully expressed the mourning at the heart of celebration. But the Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee recognized something that most outsiders to the tragedy in Eastern Europe do not recognize: the East Slavic togetherness in this political predicament. Without Maidan there would have been no Belarusian protests; without Belarusian protests there would have been no invasion of Ukraine; and without the Russian White Revolution, the massive anti-Putin protests of 2013, there would have been no Maidan. Since the Ukrainians successfully ousted their corrupt Putinist dictator Yanukovich and Ukraine de facto ceased to be a puppet state, Ukraine became the refuge of the Russian and Belarusian oppositions. Kiev meant a free place to emigrate to, second to London but preferable because of geographical and cultural proximity. Then the Belarusian and Russian authorities assassinated the exiled members of opposition one by one; but soon they had become too numerous to be targeted individually. The Norwegians understood: “Together they demonstrate…”—what? That the war on Ukraine is a war on civil society and democracy throughout the region, launched by a dictator on a pretense of popular consensus wrenched at gunpoint from his own population. The war against Ukraine is a war against democratic Europe and a consequence of the suppression of civil society in Russia and Belarus, that civil society which Memorial and Ales Bialiatski have been working to build. The most important aspect of the geo-political tragedy unfolding in the East Slavic region today is our divisions. The prize stands for, not peace that we won’t find for a long time, but our togetherness, the recognition that civil and human-rights activists in the region look forward to a common goal. This notion of solidarity permeated all the speeches.

    Ales summoned us to fight “international dictatorship.” This call especially resonates in the United States today when a former American president is forwarded to the Justice Department to face criminal charges for leading an insurrection to reverse the outcome of a democratic election. Matviichuk pointed out, unsparingly, Western complicity with the invasion; the necessity of transnational solidarity among peoples; the need of pressure from below on governments; the urgency to reform the international order that has failed to stand up properly for Ukraine. Her call should be heard globally, as we talk about the relevance of the war in Ukraine for the future of other young democracies. Martin Luther King’s words that “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” couldn’t be more concretely topical today. Among signs of the current turn away from democratic norms, one might mention the overturning of Roe vs. Wade—a typical totalitarian move asserting state control over human bodies and abolishing the democratic right to privacy. The past of the East European dictatorships and the future of the United States converge in this uncanny present.

    Rachinsky’s talk connected the dots of history and its inversion. Speaking about the current war, he observed:

    One of the first victims of this madness was the historical memory of Russia itself. Indeed, in order to pass off aggression against a neighbouring country as “fighting fascism,” it was necessary to twist the minds of Russian citizens by swapping the concepts of “fascism” and “anti-fascism.” Now, the Russian mass media refer to the unprovoked armed invasion of a neighbouring country, the annexation of territories, terror against civilians in the occupied areas, and war crimes as justified by the need to fight fascism.

    Hatred is incited against Ukraine, its culture and language are publicly declared “inferior,” and the Ukrainian people are deemed not to have a separate identity from Russians. Resistance to Russia is called “fascism”. Such propaganda absolutely contradicts the historical experience of Russia and devalues and distorts the memory of the truly anti-fascist war of 1941-1945 and the Soviet soldiers who fought against Hitler. The words “Russian soldier” in the minds of many people will now be associated not with those who fought against Hitler, but with those who sow death and destruction on Ukrainian soil. (The Nobel Lecture, Memorial, 4-5)

    This open confrontation with a monstrous regime and its system of oppression is a matter of colossal risk. “Don’t be afraid!” was Ales’s message. Rachinsky and Matviichuk definitely aren’t afraid. “Through their consistent efforts in favour of humanist values, anti-militarism and principles of law, this year’s laureates have revitalised and honoured Alfred Nobel’s vision of peace and fraternity between nations – a vision most needed in the world today,” according to the Nobel Peace Prize 2022 Announcement.

    It is the first time that I see a Western institution demonstrate in a powerful way that they understand our solidarity, our common work, and our shared vision of a democratic future in the East Slavic region.

    Back in 2019 in Chicago, when Ales, the members of Memorial, and Vasyl Cherepanyn’s Visual Culture Research Center came together to enunciate the commonalities among East Slavic cultures of protest, our goal was to create a productive dialogue among Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian intellectuals and artists who share the values of democratic governance, human and civil rights, and freedom of artistic expression, as well as among scholars of the recent history and culture of these three countries. Establishing this dialogue remains crucial to a better understanding of the complex interconnection of culture and politics in the region. Such a dialogue should be especially fruitful because these three countries have much political and cultural history in common, but interpret this cultural heritage differently. The fight for democracy, human rights and independence coincides in Belarus and Ukraine with the cultivation of national language, literature, and culture. It started like this in Russia too. At what point and why does the liberation of national consciousness turn into a suffocating chauvinism? When does it promote democracy and the embrace of the community of nations, and when does it lead to oppression, persecution of others, and political isolation? How do forms of cultivation of national identity come to differ in these three countries? What features of their historical backgrounds are most relevant? Are there cultural and political safeguards against the dangers of nationalism? This year’s Nobel Peace Prize recipients answered these questions by appeal to the universal, transnational nature of human rights. The recognition of one’s right to one’s own language and one’s own national narrative for yourself, as for others, is part of it, as Rachinsky pointed out:

    Every country and every society develop their own historical narratives, their own “national images of the past,” which often contradict those of their neighbours. The cause of disputes is usually not one fact or another, but different interpretations of the same events. Differences in the understanding and assessment of the same historical events by different peoples are inevitable, if only because their insights and assessments are born in the context of different national histories. We need to learn to recognize the reasons for these differences and to respect each people’s right to their own understanding of the past. (The Nobel Lecture, Memorial, 5)

    The three East Slavic cultures are conjoined by history and tradition, with Ukraine and Belarus having been for long stretches of time parts of the Russian and then Soviet empires. They also show many differences, conditioned by these countries’ peculiar political experience and geographical locations. Both contemporary Belarus and Ukraine belonged to the Duchy of Lithuania between the 13th and 16th centuries. Then part of Belarus and right-bank Ukraine belonged to the Polish Commonwealth. In the 18th century, the Austro-Hungarian empire claimed the Galician part of Ukraine. After a short episode of independence in 1918, both Belarus and Ukraine were reabsorbed as republics within the Soviet Union until they gained legal sovereignty in 1991. While sharing the common denominator of the traumatic Soviet past and the sense of liberation and new beginning at the time of democratic reforms in 1991, the three countries have taken different paths ever since: Belarus’s government continued as a Soviet-type authoritarian dictatorship, choosing to remain a protectorate of the Russian patron; Russia and Ukraine attempted neoliberal and democratic reforms but were swamped in the chaos of corruption and the return of totalitarianism. Although both Russia and Ukraine experienced a new awakening of democratic resistance to authoritarian corruption in 2013-14, their paths have radically diverged since. Ukraine managed to consolidate popular resistance to its regime and acquire a new independence from the kleptocratic interest, whereas Russia failed in a similar endeavor and was pulled back under a now explicitly nationalistic dictatorship. The triangulation of the political relationships among the three countries and their cultural development is complex. Nonetheless, the most productive way to understand the problems of democratization in each of them—problems that have led to the current war—would be through their togetherness, as this year’s Nobel Peace Prize challenges us to do.

    Interpretations and usages of historical memory are carried by cultural institutions and actors in various ways. The 2017 make-shift monument, raised by the people to the victims of Stalinist extralegal execution at Butovo—constituted an act of protest,an especially courageous act when one considers that sites formerly dedicated to the victims, like the former Gulag site Perm-36, have been refurbished to acknowledge the “patriotism” of their persecutors. Or in Ukraine, the holodomor, the famine resulting from the so-called collectivization of farmland, is often interpreted for local political purposes as a Russian genocide against Ukrainians in particular, rather than as a part of the Soviet regime’s sweeping extermination of its population across the whole country. The discovery of the major NKVD execution site in Kurapaty in 1988 gave momentum to the pro-democratic movement in Belarus and has ever since continued to inspire resistance against the continuation of Soviet-style dictatorship. While Belarus has never opened its KGB archives, they have been opened in Russia and Ukraine. Memorial and the Sakharov Center, founded as historical archives and research centers that collect documents and conduct research on the history of political persecutions in Soviet Russia, now find themselves at odds with a regime that glorifies and repeats Stalinist crimes against humanity. While the Belarusian government tried to deny and then refused to take a stance on the Soviet regime’s crimes against humanity at Kurapaty, the powerful popular movement resulted in thousands of memorial crosses erected by ordinary people. The recovery and preservation of collective memory was a humanist movement that fed into political activism and a culture of protest. Bringing together activists who participate in understanding the past, preserving the evidence, and demanding justice for the victims in the three countries, the Nobel Peace Prize brings out the complexity and the differences among various ideologies of memory, ranging from governmental suppression to various forms of preservation and different registers of memorialization, interpretation, and reinterpretation. These forms should not cancel each other out because, as Rachinsky observed, it is in their coexistence that they allow collective memory to persist.

    In 2019, when we came together at the Neubauer Collegium to share our experiences with the East Slavic cultures of protest—Ales Bialiatski of the organization Viasna (Belarus), Seguei Parkhomenko of The Last Address (Russia), and Vasyl Cherepanyn of the Visual Culture Research Center (Ukraine)—that was our plan. Much has changed since, and not in the way we expected. Today, we can ask ourselves with Rachinsky: “But did our work prevent the catastrophe of 24 February?” His response connects us all in the current predicament:

    The responsibility of a person for everything that happens to their country, and to the whole of humanity, is based, as Karl Jaspers also noted, on solidarity, civil and universal. The same applies to the sense of responsibility for the events of the past. It grows out of a person’s sense of his connection with previous generations, from the ability to realize himself as a link in the chain of these generations – that is, from the awareness of his belonging to a community that did not arise yesterday and, hopefully, will not disappear tomorrow. Readiness for responsibility is an exclusively personal quality: a person voluntarily assumes responsibility for what happened once or for something that is happening now, but in which he or she is not directly involved; no one else can put this burden on him. And most importantly, a sense of civic responsibility, unlike a sense of guilt, requires not “repentance,” but work. Its vector is directed not to the past, but to the future. (The Nobel Prize Lecture, Memorial, 5-6)

    Ales has been in prison for over a year now; my Ukrainian colleagues are being bombed, my Russian friends are underground, whether at home or abroad. This prize won’t help them right now, but it is a much-needed expression of understanding that we are in this together, and Putin and his foreign enablers will not prevail in their efforts to separate us, turn us against each other, and make us hate each other. Though speaking in different languages, all three laureates spoke of one thing: transnational solidarity. To quote Ales’s unassuming, quiet, simple words in response to my question in 2019, “What to do?”— “We’ll continue working…” These words, pronounced back then, resonate today with the final words of Rachinsky’s speech, “We are not giving up and continue to work…” I can only add: “Together.”

    _____

    Olga V. Solovieva is Assistant Professor in the Department of Comparative Literature at the University of Chicago. She is interested in comparative history of democratic thought and practice and intersection of culture and politics in East Slavic countries. She was a co-organizer of the 2019 workshop “Cultures of Protest in Contemporary Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia” at the Neubauer Collegium for Culture and Society at the University of Chicago.

    Back to the essay

  • Charles Bernstein — Poem-A-Day, Poem-A-Day, Jiggety Zam: The Academy of American Poets Keeps Poetry Safe from Poetry

    Charles Bernstein — Poem-A-Day, Poem-A-Day, Jiggety Zam: The Academy of American Poets Keeps Poetry Safe from Poetry

    by Charles Bernstein

    A poem of mine was selected for the “Poem-a-Day” series at the Academy of American Poets, which claims 300,000 readers. The producers of the show told me it was mandatory to submit an “About this Poem” statement along with an audio recording – “whether that statement is a full-blown exegesis or simply reportage on when and where the poem was written, or what compelled you to write the poem, etc., etc., is completely up to you.” (Audio of the poem itself was optional.) Because my possibly sardonic poem was about not substituting anything for the poem (a line could have been: “If you love the poem for what it’s about, then you don’t love the poem but what it’s about”), I wrote a sentence that echoed a series of related poems I’ve written (one of which even made it in the Norton Anthology of Poetry): “This commentary intentionally left blank.” I also attached an enhanced audio version of the line. The staff producers wrote back that what I sent did not meet their “standards.” Evidently, I misunderstood what “completely up to you” meant. Even so, I wrote a commentary explaining my point of view – why I preferred not to write an “about” statement –– and I attached an enhanced audio of this new commentary. I was informed by the producers that my audio would not be “accessible” to those who relied on the audio version of Poem-a-Day posts, even though my enhanced audio is entirely accessible, albeit slightly aesthetically challenging. The producers said they would make the needed audio themselves.

    Just before publication, I received a proof with the opening — and key — sentences of my commentary redacted: without those sentences, the commentary lost its motivation and so its sense. The producers sent a recording of the poem followed by the mangled commentary. I couldn’t tell if the recording was done by a first-gen digital reader or a person imitating one. I had to act immediately as there was no time for back and forth. Within an hour I had made a new, “straight” recording of the poem, restoring only a version of the first redacted sentence of the original commentary, assuming, correctly, that this would meet Poets.Org standards, even if it still lobotomized my comment.

    And that, well, was that.

    In one of their emails, “The Academy” expressed its appreciation for my “being an important part of our work.” “We . . . would love” to sell you a membership. At a discount.

    Making the purchase was left entirely up to me.

    Here’s the rejected audio of the extended commentary, together with my initial audio and the redacted commentary (the four initial sentences deleted by the producers are crossed out):

    MP3

    This commentary intentionally left blank.

    That’s the “about” statement I initially submitted. However, the editors told me this response didn’t “meet our standards.” My poem is about not meeting standards. The kind of poetry I want doesn’t follow rules: it makes up its own rules. Perhaps my commentary needs a commentary? The poem is itself a series of commentaries. The idea of “blank” — letting the work stand for itself — is my commentary on the poem. In other words, if you love the poem for what it is about, you don’t love the poem but what it’s about. Or perhaps you could say the commentary is the poem and the poem the commentary. I get things all, well, Topsy-Turvy.

  • Darren Byler — Discovering “Terrorists” among “Friends”: Policing in Xinjiang in the 1990s and 2000s

    Darren Byler — Discovering “Terrorists” among “Friends”: Policing in Xinjiang in the 1990s and 2000s

    by Darren Byler

    When Tursun decided to become a police officer in 1992, it seemed like the opportunity of a lifetime.[1] The state had just opened up a pathway for Uyghur high school students who excelled in Mandarin and political theory to study in elite policing academies and other schools in Eastern China (Grose 2019). At the end of the 6 years of training, a secure posting in an urban police department was virtually guaranteed. For someone who came from a village near China’s border with Kazakhstan, it promised a way out of rural poverty and, Tursun believed, a way of creating a more just society. But at the time Tursun was not yet fully aware of the fact that resource disputes between native Uyghurs and newly arrived Han settlers in the desert oases of Southern Xinjiang was one of the reasons why he was being trained to join the Xinjiang police force.

    As I write in my book Terror Capitalism (2022), the intensification of policing in Northwest China, coincided with a development of a Han migrant settlement campaign to “Open up the Northwest.” This campaign which centered on natural resource extraction and industrial farming in the ancestral lands of the Uyghurs in the Southern part of the region precipitated flashes of violence related to land theft, systemic ethnic discrimination and new restrictions on Uyghur autonomy. In April 1990, in the community of Barin, a village near the city of Kashgar, tension over access to irrigation and land, boiled over into a brief farmer-led Uyghur insurgency (Roberts 2020). A detachment of armed police and military arrived within several days and opened fire on the farmers who occupied a community government building armed primarily with hunting rifles and farming tools. Those who I interviewed who were in the surrounding communities at the time said that bodies of the insurgents were loaded in trucks and taken away.

    But there was a more fundamental change in the community beyond the disappearance of those directly involved in the uprising. Now, it appeared, that state authorities viewed the majority of Uyghur villagers in the surrounding communities as “troublemakers” simply because of their ethnicity and their proximity to the farmer uprising. Over the next several months nearly 8000 people were officially arrested (Roberts 2020). Vast numbers of people in the prefecture were forced to attend self-criticism sessions and study political ideology. They were asked to search their hearts and consider how they might have contributed to a lack of loyalty to the Party’s mission to develop and extract regional economic resources for the benefit of “the masses.” Did they consider Uyghur possession of their own lands more important than contributing to the wealth of the county? Didn’t they know that when they questioned the settlement and land distribution policies they were challenging the correctness of the Party?

    Uyghurs in this community said that it felt like the Maoist ideological campaigns that had ended with the Cultural Revolution in 1976 were returning, but that this time they were pointed not at “counterrevolutionary” enemies who supported the “capitalist road,” but rather at Uyghurs who opposed the preferential treatment for Han settlers in the new state-directed export-oriented capitalist economy. They came to understand that they were seen as impediments to the development of what was now becoming an internal settler colony in China’s post-Cold War economic rise. In the new social order, civilization itself was equated with state-led market development. Over the next two decades Uyghurs came to see how a discourse of terrorism could be used to deem them both an internal enemy of the state and of the civilized world in general if they opposed this disempowering form of development (see also Fischer 2013).  As always-already potentially terrorists Uyghurs could be framed by an internal otherness that justified drastic policing measures and eventually led to mass internment and imprisonment. Over time, the specter of the terrorist produced a fear-driven economic and political logic for the state, and the corporations it partnered with, that resulted in billions of dollars of investment in counter-terrorism surveillance in Uyghur communities.

    As social theorist Michael Dutton has argued (2005), since policing in China emerged out of this revolutionary context of the 1950s, rather than, for example, the hunting of slaves as in the United States or the pacification of the working class in Britain, Chinese policing was organized primarily around a friend or enemy distinction—with “friend” (pengyou) figured as the revolutionary masses, or the people, and the enemy figured as foreign imperialists and domestic counterrevolutionaries. Importantly, because of the revolutionary impulse of Chinese policing the latter category of enemies could at times be rehabilitated through education and carceral punishment if they were able to recognize the liberatory potential of socialist mass struggle.[2] They were, regardless of their ethnicity, still potential “compatriots” (tongbao) in the multi-national Chinese revolutionary project. But what happens when such compatriots are deemed “separatists” or “terrorists”? This is the central question this essay will explore.

    Mao’s 1957 essay on the “Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” supplies a rationale for making fine distinctions between enemies and wayward friends. This sorting and productive capacity of policing as a tool of educating and persuading provided an opening for “thought work” (sixiang gongzuo)—communal struggle sessions where those deemed out-of-line proclaimed self-criticisms and professed their new understandings of Maoist thought. Such targeted individuals were often placed under concentrated surveillance in reeducation and labor camps as internal enemies, or at a minimum, they were stigmatized in their home communities and they were viewed as compatriots who had failed in their revolutionary resolve. Their fellow community members were tasked with observing their progress, looking for any slip-up in submissive attitudes. At the end of the Maoist campaigns in 1976, the spectrum of what counted as friend was expanded to include former political prisoners and these “wayward friends” were reunited with the masses through a process called “rehabilitation” (pingfan). This process was organized by “rehabilitation committees” (pingfan weiyuanhui) who considered formal appeals those on watchlists and petitions of family members on their behalf, and organized periods of close surveillance in the communities where the wayward friends returned.

    Throughout the 1980s democracy movements, particularly on college campuses, accompanied an emergence of capitalist production and export-oriented economy. And for a time, it appeared as though the category of the internal enemy was on the verge of disappearing. Then in 1989 that prospect collapsed with the mass killing in Tiananmen Square and subsequent disappearances of thousands of democracy activists—mostly Han college students, but also Uyghur and other ethnic minority young people—all of whom were deemed internal enemies of the state.

    With the violence in Barin in 1990, as noted at the beginning of this essay, a further reorientation of “enemies” and “friends” distinctions toward Muslims in Xinjiang demanded a new police force that was equipped to decode Uyghur opposition to the state—elaborating a new sub-category in the friend-enemy continuum—“separatists” (Ch: fenlie zhuyi zhe; Uy: bölgünchi)—and  the threat it posed toward settler claims to possession of Uyghur lands (Tynen 2020). Over the next decade, teams of state workers, would be tasked with surveilling families in communities where discontentment was most pronounced. As one of these surveillance workers put it, “We worked for months on end without any days off, rummaging through the villages and homes of Uyghur farmers, making lists of names of so called ‘separatists’ and reporting their names to the upper-level officials. As human surveillance workers we searched people’s homes, sometimes even at late night hours, looking for any suspicious books that might be spreading a ‘separatist” ideology’” (Ayup 2022, 27).

    In Xinjiang the term separatist, which emerged in Chinese state discourse in relation to Taiwan’s autonomy in the 1950s, rose to replace the Maoist term “counterrevolutionary” in the 1980s as changing cold war dynamics and the turn toward a market economy following Mao’s death made “national unification” (Ch: guojia tongyi) with Taiwan appear to be more of a possibility. The term was extended by Chinese state discourse beyond Taiwan to discussions in Tibet and Xinjiang in the 1990s in response to the rise to international prominence of the Dali Lama and Tibetan government in exile. As the Dali Lama garnered support in India and the endorsement of international celebrities, the Chinese authorities worried that the Free Tibet movement might spark a “ethnic separatist” revolt within      China’s borders. This fear was given more force with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the independence of the Central Asian republics. In Xinjiang these factors solidified a shift toward policing the perceived Muslim “separatist” threat (Becquelin 2000).

    Chinese leaders viewed the Barin Uprising as a sign of Uyghur desires for greater self-determination. Increasing Han settlements in Uyghur majority areas had the benefit of both gaining access to natural resources, but also, as a result of the fracturing of the Soviet Union—China’s long-term rival—building new avenues for Chinese markets in Central Asia and attending to the resource needs of Chinese manufacturers. These economic and geopolitical factors precipitated a change in policing in Xinjiang—a change that Tursun, the Uyghur police officer whose story begins this essay, would be a part of.

    But, of course, historical changes are difficult to recognize at first, especially when they are orchestrated behind closed doors in the headquarters of the Ministry of State Security. About the time Tursun graduated from the police academy another major incident occurred. In 1997, near his home village in Ghulja, Uyghurs protested the breakup and arrest of a youth organization that taught Islamic and Uyghur moral behavior and traditions (Roberts 2020). Although the state denies this figure, it is likely that more than 100 Uyghurs were shot in the streets and more than a thousand more were taken away, arbitrarily detained in an opaque process that ranged from “reeducation through hard labor” in camps to more formal imprisonment. Some Uyghurs fled across the border to Central Asia, eventually fleeing to Afghanistan to escape extradition back to China only to be turned over to the U.S. military and sent to Guantanamo Bay where they were eventually released without charge.

    When Tursun graduated with a degree in policing science in a Chinese-language policing academy the next year, he found himself thrust almost immediately into a hunt for phantom “separatist gangs” like the protestors who organized the marches. Throughout the Xinjiang police force, officers were tasked with implementing a “hard strike campaign”—part of a series of campaigns that would culminate, as I will explain below, in the “People’s War on Terror.”  One of Tursun’s roles was to act as interpreter and translator, turning Chinese language policing science and directives into action in Uyghur communities by interpreting Uyghur confessions for Han police commanders. His beat was nearly exclusively in Uyghur neighborhoods and villages where he was often accompanied by a non-Muslim partner. He was to be the eyes, ears, and voice of the state.

    Then, almost immediately after September 11, 2001, a new category in the friend-enemy continuum was introduced in Chinese policing rhetoric and theory. “Now we were supposed to call them ‘terrorists,’” Tursun told me in Uyghur, interjecting the Chinese word for “terrorist” (Ch: kongbu fenzi). “The vast majority of the groups we found were not separatists or terrorists at all. These were labels we gave to people who committed other crimes, or didn’t commit any crime at all, but who had no one to defend them.” As Gardner Bovingdon (2010) shows in an encyclopedic index of state documents from this period, terrorism charges proliferated in the 2000s with crimes as minor as a Uyghur neighbor accused of stealing a cow from a Han settler being labeled a terrorist activity. Eager to associate the “Uyghur problem” with the Global War on Terror, Chinese officials removed most instances of the term “separatist” from official histories of the 1990s and replaced them with the term “terrorist.” The new term had a different utility. In the post-9/11 context “terrorism” allowed the Chinese state to position itself as an ally to the West and Central Asian republics in the global war against so-called Islamic “extremism” and terrorism. By offering Central Asian republics policing technology, training, and intelligence in addition to infrastructure development projects and trade incentives, Chinese authorities used a security framework to build strategic economic and political relationships that would eventually turn into its ambitious Belt and Road Development Initiative.

    Even more importantly, back in Xinjiang the terrorism label also hardened the “enemy” categorization of Muslims who opposed state-directed development and settlement of their land. No longer were “enemies” viewed simply as counterrevolutionaries or separatists, that is, those who were nevertheless compatriots and who could potentially be rehabilitated.

    For Tursun, “discovering” hidden terrorists became a primary objective. Police units that identified such “gangs” were given large rewards. From Tursun’s perspective, it was as though the policing came to serve a larger disinformation campaign. By “discovering” terrorists, the police units fulfilled their obligation in the crackdown and concealed the structural factors that caused Uyghur protest in the first place. Over and over again Tursun observed or participated in turning informants, forcing them to identify “terrorists,” and using them to break up community networks:

    We had a policy which encouraged people to spy on each other. Often they did this for money, or because we threatened them or their families. Of course we knew that a lot of our tips were just false accusations. Some people did that for money, while some people did that to take revenge on others. But we would arrest people regardless of the truth of information. For example, if four or five people gathered together for activities such as visiting a friend or attending a funeral and someone said it was an illegal gathering to teach Islam or plan violence we would arrest everyone who attended and label the host the ringleader. Everyone knew that at a funeral, people are required to conduct religious rituals. This is normal since Uyghurs are Muslim. But the spy would exaggerate and say it was extremist or terrorist. People who were being accused have no way to prove that they are innocent. Often they ended up being sentenced to 4 or 5 years in prison or “education through hard labor” camps. The informant was given money and we received our commendation. This was so common.

    Tursun found this form of state violence morally repugnant. “Most Uyghurs I met were disgusted by the very idea of terrorism,” he said, “They wanted a peaceful life, a better world for their children.” But he worried that a generation of Uyghur young people who grew up in this atmosphere, where disappearances of Uyghur community leaders became so common, would lash out. Indeed, as Sean Roberts has shown, in some instances the “terrorism” label became a self-fulfilling prophecy (Roberts 2020). While not the norm in Uyghur crimes labelled as terrorism, in a handful of cases in 2013 and 2014, Uyghurs did attack Han civilians in organized suicide attacks. These specific attacks did appear to meet international standards of what constitutes a terrorism crime—though even they may be more appropriately understood to be horrific incidents of mass murder that arise from colonial circumstances. Soon after the terrorism label arrived, Tursun tried to quit his job as an officer. He was told that he needed to serve at least 10 years before he could even begin to consider early retirement. Because he had been granted access to state secrets, quitting would be a slow process. He was told he could be arrested if he quit without a justifiable excuse.

    Over time it became clear that the hopes Tursun had for criminal justice reform would never happen. When he first joined the Public Security Bureau he thought that the presence of college-educated Uyghur officers would help improve the situation. Instead, he saw his fellow Uyghur officers, many of them who he had known for over a decade be worn down by the system. He saw many turn toward alcoholism and become withdrawn from their families. Uyghur police officers were treated with deference and fear by other members of the Uyghur community. It was good to have a friend who was a police officer, since the officer might be able to protect them from the counter-terrorism system by vouching for them. But this friendship was a guarded, political relationship. After all it was a relationship with the eyes and ears of the state, and what stood between being deemed a terrorist-enemy and a friend.

    Even though Tursun was eventually able to leave the Bureau and, through a loophole in the system, escape to Europe, he knows that had he stayed he would have been pressed into service of the mass internment camp system that was put in place in the mid-2010s. “At this point I can’t say that every Uyghur retains some aspect of their humanity,” he said quietly. “Some Uyghur officers will do anything to show their loyalty to the government, no matter what kind of suffering they cause. All they care about are the benefits and power they get from their position. I know there are some Uyghur police who feel bad about the torture that Uyghur detainees are going through now in the camps, but the percentage of those who care are not that high. At this point they are numb.”

    Although policing in China began in a revolutionary moment and was driven at first by Maoist “counterrevolutionary” politics, in the 1990s and 2000s in Northwest China it gave way to colonial-capitalist and counter-terrorism logics that participate in familiar forms of ethno-racialization and dehumanization found in post-9/11 policing systems and counter-terrorism around the world in which Muslims are racialized as deviant others. Although, they emerge from different histories, extrajudicial detention and surveillance of refugees and other unwanted populations from Kashmir, to Palestine, to France and the United States produce similar effects at differential scales (Byler 2022). As China was pulled into a global capitalist economy and the logic of developmentalism settled on a Han-centric mythos of China’s reemergence as a global power, the revolutionary multi-national inclusiveness of China’s framing of political struggle was deeply diminished.

    In 1990s China the Maoist frame of friends and enemies was folded into a concern with “unifying” the country to benefit the masses—understood as the Han majority to the East and the Han settlers who came to the frontier to claim resources for them. Here “friends” came to be those who supported this project, and “enemies” became Uyghur “separatists” who protested these settler claims. Then, in the 2000s, the discourse of Uyghur “separatist” enemies hardened into “terrorists.” Over time, the possibility of full citizenship as “friends” has severely narrowed for Uyghurs. Since 2017, hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs have been warehoused in an expansive prison system for alleged terrorism crimes (Byler 2022). Hundreds of thousands more whose “extremism and terrorism activities are not serious” have been placed in internment camps for reeducation (United Nations 2019). After an intensive period of Chinese language assimilation, ideological indoctrination, and brutal punishment, they are placed in securitized factories where they labor apart from their families and under intensive forms of technological and human surveillance. Together these carceral systems result in the largest internment of a religious minority since World War II. Uyghurs, as always-already “enemy” terrorists have become internal others, marking a turn from compatriot rehabilitation to new policing technologies of control and incarceration derived from global models of the war on terror.

    Darren Byler is an anthropologist and Assistant Professor in the School for International Studies at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, British Columbia. He is the author of Terror Capitalism: Uyghur Dispossession and Masculinity in a Chinese City and In the Camps: China’s High-Tech Penal Colony. His current research is focused on policing and carceral theory, infrastructure development and global China.

    Works Cited

    Ayup, Abduweli. 2022. The Detainment Factory: A Memoir. Manuscript.

    Becquelin, Nicolas. 2000. “Xinjiang in the Nineties.” The China Journal 44: 65-90.

    Bovingdon, Gardner. 2010. The Uyghurs: Strangers in their own land. Columbia University Press.

    Byler, Darren. 2022. Terror Capitalism: Uyghur Dispossession and Masculinity in a Chinese City. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

    Dutton, Michael. 2005. Policing Chinese Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

    Fischer, Andrew Martin. 2013. The disempowered development of Tibet in China: A study in the economics of marginalization. Lexington Books.

    Grose, Timothy. 2019. Negotiating Inseparability in China: The Xinjiang Class and the Dynamics of Uyghur Identity. Hong Kong University Press.

    Roberts, Sean R. 2020. The War on the Uyghurs. Princeton University Press.

    Tynen, Sarah. 2020. “Dispossession and displacement of migrant workers: the impact of state terror and economic development on Uyghurs in urban Xinjiang.” Central Asian Survey 39.3: 303-323.

    United Nations (UN). 2019. Information Received from China on Follow-Up to the Concluding Observations on its Combined Fourteenth to Seventeenth Periodic Reports. 8 October. Geneva: Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Available from: undocs.org/CERD/C/CHN/FCO/14-17.

    References

    [1] Although “Tursun” is now living in Europe, he has asked me to use a pseudonym to protect his identity from Chinese authorities and the stigma associated with his past work as Xinjiang police officer.

    [2] Dutton (2005) relies quite heavily on Carl Schmitt’s theorization of political struggle in his analysis of Chinese policing. Scholarship on Maoist intellectual and grassroots history since Dutton’s important contribution to Chinese political theory shows that the generative potential of Maoist framings of revolutionary struggle demands a re-examination of Schmitt’s work and the fascist context it reflects.

  • Ania Aizman— Playing the Policeman: Russian Art Before the War

    Ania Aizman— Playing the Policeman: Russian Art Before the War

    by Ania Aizman

    Russian anti-government protest has never been weaker. Decades of repressive policing have had the desired effect, successfully reducing the range of actions that protesters are willing to undertake. A new form of protest against Russia’s war on Ukraine, for example, consists of a lone picketer holding up a blank sheet of paper on a public street. The war has dramatically limited artistic range, and shifted the terms of public discourse away from visionary proposals such as the elimination of police. Before the war, though, artists were sounding the alarm about Putin’s expansion of policing, and resisting it through playful appropriation, by “playing the policeman,” repurposing police uniforms and weapons. This essay explores the potentialities and limitations of this artistic device.

    In 2018, the estimated one billion people who tuned into the World Cup final match—the largest live audience of any single event on earth—became unsuspecting witnesses to what may well be the most-viewed direct action in history. Four members of the group Pussy Riot, disguised as police officers, snuck onto the pitch. Evading referees and security forces, they turned the tense global event, highly choreographed by the Russian state, into a live-action farce. Eventually the members of Pussy Riot were caught and dragged off the field, and into prison. But not before the striking images of cops chasing cops were broadcast by media around the world. Meanwhile, Pussy Riot’s social media accounts released a list of demands: the liberation of all Russian political prisoners, an end to false court cases against regime critics, and, striking an absurdist note, the transformation “of the earthly policeman into the heavenly policeman” (Pussy Riot).

    This was an erudite allusion to the late Soviet conceptualist writer and artist Dmitry Prigov––in fact the entire action was called The Policeman Enters the Game. Up until the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine, in the 2010s, artistic representations of the police frequently cited late Soviet art in order to reflect on the ways in which Putin redeployed the police tactics of the Brezhnev era. The Brezhnev regime had indeed expanded the existing surveillance of students and members of the intelligentsia, broadly encouraging self-censorship and developing a strategy of imprisoning potential leaders before they criticized the regime in public or organized a demonstration. Thus “eliminating public acts of challenge without the use of severe force against crowds,” the Brezhnev regime sought to avoid Stalin and Khrushchev’s reputations for mass repressions (Beissinger 32). Prigov’s late 1970s poems about the “Militsaner” (Police-a-man) portrayed the Militsaner as a figure of “quasi-mythological” and “heavenly” authority, an abstract “principle of governmentality” and, simultaneously, of “earthly” mediocre, bureaucratic tastes and a penchant for casual brutality (Kukulin). Sporting a militiaman cap and reciting his poems in the tone of a pedantic Russian schoolteacher, Prigov satirized the hero of Soviet children’s books, Uncle Styopa the Policeman, popularized during the Brezhnev era (Callen).  Like Uncle Styopa the Policeman, the Militsaner of Prigov’s poems is a giant who sees into the horizon––and, simultaneously, blocks it from view, denying the existence of anything beyond his authority.

    Casting themselves as inheritors of Prigov, Pussy Riot also reinterpreted him: in their view, the “heavenly policeman” was useful as a concept or symbol, but his manifestation in reality, with its censorship and brutality, ought to be abolished. Unlike Prigov, they made explicit demands for the end of policing. Prigov, by contrast, hardly conducted direct political protest. On the contrary, because his performances were confined to the private apartment and the informal gallery space, they were basically compatible with Brezhnevite policies of concealing government criticism. Direct political critique was far from his goal: he declared that he wanted to “disappear” inside of authoritarian discourses rather than “rationalize” them or “extract anything real” (Shapoval 32). The scholar of Soviet art Gerald Janecek concluded that Prigov felt “genuine admiration for his policemen” and “loving nostalgia…for the culture of [his] ‘happy childhood.’” Prigov’s Soviet audiences, members of private countercultural circles, experienced the mere pleasure of laughing at Soviet bureaucratic language as politically provocative. But Prigov admitted that policemen, too, have enjoyed his work (Lipovetsky 253). By contrast, critique was explicit in Pussy Riot’s reinterpretation of the Militsaner.

    Other contemporary Russian artists, too, adapted the tools of their Brezhnev-era predecessors to expose the hypocrisy of policing while simultaneously rejecting their predecessors’ ambivalent irony and political neutrality. For example, the late 2010s performance art group Party of the Dead borrowed the black-and-white, zombie aesthetic of 1980s necrorealist cinema but dispensed with the necrorealists’ reenactments of assaults and crowd fights. The 80s necrorealists had been inspired by rumors that Brezhnev and other geriatric political elites were dead or near death and that their public appearances were elaborate faked. Dressed in zombie makeup and bloody bandages, the necrorealists engaged in various forms of senseless violence, including beating an actor dressed in a police uniform, and recorded these displays in 8mm and 16mm short, silent, black-and-white films. In this way, they “did not attempt to contest the system’s representations of reality” but rather to insist on a “zone of indistinction” between conformity and resistance (Alsavi 78). The 2010s Party of the Dead, by contrast, dispensed with political indistinction. To announce their opposition to the regime, they relied text, displaying copious banners and posters, and on context, demonstrating during patriotic holidays or in the aftermath of police suppression of demonstrations. At the same time, they eschewed militancy, and, like Pussy Riot in their absurdist 2018 action, opted for multivalent expression. Party of the Dead slogans such as “The dead are for peace,” “There are more of us, dead ones,” and “The dead don’t fight” can be read variously as foreboding, mournful, or ironic (see examples in Evstropov). In all these readings, though, the Party’s artists appear to identify with the victims of state violence in a relation of solidarity, acknowledging shared vulnerability––and discursive potential. Likewise, the graffiti artist Philippenzo’s mural Kisses explored “art therapy for working through fear,” portraying a SWAT officer’s ID badge that says “KISSES” against a camouflage pattern that reveals itself as a lipstick kiss print. The work cited a famous Brezhnev-themed mural: Dmitry Vrubel’s 1990 close-up of a kiss that Brezhnev shared with GDR leader Erich Honecker in 1979. Vrubel’s title God Help Me Survive this Mortal Love suggested that the viewers ought to feel disgust at the larger-than-life image of two old men kissing on the lips. Philippenzo, by contrast, dispensed with Vrubel’s homophobic and ageist gaze, proposing abstraction.

    These artistic references to Brezhnev himself and the Brezhnev era responded to profound similarities in policing styles. Before the war on Ukraine, the Putin administration’s approach to policing Russian citizens was informed by Brezhnev-era preemptive censorship, in which authorities repressed potential dissent in advance, controlling domestic and international perception, partly through extensive spying. Like Brezhnev, Putin deployed censorship out of public view––in small ways (for example by denying event permits to opposition groups) as well as large ones (framing activists with drug charges, staging the seemingly random assaults or murders of independent journalists). Putin’s own professional trajectory, begun at the height of the Brezhnev “Stagnation” era, is illuminating here. A former KGB/FSB agent, he brought covert intelligence tactics to the presidency. In one memorable comment in 1999, just as he had risen to immense power from a relatively obscure position, he joked that his ascent was a secret power grab: “I would like to report that the group of FSB officers dispatched to work secretly in the federal government has been successful in its first set of assignments” (Wood).

    Preemptive censorship worked relatively well during the economic growth of the 2000s but the mass protests of 2012 (themselves partly a response to a stagnating economy) shifted the regime’s approach. On one hand, it continued to conduct its business of policing outside of mainstream attention, while encouraging political apathy in the Russian public (Jones). On the other hand, it increasingly responded to oppositional demonstrations with ruthless displays of violence. In August 2019, police officers beat and mass-arrested students and minors, producing hundreds of images of police brutality. Responding to these events, the artist Artem Loskutov bought a police baton from a retired officer of the Russian National Guard, applied the colors of the Russian flag to it like toothpaste to a toothbrush, and smacked a blank canvass. He announced the invention of a new style of painting called dubinopis’ (a term that recalls the Russian word for icon-painting, ikonopis’ and literally means “police baton-writing”) and proceeded to sell countless canvasses on social media as a fundraiser for the protesters. Loskutov’s dubinopis’ implied a comparison between the protest demonstration and the blank canvas, warning the police that they, too, create interpretable images.

    Loskutov’s dubinopis’ joined a genealogy of Russian artists using images of policing to enter a critical dialogue with their predecessors in anti-police art. These artists eschewed authoritarian self-representation. While “playing the policeman,” they used various forms of critical framing without reenacting violence, as in the 2011 action by Voina, in which performers forcibly kissed policewomen. They also rejected the practice of inviting violence, as in Oleg Kulik’s dog performances in the mid-1990s. Lastly, these artists criticized their artistic predecessors, the actionists and the conceptualists of the late- and post-Soviet era. They charged that the actionists conceal their authoritarianism and self-aggrandizement as art, presenting themselves as sages, martyrs, or outcasts, and leading to belated painful revelations of, for instance, reactionary attitudes––as in the support voiced by members of Voina for the annexation of Crimea or domestic violence (as in the case of Petr Pavlensky) (Gerasimenko). And they charged that the playfulness and political ambivalence of late Soviet nonconformist artists like Prigov and the necrorealists left them open for cooptation. Instead, they announced their political position and distributed images of their actions on social media to broadcast their political stance. In this way, they sought to enact a more transparent, public, and collective process of de-policing.

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine spurred a mass exodus of the Russian creative class, prominently represented among the nearly four million Russians who have left the country during the war. As police target even the blandest forms of political expression, such as Ukraine-themed social media posts or blue and yellow clothing, the artistic language for de-policing employed before the invasion is rendered meaningless, or transformed beyond recognition. Thus, before the war, the painter Ekaterina Muromtseva’s 2017 cycle of canvasses called More (Of/Than) Us, spoke of the shared bodily experience of Russian protesters. Stood together, as if ordered by the police to raise their arms before a pat-down (or, possibly, execution), Muromtseva’s protesters are painted with a green camouflage pattern that bleeds across their bodies, suggesting that they share wounds, or organs. In their prewar context, these images implied the solidarity and vulnerability of demonstrators––their moral high ground, if not triumph over, police violence. Viewed during the war, however, the green camo print across the bodies of the protestors acquire a different meaning, suggesting the responsibility shared by agents of state violence with those who, in resisting it, capitulate before they have won. As Russian artists grapple with the extent of their own complicity in the war––or, as the Ukrainian artist Alevtina Kakhidze put it in her recent comic, “Russian culture is looking for an alibi that it is not a killer”––the strategy of playing the policeman looks decidedly short of radical protest. A future Russian art, if it is to be oppositional, will have to speak about the crimes committed by perpetrators of war and the trauma of their victims without playing at either.

    Ania Aizman is writing a book called Anarchist Currents in Russian Culture from Tolstoy to Pussy Riot. Her writing, translations, and book reviews have appeared with Columbia University Press and in Slavic and East European JournalSlavic Review, The LA Review of Books, and The New Yorker. She is Assistant Professor of Slavic at the University of Chicago.

    Works Cited

    Asavi, Marina-Alina. 2017. “Art and ‘Madness’: Weapons of the Marginal during Socialism in Eastern Europe.” In Dropping Out of Socialism edited by Juliane Fürst and Josie McLellan. Lanham: Lexington Books.

    Beissinger, Mark. 2002. Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.

    Callen, Patrick. 2015. “Street Art Contra Police Abuse.” Area Studies in the Global Age, edited by Edith Clowes and Shelley Jarett Bromberg. Dekalb: NIU Press.

    Evstropov, Maksim. 2020 “Partiia mertvykh: ot nekrorealizma k nekroaktivizmu.” Moscow Art Magazine no. 113. http://moscowartmagazine.com/issue/101/article/2230.

    Gerasimenko, Olesya. 2018. “A War on Many Fronts.” The Calvert Journal, 12 July. https://www.calvertjournal.com/features/show/10405/a-war-on-many-fronts-the-story-of-voina

    Janecek, Gerald. 2000. “The New Russian Avant-Gardes: Postmodern Poetry and Multimedia in the Late Soviet and Early Post-Soviet Periods.” https://umanitoba.ca/libraries/units/archives/media/Lecture_VII___Janecek.pdf (accessed May 5, 2022).

    Jones, Sarah and Greg Yudin. 2022. “Russia is Completely Depoliticized.” New York Magazine, April 7. https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2022/04/sociologist-greg-yudin-how-russia-learned-to-deny-reality.html.

    Kakhidze, Alevtina. 2022. “Russian culture is looking for an alibi that it is not a killer.” https://www.instagram.com/p/Ca_dOR9qKji/ (accessed May 5, 2022).

    Kukulin, Il’ia and Mark Lipovetskii. 2022. Partizanskii Logos: Proekt Dmitriia Aleksandrovicha Prigova. Moscow: NLO.

    Lipovetsky, Mark. 2017. “Soviet ‘Political Unconscious’ in Dmitry A. Prigov’s Poetry of the 1970s-1980s.” Russian Literature no. 87-89: 225–260.

    Loskutov, Artem. 2019. “Dubinopis’ N1 (2019)”. https://www.instagram.com/p/B1mFSCwAl2z/ (accessed May 5, 2022).

    Pussy Riot. 2018. “Pussy Riot at the FIFA-2018 World Cup final match —Policeman enters the Game.” Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7zQGV7XBkLE (accessed May 5, 2022).

    Shapoval, Sergei and D. A. Prigov. 2014. D.A. Prigov: dvadtsat’ odin razgovor i odno druzheskoe poslanie. Moscow: NLO.

    Wood, Tony. 2019 Russia Without Putin: Money, Power, and the Myths of the New Cold War. New York: Verso.

     

     

  • Florian Mühlfried — “Seeing for a State: Policing the Border between Georgia and the Russian Federation”

    Florian Mühlfried — “Seeing for a State: Policing the Border between Georgia and the Russian Federation”

    by Florian Mühlfried

    Border studies are somewhat obsessed with issues of fluidity and mobility. This may be the reason why many post-Soviet borders, which have hardened after the collapse of the Soviet Union remain largely understudied (for an important exception, see Reeves 2014). The consolidation of these borders has not always been driven by militaristic claims or state security concerns, but has also been enacted “from below”. In his study of the Turkish-Georgian border, Mathijs Pelkmans (2006) has shown how the Laz people, a population divided by Soviet borders, emphatically embraced the opportunity to reunite with their kinfolk once the border was opened in the wake of the “collapse” of the Soviet Union, only to realize that decades of spatial separation had lead to cultural and social alienation between the two groups. When such experiences of alienation became overwhelming, Pelkmans argues, the Laz on both sides of the borders tried to keep their cross-border neighbors away, thus reinforcing the border by generating cultural and social barriers by transforming taken-for-granted practices of hospitality into thinly-veiled expressions of animosity.

    The border between Georgia and the Russian Federation in the Caucasian mountains is another such example, albeit with a different twist. While in the case of the Turkish-Georgian border the locals took an interest in tightening the border as a means of keeping distance from those on the other side, most people living on the Georgian-Russian border had no such interest. A case in point are the Tushetians, a subgroup of the Georgians who speak a dialect of the Georgian language and historically reside in a remote mountainous area bordering Chechnya and Dagestan within the contemporary borders of the Russian Federation. Presently consisting of about 15,000 inhabitants, many Tushetians live in the Georgian capital Tbilisi or abroad as labor migrants. Many still engage in a traditional sheep breeding economy, making use of summer pastures in the Caucasian highlands and winter pastures in the lowlands. These winter pastures are situated on the border with Azerbaijan, but formerly also included lands on the other side of the border in Dagestan. In order to support these traditional economic forms, Tushetians continue to engage in trade across a fluid northern border.

    However, when the Soviet Union began to dissolve, they began patrol this border, dressing in Soviet uniforms provided with Georgian state emblems and eventually becoming officially sanctioned as the first official border guards of the Georgian state. How did this come about? The following sketch of the history of the policing of the border between Northeast Georgia and the Russian Federation is meant to illustrate the captivating effect of putting on a uniform and acting in the name of the state. 

    Mobilisation

    Mutual raids have been frequent events for villagers in the alpine regions of the Caucasus, as testified by the numerous defence towers and castles that provided at least temporary shelter for those attacked during such incursions. The attackers were often neighbours, located in adjacent villages, but belonged to different ethnic groups. One such example considers a mountainous region stretching along the northeast range separating the North from the South Caucasus – and the Russian Federation from the republic of Georgia. On the southern side, this region is inhabited by Tushetians; while the residents of the northern side belong to one of the many ethnic groups of Dagestan and are predominantly Muslim. Despite nominal differences in religious affiliation, Tushetians and their neighbours to the north share many cultural practices as well as customary law.

    Under the Soviet Union, both sides and their respective populations belonged to the same state. And although it is said that the chopped-off hands of enemies displayed on Tushetian house walls as trophies were not infrequent sights well into the 20th century, at least in the last decades of the Soviet Union, the practice of raiding had practically come to an end. When the Soviet state started to break apart around 1990, the practice of raiding returned. The population most affected were the Tushetians, because most of them resided in the lowlands for much of the year, due to their traditional economic practice of transhumance (a form of mobile pastoralism based on a seasonal movement of livestock). Another decisive factors was a Soviet resettlement program in the 1950s that declared that remote regions in Georgia such as Tusheti had no viable economic prospects (neperspektivnye) and forced the inhabitants to resettle in more “promising” regions for economic development (Pallot 1990: 657–660, Jähnig 1983: 38, 52). By contrast, their northern neighbours in Dagestan, called “Leks” by the Tushetians, lived in the region year long. Tushetians, in turn, blamed the “Leks” for breaking into their houses and stealing valuables, as well as for cattle theft. According to Tushetian contemporary witnesses the raids increased during the following winter of 1991, requiring action to be taken.

    Tushetian men began to patrol the border, yet could not entirely control it, due to a lack of manpower and the roughness of the terrain. In order to address this problem, Tushetian representatives got in touch with the Georgian state ministry of defence. The latter was only gradually re-establishing itself after the civil war of 1991/92, during which criminal gangs had taken control over large portions of the military and police forces. Besides, the security, or even the very existence of the Georgian state was threatened by violent conflicts with the Russian Federation, which took place in the secessionist, self-proclaimed republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia during this period. Within this context, any initiative to control the border was welcomed by the Georgian state authorities. Consequently, the Tushetian brigades got officially sanctioned as the first border guards of post-Soviet Georgia by the Georgian ministry of defence. Their first uniforms still largely stemmed from the Soviet period, but they received some official looking badges and better equipment from the Georgian capital Tbilisi – and, more importantly, the authorisation to represent a state.

    In addition to policing the border, however, the Tushetians took another action to improve the situation: the resumption of micro-diplomatic ties with their northern neighbours. For this purpose, the head of the Tushetian council (sabch’o), the local political representative body that derived from its Soviet predecessor and maintained its name, got in touch with representatives from Dagestani villages where he expected the raiders to live. Those representatives were soldiers of higher rank or village administrators (or both), but the crucial factor for their informal political authority was their status as elders. All the elders in a community taken together constituted an institution referred to as jamaat.[1]

    Preserved in the archive of the Tushetian village council, two protocols (dated 1991 and 1994) recounted meetings of administrative bodies in Dagestan and eight letters written in Russian, which were exchanged between the council of Tusheti and the jamaat of Xusheti[2] between 1993 and 1995. These protocols and letters document political and legal procedures for criminal cases. The first initiative was taken by a Tushetian delegation sent to the region of Xusheti in order to contact the local jamaat. Acknowledging the complaints of their southern neighbours, the elders promised to punish the raiders and to prevent future criminal acts. For this purpose, they revived a pre-Soviet tradition that required every adult male villager to swear on the Qur’an that they would refrain from attacking the Tushetians and seizing their property. Additionally, they reported 13 names of robbers to the Tushetian council and told the council to get in touch with state representatives in Makhachkala (capital of Dagestan) “in order to punish severely the robbers by the [civil] law.”[3] The cases of cattle theft were also resolved by means of face-to-face negotiations, sometimes with the aid of the Tushetian border guards. As stated in a letter from “the administrator of Xusheti” from 1995, the Tushetian border guards kept two cows from their northern neighbours as a kind of deposit for cattle stolen and held on the other side of the border.

     

    Immobilisation

    The events of 11 September 2001 had a profound impact on politics across the world, including in Tusheti. In addition to Russian claims that Chechen fighters were taking refuge in the Georgian mountains during the second Chechen-Russian since 1999 and that the Georgian state was either unwilling or incapable of controlling its borders, now Al Qaida and even Bin Laden personally were suspected of residing on Georgian territory. The hot spot of the day was Pankisi, a valley neighbouring Tusheti and bordering Chechnya. The local population, who go by the name Kists, had fled from Chechnya in the 19th century, and many of them maintained close ties to relatives on the northern side of the Caucasus mountains.

    In the second half of the 1990s, the Georgian government effectively lost control over this region. There was widespread corruption involving Georgian state officials, drug trafficking, money laundering, reports of radical Muslim propaganda, and military training for Chechen fighters and their allies. In the years to come, an Arab and an Algerian citizen residing in Pankisi without Georgian visas were imprisoned by Georgian police forces. Some of the foreign trained fighters also fought in the second Chechen war.

    The Georgian government at that time attempted to dismiss the accusations, but with limited success. As the Russian government threatened to invade Georgia in order to arrest the Chechen and Muslim fighters, then president Shevardnadze appealed to the US government for support. With its strategic interest in the Caucasus and support for the Georgian political orientation towards the West, the US provided assistance in the form of military aid and training. In spring 2002, approximately 200 Special Operations Forces were sent to train and equip four 300-man Georgian battalions with light weapons, vehicles and communication devices. With this kind of support, the Georgian army was able to invade the Pankisi gorge in summer 2002 and reassert state control.

    The Georgian military and its capacity to control its national borders were monitored and fostered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE). Having already started their mission to Georgia in 1992, the OSCE was mandated to observe and report on movement across parts of the border between Georgia and the Russian Federation from late 1999 until the end of 2004. While the area of operation initially only covered the border between Georgia and the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, it was extended in subsequent years to the Ingush and Dagestan segments of the Georgian-Russian border.

    In the heyday of the OSCE mission to Georgia, plenty of employees from all over Europe had focused their binoculars on the Russian side of the border. The monitors could testify that any kind of border transgression had clearly come to an end. With the beginning of the new millennium, the two sides of the Caucasus had been effectively disconnected. Locals from the Northern Caucasus could no longer go shopping in Omalo, as they had done in the 1990s, and the Georgian shepherds could no longer use pastures in Dagestan, as they had done for centuries. Any kind of trans-boundary diplomacy had to be enacted via state authorities and direct negotiations were no longer possible. Moreover, the Tushetians could no longer decide for themselves whom to allow on their territory and whom to reject.

    In the course of an OSCE training program – and possibly related to it – the organisational structure of the border guards underwent significant changes. In 2006, their affiliation was changed from military to police, thus bringing the personnel under control of the Georgian ministry of internal affairs and thus coordinating their actions with other forms of policing. In recent years, the recruiting and placement criteria have also altered. In the beginning, local affiliation was seen as an advantage for border guards because of the local expertise and social embeddedness of the soldiers. After a while, this policy was dismissed as disadvantageous. Consequently, the border guards today come from all parts of Georgia, with Tushetians in the minority. What began as an effort to police the border “from below” ended (and in some ways resulted) in a consolidation of policing authority in state hands.

    Conclusion

    The Georgian state the Tushetians sought to protect was envisioned as both a presence and an absence: a presence in the performances of physical control over territory, an absence in the practice of regulating the social, religious and legal relations with the neighbours. But the state the Tushetians invoked once they put on Georgian uniforms was a captivating one that, over the course of time, didn’t make any concessions: The intentions of its subjects ended at the borders it defined. The uniform the Tushetians voluntarily assumed in order to strengthen their status, in turn, became a captivating force of their own dispossession. Whereas initially, they hoped to increase their bargaining position in a more structured relationship with their neighbours, they later had to realize that representing a state can take various meanings in various contexts with different, sometimes paralyzing consequences. One such consequence was that Tushetians could no longer attend religious festivals alongside their Muslim neighbours, as they have done for centuries. Another consequence was that they were no longer capable of settling conflicts directly with their counterparts on the other side of the border, and that routinized practices of creating social bonds across lines of ethnic, religious and regional affiliation such as sworn brotherhood could no longer be practiced.

    What this case also illustrates is that acting and speaking in the name of the state occasionally causes unanticipated and unwanted consequences. What was initially expected to increase the scope of agency eventually paved the way for its very limitation. One obvious reason for this is that uniforms reproduce chains of command, and thus their use inadvertently stratified and solidified a hierarchical system. In the turmoil that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union and re-making of statehood in post-Soviet Georgia, central authority was rather weak and left much room for non-state actors to take state affairs in their own hands; this was the case for Tushetians. With the consolidation of centralized power, their superiors from the Georgian government based in the Georgian capital prioritized security concerns over local interests. This quest for security, in turn, was supported by Georgia’s Western allies such as the European Union and particularly the Unites States.

    Moreover, Tushetians began to invoke a new conception of statehood during this period. For centuries, Tushetians have guarded the northern border to Georgia, alongside other groups who live in the Caucasian mountains such as Khevsurs. In addition to the presence of self-armed forces ready to ward-off incursions, signal towers were erected by the locals, but not least in the interest of the political power holders in the lowlands to communicate the danger of an approaching enemy. Such border guarding, however, consolidated these local populations’ autonomy vis-à-vis the state centre by increasing their bargaining power because they acted outside of a chain of command. The Georgian state which began to consolidate amidst the chaos of the 1990s, however, was unwilling to accept these fluidity borders. In an ironic twist, Tushetians provided the very legibility needed to pave the way for the state apparatus to regulate their lives(cf. Scott 1998).

    Florian Mühlfried is full professor for social anthropology at the Ilia State University in Georgia. His publications include the monographs Mistrust: A Global Perspective (2019) and Being a State and States of Being in Highland Georgia (2014) as well as the co-edited volumes Sacred Places, Emerging Spaces: Religious Pluralism in the Post-Soviet Caucasus (2018) and Soviet Era Anthropology in the Caucasus and Central Asia (2012).

    Works Cited

    Jähnig, Wolfgang. 1983. Die Siedlungsplanung im ländlichen Raum der Sowjetunion mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Konzepts der ‘Agrostadt’. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot.

    Mühlfried, Florian. 2014. Being a State and States of Being in Highland Georgia. Oxford, New York: Berghahn.

    Pallot, Judith. 1990. „Rural Depopulation and the Restoration of the Russian Village under Gorbachev.“ Soviet Studies 42 (2): 655–674.

    Pelkmans, Mathijs. 2006. Defending the Border: Identity, Religion, and Modernity in the Republic of Georgia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Reeves, Madeleine. 2013. Border Work: Spatial Lives of the State in Rural Central Asia. Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing Like a State. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press.

    References

    [1] For more details on the history and functions of these jamaats, see Mühlfried 2014: 133ff.

    [2] Xusheti (also called Iusheti in one letter) is an unofficial name of a region in Dagestan bordering Tusheti. It is used in the letters as a self-designation of the respective jamaat, and by the Tushetians in colloquial conversations. However, it is not testified for in official sources.

    [3] It is unknown to me, if this punishment was ever enacted. I also cannot verify if they were punished by the jamaat according to religious law, as stated by the head of the Tushetian council in an interview.

  • Eliot Borenstein — Police/State: All Bastards Are Cops

    Eliot Borenstein — Police/State: All Bastards Are Cops

    by Eliot Borenstein

    While I have never been one for fieldwork, it does occur to me that I have had several encounters with the post-Soviet police; fortunately, they were all in the 1990s, when the stakes for such incidents were relatively low.  Now I see that, when I was sitting in a Moscow militia van in 1999 after failing to produce documents 100 feet from my rented apartment, I should have anticipated that 21 years later, my need for data could have been satisfied if I had just asked the right questions.

    Instead, I just passed the time giving unsatisfactory answers to inquiries about my background until the cop finally asked straight out if I was Jewish.  This had nothing to do with any legal jeopardy I might have been in, and admitting to being Jewish would not have gotten me into any trouble. Quite the contrary: I was usually stopped by police in their ongoing attempts to round up suspicious “people of Caucasian nationality” (“Do you ever stop blonds?” I asked once, but only after brandishing my boss-level immunity in the form of the magic American passport that I had neglected to carry the day of the police van incident).  The Jewish Question (to coin a phrase) was more a matter of satisfying a mutual, if inconsequential need: his to peg my ethnicity, and mine to make him say it. After most likely missing several hints about possible bribes, I was let go, with a stern warning to carry my passport with me at all times.

    All of which is to say that, in interacting with the post-Soviet militia, I never was quite sure what sort of institution I was dealing with. Were they supposed to be stopping crime, or were they the Russian equivalent of ICE, keeping the city safe from the threat of undocumented dark hair?  Besides doing a poor job of ethnic profiling (they really could have learned a lot from their much more efficiently racist counterparts in the U.S.), and despite doing an even worse job at catching criminals (if the news was any indication), what were they really for?

    But the police are only one half of the theme of this collection of essays; the other is prisons.  Policing and prisons seem like an obvious pairing, like love and marriage (if only from a post-divorce point of view).  But in terms of their symbolic resonance for the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia, they are not equal partners.  As portrayed by critics and dissidents, the Soviet prison camp system was the country’s master metaphor:  the USSR was one vast carceral “zone,” but with less freedom of speech.  It worked well with the American Cold War metaphor of the Soviet Union as a penitentiary for “captive nations.” I bring these ideas up not to endorse them; the portion of the non-incarcerated Soviet population that saw themselves as “prisoners” was probably miniscule.  The power of these metaphors did not reside in their empirical accuracy, but in their rhetorical force.  From an oppositional point of view, they made intuitive sense.

    But that metaphorical power rested on the dissident’s familiar distinction between the “political” criminal and the “real” criminal.  Well before the Soviet Union ended, a romantic subculture surrounding the thieves’ prison life made its way outside the “zone,” particularly in the form of the blatnaya pesnia, a musical genre glorifying th life of the outlaw.  By the 1990s, prison became the source of important segments of popular culture: providing slang, serving as the setting for various flavors of criminal melodrama, and inspiring fashions and behaviors among the gopniki in a rough analog to the prison/hip-hop connection.

    It was only in the shift from medium- to high-Putinism that prison started once again to make inroads into the public political consciousness, thanks to high-profile cases (Khodorkovsky, Magnitsky, Pussy Riot). The post-Pussy Riot “Media Zona” project is important not just for the obvious reason (activism on behalf of the incarcerated), but also for the shear linguistic novelty of putting those two words (“Media” and “Zone”) together. As for their other activist endeavor, “Zona prava” (Zone of Law), the irony speaks for itself.

    The path of the “police” from the late-Soviet to the post-Soviet is more complicated.  I would like to put forward the proposition that the police as police occupied only a small corner of the country’s psychic real estate; the USSR was relatively short on police, but long on policing.

    Technically, there were no police, but rather the militia. The term initially signaled a break with the Tsarist-era police, and carried a whiff of spontaneous self-organization (even if that whiff was deceptive). Favoring a military-style hierarchy to a greater extent than its Western counterparts, the militia exemplified the Soviet tendency to turn the military into the template for an unofficial Table of Ranks: you get to be a general, and you get to be a general–everyone gets to be a general!

    In the (technical) absence of police, the USSR had hypertrophied police functions, shared not only by those very same military and militarized bodies (including, but not limited to, the KGB), but also Party structures, enterprises, and medical authorities.  The fight against crime (as we would understand the word) was never the cornerstone. If statistics have even minimal validity, crime was not a significant, widespread problem, or at least not framed as such. Instead, these institutions policed the borders of the behaviorally and ideologically permissible.  Crossing certain lines led to serious policing of the violators, but by bodies that were not, technically, police. It was not that all cops were bastards, but that all bastards were, in some way or another, cops.

    Some, but not all of this changes after 1991.  As crime becomes central to the news, it also colonizes popular entertainment: a perceived boom in robbers yields a similar growth in cops. The popularity of crime genres was already apparent in Soviet times, but kept under wraps by limited publication and scant imports of foreign crime film and fiction, and the ideological strictures that limited the ability to represent crime as a home-made phenomenon.  Actual cops (that is, militiamen) become heroes and anti-heroes, from the early days of the television series  Menty (Ulitsy razbitykh fonarei) (Cops/Broken Streetlights) (1998-2019) down to the more recent series  Mazhor (inexplicably plucked out of the Russian linguistic ghetto by Netflix and renamed Silver Spoon) (2014-).

    At the same time, the militia (now police) are more recognizable as a problem. It is the various divisions of the police and similar state organizations who are responsible for arresting and beating protesters, for example. The police are now more appropriate as a symbol of state repression, but they still do not have a monopoly on policing.  Those same repressive functions exercised by schools, enterprises, and medical establishments still have a policing role. In the case of the first two, it is they who are still responsible for mobilizing their constituencies to vote “correctly,” for example, while medical experts continue to be called upon to declare (or try to declare) inconvenient people “unfit.”  If this all sounds Foucauldian, I apologize, because I intend for it to be more along the lines of “Foucault-adjacent.” These institutions do not constitute power/knowledge, but rather enforce it. In other words, they police.

    As for the police/militia themselves, post-Soviet conditions require a level of visibility from them that was not as necessary under Late Socialism.  The police, and particularly OMON (the Russian equivalent of SWAT) are deployed not just operationally, but operatically, that is, performatively. With a dynamic weirdly inverted later by Pussy Riot, their masked anonymity and displays of overwhelming superior force help constitute the Putinist paradigm of strength and order. And technically, the Russian police, even when local, are the ground-level instantiation of a federal authority (serving within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)). In the state imaginary, federal authority replicates itself anywhere and everywhere, a structure that is as much fractal as it is hierarchical.

    The police function as both a symbol of state biopower and its most immediate physical manifestation.  Their bodies are sacred and untouchable in a way that those of ordinary citizens are not; think of the Bolotnaya Square Trial, where no officer got in trouble for beating protesters, but protesters were prosecuted for the equivalent of hurting the cops’ fists with their faces.[i] In such an unequal contest between differently valued and empowered bodies, what kind of resistance is available?

    To address this question, I want to end my talk by bringing in Actionism, and in particular, the collective known as Voina.[ii] The immediate audience for most of Voina’s actions in the Medvedev years (the feast in the subway car, the cats thrown at McDonald’s cashiers, and so on) are the by-standers: this is art that leverages physical presence and emphasizes the use of bodies in space (as they did during the Biological Museum orgy).[iii] The second, much larger audience, is on the Internet—most of what they did would have been local and ephemeral without video uploads.  But there is a third audience whose role is undeniable, even if that audience is not always physically present:  law enforcement.

    Law enforcement, or, put more simply, the police, are always a potential restraint on their activities. In fact, I would argue that the police play the same role of productive restriction as meter and rhyme do for traditional poetry: nearly all of Voina’s performances took place within short time frames limited by the inevitable arrival of the police.  Either the police’s arrival was part of the act, or a successful action relied on the complementary distribution of Actionist bodies and police bodies:  it all worked out as long as they weren’t in the same place at the same time.

    Voina’s last action, which now looks like a transitional, pupal stage between the larva of Voina and the butterfly of Pussy Riot, exposes the dangers in conflating the police as symbol and the police as body.  “Commemorating” the new law transforming the militia into the police, “Kiss the Pig,” consisted of female members of Voina (including Nadia Tolokonnikova and Katia Samutsevich, two future Pussy Riot trial defendants) surprising female cops and kissing them on the lips without permission.  Though Tolokonnikova says she wanted men involved, this was really the only arrangement unlikely to end in serious physical violence:  women kissing male cops could not be sure of getting away safely, men kissing female cops would be arrested for assault, and men kissing male cops would be lucky to escape with their lives. Faced with the obvious (and in my opinion, entirely valid) criticism that what she and her colleagues were doing was a kind of sexual assault, Tolokonnikova responded that when a person puts on a cop’s uniform, they stop being a person and become only a cop.

    In other words, she sees the symbolic cop as overriding the physical cop. Cops, like kings, have two bodies, but for the purposes of the action, only one of them really matters: the physical body is exploited as a weakness in the symbolic cop body.  In a way, this is a brilliant reductio ad absurdum of the symbolic prominence that the police have attained under High Putinism.  But it also means assenting to that very logic and deploying personal biological power in the cause of the negation of state biopower. This is a conundrum that cannot be solved, even by performance art.  It is a losing proposition, transforming the political protester into something akin to an actual criminal, thereby validating the state’s framework.

    When I was working on my book Pussy Riot: Speaking Punk to Power (2020), this was the only moment when I was truly disappointed in Tolokonnikova. For the most part, Actionists and the 2012 protesters had avoided the trap of binary, Manichaean thinking that caught so many Soviet-era dissidents (who, in their crusade for freedom, developed an ideologically rigid maximalism and became the mirror image of the regime they despised). The demonstrators and Actionists sidestepped this trap through absurdity, but also came close to the bodily self-sacrifice of the non-violence of Gandhi and King.

    The final irony is that the Actionist who seemed to literally embody this ethos was Pavel Pavlensky, notorious, for among other things, nailing his own scrotum to the cobblestones of Red Square. But now his former partner Oksana Shalygina has written a book detailing the sadistic abuse she suffered at his hands. Shalgyina ends her interview with Wonderzine with a statement that says it all:

    He was sincere in his struggle, but he was the same [repressive] authority as the one he fought against.

    Power, authority, the law –they are like quicksand: the more you fight, the more you are sucked in. Or, in the words of Sonny Curtis and the Crickets: I fought the law and the law won.

    Eliot Borenstein is Professor of Russian & Slavic Studies at New York University. His most recent books include Plots against Russia: Conspiracy and Fantasy after Socialism (winner of the 2020 Wayne S. Vucinich brook prize and the 2020 AATSEEL book prize), and Meanwhile, in Russia…: Russian Internet Memes and Viral Video  (2022).

    Works Cited

    Borenstein, Eliot. 2020. Pussy Riot: Speaking Punk to Power. London: Bloomsbury.

    Taratura, Iuliia. 2020 “’Eto byli ne bytovye izbieniia, a sadizm’: Oksana Shalygina o zhizni s Petrom Pavlenskim.” Wonderzine, November 2. https://www.wonderzine.com/wonderzine/life/life-interview/253377-intervyu-oksana

    References

    [i] The case refers to a protest that took place in Moscow on May 6, 2012. More than thirty protesters were charged with various offense, twelve of whom received prison sentences from two to four and a half years.

    [ii] Founded in 2007, Voina was a political performance art group with branches in both Moscow and St. Petersburg.

    [iii] On February 29, 2008, right before Dmitry Medvedev was elected president, 10 members of Voina protested by having sex in the Moscow Timiryazev Museum of Biology.